rnm 


REESE  LIBRARY 

OF  THK 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

C/tf.w  No. 


REESf 


ener al    Herman 


IN  JtTLY,   1001. 


_          O  O 

1= 


GENERAL   HERMAN    kjAUPT  f\T  84, 


REMINISCENCES 


OF 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT 


Director,  Chief  Engineer  and  General  Superintendent  of  the 

Pennsylvania  Railroad 

Contractor  and  Chief  Engineer  for  the  Hoosac  Tunnel 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  United  States  Military  Railroads  in  the 

Civil  War 

Chief  Engineer  of  the  Tidewater  Pipeline 
General  Manager  of  the  Richmond  &  Danville  and 

Northern  Pacific  Railroads 

President  American  Air  Power  Company 

Etc        Etc 

GIVING 

HITHERTO  UNPUBLISHED  OFFICIAL  ORDERS, 

PERSONAL  NARRATIVES  OF  IMPORTANT  MILITARY 
OPERATIONS, 

AND 

INTERVIEWS  WITH  PRESIDENT  LINCOLN,  SECRETARY  STANTON,  GENERAL- 
IN-CHIEF  HALLECK,  AND  WITH  GENERALS  MCDOWELL,  Mc- 
CLELLAN,  MEADE,  HANCOCK,  BURNSIDE,  AND  OTHERS 
IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMIES  IN  THE  FIELD, 
AND  His  IMPRESSIONS  OF  THESE  MEN 


[WRITTEN   BY  HIMSELF] 


WITH  NOTES  AND  A  PERSONAL  SKETCH  BY 
FRANK  ABIAL  FLOWER 


Illustrated  from  Photographs  of  Actual  Operations  in  the  Field 


1901 


LIMITED  AUTOGRAPH  EDITION. 
Sold  only  by  Private  Subscription. 

REESE 


WRIGHT  &  JOYS  CO., 

ENGRAVERS, 
PRINTERS, 

MILWAUKEE,  Wis. 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 


T^HEEE  is  too  much  truth  in  the  Irish  observation  that  "No  one 
*  thinks  of  strewing  flowers  on  a  friend's  grave  till  after  he  is 
dead." 

The  writer  entertained  a  decided  feeling  that  a  man  like  Gen 
eral  Haupt,  full  of  years,  of  goodness,  of  unselfish  patriotism,  and 
of  widely  fruitful  deeds,  certainly  should  have  his  "grave"  be 
strewn  with  the  very  choicest  flowers  while  yet  there  was  life  to 
enjoy  their  fragrance. 

This  feeling  led  to  the  publication  of  the  present  volume. 

The  main  portion  of  it,  which  is  General  Haupt's,  was  com 
mitted  to  writing  by  him  in  1889.  He  had  no  intention  of  pub 
lishing  the  collection — merely  desired  to  get  into  record  form,  for 
the  gratification  of  his  grandchildren  and  other  immediate  de 
scendants,  many  important  facts  concerning  our  civil  war  which 
had  entirely  escaped  the  attention  of  historians — especially  those 
in  which  he  was  either  the  foremost  or  a  conspicuous  actor.  They 
embrace  personal  interviews  with  the  President,  Secretary  of  War, 
General  Halleck,  and  the  Generals  in  command  of  the  armies  in 
the  field,  of  which  there  are  no  official  records. 

While  going  over  his  manuscript  in  search  of  material  to  ver 
ify  certain  portions  of  a  Life  of  Edwin  M.  Stanion,  the  writer 
•discovered  not  only  the  general  historical  value  of  the  matter,  but 
that  the  almost  abnormal  modesty  of  the  narrator  had  resulted  in 
so  much  self -submergence  as  to  entirely  deprive  him  of  many  im 
portant  honors  to  which  he  was  incontestably  entitled. 

General  Haupt  was,  therefore,  besought  to  consent  to  the  pub 
lication,  during  his  lifetime,  of  a  limited  edition  of  his  formal  mil- 


100128 


vi  PREFATORY  NOTE. 

itary  story,  prefixed  by  such  a  condensed  but  general  sketch  of  his 
life  as  would  afford  an  indication  of  at  least  the  mountain-peaks 
of  his  remarkably  ]ong  and  honorable  career. 

This  seemed  the  more  necessary  because  the  meagre  records  of 
the  Government  disclose  not  even  the  shadow  of  a  reason  for  his 
sudden  retirement  from  the  army  at  the  very  zenith  of  his  splendid 
achievements  as  Director  of  the  Military  Railroads  of  the  United 
States,  thus  leaving  the  impression,  perhaps,  that  there  had  been 
something  discreditable  in  his  conduct. 

He  yielded  to  this  importunity,  with  the  result  that  900 
numbered  autograph  copies  of  his  story  are  available  for  such 
personal  friends,  army  officers  and  libraries  as  care  to  subscribe 

for  them.  t-    A    IT 

r«  A«  r» 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 


PAGE 
GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT  (AT  84) Frontispiece 

HERMAN  HAUPT  (AT  34) xi 

1  POTOMAC  CREEK  BRIDGE,  BUILT  (AS  LINCOLN  SAID)  OF  CORNSTALKS 

AND  BEANPOLES 41 

2  BRIDGE  ACROSS  CHATTAHOOCHEE  RIVER,  GEORGIA,  780  FEET  LONG 

AND  90  FEET  HIGH  — BUILT  IN  4^  DAYS 51 

3  BRIDGE  TRUSSES  OF  BOARDS,  PREPARED  FOR  HOOKER'S  CAMPAIGN. 

SPAN  60  FEET 61 

4  BRIDGE  OF  BOARD  TRUSSES  BEING  TESTED  FOR  DEFLECTIONS 71 

5  TESTING  BOARD  TRUSSES  FOR  MILITARY  BRIDGE 81 

6  BRIDGE  OF  BOARD  TRUSSES  LOADED  UNTIL  IT  BROKE  AT  Two  TONS 

PER  FOOT 91 

7  HAUPT'S  TORPEDO  FOR  QUICKLY  WRECKING  WOODEN  BRIDGES 101 

8  STEEL  HOOKS,  AND  PIECE  OF  RAIL  TWISTED  BY  THEIR  USE Ill 

9  DESTROYING  TRACK,  BY  CORKSCREW  TWIST,  WITH  LEVERS  AND  STEEL 

HOOKS 121 

10  DESTROYING  TRACK,  BY  CORKSCREW  TWIST,  WITH  LEVERS  AND  STEEL 

HOOKS 131 

11  BENDING  RAILS  WITH  AID  OF  HORSE 141 

12  BREAKING  AND  BENDING  RAILS  AROUND  TREE 151 

13  CONFEDERATE  MODE  OF  DESTROYING  RAILROAD  TRACK 161 

14  STRAIGHTENING  SLIGHT  BENDS  IN  RAILS  BY  USE  OF  JACKSCREW 171 

15  STRAIGHTENING  BENDS  IN  RAILS  BY  LETTING  THEM  FALL  ACROSS  A 

TIE 181 

16  POCKET  AUGER  FOR  MAKING  MORTICES  AND  TENONS  FOR  BLANKET 

BOATS 191 

17  DRILL— CONSTRUCTING  BLANKET  BOATS 201 

vii 


viii  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

PAGB 

18  DRILL— BLANKET  BOATS  PARTLY  CONSTRUCTED 209 

19  BLANKET  BOAT  FINISHED  AND  BOAT  FRAME  READY  FOR  COVER 217 

20  GENERAL  HAUPT  ON  FLOAT  MADE  OF  Two  SMALL  RUBBER  CYLIN 

DERS—USED  FOR  SCOUTING  PURPOSES 225 

21  SMALL  RAFT  OF  BLANKET  BOATS  CROSSING  THE  POTOMAC  RIVER....  23& 

22  SMALL  RAFT  OF  BLANKET  BOATS 241 

23  RAFT  OF  BLANKET  BOATS  WITHOUT  LOAD 24-9 

24  LARGE  RAFT  OF  BLANKET  BOATS  FERRYING  INFANTRY  ACROSS  THE 

POTOMAC  RIVER 257 

25  RAFT  OF  BLANKET  BOATS  FERRYING  FIELD  ARTILLERY  AND  MEN 

OVER  POTOMAC  RIVER 26S 

26  ARKS  MADE  OF  FRAMES  COVERED  WITH  CANVAS  FOR  TANSFERRING 

MILITARY  STORES  AND  CARS  BY  WATER 27& 

27  PLATFORM  FOR  CONSTRUCTING  ARKS,  AND  ARK  READY  FOR  LAUNCHING.  281 

28  FLOAT  OF  Two  CANAL  BOATS  TRANSFERRING  EIGHT  LOADED  CARS 

FROM  ALEXANDRIA  TO  ACQUIA  CREEK 291 

29  GENERAL  HAUPT'S  STOCKADE  AT  ALEXANDRIA,  VA 299 

30  AFTER  THE  FIRST  CHARGE  AT  FREDERICK SBURG,  VA 307 

31  GENERAL  HAUPT  AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 315 


CONTENTS. 


PAGES 
GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT  (PERSONAL  SKETCH) xiii  to     xl 

CHAPTER  I. 
CALLED  BY  SECRETARY  STANTON 43  to    68 

CHAPTER  II. 
SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN 69  to    97 

CHAPTER  III. 
RESULTS  OF  McCLELLAN'S  CONDUCT 98  to  115 

CHAPTER  IV. 
TWO  PERILOUS  DAYS  AT  BULL  RUN 116  to  128 

CHAPTER  V. 
GENERAL  POPE  POUNDED  TO  PIECES 129  to  135 

CHAPTER  VI. 
AIDING  McCLELLAN'S  CAMPAIGN 136  to  157 

CHAPTER  VII. 
OPERATIONS  UNDER  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  E.  BURNSIDE 158  to  175 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 176  to  183 

CHAPTER  IX. 
OPENING  OPERATIONS  UNDER  GENERAL  HOOKER 184  to  187 

CHAPTER  X. 
IRREGULARITIES  IN  THE  WEST 188  to  196 

CHAPTER  XI. 
PORTABLE  TRACK-WRECKING  APPARATUS 197  to  203 

CHAPTER  XII. 
HOOKER  FLUNKS  AND  IS  RELIEVED 204  to  207 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG . .  . .  208  to  222 


x  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
MEADE  URGED  IN  VAIN  TO  FIGHT 223  to  231 

CHAPTER  XV. 
OFFICIAL  RECORDS  OF  GETTYSBURG 232  to  245 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
LEE'S  ESCAPE  UNINTERRUPTED 246  to  253 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

RESTORING  WRECKED  RAILROADS  EXPEDITIOUSLY 254  to  260 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

RUPTURE    OF    OFFICIAL    RELATIONS    CAUSED   BY   GOV 
ERNOR  ANDREW,  OF  MASSACHUSETTS 261  to  267 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
FINAL  REPORT 268  to  280 

CHAPTER  XX. 
DESCRIPTION  OF  PHOTOGRAPHIC  ILLUSTRATIONS 283  to  288 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

SUBSEQUENT  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  THE   MILITARY  RAIL 
ROAD  CORPS 289  to  296 

CHAPTER  XXII. 
MY  ASSOCIATES  AND  SUPERIORS 297  to  311 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 
PERSONNEL  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  MILITARY  RAILROADS..312  to  319 

APPENDIX 320  to  326 

INDEX..  ..327 


KjERMAN    M^UPT    AT    34. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT. 


ENERAL  HAUPT,  now  in  his  85th  year  and  the  active  head 
of  an  important  manufacturing  enterprise  in  the  United 
States,  is  one  of  the  most  interesting,  as  he  certainly  is  one  of  the 
most  remarkable,  figures  in  our  history. 

Few  men  have  participated  in  so  much  that  has  contributed 
to  the  growth  and  grandeur  of  our  country,  yet  how  little  the 
world  knows  of  his  career,  how  reluctant  the  trumpeters  have  been 
to  herald  his  achievements ! 

A  designer  and  builder  of  roads  and  bridges;  a  constructor 
of  railroads  and  tunnels;  a  professor  and  author;  an  inventor  and 
master  mechanic;  a  military  strategist  and  civil  counsellor;  a 
railway  manager  and  canal  engineer ;  a  manufacturer  and  organ 
izer  of  great  enterprises;  a  military  and  civil  engineer,  still  up- 
to-date  and  a  leader  of  progress,  he  links  the  old  with  the  new,  the 
slow  and  sleepy  past  with  the  swift  and  dashing  present  in  a  way 
that  is  entirely  exceptional. 

He  was  born  in  Philadelphia  on  March  26,  IS  17.  His  father, 
Jacob  Haupt,  died  in  1828,  leaving  a  widow  and  six  children. 

WEST   POINT   COMMISSION  DATED  AHEAD. 

In  1830,  through  the  help  of  John  13.  Steriger,  Member  of 
Congress  from  Pennsylvania,  he  received  an  appointment  to  West 
Point  from  President  Andrew  Jackson;  but  as  he  was  only  13,  the 
commission  was  dated  a  year  ahead.  He  entered  in  June,  1831, 
at  the  age  of  14,  and  graduated  in  1835,  at  the  age  of  18,  in  a 
class  with  General  George  G.  Meade  and  others  who  became  dis 
tinguished  in  the  civil  war. 

Of  that  early  class  of  fifty-six  members,  there  are  no  sur 
vivors  except  General  Haupt,  and  in  the  entire  list  of  graduates 
of  the  United  States  Military  Academy  the  only  senior  is  General 
Thomas  A.  Morris  (1834)  of  Indianapolis,  Ind. 

In  the  fall  of  1835  he  resigned  his  commission  in  the  army  to 


XIV 


A   PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 


become  assistant  engineer,  under  H.  R.  Campbell,  in  surveying  a 
railroad  from  Nbrristown  to  Allentown,  in  Pennsylvania,  and 
subsequently  in  locating  the  Norristown  &  Valley  Railroad. 

For  many  years  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  built,  owned  and 
managed  railways  and  canals,  and  in  1836,  although  only  19, 
Haupt  was  appointed  principal  assistant  in  the  service  of  the  State, 
and,  as  such,  located  a  railroad  from  Gettysburg  across  South 
Mountain  to  the  Potomac — now  a  part  of  the  Western  Maryland 
system. 

In  1838,  on  becoming  21,  he  was  married  to  Miss  Ann  Ce 
cilia,  daughter  of  his  pastor,  Rev.  Benjamin  Keller,  of  Gettysburg. 
A  lively,  cheerful  and  accomplished  woman,  she  shared  his  for 
tunes  for  fifty-three  years  and  became  the  mother  of  eleven  chil 
dren,  of  whom  Professor  Lewis  M.  Haupt,  formerly  of  the  Univer 
sity  of  Pennsylvania,  and  now  a  member  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission,  is  the  third  son. 

A  DECISIVE  EVENT. 

In  184:0  he  was  engaged  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  York 
&  Wrightsville  Railroad — an  event  which  ultimately  was  the  means 
of  developing  the  magnificent  possibilities  of  railway  and  bridge 
construction  which  have  since  astonished  the  world. 

On  this  road  were  a  number  of  lattice  bridges  for  which  the 
plans  had  been  prepared  previously,  and  the  timbers  already  or 
dered. 

Young  Haupt  deemed  them  too  weak  for  the  duty  they  were 
designed  to  perform  and  at  once  sought  advice  from  all  the  promi 
nent  engineers  of  the  country  as  to  the  proper  mode  of  calculating 
the  strength  of  a  trussed  bridge. 

He  was  astonished  to  find  that,  with  one  exception,*  not  an 
engineer  in  the  United  States,  or  in  the  world,  so  far  as  he  could 
discover,  ever  attempted  to  calculate  the  strength  of  a  truss — except 
in  a  triangular  system.  The  members  were  generally  all  of  the 
same  dimensions;  the  counter-brace  was  either  unknown  or  its 


*  NOTE. — Benj.  II.  Latrobe,  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  appeared  to 
calculate  the  strains  upon  his  bridges,  but  his  structures  were  simple  triangular 
systems  in  which  pressure  at  the  apex  was  transmitted  in  the  direction  of  the  two 
sides  to  the  base — the  abutments  or  other  points  of  resistance,  as  in  the  Fink  and 
Bollman  trusses — in  which  the  problem  was  solved  by  the  parallelogram  of  forces. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT. 


xv 


office  not  understood,  and  the  fact  that  there  were  vastly  different 
strains  at  different  points  of  the  same  system  was  generally  unrec 
ognized. 

STUDYING  BRIDGE  CONSTRUCTION. 

Unwilling  to  admit  that  the  problem  could  not  be  solved,  he 
continued  to  search  for  the  laws  governing  the  transmission  of 
strains  and  to  attempt  to  originate  formula  by  which  strain  sheets 
could  be  calculated  and  the  strength  of  any  truss,  however  com 
plicated,  might  be  accurately  determined. 

Being  in  a  country  town,  without  books  of  reference  or  access 
to  scientific  apparatus,  he  was  compelled  to  evolve  his  own  formu- 
Ise  and  invent  his  own  modes  of  experimentation. 

Commencing  with  experiments  on  the  resistance  of  timbers, 
he  discovered  that  the  strains  could  be  represented  by  the  ordinates 
of  conic  sections,  which  led  to  a  new  but  simple  mode  of  obtaining 
formulae  and  determining  strains  on  beams  in  all  possible  posi 
tions.  He  then  experimented  with  models  of  his  own  design  and 
construction,  and  took  observations  on  bridges  during  the  passage 
of  trains  until  certain  conclusions  which  he  had  reached  were  so 
well  established  that  he  published,  anonymously,  in  1841,  a 
pamphlet  entitled,  "Hints  on  Bridge  Construction,"  which  at 
tracted  much  attention  and  led  to  some  controversy. 

On  completing  the  York  &  Wrightsville  Koad,  General 
Haupt  was  appointed  Professor  of  Mathematics  and  Engineering 
in  Pennsylvania  College  at  Gettysburg.  In  1844  he  began  the 
preparation  of  a  general  text-book  on  civil  engineering,  but,  on 
reaching  the  subject  of  bridges,  abandoned  everything  for  the  pur 
pose  of  renewing  his  previous  attempt  to  solve  the  very  important 
problem  of  calculating  the  strains  in  this  class  of  structures. 

SOLVES  THE  GREAT  PROBLEM. 

Having  acquired  a  greater  profundity  in  general  mathematics, 
and  being  strengthened  by  added  years  and  experience,  he  was  able 
to  solve  riddles  which  before  had  baffled  him.  In  due  time  he  had 
ready  the  manuscript  of  the  noted  work  which  finally  reached  all 
civilized  countries  —  "General  Theory  of  Bridge  Construction." 

For  five  years,  however,  he  was  unable  to  get  his  book  before 
the  public,  because  he  could  find  no  engineer  capable  of  reviewing 


xvi  A   PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

it  and  no  publisher  who  dared  to  put  it  forth — the  manuscript  be 
ing  generally  returned  without  any  comment  for  or  against  it.  In 
1851  D.  Appleton  &  Co.  undertook  its  publication,  and  were  re 
warded  with  its  prompt  success.  The  volume  met  a  very  general 
want,  and  its  sales  were  large. 

This  pioneer  work  became  a  text-book  in  schools  and  colleges, 
and  Professor  Gillespie,  of  Union  College,  wrote  to  Haupt  from 
London  reporting  the  strong  terms  of  commendation  with  which  it 
was  received  by  Robert  Stephenson  and  his  associates. 

From  that  time  engineers  began  to  calculate  strain  sheets  and 
distribute  material  properly  to  meet  the  varying  requirements  of 
self-supporting  pendant  structures,  without  which  the  marvelous 
achievements  of  engineering  science,  as  exemplified  throughout  the 
world  to-day,  would  have  been  impossible. 

As,  beyond  question,  transportation  is  the  chief  of  the  basic 
elements  of  civilization,  Mr.  Haupt  belongs  in  the  front  rank  of 
the  most  distinguished  benefactors  of  mankind. 

CONSTRUCTING   THE    PENNSYLVANIA   RAILROAD. 

In  1846  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  was  chartered.  Haupt 
applied  to  President  Samuel  V.  Merrick  for  a  position  with  the 
company,  but  was  told  that  engineers  were  as  plentiful  as  black 
berries  and  that  there  were  scores  of  applicants  for  every  open 
position,  so  he  returned  to  Gettysburg. 

John  Edgar  Thomson  had  been  appointed  Chief  Engineer, 
with  Edward  Miller  associate  on  the  Western,  and  William  B. 
Foster  on  the  Eastern  Division.  Foster  had  been  a  canal  en 
gineer,  and  filled  his  division  with  his  old  assistants,  who  knew 
little  or  nothing  about  railroads.  The  consequence  was  that  after 
the  location  of  sixty  miles  of  the  Juniata  Division,  the  chief  en 
gineer  walked  over  the  line  and  decided  that  an  entire  revision 
must  be  made  before  construction  could  begin,  although  the  con 
tractors  had  built  shanties  and  were  ready  to  commence  wor£. 

In  this  dilemma  he  sent  for  Mr.  Haupt,  who  accepted  the  posi 
tion  offered,  and  not  only  relocated  the  entire  division  without  de 
laying  the  work,  but  effected  great  improvement  in  the  line  and  a 
large  reduction  in  cost. 

His  leisure  hours  were  still  devoted  to  the  study  of  bridge 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xvii 

problems.  One  day  he  was  surprised  by  a  visit  from  Chief  En 
gineer  Thomson.  It  was  the  first  appearance  of  that  officer,  and 
on  a  very  cold  day  in  the  winter  of  1848.  After  he  had  become 
sufficiently  thawed  out  to  turn  his  head,  he  discovered  the  model  of 
a  bridge  truss  resting  on  two  chairs  and  loaded  with  weights. 

With  a  smile  he  remarked:  "Some  fellow  has  been  trying 
to  make  a  bridge  and  don't  know  anything  about  it.  He  has  got 
his  braces  in  the  wrong  way." 

Ilaupt  replied:  "Excuse  me,  Mr.  Thomson,  if  I  presume  to 
differ  from  you.  I  think  they  have  been  put  in  the  right  way. 
They  are  not  braces,  but  counter-braces.  It  is  a  model  of  a  coun 
ter-braced  arch." 

Proceeding  to  explain  the  model  and  the  results  of  his  in 
vestigations,  for  about  an  hour  he  gave,  in  fact,  a  lecture  on  bridge 
construction,  during  which  Mr.  Thomson  was  a  very  attentive 
listener,  occasionally  nodding,  or  giving  an  expression  of  acquies 
cence  as  some  new  point  was  made  which  met  his  approval. 

After  the  bridge  explanation  was  finished  the  railroad  maps 
were  examined  and  much  gratification  expressed  over  the  improve 
ments  made,  and  Ilaupt  was  immediately  promoted  to  principal 
assistant. 

On  Mr.  Thomson's  return  to  Harrisburg  he  sent  to  Ilaupt  a 
large  roll  of  the  bridge  plans  that  had  been  prepared  for  the  road, 
with  a  line  in  pencil :  "I  would  like  to  have  your  opinion  about 
these." 

The  opinions  were  given,  merits  and  defects  being  pointed  out 
in  writing,  and  the  roll  returned.  As  a  result  another  assistant 
was  sent  at  once  to  relieve  Ilaupt,  who  was  ordered  to  report  at 
Harrisburg  to  assume  the  important  duties  of  examining  and  criti 
cising  the  plans  of  location  and  construction  from  all  parts  of  the 
line  and  suggesting  necessary  changes. 

ORGANIZES  AND  OPERATES   THE  PENNSYLVANIA  RAILROAD. 

When  the  first  division  approached  completion,  Haupt  was 
selected  as  General  Superintendent  and  directed  to  visit  the  princi 
pal  roads  of  'New  England  for  the  purpose  of  examining  their  sys 
tems  of  accounts,  plans  of  organization,  snowplows,  machinery, 
and  everything  connected  with  the  operation  of  a  road. 


xviii  A   PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

On  his  return  he  submitted  a  plan  of  organization  and  man 
agement,  with  forms  and  blanks  for  every  branch  of  the  business, 
which  was  adopted  without  change,  and  which,  modified  to  meet 
subsequent  new  conditions  and  features  in  transportation,  is  in  use 
to  this  day  on  what  is  generally  regarded  as  the  best-managed  rail 
way  property  in  the  world. 

Haupt  at  once  urged  upon  the  Board  of  Directors  the  policy 
of  developing  the  local  business  of  the  line,  especially  in  coal, 
lumber,  iron  and  agricultural  products,  by  reduced  rates  during 
the  season  when,  from  the  close  of  navigation  on  the  Ohio,  the 
equipment  was  not  fully  employed. 

Up  to  this  time  the  impression  prevailed  that  nothing  could 
be  carried  on  a  railroad  without  loss  that  did  not  pay  over  2  cents 
per  ton  per  mile. 

To  settle  this  question  Haupt  made  a  careful  analysis  of  the 
business  of  the  preceding  year,  classifying  the  fixed  and  variable 
items  and  the  extent  to  which  cost  would  be  affected  by  volume  of 
transportation.  He  demonstrated  that,  if  the  volume  were  in 
creased  to  a  million  tons  per  year,  as  it  could  be  by  proper  encour 
agement  of  local  traffic,  the  cost  per  ton-mile  would  be  reduced  to 
six  mills  from  points  east  and  seven  mills  from  points  west  of  the 
Alleghanies.* 

This  was  the  first  careful  and  scientific  analysis  published, 
or  perhaps  made,  of  the  cost  of  railway  transportation,  which  was 
subsequently  elaborated  by  Albert  Fink,  A.  M.  Wellington  and 
others. 

It  caused  much  astonishment  and  the  declaration  that  by 
proper  encouragement  the  freight  business  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad  could  be  increased  to  a  million  tons  was  regarded  as  the 
utterance  of  a  visionary  enthusiast. 

Ultimately,  however,  Haupt  saw  his  plan  of  encouraging 
local  industries  fully  adopted  and  never  abandoned,  and  the  extra 
million  tons  of  freight  which  he  advocated  as  a  certainty  in  the 
near  future  was  very  soon  added,  and  then  multiplied  over  and 
over  again  more  than  fifty  times. 


*  NOTE. — See  4th  and  5th  Annual  Reports  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad, 
1851-1852 ;  also  his  final  report  on  retiring  from  the  office  of  General  Superintendent, 
pages  81-85. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xix 

On  January  15,  1852,  he  submitted  a  series  of  papers  oppos 
ing  the  policy  of  a  State  tax  on  railroad  traffic  to  sustain  the  public 
canals,  and  also  an  analysis  of  the  increased  cost  of  conducting 
transportation  due  to  enforced  connections  with  State  improve 
ments  (canals  and  railways)  and  the  conflicting  schedules  of  the 
two  interests. 

In  the  Sixth  Annual  Report,  H.  J.  Lombaert,  his  successor, 
said:  "During  the  greater  portion  of  the  year  (1852)  the  opera 
tions  of  the  road  were  conducted  under  the  direction  of  H.  Haupt, 
late  General  Superintendent,  to  whose  ability  and  success  the  re 
sults  of  the  present  and  preceding  years7  operations  abundantly 
testify,  and  to  whom  no  one  will  more  readily,  than  your  present 
Superintendent,  award  all  the  credit." 

On  page  32,  ei  seq.,  of  the  Seventh  Annual  Report  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad.  Mr.  Haupt  says:  "To  secure  a  traffic  of 
1,000,000  tons  and  make  the  road  an  instrument  of  incalculable 
good  to  the  citizens  of  the  State,  low  rates,  with  moderate  divi 
dends,,  must  indicate  the  settled  policy  upon  which  the  operations 
are  to  be  conducted." 

The  entire  report  is  to-day  as  remarkable  for  wisdom  and 
foresight  as  it  was  when  made,  almost  a  half-century  ago,  when 
railway  management  was  crude,  unscientific  and  haphazard.  In 
fact,  if  the  policy  advocated  by  Haupt  had  been  adopted  and  ad 
hered  to,  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  would  have  been  out  of  debt 
years  ago  and  kept  out,  and  would  be  now  altogether  the  most  eco 
nomical  artificial  freight-carrier  of  great  proportions  in  the  world. 

Soon  after  he  became  General  Superintendent  his  efforts  to 
unify  and  classify  rates  resulted  in  a  meeting  of  trunk-line  presi 
dents  and  other  officials  at  the  St.  Nicholas  Hotel,  in  New  York. 
In  this,  the  first  meeting  of  the  kind  ever  held  in  America,  Mr. 
Haupt  took  the  initiative  in  effecting  an  organization,  bringing  on 
discussion  and  coming  to  conclusions.  Similar  meetings  were  held 
afterwards  and  resulted  in  mutually  valuable  understandings. 

In  1853  he  notified  the  Board  of  Directors,  who  had  twice 
declined  to  receive  his  resignation,  that  he  had  accepted  the  position 
of  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Southern  Railroad  of  Mississippi,  and  v 
that  his  connection  with  the  company  would  terminate  at  a  given 
date.     He  recommended  that  Herman  J.  Lombaert,  his  assistant, 


xx  A  PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

be  made  his  successor,  and  Thomas  A.  Scott,  then  agent  at  Holli- 
daysburg,  be  appointed  Assistant  Superintendent,  which  selections 
were  ratified. 

This  promotion  enabled  Colonel  Scott,  some  years  after,  to 
succeed  to  the  presidency  of  the  Kailroad  Company,  and  to  live  in 
history  as  one  of  the  great  railway  managers  of  the  country. 

The  location  of  the  Southern  Railroad  occupied  about  six 
months,  when  Mr.  Haupt  was  recalled  to  take  the  position  of  Chief 
Engineer  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  which  he  retained  until 
the  completion  and  opening  of  the  whole  line  to  Pittsburg,  includ 
ing  the  Allegheny  Mountain  tunnel. 

He  was  also  elected  by  the  councils  of  Philadelphia  as  a  di« 
rector  of  the  company  to  represent  the  stock  held  by  the  city — a 
very  distinguished  mark  of  confidence  and  respect. 

THE  FAMOUS  HOOSAC  TUNNEL  CONTEST. 

We  now  come  to  a  very  important  and  interesting  portion  of 
Mr.  Haupt's  career,  which  involves  his  fortune  and  reputation,  the 
honor  and  integrity  of  the  State  of  Massachusetts,  and  an  account 
of  the  vicissitudes  of  constructing  the  great  railway  tunnel  through 
the  Hoosac  Mountain. 

In  1855,  while  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad 
and  director  of  that  company  for  the  City  of  Philadelphia,  he  was 
requested  to  make  an  examination  of  the  proposed  Hoosac  tunnel, 
on  the  line  of  the  Troy  &  Greenfield  Railroad,  in  Massachusetts, 
and  give  his  opinion  as  to  its  practicability.  He  reported  favor 
ably  and,  after  much  solicitation,  was  prevailed  upon  to  take  an 
interest  in  the  contract  for  its  construction  and  assist  in  raising 
$100,000  as  additional  capital — a  portion  of  which  came  from  his 
associates  in  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad. 

The  contract  was  for  $4,000,000.  The  State  of  Massachu 
setts  had  agreed  to  loan  its  credit  to  the  extent  of  $2,000,000 ;  the 
company  had  made  an  issue  of  $900,000  in  bonds  and  was  to  pro 
vide,  from  town  and  individual  subscriptions,  a  liberal  amount  of 
additional  cash. 

The  contract  was  signed  in  1856,  when  he  resigned  from  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad  and  began  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
work.  As  soon  as  it  became  apparent  that  the  tunnel  was  in  good 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT. 


xxi 


hands  and  would  probably  be  carried  to  completion  at  an  early 
date,  thus  opening  a  parallel  and  rival  line  to  the  Boston  &  Albany 
Railroad,  a  persistent  series  of  violent  attacks  was  made  upon  the 
company  and  its  contractors — and  especially  upon  Mr.  Haupt. 

Articles  were  published  in  most  of  the  leading  papers  to  create 
an  adverse  public  sentiment.  In  them  the  tunnel  was  described  as 
a  visionary  and  impracticable  scheme,  the  contractors  were  de 
nounced  as  swindlers,  the  subscribers  to  the  stock  were  warned 
against  liquidating  their  subscriptions  and  assured  that  the  com 
pany  had  no  power  to  enforce  payment. 

When  the  editors  of  papers  which  had  made  these  attacks  were 
summoned  before  investigating  committees,  the  articles  were  al 
most  invariably  traced  to  Springfield,  and  to  parties  in  the  employ 
or  under  the  influence  of  Chester  W.  Chapin,  president  of  the  Bos 
ton  &  Albany,  then  known  as  the  Western  Railroad  Company. 
The  articles  had  the  effect,  notwithstanding  this  exposure  of  their 
origin,  of  exciting  hostile  legislation,  of  embarrassing  the  tunnel 
company,  of  stopping  the  collection  of  subscriptions  and  of  pre 
venting  the  contractors  from  securing  regularly  the  State  payments 
for  work  upon  which  they  had  relied.  The  object  of  these  move 
ments  was  transparent;  it  was  to  kill  the  tunnel  project  by  ruining 
the  contractors. 

But  these  unjust  and  wicked  attacks  only  served  to  stimulate 
Mr.  Haupt  to  increased  exertions.  Unable  to  secure  any  aid  what 
ever  from  the  railroad  company  of  which  the  tunnel  formed  a  part, 
he  mortgaged  his  own  large  property  in  the  State  of  Pennsylvania, 
sold  stocks  and  borrowed  money  from  personal  friends  and  kept 
the  work  going  until  the  financial  crash  occurred  in  1857. 

At  this  time  he  himself  was  carrying  a  floating  debt  of  about 
$200,000.  With  the  exception  of  $67,000,  he  had  provided  all  the 
capital  required  to  carry  on  the  work.  Not  a  dollar  had  been  paid 
by  the  company,  or  any  other  party  in  Massachusetts ;  three  of  his 
partners  had  failed,  and  the  remaining  one  could  render  no  assist 
ance. 

Their  failure  impaired  his  hitherto  gilt-edge  credit.  Dis 
counts  were  refused,  and  he  was  forced  to  take  up  more  than 
$20,000  of  the  paper  of  the  discredited  parties  that  already  had 
been  discounted. 

2 


xxii  A  PERSONAL  SKETCH  OF 

In  this  emergency  a  friend  in  Philadelphia  (Alexander  J. 
Derbyshire)  a  director  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  unsolicited 
and  without  security,  providentially  placed  $30,000  to  Mr.  Haupt's 
credit,  refusing  to  accept  more  than  6  per  cent,  interest,  although 
money  was  worth  1J  to  2  per  cent,  and  even  more  per  month. 

This  timely  loan  enabled  him  to  so  far  complete  the  work  re 
quired  by  the  onerous  conditions  of  the  Massachusetts  statute  as  to 
entitle  him  to  the  first  payment  of  $100,000  from  the  State;  and, 
after  a  severe  contest,  in  which  every  obstacle,  legal  and  otherwise, 
was  interposed  to  prevent  it,  the  Executive  Council  decided  that 
the  money  had  been  fairly  earned  and  ordered  the  payment  to  be 
made. 

After  this,  the  work  progressed  without  embarrassment  until 
I860.  The  payments  by  the  State  had  strengthened  Mr.  Haupt's 
credit,  and  he  was  again  able  to  procure  the  necessary  bank  accom 
modations.  When  the  Legislature  met,  an  investigation  was  or 
dered  at  the  suggestion  of  hostile  parties,  and  a  committee  appoint 
ed,  supposed  to  be  unfriendly,  with  power  to  send  for  persons  and 
papers. 

After  a  protracted  investigation  the  committee  turned  com 
pletely  in  his  favor,  and  reported  a  bill,  in  the  preparation  of  which 
he  had  largely  assisted,*  which  placed  the  work  on  a  sure  basis, 
expunged  the  onerous  and  unnecessary  features  of  the  original  loan 
act  and,  had  it  not  been  repealed  subsequently,  would  have  carried 
the  tunnel  to  completion  in  about  six  years  without  costing  the 
commonwealth  one  cent,  either  for  principal  or  interest.  The 
principal  had  been  provided  for  by  annual  accretions  to  a  sinking 
fund,  and  the  interest  was  payable  by  the  tunnel  company. 

The  committee,  after  a  thorough  examination  of  the  con 
tractors  and  of  their  books,  papers  and  superintendents,  became 
convinced  that  the  tunnel  was  actually  costing  only  about  $40  per 
running  foot,  and  that  an  allowance  of  $50  per  foot,  or  $1,250,000 
for  the  whole  tunnel,  was  sufficient  to  insure  its  completion  with 

*  NOTE. — Amos  B.  Merrill,  a  lawyer  of  ability  and  a  member  of  the  com 
mittee,  intimated  to  a  mutual  friend  that  he  really  wanted  to  know  the  exact  truth 
in  regard  to  the  ceaseless  charges  that  Haupt  was  a  scoundrel  and  swindling  the 
commonwealth.  Haupt  sent  word  to  him  that  if  he  would  come  to  his  hotel  he 
might  see  the  record  of  every  transaction  pertaining  to  the  contract.  He  went, 
with  the  result  that  he  promptly  changed  front  and,  assisted  by  Haupt,  drafted  the 
bill  above  mentioned,  which  set  the  wheels  of  the  great  work  to  turning  again. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xxiii 

the  dimensions  prescribed  by  statute,  and  they  divided  the  loan 
(of  $2,000,000)  so  as  to  apportion  $750,000  to  aid  in  the  construc 
tion  of  the  thirty  miles  of  road  between  the  tunnel  and  Greenfield. 

These  statements  may  seem  very  extraordinary  in  the  face  of 
the  fact  that,  when  the  State  of  Massachusetts,  in  1862,  took  pos 
session  of  the  work  and  undertook  to  finish  it  under  direction  of  her 
commissioners,  fourteen  years  of  time  and  an  expenditure  of  more 
than  twenty  millions  in  money  were  required  for  its  completion, 
but  they  are  literally  true. 

The  bill  of  1860  became  a  law  with  the  approval  of  Governor 
1ST.  P.  Banks,  and,  had  he  remained  in  office  one  year  more,  the 
work  would  have  been  so  far  advanced  that  further  efforts  to  ham 
per  or  destroy  it  would  have  had  no  prospect  of  success. 

But,  unfortunately  for  all,  and  especially  for  the  common 
wealth,  Governor  Banks  declined  a  renomination  and,  upon  leaving 
office  in  1861,  omitted  by  sheer  accident  to  sign  the  order  for  the 
payment  of  the  tunnel  estimate.  His  successor,  John  A.  Andrew, 
refused  to  sign  the  order,  and  expressed  want  of  confidence  in  the 
State  Engineer  and  dissatisfaction  with  the  contractors. 

As  Mr.  Haupt  enjoyed  the  entire  confidence  of  the  Executive 
Council,  the  position  of  the  Governor  gave  its  members  much  em 
barrassment,  but  they  passed  the  order  for  the  payment  of  the  esti 
mate  notwithstanding  his  objections.  The  Governor  then  asked 
the  State  Engineer  to  resign.  He  declined  to  do  so,  and  was  re 
moved  and  a  new  engineer  nominated  to  succeed  him. 

Mr.  Haupt,  being  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Visitors,  was  at 
West  Point  at  the  time,  where  he  received  a  telegram  from  a  mem 
ber  of  the  Council  informing  him  of  the  nomination  and  stating 
that,  if  unsatisfactory,  the  Council  would  refuse  to  confirm.  He 
replied:  "Make  no  opposition.  I  can  get  along  with  any  en 
gineer  who  is  competent  and  honest." 

The  nomination  of  Engineer  Whitwell  was  confirmed,  but  be 
fore  proceeding  to  an  examination  of  the  work,  he  visited  Spring 
field,  where,  as  testimony  subsequently  proved,  he  remained  for  a 
day  or  two  in  conference  with  officers  of  the  Boston  &  Albany 
Road,  at  whose  suggestion,  as  was  afterwards  understood,  he  had 
been  appointed. 

Members  of  the  Council  had  urgently  requested  the  Governor, 


xxiv  A  PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

before  assuming  a  hostile  attitude,  to  send  for  Mr.  Haupt  and 
ascertain  the  actual  condition  of  affairs.  This  he  refused  to  do. 
He  desired  no  personal  interview,  wanted  no  new  facts,  and  per 
sistently  adhered  to  what  was  really  a  position  of  unrelieved  dis 
credit. 

Upon  examining  the  estimates  the  new  engineer  could  find 
no  errors  in  the  calculations.  He  then  said  that  the  questions  at 
issue  could  not  be  decided  by  mere  figures.  He  must  "exercise 
judgment !"  He  must  protect  the  State,  he  said,  and  arbitrarily 
deducted  nearly  $100,000  from  the  amount  due  for  work  done  and 
materials  delivered  under  his  predecessor. 

Mr.  Haupt  was  then  rapidly  delivering  rails  under  contract* 
with  the  Rensselaer  Iron  Works,  and  deprivation  of  earned  pay 
ments  meant  ruin.  He  therefore  suspended  work  and  appealed  to 
the  Governor  and  Council.  A  committee  of  three  was  appointed, 
who,  after  three  weeks  of  thorough  investigation,  reported  that  the 
State  Engineer  had  transcended  his  authority;  that  his  acts  had 
been  in  violation  of  the  good  faith  of  the  State  that  had  been 
pledged  to  the  enterprise,  and  reported  an  order  to  require  him  to 
revise  his  estimates. 

Governor  Andrew  refused  to  put  the  question  on  this  order  to- 
vote.  The  Council  then  prepared  a  written  protest  against  the 
arbitrary  and  absolutely  unfair  action  of  the  Governor,  signed  by 
all  of  the  members  except  one,  and  asked  to  have  it  inserted  in  the 
official  minutes.  The  Governor  refused  to  permit  the  protest  to  go- 
into  the  minutes,  and  it  reached  the  people  as  a  part  of  a  smudgy 
chapter  in  Massachusetts  history  by  publication  in  The  Boston 
Post. 

Nothing  more  could  be  done  until  the  meeting  of  the  Legisla 
ture,  when  a  joint  special  committee  of  investigation  was  appointed, 
consisting  of  seven  members  from  the  House  and  three  from  the 
Senate.  The  opponents  of  the  tunnel  made  great  efforts  to  secure 
an  adverse  report  from  the  committee,  employing  ex-Governor  Geo. 
S.  Boutwell  as  counsel,  but  the  report,  after  several  months  of  pro 
tracted  investigation,  was  unanimously  in  Haupt 's  favor. 

It  not  only  reaffirmed  the  decisions  of  the  committee  of  the 
Executive  Council  and  censured  the  State  Engineer,  but  reported  a 
bill  which  reinstated  the  contractors  in  possession  of  the  work  and 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xxv 

appropriated  $150,000  to  compensate  them  for  damages  caused  by 
tlie  entirely  wrongful  suspension. 

Governor  Andrew  was  more  than  ever  incensed  at  this  sweep 
ing  report,  and  announced  a  determination  to  veto  the  bill  if  it 
passed,  as  well  as  any  other  tunnel  bill,  unless  it  should  be  one  that 
would  take  the  work  out  of  Haupt's  hands;  but  he  signified  a 
willingness  to  approve  an  act  to  put  the  work  under  charge  of  State 
commissioners. 

This  suggestion  pleased  those  who  wanted  the  tunnel.  They 
begged  llaupt  to  make  no  resistance  to  the  wishes  of  the  Governor ; 
that  justice  would  be  done  to  him  at  some  time,  though  not  then. 
"Let  the  State  get  her  foot  into  it,"  they  said,  "so  that  she  cannot 
back  out,  and  then  we  will  see  that  your  interests  are  protected." 

He  asked  if  the  State  could  not  then  reimburse  his  personal 
expenditures  with  simple  interest.  The  answer  was :  "No !  If 
a  single  dollar  is  put  into  the  bill  for  your  relief,  the  Governor  will 
veto  it.  We  will  put  in  a  sum  to  pay  the  sub-contractors  and  land 
owners,  and  we  will  extend  the  right  of  redemption  to  ten  years, 
but  that  is  all." 

He  replied  that  such  extension  would  be  valueless ;  that  while 
he  could  finish  the  tunnel  in  six  years,  the  State  would  not  do  it  in 
ten,  and  the  right  would  expire  unused.  Jonathan  E.  Field 
(brother  to  Cyrus  W.  Field  and  to  Justice  Stephen  J.  Field,  of  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court),  chairman  of  the  Railroad  Com 
mittee,  said :  "We  will  make  the  time  sufficient.  I  will  make  it 
ten  years  from  the  completion  of  the  tunnel,"  to  which  Haupt  add 
ed,  "and  the  opening  of  the  same  for  use,"  which  was  accepted. 

Haupt  then  stated  that  there  was  another  condition  of  far 
greater  importance,  without  which  he  could  not  accept  the  act.  It 
had  been  proved  that,  in  his  hands,  the  two-million  loan  would  be 
sufficient  to  complete  the  tunnel,  but  Haupt's  experience  with  State 
work  in  Pennsylvania  led  him  to  apprehend  that  the  cost  under 
public  management  would  be  greatly  increased,  and  might  be  ex 
tended  to  four  or  five  millions,  in  which  case  he  would  be  unable 
to  redeem.  A  provision  was  therefore  inserted  that  all  expendi 
tures  made  and  to  be  made  for  which  the  company  should  be  held 
responsible  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  redemption,  should  not 
exceed  $2,000,000. 


xxvi  A  PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

The  bill  passed  and  was  accepted  by  the  stockholders.  Com 
missioners  were  appointed,  and,  after  fourteen  years  of  time  and 
the  expenditure  of  over  $20,000,000  in  cash,  as  already  stated,  the 
tunnel  was  completed  and  opened  for  use. 

During  this  time  Haupt  made  repeated  efforts  to  secure  the 
repayment  of  his  advances,  but  the  tunnel  commissioners  opposed 
any  legislation  to  this  end.  All  attempts  were  unavailing.  The 
commissioners  condemned  the  work  generally,  altered  the  plans, 
and  missed  no  opportunity  to  inflict  damage  upon  him,  personally 
and  professionally,  apparently  with  a  view  to  defend  and  justify 
the  hostile  action  of  Governor  Andrew,  although,  at  the  same  time, 
they  were  inflicting  millions  of  losses  upon  the  State. 

At  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1862  no  one  ques 
tioned  the  existence  of  the  Hoosac  Tunnel  Company's  right  of 
redemption  under  the  general  statute.  No  movement  could  be 
made,  however,  looking  to  redemption  until  the  tunnel  was  com 
plete.  An  application  was  made  to  the  Legislature,  after  that 
event,  for  the  appointment  of  a  commission  to  determine  the 
amount  to  be  paid.  The  Attorney-General  appeared  in  opposition 
and  argued  that  no  legislation  was  required,  as  "a  perfect  remedy 
existed  in  the  courts." 

The  rejection  of  this  petition  forced  Haupt  to  employ  counsel 
and  bring  suit  in  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court.  He  had  the  best 
lawyers  in  Pennsylvania,  New  York  and  Boston.  Amongst  them 
were  Joseph  H.  Choate,  E.  Bockwood  Hoar,  John  C.  Bullitt,  Sam 
uel  Dickson  and  D.  W.  Gooch,  who  considered  the  case  perfect, 
both  in  law  and  equity,  and  regarded  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
as  unquestionable,  and  filed  a  bill. 

The  Attorney-General,  to  the  surprise  of  all,  now  denied  the 
jurisdiction  of  those  courts,  and,  what  was  more  astonishing, 
pleaded  the  sovereignty  of  the  commonwealth  as  a  bar  to  the  en 
forcement  of  any  judgment  on  a  contract  into  which  the  State 
had  deliberately  entered. 

Although  such  a  course  seemed  impossible,  the  court  sustained 
the  demurrer  of  the  commonwealth  and  dismissed  the  bill. 

Thereafter  for  years  all  of  Haupt's  applications  to  the  Legis 
lature  to  obtain  justice  were  unavailing.  At  last,  however,  the 
time  arrived  when  the  people  of  Massachusetts  became  dissatisfied 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  xxvii 

with  the  annual  losses  of  the  Hoosac  Tunnel  under  State  manage 
ment,  and  clamored  for  the  sale  of  the  property ;  but  no  purchaser 
could  be  found  so  long  as  the  right  of  redemption  remained  un 
satisfied. 

If  the  property  should  pass  out  of  the  hands  of  the  State  to 
a  party  not  protected  by  the  shield  of  sovereignty  which  had  been 
raised  up  to  escheat  her  creditors,  suit  could  be  brought  by  Haupt 
and  the  property  recovered.  Necessity,  therefore,  compelled  some 
settlement,  and  a  bill  was  passed  in  1884  authorizing  the  Governor 
and  Council  to  liquidate  the  claims,  if  it  could  be  done — not  on  a 
basis  of  justice,  but  on  terms  satisfactory  to  themselves. 

Mr.  Haupt  had  interviews  with  Governor  Robinson  and  the 
State  Treasurer,  presenting  statements  showing  that  the  expendi 
tures  of  private  parties  in  excess  of  the  sums  that  had  been  advanced 
by  the  State,  and  including  payments  due  for  work  done,  amount 
ed,  with  simple  interest,  to  about  $1,400,000.  At  the  last  inter 
view  the  Governor  said :  "I  will  not  deny  that  great  injustice  has 
been  done  to  you;  but  it  was  not  my  administration  that  did  it, 
and  I  am  not  responsible.  Further,  I  may  as  well  be  perfectly 
frank,  and  say  that  I  do  not  propose  to  make  any  settlement  that 
I  cannot  justify  as  a  good  bargain  for  the  people  of  Massachu 
setts  !" 

The  Governor  also  stated  that  interest  did  not  run  against  a 
State,  and,  whether  Haupt  had  borrowed  money  at  6  or  at  20  per 
cent,  to  carry  on  the  tunnel  work,  no  part  of  it  should  be  refunded. 
He  finally  offered  $300,000,  to  be  paid  to  the  Troy  &  Greenfield 
Railroad  Company  upon  the  transfer  and  surrender  of  all  capital 
stock.  If  not  accepted,  he  would  refer  the  matter  back  to  the  Leg 
islature  and  have  no  more  to  do  with  it. 

There  was  therefore  no  redress.  The  ultimatum  of  the  Gov 
ernor  had  to  be  accepted.  After  paying  counsel  and  some  small 
debts  of  the  company,  only  $200,000  remained.  This  was  divid 
ed  among  all  the  stockholders,  giving  the  contractors,  H.  Haupt  & 
Co.,  eight  cents  on  the  dollar  for  stock  they  had  been  compelled  to 
accept  at  par  in  payment  for  work  done  and  materials  furnished. 

For  twenty  years  Haupt  paid  interest  on  debts  contracted  in 
consequence  of  expenditures  of  which  Massachusetts  received  the 
benefit,  but  he  secured  no  reimbursement — absolutely  not  a  cent — 


xxviii  A   PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

and  in  consequence  lost  the  fine  coal  lands  and  other  property  in 
Pennsylvania  which  he  had  mortgaged  in  order  to  prevent  "the 
generous  and  opulent  old  commonwealth,  whose  honor  is  untar 
nished  and  whose  financial  credit  is  unsurpassed/7  from  wrecking* 
her  own  enterprise! 

Not  only  so,  but  at  one  period  of  the  contest  he  became  so 
straightened,  financially,  that  Mrs.  Haupt  was  compelled  to  pawn 
some  of  her  jewels  (though  her  husband  was  not  aware  of  it)  to 
help  keep  the  family  pot  boiling. 

A  remarkable  feature  of  this  great  tunnel  controversy,  so 
unprecedented  in  the  history  of  any  State,  was  the  single-handed 
courage  and  ability  with  which  Mr.  Haupt  fought  his  side  of  the 
battle  during  two-thirds  of  a  generation,  never  losing  a  point  be 
fore  bodies  in  which  integrity,  intelligence,  fairness  and  facts  were 
permitted  to  control  decisions.  He  never  employed  an  attorney 
or  was  assisted  by  counsel  until  the  end,  when  the  matter  was 
taken  to  the  Supreme  Court. 

During  the  numerous  and  protracted  hearings  and  investiga 
tions  which  characterized  the  contest,  the  enemies  of  the  tunnel 
summoned  nearly  all  of  the  engineers  in  Massachusetts  and  several 
from  other  States,  who,  of  course,  knew  what  was  wanted  of  them. 
Haupt  summoned  none  but,  although  strenuous  efforts  were  made 
to  deprive  him  of  that  privilege,  he  was  permitted  to  cross-examine 
all  witnesses. 

Besides  being  confessedly  one  of  the  most  learned  and  able 
engineers  of  his  time,  he  had  enjoyed  practically  the  limit  of  en 
gineering  experience  in  canals,  bridges,  viaducts,  railways,  tun 
nels,  highways  and  all  forms  of  topographical  and  constructive 
work.  He  was  thus  able,  almost  invariably,  to  confuse  his  oppo 
nents,  and  sometimes  to  cover  them  with  extreme  ridicule. 

At  the  time  of  the  suspension  of  tunnel  work  in  1861,  Mr. 
Haupt  had  made  great  progress  in  rock-drilling  machinery,  and 

*  NOTE. — "It  affords  me  much  gratification  to  be  able  to  state,"  wrote  General 
Haupt  in  1889,  "that  a  short  time  before  his  death  Governor  Andrew  admitted  to 
General  William  Raymond  Lee,  a  mutual  friend,  that  he  had  made  a  mistake  in  his 
Hoosac  tunnel  policy,  and  had  done  me  personally  great  injustice.  The  acknowl 
edgment  disarmed  the  resentment  I  had  felt  for  the  long  and  unmerited  persecu 
tion  which  followed  me  to  Washington,  disturbed  my  friendly  relations  with  Secre 
tary  Stanton  and  led  to  my  retirement  in  the  fall  of  1863  from  the  position  of 
Director  of  Military  Railroads,  as  the  records  will  show." 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xxix 

had  developed  a  machine  that  was  far  in  advance  of  the  perforator 
at  work  in  the  Mont  Cenis  tunnel  at  the  same  time.  This  drill 
was  improved  by  a  Mr.  Taylor,  in  the  employ  of  J.  A.  McKean, 
who  represented  Mr.  Haupt  in  Europe,  and  accomplished  more 
rapid  progress  at  less  expense  for  repair  than  any  drill  used  in  the 
St.  Gothard  tunnel  or  elsewhere  in  the  Old  World;  but  Haupt 
never  received  any  royalties  er  other  compensation  for  its  use. 

Mr.  Haupt's  supreme  knowledge  of  engineering  principles, 
his  great  energy  and  experience,  his  genius  for  inventing  more 
efficient  rock-drilling  and  other  machinery,  and  his  tact  and  econ 
omy  in  the  management  of  men,  if  he  had  not  been  harassed  and 
circumvented  by  Governor  Andrew  and  other  officials  of  Massa 
chusetts,  would  have  resulted  in  completing  the  tunnel  without  a 
cent  of  cost  to  the  State.  As  it  was,  the  State,  in  the  end,  sold  to 
the  Fitchburg  Kailroad  for  $7,000,000  a  work  which  had  cost  $20,- 
000,000. 

This  somewhat  extended  notice  of  Mr.  Haupt's  long  and  dis 
astrous  battle  with  Massachusetts  seems  necessary,  particularly 
because  the  contest  was  the  means  of  depriving  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  of  the  services,  in  the  hour  of  her  greatest  peril  during 
the  civil  war,  of  a  military  railway  builder  and  transportation 
manager  whose  achievements  stand  in  history  unsurpassed  to  this 
day. 

CALLED  TO  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

In  April,  1862,  after  the  report  of  the  investigating  com 
mittee  had  been  made  and  when  the  legislative  contest  was  at  a 
crisis,  Mr.  Haupt  was  called  to  Washington  by  an  urgent  tele 
gram  from  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War.  Being  prom 
ised  by  the  chairman  of  the  joint  committee  that  his  interests 
should  be  safeguarded,  he  proceeded  at  once  to  Washington  and 
began,  with  that  extraordinary  energy  which  characterized  all  his 
movements,  to  rescue  the  railways  and  transportation  service  of 
the  Federal  armies  from  the  apparently  irretrievable  chaos  into 
which  they  had  fallen. 

Thus  began  the  army  career  so  modestly  and  concisely  told 
in  the  story  which  forms  the  main  body  of  this  volume,  and  which 
gives  to  General  Haupt  his  undying  place  in  history. 

Stanton,  who  was  a  man  of  enormous  comprehension  and 


xxx  A   PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

energy  of  action,  well  knew  what  he  was  doing  when  he  sent  for 
Ilaupt  to  take  charge  of  the  military  railways  of  the  United  States. 
He  had  frequently  met  him  and  felt  his  powers  in  the  long  series 
of  railway  and  canal  litigation  which  he  had  conducted  in  Penn 
sylvania,  when  Haupt  was  Chief  Engineer  or  General  Superin 
tendent  and  director  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  and  under- 
s^ood  both  his  accomplishments  and  experience  and  his  high  order 
of  native  ability. 

He  knew  that  Haupt  was  among  the  very  foremost  engineers 
of  his  time — an  organizer  of  large  enterprises,  a  manager  of  big 
railroads  and  a  man  of  probity,  fearlessness  and  persistence,  as 
well  as  an  accomplished  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy  at  West 
Point. 

He  therefore  bestowed  unlimited  authority  upon  his  new  ap 
pointee,  which  was  used  with  supreme  energy,  abundant  success 
and  the  best  of  judgment. 

In  order  to  obey  the  call  of  his  country,  which  he  served  with 
all  his  might  without  compensation,  Mr.  Haupt  left  his  fortunes 
and  professional  reputation  in  jeopardy  in  Massachusetts,  where 
he  was  not  only  plucked  and  skinned,  but  drawn  and  quartered. 

TIRELESS  AND   SUPREME  AT   SECOND   BULL  EUN. 

His  financial  and  professional  sacrifices  on  the  altar  of  patri 
otism,  great  as  they  were,  did  not  equal  his  services  to  the  Union 
cause,  and  there  are  two  pictures  of  his  operations  in  the  army 
which  should  be  written  in  words  of  ever-living  light  on  the  most 
brilliant  page  of  American  history.  At  the  second  battle  of  Man- 
assas  (Bull  Run),  a  few  miles  south  of  Washington,  in  August, 
1862,  in  which  General  Pope  and  his  handful  of  beleaguered  fight 
ers  were  left  in  the  lurch  before  Stonewall  Jackson's  fiery  army  by 
McClellan  and  other  Generals  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  who 
stood  near  in  idleness  with  large  bodies  of  veteran  troops,  Haupt 
for  the  time  was  President,  Secretary  of  War,  General-in-Chief, 
Chief  Commissary  and  Chief  of  Transportation. 

Night  and  day  for  several  days,  with  little  food  and  less  sleep, 
he  was  going  from  place  to  place,  and  General  to  General,  rebuild 
ing  bridges,  forwarding  refugees,  telegraphing  to  the  President, 
discovering  the  enemy,  bringing  away  and  caring  for  the  wounded, 
advancing  supplies  and  munitions  and  planning  succor  for  Pope. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xxxi 

For  days  and  nights  he  was  among  the  chief  men  in  the  quak 
ing  republic,  but  he  used  all  his  authority  and  all  his  energies  for 
no  purpose  except  to  prevent  still  greater  disaster  to  the  Union 
armies. 

When  he  returned  to  Washington  the  Cabinet  was  in  session 
in  the  War  Office. 

"Come  in,  Haupt,"  shouted  Secretary  Stanton. 

As  he  entered  Stanton  rushed  forward,  held  him  with  both 
hands,  thanked  him  in  the  presence  of  the  President  and  Cabinet, 
addressed  him  as  General  and,  on  the  following  day,  sent  him  a 
brigadier's  commission. 

WONDERFUL  SUCCESS  AND  FOEESIGHT  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

In  the  terrific  crash  at  Gettysburg  he  was  even  more  supreme, 
and  his  services  were  beyond  the  power  of  formal  estimation.  His 
old  classmate,  General  George  G.  Meade,  like  himself  a  Pennsyl- 
vanian,  had  just  been  placed  in  command  to  fight  in  defense  of  his 
native  soil.  Biit  Meade  did  not  know  how  his  own  forces  were 
distributed  nor  the  whereabouts  or  movements  of  the  enemy  under 
Lee. 

Haupt,  as  skilled  in  military  strategy  as  any,  perfectly  fa 
miliar  with  every  rood  of  ground  in  that  section,  and  determined 
that  Lee  should  be  permitted  to  march  no  further  into  the  ISTorth, 
came  to  the  rescue.  On  foot,  on  horseback  and  on  locomotive  he 
raced  about  until  he  had  located  and  counted  the  forces  of  the 
enemy ;  correctly  divined  the  objects  of  the  swift  and  sudden  move 
ments  of  Lee,  which  had  been  inexplicable  to  the  Federal  com 
manders;  concluded  that  Gettysburg  was  to  be  the  point  of  con 
centration  of  the  enemy,  and  by  courier  and  telegraph  fully  in 
formed  Meade  and  the  authorities  at  Washington  of  the  entire  situ 
ation. 

This  had  been  barely  accomplished  when  Lee  opened  the  awful 
slaughter  in  which  there  were  55,000  killed,  wounded  and  missing, 
with  a  dash  and  determination  rarely  equaled  and  never  excelled. 

The  Confederates  were  met  by  a  fire  as  deadly  as  their  own, 
and  while,  for  three  days,  the  battle  raged  back  and  forth  through 
Gettysburg,  around  the  home  which  he  had  erected  for  his  bride 
and  where  his  children  were  born,  Haupt  was  repairing  bridges, 


xxxii  A   PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

restoring  broken  railways,  removing  the  wounded  and  pouring 
stores  and  munitions  upon  the  field  at  such  a  rate  that  at  the  close 
of  the  contest  there  was  enough  on  hand,  as  stated  by  the  Chief 
Quartermaster,  General  Rufus  Ingalls,  to  supply  the  army  for 
nearly  a  week  in  advance. 

Not  only  so,  but  so  ceaseless  had  been  his  energy  day  and  night 
and  so  comprehensive  his  plans  that,  the  second  day  after  the  close 
of  the  fight  all  the  railway  and  telegraph  lines  which  Lee  had  been 
continually  destroying  were  restored  and  in  working  order  to 
Washington  and  to  Baltimore,  although  nineteen  bridges  had  been 
broken  on  the  Northern  Central  Railroad  and  several  others  on 
the  branches. 

Great  as  had  been  his  usefulness,  his  important  labors  were 
not  ended.  Believing  that  Lee,  out  of  forage  and  heavy  ammuni 
tion,  with  his  communications  broken,  was  in  a  trap  and  could  be 
captured  with  his  shattered  and  hungry  army  en  masse,  Haupt,  on 
the  morning  after  Lee's  retreat,  sought  Meade  at  headquarters  to 
explain  the  situation  and  urge  him  to  strike  the  final  blow  of  the 
wrar. 

When  he  found  that  Meade  was  afraid  or  unwilling  to  under 
take  to  pursue  his  advantage  over  Lee,  Haupt  jumped  on  a  loco 
motive  at  midnight  of  Sunday  and  rushed  away  to  Washington. 
Before  breakfast  he  had  made  known  at  the  capital  the  true  condi 
tions  at  Gettysburg  and  urged  the  authorities  to  compel  Meade  to 
move,  to  pursue,  to  strike  and  capture  Lee. 

He  then  hastened  his  little  engine  back  to  Gettysburg,  expect 
ing  the  orders  from  Washington  would  be  obeyed,  and  desiring  to 
be  there  to  help ;  but  Meade  did  not  move  and  Lee  escaped,  to  the 
great  disappointment  of  Lincoln,  Stanton  and  Halleck,  and  the  still 
greater  disappointment  and  grief  of  General  Haupt. 

If  Meade  had  acted,  or  if  anyone  had  thought  to  place  Haupt 
in  command  on  Sunday,  July  5,  1863,  Lee  would  doubtless  have 
been  captured  and  the  Rebellion  ended. 

GOVERNOR  ANDREW'S  HOSTILITY  FINALLY  SUCCESSFUL. 

In  the  meantime,  as  opportunity  offered,  Haupt  had  been 
prodding  away  to  save  property  tied  up  in  the  Hoosac  tunnel,  very 
much  to  the  annoyance  of  Governor  Andrew,  who,  apparently,  had 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xxxiii 

undertaken  the  entire  destruction  of  the  contractor,  but  who,  thus 
far,  had  been  worsted  in  every  bout,  even  the  committees  which 
had  been  packed  against  Haupt  turning  and  reporting  in  his  favor. 

Governor  Andrew  was  intensely  hostile  to  slavery  and  a  furi 
ous  and  effective  supporter  of  the  war.  He  was  ceaseless  in  his 
efforts  to  raise  men  and  money ;  so,  when  he  went  to  Washington 
and  demanded  that  General  Haupt  be  compelled  to  live  up  to  the 
technical  terms  of  his  commission  as  Brigadier-General,  which 
would  have  kept  him  away  from  Boston  and  the  Massachusetts 
Legislature,  Secretary  Stanton  was  compelled  to  yield. 

Stanton  could  do  nothing  without  the  active  and  hearty  sup 
port  of  the  loyal  Governors  of  the  North,  of  whom  Andrew  was  a 
leader.  It  was  Haupt  or  Massachusetts,  and  Stanton,  of  course, 
promptly  chose  Massachusetts.* 

For  some  years  subsequent  to  the  war,  General  Haupt  fol 
lowed  his  profession  of  consulting  engineer  in  Pennsylvania.  In 
1867  he  visited  Europe  on  the  invitation  of  the  Royal  Polytechnic 
Society  of  Cornwall,  to  explain  his  system  of  mining  and  tunneling 
by  power  machinery. 

One  of  the  rock  drills  invented  by  him  for  use  in  the  Hoosac 
tunnel,  and  which  was  the  type  of  those  used  in  driving  through 
the  great  St.  Gothard  tunnel  with  so  much  rapidity,  was  on  exhi 
bition  and  received  the  highest  honors  awarded  by  the  society. 


*  NOTE. — Inquiring  minds  may  wonder  whether  Governor  Andrew  could 
assume,  promptly  on  taking  office  and  maintain  for  years,  such  an  intense,  special 
and  officially  active  hostility  against  Haupt  without  some  reason.  There  were  rea 
sons,  of  course,  but  they  had  no  relation  whatever  to  Haupt. 

One  of  his  closest  and  most  influential  friends  was  Frank  Bird,  a  large  paper 
manufacturer  of  Walpole.  Bird  was  largely  under  the  influence  of  Daniel  Harris, 
President  of  the  Connecticut  Valley  Railroad  who,  in  turn,  together  with  his  little 
railroad,  was  dominated  by  Chester  W.  Chapin,  President  of  the  Western  Railway. 

As  stated  hereinbefore,  Chapin  was  desperately  anxious  to  kill  the  Hoosac 
tunnel  project  because,  on  its  completion,  it  would  open  up  the  Troy  &  Greenfield 
Railway  as  a  carrying  line  parallel  and  rival  to  .his  own.  Besides,  Andrew  had  a 
reason  of  his  own  for  fighting  Haupt — entirely  personal.  On  leaving  office,  Gov 
ernor  N.  P.  Banks,  his  predecessor,  delivered  an  elaborate  valedictory.  As  valedic 
tories  were  unusual,  this  unexpected  performance,  covering  the  leading  features  of 
the  onsweeping  rebellion,  took  nearly  all  the  wind  out  of  Governor  Andrew's 
inaugural  sails,  at  the  very  last  moment,  which  embarrassed  and  angered  him 
exceedingly. 

Governor  Banks,  pressed  by  more  duties  than  he  could  perform  at  the  last 
moment,  lost  sight  of  Haupt  &  Company's  order  for  $100,000,  money  previously 
earned  and  formally  allowed,  and  failed  to  sign  it. 

Although  such  action  was  like  "swearing  a  seal  off  the  record,"  Andrew 
refused  to  sign  the  order,  thus  making  a  double  play — hitting  Banks,  whom  he 
disliked,  and  pleasing  his  friend  Bird,  the  agent  of  Chapin,  Harris  and  the  Western 
Railway  Company. 


xxxiv  A   PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

In  1870  he  made  an  examination  and  report  upon  wood  pave 
ments,  with  experiments  in  Boston  in  preservative  processes.  The 
report  was  unfavorable  and  the  processes  were  abandoned.  Dur 
ing  the  same  year  he  also  reported  upon  and  located  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley  Railroad,  which  was  subsequently  built. 

In  1874  John  Edgar  Thomson,  President  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad,  urged  the  appointment  of  General  Haupt  as  Vice-Presi- 
dent  of  the  Southern  Railway  Security  Company,  in  which  the 
Pennsylvania  Company  had  a  very  large  stock  interest.  That 
office  was  not  created,  but  in  lieu  thereof  he  was  appointed  General 
Manager  and  director  of  the  Richmond  &  Danville  system,  which 
extended  from  Richmond,  Ya.,  to  Atlanta,  Ga.,  with  its  connec 
tions  and  branches.  In  this  position  he  prepared  the  plan  for 
organizing  the  Southern  Railway  and  Steamship  Association, 
which  was  adopted.  He  was  named  as  pool  commissioner,  but  de 
clined,  when  Albert  Fink  accepted  the  position.  He  continued  as 
General  Manager  until  the  death  of  President  Thomson. 

HAUPT's  PROUDEST  ACHIEVEMENT A  TIDE-WATER  PIPELINE. 

In  1878  he  was  employed  by  the  Pennsylvania  Transporta 
tion  Company  to  investigate  and  report  upon  the  practicability  of 
constructing  a  pipe  line  for  the  transportation  of  crude  petroleum 
from  the  wells  in  the  Allegheny  Valley  to  tidewater. 

After  procuring  data  from  the  various  local  pipe  lines  to 
determine  the  discharges  under  given  pressures  and  thus  obtain 
data  for  the  main  line,  he  concluded  that  the  successful  operation  of 
a  line  hundreds  of  miles  in  length  over  high  altitudes  and  through 
low  valleys  would  require  a  number  of  pumping  stations  so  located 
with  reference  to  the  topography  of  the  country  that  the  work  of 
the  plants  would  be  equal,  and  that  such  governors  or  other  mechan 
ical  devices  must  be  introduced  as  would  compel  the  pumps  of  the 
several  stations  to  work  synchronously  and  regulate  each  other 
automatically.  Also,  that  provision  must  be  made  for  expansion 
of  so  long  a  line  of  pipes  over  a  rugged  profile. 

These  apparently  difficult  problems  were  satisfactorily  solved 
by  him,  a  favorable  report  submitted,  and  the  work  begun. 

This  project  naturally  provoked  the  active  hostility  of  the 
Standard  Oil  Company,  and  of  all  the  trunk  line  railroads.  Henry 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  xxxv 

Harley,  the  head  of  the  pipe  line  enterprise,  although  a  man  of 
liberal  means,  was  under  heavy  call  obligations  at  the  banks.  The 
Standard  Oil  Company  and  some  other  corporations  informed  the 
banks  that  they  must  either  cease  carrying  Harley  or  lose  the 
company  deposits. 

The  resulting  pressure  soon  forced  Harley  into  bankruptcy, 
and,  as  his  company  held  the  only  charter  in  existence  for  a  trunk 
pipe  line,  the  project  was  supposed  to  have  been  killed. 

At  this  juncture  B.  D.  Benson  and  D.  McKelvy,  large  pro 
ducers  of  oil  of  Titusville,  Pa.,  inquired  of  General  Haupt  whether 
a  right-of-way  could  not  be  obtained  by  purchase  and  a  pipe  line 
built  through  the  States  of  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  to  tide 
water,  without  a  charter. 

The  great  power  of  the  hostile  Standard  Oil  Company  and  of 
the  trunk  line  railroad  corporations,  with  their  vast  resources  and 
numerous  agents,  together  with  the  fact  that  there  was  no  law 
authorizing  the  condemnation  of  land  for  this  purpose,  and  that  a 
single  defect  in  title  or  a  single  break  of  even  a  foot  in  the  line 
would  be  fatal,  gave  to  the  undertaking  an  extremely  hazardous 
aspect. 

There  were  hundreds  of  highways,  one  or  two  canals,  many 
streams,  several  railways  and  thousands  of  farms  to  be  crossed,  but 
Haupt  believed  he  could  get  through,  under  or  over  them  all,  and 
undertook  the  task.  No  one  was  to  know  or  ever  knew  his  plans, 
methods  of  procedure  or  route,  but  he  was  to  have  a  carte  blanche 
and  unlimited  credit. 

He  ran  surveys  through  many  counties  and  in  numerous  direc 
tions  as  a  ruse  to  concentrate  the  operations  of  his  enemies  where 
they  would  be  harmless,  but  quietly  bought  and  paid  for  his  right- 
of-way  on  routes  where  he  had  no  surveyors,  taking  extreme  cau 
tion  in  the  preparation  of  all  papers  and  contracts  and  the  descrip 
tion  of  all  lands,  so  that  everything  should  be  proof  against  in 
junctions  and  other  processes  of  attack,  always  communicating 
with  principals  through  third  parties  and  by  means  of  secret  cipher. 

He  had  succeeded  everywhere  and  knew  that  his  proceedings 
were  secure,  when,  toward  the  end  of  the  line,  he  was  blocked 
in  Maryland,  where  he  was  unable  to  get  over  the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  Railway  tracks. 


xxxvi  A   PERSONAL  SKETCH   OF 

Finally  he  secured  permission  from  the  County  Commission 
ers  of  Baltimore  to  lay  his  line  on  a  county  bridge,  high  over  the 
tracks,  thus  defeating  the  railroad  and  reaching  tidewater  in  safety. 

Without  the  power  of  eminent  domain  to  condemn  rights-of- 
way  for  hundreds  of  miles  through  the  property  of  those  recalci 
trant  holders  who  are  encountered  in  every  great  enterprise,  and 
surrounded  and  watched  everywhere  by  the  hostile  agents  of  the 
most  powerful  corporations  in  the  United  States,  Haupt's  pipe 
line  achievement  stands  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable  feats  of  its 
character  in  this  country,  and  is  the  one  in  which,  perhaps,  he 
takes  the  greatest  pride. 

The  Tidewater  Pipeline,  which  Haupt's  success  rendered  pos 
sible,  is  now,  as  it  has  been  for  many  years,  in  successful  operation, 
with  offices  on  Broadway,  New  York,  and  is  one  of  the  decisive  ele 
ments  which  combined  to  give  cheap  illuminating  fluid  to  the  peo 
ple  of  the  entire  nation,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  members  of  its 
original  enemy,  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  have  been  able  to 
accumulate  fortunes  that  are  really  fabulous  in  size,  due  in  part 
to  the  system  of  trunk  pipe-lines  like  Haupt's  now  in  general  use 
under  the  general  law  subsequently  passed. 

In  1879  General  Haupt  was  employed  to  examine  and  report 
upon  Hardie's  pneumatic  motors,  five  of  which  were  constructed 
and  tested  upon  the  Second  Avenue  Railroad  in  New  York.  A 
compression  plant  was  erected  in  Harlem,  from  which  air  at  a 
pressure  of  360  pounds  was  introduced  into  cylinders  placed  under 
the  car  seats.  The  motors  were  entirely  successful,  but  were  never 
generally  introduced. 

Haupt  demonstrated  that  the  cost  of  transporting  passengers- 
by  horse  power,  including  general  expenses  and  a  6  per  cent,  divi 
dend,  was  4.55  cents  each,  and  by  pneumatic  motor  2.57  cents  each. 

Such  a  result  was  entirely  revolutionary,  but  the  projectors 
could  not  get  their  motors  upon  the  roads. 

In  the  same  year  (1879)  General  Haupt  was  appointed  con 
sulting  engineer  of  the  United  States  Hydrogen  Company,  a  cor 
poration  engaged  in  developing  processes  for  the  anti-corrosive 
treatment  of  iron  and  steel.  Many  of  the  results  were  entirely 
satisfactory,  and  articles  treated  by  these  processes  resisted  even 
the  attacks  of  aqua  regia. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xxxvii 

It  is  certain  that  the  remarkable  success  which  attended  the 
treatment  in  some  cases  positively  proved  that  equal  success  could 
have  been  secured  in  all  other  cases  if  the  essential  conditions  had 
been  carefully  determined  and  duplicated;  but  in  consequence  of 
circumstances  beyond  his  control  they  were  not;  the  enterprise 
languished  and  died,  though  the  process  and  General  Haupt's 
knowledge  still  live. 

GENERAL  MANAGER  OF  THE  NORTHERN  PACIFIC. 

In  the  spring  of  1881  he  was  appointed  General  Manager  of 
the  Northern  Pacific  Railroad,  which  position  he  held  until  the 
fall  of  1884.  During  this  period  the  road  was  completed  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  and  the  various  divisions  and  departments  as  re 
organized  by  him  were  put  in  working  order. 

The  management  of  the  Yillard  gold-spike  celebration  at  the 
opening  of  the  road  in  Montana  was  attended  with  peculiar  difficul 
ties  and  many  serious  risks.  There  were  four  sections  of  about  fif 
teen  Pullman  cars,  each  to  be  transported  from  St.  Paul  over  two 
mountain  ranges,  with  temporary  grades  of  240  feet  per  mile,  and 
with  a  large  number  of  inexperienced  train  hands  to  manage  the 
brakes.  It  was  an  extremely  anxious  time  for  General  Haupt,  who 
alone  knew  and  appreciated  the  full  extent  of  the  danger  and 
responsibility ;  but  he  carried  everything  through  without  accident, 
and  the  gold-spike  celebration  marked  an  epoch  in  railway  history. 

In  1883  he  prepared  a  pamphlet  on  the  bane  of  constant  legis 
lative  interference  by  States  with  railroad  properties  and  manage 
ment,  which  was  so  favorably  received  by  the  railroad  companies 
of  the  Northwest  that  several  thousand  extra  copies  were  printed 
for  general  distribution. 

While  General  Manager  he  secured  the  great  terminals  at  St. 
Paul,  Minneapolis  and  elsewhere,  which  now  form  such  an  im 
portant  part  of  the  value  of  the  Northern  Pacific. 

In  1884  he  was  elected  President  of  the  Dakota  &  Great 
Southern  Railroad,  and  at  about  the  same  time  became  one  of  the 
ten  proprietors  of  the  town-site  of  West  Superior,  at  the  head  of 
Lake  Superior,  which  has  since  grown  from  a  pine  slashing  to  a 
place  of  between  3 0,000  and  40,000  people,  and  to  be  one  of  the 
very  largest  shipping  ports  on  the  Great  Lakes. 


xxxviii  A  PERSONAL  SKETCH  OF 

During  all  these  activities  General  llaupt  has  been  a  volumin 
ous  writer,  especially  upon  technical  and  professional  subjects. 
He  has  made  investigations  and  prepared  treatises  and  reports 
almost  without  number,  some  of  them,  unquestionably,  of  great  and 
enduring  value. 

His  report  on  the  Meigs  system  of  elevated  railroads  sustained 
the  claims  of  the  inventor. 

One  of  his  most  elaborate  reports  relates  to  Birdsall  Holly's 
system  of  steam-heating  for  cities.  It  introduced  a  series  of  direct 
experiments  on  the  transmission  of  elastic  fluids  through  pipes, 
made  at  the  works  of  the  Holly  Manufacturing  Company,  at  Lock- 
port,  N.  Y.,  from  which  new  and  valuable  formulae  were  deduced 
for  the  calculation  of  discharges  under  pressure,  with  numerous 
tables  of  lasting  and  practical  value. 

The  subject  of  improving  the  navigation  of  rivers  had  occu 
pied  his  attention  as  far  back  as  when  he  was  Chief  Engineer  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad.  He  then  published  a  review  of  the  plans 
proposed  by  Charles  Ellett  and  others,  with  suggestions  of  his  own 
especially  applicable  to  the  Ohio.  Having  been  invited  to  attend 
a  meeting  of  the  Ohio  River  Commissioners  in  Washington  in 
1880,  he  prepared  papers  which,  on  being  submitted  to  Congress, 
were  published  in  H.  R.  Miscellaneous  Doc.  33,  46th  Congress,  2d 
Session. 

His  plans  were  well  received  by  the  committees  of  both 
Houses,  and  were  referred  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  by  him  to 
the  Chief  of  Engineers,  who  appointed  a  board  consisting  of  five 
of  the  highest  officers  of  the  Corps  to  investigate  and  report  upon 
them.  Several  hearings  were  given,  and  the  board  finally  report 
ed,  in  substance,  that,  although  they  possessed  the  results  of  twenty- 
five  consecutive  years  of  observations  on  the  flow  of  water  in  the 
Ohio,  made  by  their  own  engineers,  their  data  were  insufficient; 
that  more  extended  and  careful  examinations  should  be  made  and, 
if  previous  results  should  be  confirmed,  the  plans  of  General  Haupt 
would  be  worthy  of  careful  consideration. 

The  report  did  not  suggest  whether  the  required  "observa 
tions'7  should  cover  twenty-five  years  or  twenty-five  centuries. 

The  Haupt  plan  contemplated  a  navigation  without  locks  or 
dams,  that  would  not  obstruct  commerce  in  high  water  or  at  ordi- 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  xxxix 

nary  navigable  stages,  but  would  secure  a  depth  of  six  feet  at  the 
lowest  stages.  All  that  he  asked  was  permission  to  test  his  princi 
ple  on  one  of  the  worst  shoals  in  the  river,  not  interfering  with 
traffic  and  giving  ample  security  to  the  effect  that,  if  not  successful, 
in  the  opinion  of  a  mixed  board  of  civil  and  military  engineers,  he 
would  remove  all  the  material  placed  in  the  stream  and  leave  it 
precisely  as  it  was  before  undertaking  the  experiment. 

The  cost  of  the  improvement  would  have  been  about  one- 
fourth  that  planned  by  the  Government  engineers,  as  illustrated 
at  the  Davis  Island  dam  at  Pittsburg. 

James  E.  Eads  characterized  the  proposed  plans  for  retarding 
the  velocity  of  discharge  and  increasing  navigable  depth  as  entirely 
new,  but  believed  they  would  accomplish  the  desired  end.  Never 
theless,  the  Government,  which  could  have  done  so  without  a  cent 
of  cost  or  risk,  has  never  permitted  them  to  be  tested. 

In  1893  he  published  a  volume  giving  comparative  estimates 
of  cost  of  construction  and  operation  of  all  the  systems  of  city  and 
suburban  railways  then  known  and  used.  As  to  power,  he  found 
that  compressed  air,  used  in  a  proper  motor,  was  cheaper,  better 
and  safer  than  any  other  system  and,  with  an  honest  capitalization, 
would  earn  fair  dividends  on  2-J-cent  fares. 

It  was  impossible  to  secure  the  adoption  of  compressed  air  on 
any  prominent  line  in  consequence  of  the  opposition  of  capitalists 
who  had  many  millions  invested  in  electrical  apparatus  and  who 
felt  compelled  to  discourage  and  paralyze  anything  that  promised 
to  be  a  formidable  competitor  to  electrical  propulsion. 

IN  ACTIVE  BUSINESS  AT  EIGHTY-FIVE. 

Although  in  his  eighty-fifth  year,  General  Haupt  has  not  re 
tired  from  active  business.  In  the  enjoyment  of  perfect  health, 
with  all  his  faculties  clear,  strong  and  vigorous,  he  is  President 
and  the  active  head  of  the  American  Nutrient  Company,  of  Jersey 
City,  and  travels  back  and  forth  between  Washington  (his  home) 
and  Philadelphia,  and  New  York,  and  elsewhere,  with  all  the 
eagerness  and  buoyancy  of  a  man  of  forty. 

He  is  a  life-member  of  the  American  Philosophical  Society, 
Pennsylvania  Historical  Society  and  Franklin  Institute,  and  an 
honorary  member  of  other  associations.  He  takes  an  active  inter- 


xl  A  PERSONAL  SKETCH. 

est  in  social,  philosophical  and  public  questions,  and  occasionally 
finds  time  to  publish  leaflets  and  pamphlets  giving  his  views  upon 
current  topics. 

The  modesty  of  his  Christian  life,  the  generosity  of  his  for 
giving  spirit,  the  fairness  of  his  profound  judgment  and  the  integ 
rity  of  all  his  thoughts  and  purposes  form  a  rare  supplement  to  his 
great  abilities,  his  strong  will,  his  fearless  attacks,  his  ceaseless 
energy  and  his  many,  many  splendid  achievements. 

FRANK  ABIAL  FLOWER. 


CHAPTER  I. 
CALLED  BY  SECRETARY  STANTON. 

ON  April  22,  1862,  while  engaged  in  an  exciting  contest  in 
Boston  over  the  TToosac  Tunnel  bill,  I  received  a  telegram 
from  the  Secretary  of  War  requesting  my  immediate  presence  in 
Washington,  and,  about  the  same  time,  one  from  Hon.  John 
Covode,  of  Pennsylvania,  in  these  words :  "Come  here  immedi 
ately  ;  Secretary  Stanton  wants  you." 

I  showed  these  telegrams  to  Hon.  Jonathan  E.  Field  and  other 
prominent  members  of  the  Massachusetts  Senate  and  House,  who 
advised  me  to  go,  pledging  themselves  to  protect  my  interests, 
which  pledge  was  fully  redeemed. 

A  Joint  Special  Committee  of  ten  had  made  a  report  unani 
mously  endorsing  my  management  of  the  Hoosac  Tunnel  con 
struction,  and  had  reported  a  bill  to  reinstate  me  in  possession  of 
work,  of  which  I  had  been  deprived  by  Governor  John  A.  Andrew, 
with  an  appropriation  to  compensate  for  the  damages  caused  by  the 
enforced  suspension. 

Governor  Andrew  had  announced  his  determination  to  veto 
this  bill,  or  any  other  that  would  retain  the  work  in  my  hands,  but 
was  willing  to  assume  the  partially-completed  tunnel  as  a  State 
work.  After  several  conferences  with  members  of  the  Legislature 
and  officers  of  the  Company,  I  had  agreed  to  surrender  possession  to 
the  State  on  certain  very  important  conditions,  and  had  the  prom 
ise  that  these  conditions  should  be  inserted  in  a  bill  to  be  presented ; 
but  the  bill  had  not  been  drafted  and  the  action  of  the  Executive 
was  uncertain.  The  situation  was  critical,  as  fortune  and  reputa 
tion  were  at  stake. 

However,  I  immediately  reported  in  Washington  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War.  At  this  interview  I  made  inquiry  as  to  the  service  to 
be  performed  and  the  time  probably  required.  Mr.  Stanton  stated 
that  General  McClellan  was  on  the  Peninsula  operating  against 
Richmond ;  that  General  McDowell  was  ordered  to  cooperate  by  a 
forced  march  across  the  country,  but  could  not  move  until  the 
Eredericksburg  Railroad  was  put  in  order  for  transportation  of 
troops  and  supplies;  that  the  bridges  had  been  burned,  the  track 
destroyed  and  the  rails  carried  off ;  that  so  soon  as  the  line  could  be 

43 


44  REMINISCENCES   OF 

reconstructed,  McDowell  could  move,  Richmond  would  fall  and 
the  war  would  be  ended.  My  services  might  be  required  for  three 
or  four  weeks,  and  added:  "If  the  war  is  not  finished  in  three 
months,  I  will  resign." 

I  desired  the  Secretary  to  put  his  orders  in  writing,  and  soon 
after  received  the  following  note : 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  D.  C.,  April  24, 1862. 
Herman  Haupt,  Esq. 

DEAR  SIR  :  I  desire  you  to  proceed  directly  to  the  Headquarters  of 
Major-General  McDowell  on  the  Rappahannock  and  receive  his  instruc 
tions  respecting  the  engineering  work  which  he  desires  to  have  executed 
for  his  advance.  If,  upon  inspecting  the  operations,  you  can  devote  your 
time  and  abilities  to  the  service  of  the  Government  in  their  completion, 
you  will  be  regarded  as  rendering  important  and  patriotic  assistance  to 
the  country  which  will  be  cordially  acknowledged  by  this  Department. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

To  this  communication  the  following  reply  was  returned : 

WASHINGTON,  April  25, 1862. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War: 

I  have  considered  your  request  and  will  go  immediately  to  General 
McDowell,  ascertain  the  position  of  affairs  and  the  precise  character  of 
the  duties  to  be  performed.  If  they  shall  appear  to  be  such  as  impera 
tively  to  require  my  personal  attention,  it  will  be  given,  although  the 
sacrifices  in  other  important  interests  will  be  great.  If  I  can  suggest 
arrangements  to  dispense  with  my  personal  services,  this  may  be  done. 
In  any  event,  I  would  expect  to  continue  only  so  long  as  public  exigencies 
demanded  it. 

I  have  no  military  or  political  aspirations,  and  am  particularly 
averse  to  wearing  the  uniform;  would  prefer  to  perform  the  duties  re 
quired  without  military  rank,  if  possible,  but  if  rank  is  essential  as  a 
means  to  aid  in  the  performance  of  duty,  I  must  acquiesce. 

Pay  I  do  not  require  or  care  about.  If  I  take  the  position  you  have 
so  kindly  offered,  it  will  be  with  the  understanding  that  I  can  retire 
whenever,  in  my  opinion,  my  services  can  be  dispensed  with,  and  that  I 
will  perform  no  duties  on  the  Sabbath  unless  necessity  imperatively  re 
quires  it,  and  of  that  necessity  I  must  be  the  judge,  so  far  as  may  be  con 
sistent  with  military  subordination. 

Yours,  with  much  respect, 

H.  HAUPT. 

A  small  steamer  having  been  placed  at  my  disposal,  I  pro 
ceeded  down  the  Potomac  in  search  of  General  Irvin  McDowell. 
I  found  him  on  a  steamer  lying  at  anchor  near  Belle  Plain,  pre 
sented  my  letter  from  the  Secretary  and  remained  about  one  hour 
in  conversation,  during  which  he  gave  me  very  full  information  as 
to  the  condition  of  the  road  and  bridges  and  the  work  required  to 
be  executed. 

As  I  was  about  to  retire  he  remarked,  much  to  my  surprise : 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  45 

"Why,  Haupt,  you  don't  seem  to  know  me."  I  replied  that  I  was 
not  aware  that  I  had  ever  met  him  before.  "Well,"  said  the  Gen 
eral,  "that  hurts  my  feelings.  Don't  you  remember  when  I  came 
to  West  Point  as  a  plebe  in  1834,  that  you  took  me  into  your  tent 
during  my  first  encampment  and  extended  to  me  your  protection  as 
an  older  cadet  ?" 

I  did  remember  that  a  fat  boy  from  Ohio  had  been  quartered 
in  my  tent,  but  had  no  idea  that  this  boy  was  the  General  in  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock.  However,  the  ice 
was  broken;  from  that  time  we  were  friends.  Our  relations  be 
came  most  cordial  and  confidential,  and  there  is  no  one  for  whom, 
as  a  gentleman  and  a  soldier,  I  entertained  a  more  profound 
respect. 

On  my  return  to  Washington,  April  27, 1  was  appointed  Aide- 
de-Camp  on  the  staff  of  General  McDowell  with  the  rank  of 
Colonel,  and  after  collecting  men  and  material,  I  proceeded  to 
Acquia  Creek  and  commenced  the  construction  of  the  road  to 
Fredericksburg,  landing  with  my  men  at  Acquia  Creek  Tuesday 
morning,  April  29. 

The  following  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  Freder- 
icksburg,  May  25,  will  give  information  in  regard  to  operations 
in  the  reconstruction  of  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad : 

OPERATIONS  UNDER  GENERAL  MCDOWELL. 

FREDERICKSBURG,  VA.,  May  25,  1862. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanion,  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR:  In  compliance  with  your  request  that  I  should  give  a  report 
of  operations  connected  with  the  reconstruction  and  opening  of  the  Mili 
tary  Railroad  between  Fredericksburg  and  Acquia  Creek,  I  beg  leave  to 
state  that  on  Tuesday,  April  22,  'I  received  your  telegram  at  Boston  re 
questing  an  immediate  interview  at  Washington.  I  started  on  Wednes 
day,  called  upon  you  on  Thursday,  saw  General  McDowell  at  the  head 
quarters  of  his  Division  on  Friday,  learned  from  him  the  urgent  neces 
sities  which  required  prompt  action,  returned  on  Saturday  to  Washing 
ton  to  make  further  arrangements  with  your  Department,  procured  im 
plements  and  supplies,  and  on  Tuesday  morning,  in  company  with  Daniel 
Stone,  Esq.,  landed  at  Acquia  Creek  prepared  to  commence  operations. 

The  condition  of  the  road  was  briefly  as  follows : 

The  extensive  wharf  at  Acquia  Creek,  covering  a  surface  of  more 
than  an  acre,  or  about  50,000  superficial  feet,  with  all  the  buildings  con 
nected  therewith,  had  been  destroyed  by  fire.  For  a  distance  of  three 
miles  the  track  had  been  torn  up,  the  rails  carried  south  out  of  reach, 
the  ties  put  in  piles  and  burned.  All  the  bridges  were  destroyed,  the 
superstructures  burned,  and  in  several  instances  the  abutments  blown  up. 

The  reconstruction  of  the  roads  and  wharf  demanded  immediate 
attention.  A  commencement  had  been  made  at  the  wharf,  and  some  ties 
had  been  cut  in  the  woods,  but  there  was  no  proper  organization  for  work. 
We  proceeded  on  Tuesday  to  organize  and  commenced  to  lay  track.  The 
road  bed  had  been  used  by  cavalry,  the  wet  weather  had  converted  the 


46  REMINISCENCES   OF 

clay  surface  into  tenacious  mud,  the  cross  ties  were  of  all  conceivable 
dimensions.  The  artificers  were  soldiers  without  experience  in  track- 
laying,  the  weather  was  rainy;  yet,  by  taking  some  of  the  most  intelli 
gent  young  officers,  using  them  as  assistant  engineers,  making  levelling 
instruments  from  sticks,  working  all  night  in  the  rain,  spiking  rails  by 
the  use  of  lanterns,  the  three  miles  of  track  were  laid  in  three  days  so 
that  engines  could  pass  over  and  transport  material  for  work  further  in 
advance.  More  than  3,000  cross  ties  were  manufactured  by  soldiers  from 
the  stump  during  that  time  and  delivered  on  the  road. 

On  Saturday  morning,  May  3,  the  first  load  of  bridge  lumber  was 
carried  from  Acquia  Creek  for  the  Ackakeek  bridge.  This  opening  was 
a  single  span  of  about  150  feet  and  elevation  of  30  feet.  About  noon  on 
Saturday  we  were  honored  by  a  visit  from  yourself  in  company  with 
Secretaries  Seward  and  Chase  and  General  Moorhead.  At  that  time  no 
part  of  the  bridge  had  been  erected  and  only  the  framing  commenced. 
The  next  afternoon  General  McDowell  rode  across  the  bridge  on  an 
engine. 

The  time  occupied  in  erecting  it  was  about  15  working  hours. 

The  next  and  most  serious  obstruction  was  the  deep  chasm  of 
Potomac  Creek  nearly  400  feet  wide,  which  had  been  crossed  by  a  deck 
bridge  of  about  80  feet  elevation  above  the  water.  No  work  was  done 
until  the  3d  of  May,  except  cutting  some  logs  in  the  woods  at  a  point 
so  distant  that  but  few  of  them  could  be  used.  On  Saturday,  May  3d, 
some  of  the  logs  were  laid  for  crib  foundations,  but  it  was  not  until 
Tuesday  of  the  following  week  that  any  proper  organization  could  be 
effected.  Three  companies  of  the  6th  and  7th  Wisconsin  and  of  the  19th 
Indiana  Kegiments,  under  Lieutenants  Harker,  Pond  and  Ford,  had  been 
detailed  as  a  construction  force,  but  many  of  the  men  were  sickly  and 
inefficient,  others  were  required  for  guard  duty,  and  it  was  seldom  that 
more  than  100  to  120  men  could  be  found  fit  for  service,  of  whom  a  still 
smaller  number  were  really  efficient,  and  very  few  were  able  or  willing 
to  climb  about  on  ropes  and  poles  at  an  elevation  of  80  feet.  With  sol 
diers  unaccustomed  to  such  work,  with  an  insufficient  supply  of  tools, 
with  occasional  scarcity  of  food  and  with  several  days  of  wet  weather, 
the  work  was  nevertheless  advanced  so  rapidly  that  in  nine  days  the 
bridge  was  crossed  on  foot,  and  in  less  than  two  weeks  an  engine  was 
passed  over,  to  the  great  delight  of  the  soldiers  whose  labors  had  con 
structed  it. 

By  a  computation  made  by  A.  W.  Hoyt,  Esq.,  Civil  Engineer,  it 
appears  that  the  number  of  lineal  feet  of  timber  in  the  bridge  across 
Potomac  Creek  is  34,760,  which,  if  placed  in  a  straight  line,  would  reach 
nearly  seven  miles.  The  equivalent  in  board  measure  is  about  two  and 
a  half  millions  of  feet. 

The  bridge  across  the  Rappahannock  was  constructed  under  the 
immediate  supervision  of  Daniel  Stone,  Esq.,  who  was  placed  by  you  in 
general  charge  of  construction.  The  bridge  was  constructed  in  about 
the  same  time  as  that  at  Potomac  Run.  It  is  about  600  feet  long  and  43 
feet  above  water,  depth  of  water  10  feet. 

The  reconstruction  of  the  road  and  bridges,  under  the  circum 
stances,  in  so  short  a  time,  with  an  ordinary  detail  of  troops  taken  pro 
miscuously,  without  selection,  with,  for  part  of  the  time,  an  insufficient 
supply  of  tools  and  implements,  is  certainly  a  most  extraordinary  per 
formance,  and  reflects  the  highest  credit  upon  the  officers  and  soldiers 
whose  energy  and  perseverance  have  accomplished  it. 

The  services  of  Captains  Simon  Barstbw  and  Joseph  C.  Willard,  of 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  47 

the  staff,  cannot  be  too  highly  estimated,  but  much  credit  is  due  also  to 
Major  Brown,  of  the  staff,  Captains  Conrad,  Shannon,  Henry  and  Feas- 
ter,  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves.  Colonel  Biddle  and  his  officers,  espe 
cially  Lieutenants  Kennedy,  of  the  9th  Pennsylvania  Reserves;  Lamp- 
man,  of  the  30th  New  York  ;  Rogers,  of  the  6th  Wisconsin  ;  Upperdale,  of 
the  14th  New  York;  Sexton,  of  the  2d  Wisconsin;  Thomas,  of  the  6th 
Wisconsin;  Barter,  of  the  19th  Indiana;  Ramsey,  of  the  8th  Pennsyl 
vania;  Pennypacker,  of  the  4th  Pennsylvania,  and  many  non-commis 
sioned  officers  and  privates  who,  in  consideration  of  valuable  services, 
have  been  detailed  permanently  as  members  of  a  construction  corps  for 
future  operations  of  a  similar  character.  The  services  rendered  by  E.  0. 
Smeed,  W.  W.  Wright,  I.  B.  Nevins,  G.  F.  Spear,  W.  R.  Fulton  and 
Samuel  Longmaid,  civilians  and  foremen  in  the  construction  of  the  work, 
must  not  be  overlooked. 

The  above  report  is  very  respectfully  submitted  by 

H.  HAUPT,  A.  D.  C., 
Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 
Va.,  Department  of  the  Rappahannoclc. 


During  the  reconstruction  of  this  road,  General  McDowell 
came  out  almost  daily  to  watch  the  progress  and  encourage  the 
men  by  his  presence.  He  said  he  had  never  heard  sweeter  music 
than  the  click  of  the  hammers  when  we  were  working  all  night 
near  his  Headquarters,  spiking  rails  by  the  aid  of  lanterns,  the 
men  soaked  with  rain  and  the  ties  laid  in  mud. 

It  was  a  hard-looking  track  when  first  laid,  and  when  the 
General  rode  out  next  morning  to  inspect  it,  lie  expressed  the 
opinion  that  an  engine  could  never  be  run  over  it.  I  requested  him 
to  suspend  judgment  until  next  morning,  and  look  at  the  road  then. 
He  came,  as  promised,  and  expressed  surprise  to  find  the  track  in 
good  line  and  surface  and  ballasted  with  earth,  but  as  the  ties  had 
been  cut  by  soldiers  and  varied  in  thickness  from  four  inches  to  a 
foot,  the  task  of  surfacing  was  not  an  easy  one. 

It  was  good  work,  under  existing  conditions,  to  lay  three  miles 
of  track  in  three  days. 

The  bridge  across  the  Ackakeek  was  commenced  on  Saturday, 
May  3,  and  finished  so  that  General  McDowell  crossed  on  an 
engine,  Sunday,  May  4.  The  length  was  150  feet.  Time  of  re 
construction,  15  hours. 

The  Potomac  Run  bridge  was  now  taken  in  hand.  Some  work 
was  commenced  May  3,  but  no  organization  effected  until  May 
6.  The  last  trestle  was  raised  on  May  13,  so  that  but  seven  days 
were  occupied  in  this  work,  at  which  time  the  bridge  could  be 
crossed  on  foot.  An  engine  passed  over  on  the  evening  of  May  15, 
and  on  Monday,  May  19,  trains  were  running  to  Fredericksburg. 

The  following  statement  was  made  by  General  McDowell 
before  the  Court  of  Inquiry: 

The  Potomac  Run  Bridge  is  a  most  remarkable  structure.  When 
it  is  considered  that  in  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon,  trestle  bridges  of 


48  REMINISCENCES   OF 

more  than  one  story,  even  of  moderate  height,  were  regarded  as  imprac 
ticable,  and  that,  too,  for  common  military  roads,  it  is  not  difficult  to 
understand  why  distinguished  Europeans  should  express  surprise  at  so 
bold  a  specimen  of  American  military  engineering.  It  is  a  structure 
which  ignores  all  the  rules  and  precedents  of  military  science  as  laid 
down  in  books.  It  is  constructed  chiefly  of  round  sticks  cut  from  the 
woods,  and  not  even  divested  of  bark;  the  legs  of  the  trestles  are  braced 
with  round  poles.  It  is  in  four  stories — three  of  trestle  and  one  of  crib 
work.  The  total  height  from  the  deepest  part  of  the  stream  to  the  rail, 
is  over  80  feet.  It  carries  daily  from  10  to  20  heavy  railway  trains  in 
both  directions,  and  has  withstood  several  severe  freshets  and  storms 
without  injury. 

The  bridge  was  built  in  May,  1862,  in  nine  working  days,  during 
which  time  the  greater  part  of  the  material  was  cut  and  hauled.  It  con 
tains  more  than  two  million  feet  of  lumber.  The  original  structure, 
which  it  replaced,  required  as  many  months  as  this  did  days.  It  was 
constructed  by  the  common  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Rappahannock, 
command  of  Major-General  McDowell,  under  the  supervision  of  his 
aide-de-camp,  Colonel,  now  Brigadier-General  Herman  Haupt,  Chief  of 
Railroad  Construction  and  Transportation. 

The  Potomac  Creek  bridge  [see  illustration  on  page  41]  was 
the  first  of  the  kind  constructed,  but  it  stood  the  test  and  served  as 
a  model  for  many  others  subsequently  erected.  It  was  practically 
a  mistake  to  build  the  first  story  of  crib-work,  but  as  many  of  the 
men  were  accustomed  to  building  log  houses  and  were  not  carpen 
ters,  I  put  them  at  work  at  which  I  supposed  they  were  familiar. 
Possibly  a  day  or  two  might  have  been  saved  by  using  trestles  or 
bents  for  the  whole  structure. 

The  most  remarkable  feature  about  this  bridge  is  the  fact  that 
it  was  built  by  common  soldiers,  not  by  mechanics.  After  a  perma 
nent  Construction  Corps  had  been  organized  and  the  men  properly 
drilled,  a  much  larger  bridge  was  erected  by  one  of  my  former 
assistants,  E.  C.  Smeed,  in  half  the  time. 

The  following  telegram  to  General  McDowell  from  Potomac 
Creek,  May  14,  1863,  reports  some  difficulties: 

There  are  so  few  men  here  able  or  willing  to  climb  about  on  the 
high  trestles,  that  I  fear  the  work  of  bracing  will  be  extremely  tedious. 
Out  of  twelve  men  selected  to  spike  poles  on  top  of  bents,  only  one  made 
his  appearance.  I  must  therefore  resort  to  new  expedients.  I  propose, 
as  soon  as  I  can  get  track  timbers  down  and  track  closed,  to  pull  over  the 
engine,  Washington,  by  means  of  ropes.  If  it  goes  into  the  creek,  it  will 
cease  to  trouble  us  for  awhile;  if  it  reaches  the  other  side,  it  will  have  a 
good  road  and  may  keep  the  track.  We  can  readily  get  cars  over  by 
planking  between  the  tracks  and  pushing.  The  rain  gives  us  much 
trouble,  but  I  will  spare  no  effort  to  get  an  engine  to  the  Rappahannock 
by  Saturday  (17).  Men  are  wet,  dull  and  no  life  or  activity  in  them. 

With  all  these  difficulties,  the  bridge  was  finished  in  ample 
time,  as  the  army  did  not  move  until  May  26,  and  then  it  was  a 
retrograde  and  not  an  advance  movement. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  49 

When  Fredericksburg  had  been  evacuated  by  the  Confeder 
ates,  a  number  of  torpedoes  with  percussion  fuses  had  been  placed 
under  the  tracks  about  the  depot  grounds  to  blow  up  trains  that 
might  attempt  to  enter.  The  locations  had  been  pointed  out  by 
friendly  contrabands,  and  the  soldiers  had  removed  quite  a  number 
and  placed  them  in  a  small  brick  building  detached  from  the  sta 
tion,  that  had  been  used  as  a  powder  magazine  by  the  railroad  com 
pany.  A  sentinel  on  duty  one  day  probably  handled  one  of  these 
torpedoes  carelessly  and  caused  an  explosion  of  the  whole  number. 
The  report  was  startling.  The  city  was  shaken  and  the  building 
blown  to  atoms — not  a  brick  left.  Nothing  was  ever  seen  of  the 
sentinel  except  a  piece  of  his  gun  at  a  considerable  distance  from 
the  spot. 

As  it  was  not  certain  that  all  the  torpedoes  had  been  removed, 
the  first  train  was  made  up  by  putting  the  engine  behind  and  a  car 
very  heavily  loaded  with  scrap  iron  in  front,  so  as  to  explode  any 
torpedoes  before  the  engine  reached  them ;  but  none  were  found. 

After  completing  the  road  to  Fredericksburg,  I  removed  my 
Headquarters  to  that  city  and  took  possession  of  a  comfortable  resi 
dence  that  had  been  abandoned  by  its  former  occupants.  General 
Marcena  R.  Patrick  was  Provost  Marshal-General.  His  adminis 
tration  gave  great  satisfaction  to  the  citizens.  Private  property 
was  protected,  depredations  by  soldiers  punished,  and  good  order 
maintained. 

On  my  first  visit  to  the  city  I  saw  fifteen  or  twenty  soldiers 
standing  along  the  curbstone,  with  boards  on  their  backs  stating  their 
offenses,  such  as  "I  stole  a  ham,"  "I  broke  into  a  private  house," 
etc.  On  one  occasion  a  General  Officer  had  taken  possession  of  a 
dwelling  occupied  by  a  widow  and  two  daughters  and  required 
them  to  seek  other  quarters.  When  General  McDowell  heard  of  itr 
he  reprimanded  the  officer,  compelled  him  to  vacate,  and  reinstated 
the  former  occupants. 

On  Friday,  May  23,  President  Lincoln  and  most  of  the  mem 
bers  of  his  Cabinet  visited  General  McDowell  at  his  Headquarters, 
at  the  Lacy  House,  on  the  north  side  of  the  Eappahannock.  I 
accompanied  them  from  and  to  Acquia  Creek.  The  President 
seemed  to  be  much  interested  in  the  Potomac  Creek  bridge,  and  on 
his  return  to  Washington  remarked  to  members  of  the  War  Com 
mittee  that  he  had  "seen  the  most  remarkable  structure  that  human 
eyes  ever  rested  upon.  That  man  Haupt  has  built  a  bridge  across. 
Potomac  Creek,  about  400  feet  long  and  nearly  100  feet  high,  over 
which  loaded  trains  are  running  every  hour,  and,  upon  my  word,, 
gentlemen,  there  is  nothing  in  it  but  beanpoles  and  cornstalks." 

At  this  interview,  after  other  matters  had  been  considered,. 
General  McDowell  turned  to  the  President  and  said  that  Shieldsr 


SO  REMINISCENCES   OF 

command  had  come  back  from  the  Shenandoah  valley  out  of  shoes, 
clothing  and,  in  fact,  everything;  that  his  supplies  could  not  be 
issued  before  the  next  day  (Saturday)  and  that  he  could  not  be 
ready  to  move  before  Sunday ;  but,  knowing  the  President's  disin 
clination  to  initiate  movements  on  that  day,  he  would  defer  to  his 
judgment  and  allow  him  to  name  the  time.  The  President  re 
flected  for  a  short  time  and  then  said :  "I'll  tell  you  what  to  do ; 
take  a  good  ready  and  start  Monday  morning." 

Every  preparation  had  been  made  for  a  very  rapid  movement 
towards  Richmond  on  Monday,  May  26.  I  had  a  profile  of  the 
line  to  Richmond,  knew  the  size  of  every  bridge,  and  was  prepared 
for  prompt  reconstruction. 

The  Massaponix  bridge,  6  miles  from  Fredericksburg,  had 
been  prepared  for  burning  and,  anticipating  an  advance,  was 
buired  Monday  morning,  but  we  had  a  new  bridge  ready,  and  al 
though  I  was  not  personally  present,  the  bridge  was  reconstructed 
by  a  portion  of  my  force  in  half  a  day,  much  to  the  surprise  of  the 
contrabands,  who  said :  "The  Yankees  can  build  bridges  quicker 
tl« an  the  Rebs  can  burn  them  down." 

On  Sunday  morning,  May  25,  an  Orderly  rode  to  my  quar 
ters  and  delivered  a  note  from  General  McDowell,  who  wished  to 
see  me  immediately.  I  accordingly  repaired  to  the  Lacy  House 
and  found  him  in  a  state  of  great  excitement.  He  placed  in  my 
hands  a  bundle  of  dispatches  and  told  me  to  read  them,  and  they 
would  advise  me  of  the  situation. 

I  found  that  orders  had  been  issued  to  move  the  army  by 
forced  marches  to  Front  Royal  to  intercept  Jackson.  McDowell 
replied,  substantially,  that  Washington  was  in  no  danger;  that 
forces  under  Banks  and  Fremont  were  sufficient  for  the  protection 
of  the  capital ;  that  Jackson  had  only  one-third  the  distance  to  re 
treat  that  he  had  to  advance;  that  before  he  could  reach  Front 
Royal  the  enemy  would-be  out  of  reach ;  that  the  move  was  only  a 
diversion  to  break  up  the  plan  of  the  campaign ;  that  if  allowed  to 
advance,  Richmond  would  fall  and  the  war  would  be  substantially 
ended.  If  orders  n#w  received  were  insisted  on,  the  war  would  be 
indefinitely  prolonged. 

The  orders  were  insisted  upon  and,  as  the  sequel  proved,  the 
war  was  indefinitely  prolonged.  For  the  failure  to  capture  Jack 
son  the  public  demanded  a  victim  and,  soon  after,  McDowell  was 
relieved  and  Pope  put  in  command. 

So  far  as  my  observation  and  knowledge  of  the  facts  extended, 
General  McDowell  was  rarely  permitted  to  execute  any  movement 
that  he  recommended,  but  was  compelled  to  do  that  which  was 
contrary  to  his  own  judgment  and  against  which  he  protested. 

The  next  day,  Monday,  May  26,  I  was  off  with  my  corps  for 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  53 

Alexandria  to  reconstruct  the  Manassas  Gap  Road  and  throw 
troops  and  supplies  into  Front  Royal,  leaving  Daniel  Stone  with  a 
part  of  the  force  to  reconstruct  the  bridge  across  the  Massaponix, 
for  which  the  material  was  already  loaded  on  the  cars. 

The  following  telegrams  exhibit  some  of  the  difficulties  I 
had  to  contend  with : 

POTOMAC  CREEK,  May  13, 1862. 
General  McDowell: 

The  last  bent  was  raised  at  Potomac  Creek  this  evening,  and  several 
persons  have  walked  over  it,  but  the  day  has  been  a  miserable  one,  and 
with  all  my  efforts  I  could  scarcely  get  two  hours'  work  out  of  the  men. 
They  soon  became  wet  and  worked  without  spirit  or  good  will.  I  have 
sent  for  50  laborers,  and  will  be  able  to  determine  how  many  more  will  be 
required  if  I  can  get  an  idea  of  the  number  of  contrabands  available  at 
Fredericksburg  for  warehouse  purposes.  -n"r»rr« 

H.  HAUPl. 

May  19, 1862. 
P.  H.  Watson,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War: 

Accept  my  thanks  for  your  prompt  attention  to  my  request.  I  have 
not  yet  been  supplied  with  material  as  fast  as  I  could  use  it ;  when  I  can 
draw  upon  the  woods  I  am  independent,  but  I  cannot  make  planks  and 
spikes  with  axes,  so  excuse  the  trouble  I  have  given  you.  -o-  TT  A  -i-mrr 

id..  J~i  A  U  r  '  t 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  May  20, 1862. 
Colonel  H.  Haupt: 

I  congratulate  you  on  the  success  of  your  first  attempt.  Your  fore 
sight,  energy  and  general  good  management  will  insure  continual  success. 
The  news  of  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown  without  either  fight  or  bombard 
ment  is  confirmed.  The  evacuation  was  completed  last  night,  but  had 
been  going  on  for  some  days.  P.  H.  WATSON, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 

FREDERICKSBURG,  May  26,  1862. 
To  Major-General  McDowell. 

SIR  :  After  receiving  your  instructions  this  morning,  to  advance  for 
the  purpose  of  constructing  the  bridge  across  the  Massaponix,  I  pro 
ceeded  to  make  the  necessary  preparations,  but  found  that  the  opinions 
of  Mr.  Stone  and  myself  did  not  precisely  coincide  and  that  considerable 
confusion  existed.  Whilst  giving  some  directions  in  regard  to  the  move 
ment  Mr.  Stone  handed  me  his  letter  of  instructions  from  the  Secretary 
of  War,  which  I  had  never  before  seen,  and  which  is  in  the  following 

words : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON  CITY,  D.  C.,  April  26, 1862. 

This  may  certify  that  Daniel  Stone  is  authorized  to  do  anything  he  may  deem  expe 
dient  to  open  for  use  in  the  shortest  possible  time  the  Richmond  &  Acquia  Creek  Railroad, 
and  all  Government  transports  are  required  to  transport  free  of  charge  any  men  or  mate 
rial  he  may  require  for  that  purpose.  EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

This  letter  gives  Mr.  Stone  absolute  and  exclusive  control,  not 
only  over  the  bridges,  but  over  the  construction  of  the  road,  leaving  me 
absolutely  nothing  to  do  but  play  the  part  of  superintendent  of  trans 
portation,  a  position  which  no  consideration  but  a  sense  of  duty  would 
for  a  moment  induce  me  to  accept,  and  which  I  would  hold  only  until  a 


54  REMINISCENCES   OF 

successor  could  be  found.  By  not  showing  me  his  instructions,  Mr. 
Stone  left  me  under  wrong  impressions  in  regard  to  his  position,  which 
led  to  hostile  jurisdiction. 

The  Honorable  Secretary  of  War  stated  to  me  verbally  that  I  was 
placed  in  general  charge  of  all  matters  pertaining  to  construction  and 
transportation  in  your  Division  of  the  Kappahannock,  at  least  I  so  under 
stood  him,  but  he  could  not  at  the  time  have  remembered  the  character 
of  the  letter  given  to  Mr.  Stone,  which  admits  of  no  such  construction. 
I  do  not  see  under  the  general  powers  granted  to  Mr.  Stone  directly 
from  the  War  Department,  that  even  you  can  give  him  any  directions; 
the  language  is  explicit  and  comprehensive  in  an  extraordinary  degree: 
"Daniel  Stone  is  authorized  to  do  anything  he  may  deem  expedient;"  it 
leaves  nothing  for  any  one  else. 

In  the  Department  of  Transportation  there  is  also  a  conflict  of 
authority  in  the  general  instructions  given  to  Col.  McCallum,  as  General 
Director  of  all  the  Military  Railroads  of  the  United  States.  In  the  exer 
cise  of  his  authority  he  has  the  exclusive  right  to  appoint  all  employees, 
purchase  all  supplies,  direct  all  operations.  I  can  only  act  as  his  assist 
ant  and  subordinate ;  there  cannot  be  two  co-existent  and  equal  heads  in 
one  Department.  Mr.  McCallum  is  my  personal  friend.  There  is  not, 
and  will  not  be,  any  personal  difficulty  between  us,  but  there  is  a  serious 
defect  in  organization  which  interferes  with  successful  operation. 

I  find  no  fault  with  the  Secretary  of  War.  I  understand  and  appre 
ciate  his  position.  His  extreme  desire  to  secure  the  completion  of  this 
important  communication  induced  him  to  summon  others  as  well  as  my 
self  to  his  aid.  If  I  have  rendered  any  services,  the  fact  is  a  sufficient 
compensation  for  me,  and  if  I  have  aided  you  in  any  way,  it  will  ever 
afford  me  much  gratification  to  remember  the  very  nattering  acknowl 
edgment  I  have  received  from  yourself  and  from  the  Honorable  Secre 
tary  of  War.  It  seems  to  me  now  that  my  mission  here  is  ended,  or  will 
be  as  soon  as  the  transportation  shall  have  become  better  organized.  But 
I  wish  to  assure  you  that  I  shall  carry  with  me  a  grateful  recollection 
of  your  kindness  and  the  highest  appreciation  of  you  as  a  soldier  and  a 
man.  Your  efforts  to  suppress  disorder,  punish  crimes,  enforce  disci 
pline,  and  do  justice  to  all  classes  have  done  much  to  relieve  war  of  its 
most  odious  features  and  have  secured  for  you  the  esteem  even  of  those 
whose  sympathies  are  with  the  enemy. 

Very  respectfully  submitted,  H.  HAUPT. 

Immediately  afterwards  I  received  the  following,  which 
placed  me  in  supreme  command : 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  D.  C.,  May  28,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt. 

SIR:  You  are  hereby  appointed  Chief  of  Construction  and  Trans 
portation  in  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock,  with  the  rank  of 
Colonel,  and  attached  to  the  staff  of  Major-General  McDowell. 

You  are  authorized  to  do  whatever  you  may  deem  expedient  to  open 
for  use  in  the  shortest  possible  time  all  Military  Railroads  now  or  here 
after  required  in  said  Department ;  to  use  the  same  for  transportation 
under  such  rules  and  regulations  as  you  may  prescribe ;  to  appoint  such 
assistants  and  employes  as  you  may  deem  necessary,  define  their  duties, 
and  fix  their  compensation;  to  make  requisitions  upon  any  of  the  mili 
tary  authorities,  with  the  approval  of  the  Commanding  General,  for  such 
temporary  or  permanent  details  of  men  as  may  be  required  for  the  con- 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  55 

struction  or  protection  of  lines  of  communication;  to  use  such  Govern 
ment  steamers  and  transports  as  you  may  deem  necessary;  to  pass  free 
of  charge  in  such  steamers  and  transports,  and  on  other  military  roads, 
all  persons  whose  services  may  be  required  in  construction  or  transporta 
tion;  to  purchase  all  such  machinery,  rolling  stock  and  supplies  as  the 
proper  use  and  operation  of  the  said  railroads  may  require,  and  certify 
the  same  to  the  Quartermaster  General,  who  shall  make  payment  there 
for. 

You  are  also  authorized  to  form  a  permanent  corps  of  artificers, 
organized,  officered,  and  equipped  in  such  manner  as  you  may  prescribe  ; 
to  supply  said  corps  with  rations,  transportation,  tools  and  implements 
by  requisitions  upon  the  proper  Departments;  to  employ  civilians  and 
foremen  and  assistants,  under  such  rules  and  rates  of  compensation  as 
you  may  deem  expedient;  to  make  such  additions  to  ordinary  rations 
when  actually  at  work  as  you  may  deem  necessary. 

You  are  also  authorized  to  take  possession  of  and  use  all  railroads, 
engines,  cars,  machinery  and  appurtenances  within  the  geographical  lim 
its  of  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  all  authority  granted  or 
instructions  heretofore  given  to  other  parties  which  may  in  any  way 
conflict  with  the  instructions  herein  contained  are  and  will  be  without 
force  or  effect  in  the  said  Department  of  the  Rappahannock  from  and 
after  this  date. 

By  order  of  the  President,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  of  the  United  States. 


Secretary  of  War. 

MANASSAS,  May  29,  1862. 
GENERAL  ORDERS, 

No.  17. 

The  following,  received  from  the  War  Department,  is  published 
for  the  information  and  guidance  of  all  concerned  : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  May  28,  1862. 

Ordered,  That  Colonel  Herman  Haupt  be  recognized  as  the  Chief  of  the  Rail 
road  Construction  and  Transportation  in  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock,  and 
that  all  other  persons  connected  with  that  Department  be  subordinate  to  him,  under 
the  Department  command.  EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Accordingly,  all  persons  connected  with  the  railroads,  either  in  the 
Departments  of  Construction  or  Transportation,  will  receive  the  orders 
of  Col.  Haupt,  A.  D.  C.,  as  if  they  were  given  directly  by  the  Major- 
General  commanding  the  Department. 

By  command  of  Major-General  McDowell. 

SAM'L  BRECK, 
Official.  A.  A.  General. 

Notwithstanding  the  objections  of  General  McDowell,  the 
orders  to  march  to  Front  Koyal  and  capture  Jackson  were  in 
sisted  upon,  and  on  Monday,  May  26,  1862,  instead  of  the  "on  to 
Biohmond"  move  that  had  been  determined  upon,  and  for  which 
all  things  were  ready,  the  army  commenced  its  forced  marches 
across  the  country,  leaving  baggage  and  knapsacks  to  be  forwarded 
by  river  and  rail.  I  left  with  my  Construction  Corps  for  Alex 
andria,  and  after  making,  as  I  supposed,  satisfactory  arrangements 


56  REMINISCENCES   OF 

with  the  Superintendent  at  that  point,  Colonel  J.  H.  Devereux,  for 
the  management  of  the  transportation,  proceeded  to  reconstruct 
the  Manassas  Gap  Kailroad. 

The  road  was  soon  put  in  passable  condition  to  Rectortown 
and  Piedmont.  About  the  middle  of  the  week  General  McDowell 
reached,  and  established  his  Headquarters  at,  Rectortown,  and  a 
depot  was  formed  at  Piedmont.  The  equipment  of  the  road  was 
insufficient  for  the  amount  of  transportation  so  suddenly  thrown 
upon  it,  and  to  make  requisitions  upon  other  roads  and  secure 
rolling  stock,  required  time.  The  difficulties  of  the  situation  were 
greatly  increased  by  the  usual  military  interference  with  the  run 
ning  of  trains,  and  by  the  neglect  or  refusal  of  subordinates  in  the 
Commissary  and  Quartermaster  Department  to  promptly  unload 
and  return  cars. 

On  my  arrival  at  Piedmont,  four  miles  beyond  Rectortown,  I 
found  a  paymaster  who  had  appropriated  one  of  the  box-cars  stand 
ing  on  the  main  track,  and  was  using  it  as  his  office.  This  gentle 
man  had  been  appointed  from  civil  life  and  was,  as  usual,  greatly 
impressed  with  the  importance  and  dignity  of  his  position.  He 
positively  refused  to  vacate  the  car.  I  represented  that  the  army 
could  not  be  supplied  unless  we  could  have  the  use  of  the  track ;  he 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  payment  of  the  men  was  quite  as  im 
portant  as  supplying  them  with  rations.  To  the  representation 
that  he  could  establish  his  office  just  as  well  in  a  house  as  in  a  car, 
he  again  decidedly  declared  his  intention  not  to  vacate. 

As  remonstrance  was  useless,  I  went  off,  procured  a  detail 
from  the  guard,  ordered  the  men  to  remove  the  money  chests,  table, 
chairs  and  papers  to  a  brick  house  near  the  track,  and  directed  the 
paymaster  to  follow,  which  he  did  without  further  opposition. 

At  Piedmont  a  blockade  occurred  by  failure  to  unload  trains. 
The  fact  was  reported  to  General  McDowell,  who  sent  for  his  chief 
Quartermaster  and  chief  Commissary  and  ordered  them  to  repair 
immediately  to  Piedmont  and  superintend  personally  the  unload 
ing  of  cars.  This  was  an  unpleasant  duty.  The  night  was  dark, 
the  distance  four  miles,  and  the  rain  poured  down  in  torrents. 

Expected  trains  next  morning  did  not  come  forward.  I 
waited  for  hours  in  suspense  and  anxiety.  Concluding  that  my 
orders  about  the  schedule  had  been  disobeyed,  I  wrote  a  letter  of 
censure  to  the  Superintendent  and  proposed  to  remove  him. 

It  was  fortunate  that  I  waited  for  explanations.  J.  H. 
Devereux  was  one  of  the  best  men  in  the  service,  but  I  did  not  then 
know  him.  When  we  did  know  each  other,  our  relations  became 
almost  fraternal.  His  ability  was  recognized  also  by  others,  and 
after  the  war  he  became  one  of  the  leading  railroad  managers  of 
the  country. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  57 

The  letter  from  Colonel  Devereux  will  explain  the  situation : 

ALEXANDRIA,  June  3, 1862. 

H.  Haupt,  Colonel  and  Chief  Construction  and  Transportation,  Depart 
ment  of  RappahannocJc. 

SIR:  I  beg  most  respectfully  to  answer  more  in  detail  your  tele 
gram  of  to-night. 

You  say  "the  road  has  been  opened  and  track  clear  since  Sunday 
morning,  but  not  a  pound  of  supplies  had  reached  Front  Royal  at  noon." 

I  answer :  All  my  power  save  engines  Rapidan,  Fairfax,  Delaware, 
Ferguson  and  Indiana  were  on  the  Gap  Road.  The  Fairfax  was  (and  is 
yet)  too  much  out  of  order  to  run.  Still,  we  press  her  as  a  switch  engine, 
and  are  forced  to  use  her  on  main  line,  where  she  broke  down  on  Satur 
day,  delaying  for  hours  all  business.  She  switches  and  brings  up  cars 
from  Quartermaster  and  Commissary  Department.  The  Rapidan  is  the 
only  engine  we  can  trust  to  do  the  daily  heavy  work  between  Washington 
and  Alexandria.  She  has  to  be  here,  and  nevertheless  she  has  been  sent 
with  heavy  trains  to  Manassas  to  be  forwarded  on  Gap  Road  by  your  re 
turn  power. 

The  Indiana  is  an  old  machine,  only  used  as  a  switching  engine  in 
this  yard,  poor  at  that,  but  has  been  forced  (with  our  engines  off),  to  take 
part  in  the  Washington  work.  The  Delaware  and  Ferguson  have  had  all 
they  could  do  in  forwarding  Quartermaster  and  Commissary  stores  from 
here  to  Manassas  to  meet  there  the  return  power,  and  in  distributing 
stores  to  troops  guarding  our  road. 

I,  therefore,  could  not  send  through  trains  to  Front  Royal,  but  I 
knew  well  Stone,  at  Manassas,  and  Irish,  at  Rectortown,  representing  me, 
would  do  all  they  could  do.  And  I  beg  to  say  they  act  for  me,  and  I  ani 
responsible  for  their  shortcomings.  But  they  could  not  get  other 
engines,  or  the  use  of  the  telegraph. 

Knowing  the  need  of  the  stores  (telegraphed  about  it  from  Wash 
ington  and  spurned  by  the  Commissary  and  Quartermaster),  I  advised 
and  posted  Irish  and  Stone  daily  about  it.  But  generally  in  their  reply 
was  the  fact  the  military  were  holding  the  trains  somewhere,  or  the  mili 
tary  were  using  the  wire.  I  could  not  myself  get  anything  from  Irish 
without  a  long  delay — in  one  case  for  an  entire  day,  and  I  was  rapped 
over  the  knuckles  by  the  War  Department  in  endeavoring  to  get  an 
important  order  to  him  and  was  told  to  "hold  on."  In  my  dispatches  to 
you,  sir,  I  stated  the  condition  of  the  stores,  and  how  they  would  have  to 
be  moved,  and  this  not  only  one  time,  but  several,  as  I  remember,  and  in 
your  one  reply  you  said  the  power  should  be  "returned  promptly." 

June  1st,  Irish  telegraphs  he  had  sent  trains  all  forward  to  Mark- 
ham,  and  Col.  Haupt  may  send  further,  and  he  (Irish)  cannot  say  when 
a  train  will  return.  And  this  "return"  was  about  these  stores.  Again, 
Irish  tells  me  he  sent  troops  on  the  trains  from  Rectortown  in  the  morn 
ing,  and  at  5  p.  M.  they  were  ordered  by  you  to  Front  Royal,  and  that 
then,  11  at  night,  they  had  not  returned,  and  would  not  probably  return, 
as  the  road  at  night  was  not  safe  to  run. 

I  could  not  satisfy  myself  with  every  possible  inquiry  that  the 
trains  were  moved  to  the  best  advantage.  But  in  all  cases  I  did  find  that 
Stone  and  Irish  were  doing  everything  they  could  and  were  permitted  to 
do,  and  I  fell  back  on  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  Col.  Haupt,  my 
commanding  officer,  was  there  in  person,  and  that  he  would  have  my 
requests  to  himself  and  to  my  men  properly  carried  out.  Stone  and 
Irish,  sir,  as  well  as  yourself,  I  advised  that  the  return  power  from  the 


58  REMINISCENCES   OF 

Gap  Road  must  take  the  stores  I  forwarded  there,  and  if  no  stores  or 
supplies  had  reached  Front  Royal  at  the  time  you  state,  I  think  I  have 
shown  that  it  was  through  no  fault  of  the  Transportation  Department. 

You  say  "no  excuse  can  be  made  for  this  (lack  of  supplies)  that 
will  satisfy  the  public,"  if  coal  is  out.  The  question  is,  "why  was  not 
all  procured  in  season?" 

Because,  sir,  I  respectfully  state  that  to  the  public  no  such  excuse 
will  be  made.  We  have  only  one  coal  light  engine,  never  used  for  freight. 
On  Monday  week,  Col.  McCallum  seized  from  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Road 
three  heavy  coal  burners  for  the  special  purpose  of  aiding  me  in  sending 
forward  Ord's  Division.  They  were  on  the  road  when  you  came,  but  had 
done  the  duty  they  were  procured  for  and  I  still  kept  them,  and  to  meet 
the  demands  that  might  occur  by  keeping  them,  I  ordered  coal.  This  was 
last  week.  The  engines  did  not  get  out  of  coal  till  yesterday,  Monday. 

Col.  McCalluin  telegraphed  me  this  A.  M.:  "I  ordered  a  car  load 
of  soft  coal  for  you  on  Friday  from  Georgetown,  and  the  party  agreed 
to  deliver  it  at  Alexandria  by  Saturday  night.  He  has  had  some  trouble 
in  getting  vessel  to  take  it,  but  has  succeeded  in  getting  vessel  this  morn 
ing,  and  promises  to  have  the  coal  in  Alexandria  some  time  to-night." 

I  therefore  must  say  that  neither  I  nor  my  men  could  have  done 
more,  and,  moreover,  more  than  three-quarters  of  your  locomotives  on 
Gap  Road  are  wood  burners.  Coal  burner  70  being  broken,  leaves  only 
two  coal  engines  in  use.  The  70  has  her  steam  chest  perforated  and  her 
cylinders  out  of  order,  and  is  of  no  use.  And  I  did  not  propose  to  do 
anything  to  her,  as  on  our  own  broken  machines  we  have  plenty  of  work 
day  and  night. 

The  telegraph  officers  are  not  enough  in  number  and  have  only  one 
operator  to  work  the  24  hours  through.  A  man  must  sleep  and  eat. 

Irish  telegraphed  me  Glasscut  was  used  up,  and  it  was  useless  to 
try  to  work  the  road  as  it  should  be  until  more  operators  were  obtained. 
I  at  once  referred  him  to  you  and  to  have  you  ask  Col.  Stager  for  the 
help  needed. 

About  this  I  stated  to  you  at  Rectortown,  and  you  said  if  I  tele 
graphed  you  a  list  of  officers  and  operators  you  would  at  once  apply  to 
Col.  Stager  for  them.  I  sent  this  telegraph,  designating  stations,  within 
ten  minutes  after  reaching  Alexandria  on  Saturday  morning. 

As  I  write,  my  operator  comes  to  my  desk  and  tells  me  he  can't  get 
my  train  business  oS,  being  ordered  out  of  circuit  by  the  War  Depart 
ment. 

Since  I  have  been  in  charge  here,  sir,  matters  have  worked  well 
and  smoothly.  So  say  at  least  the  powers  above  me.  You  make  the  first 
complaint  against  me,  and  I  beg  to  say  that  day  and  night  I  have  been 
at  my  post,  and  in  action  and  planning  could  do  no  better.  But  I  have 
not  control  of  my  trains,  my  telegraph,  neither  have  my  men,  and  we 
could  only  do  what  we  have  been  allowed  to  do. 

Any  arrangement  you  suggest  orf  tell  me  to  do,  I  will  carry  out 
cheerfully  and  with  all  my  energy,  but  please  do  not  hold  me  responsible 
for  the  effects  of  such  plans  or  for  any  military  interference  with  them, 
at  least  when  you  are  there  on  the  ground. 

You  instruct  me  to  run  without  reference  to  telegraph  and  I  at  once 
proceed  on  your  order,  using  all  the  engines  that  can  come  to  us,  but  of 
course,  the  trains  must  remain  on  the  sidings  until  I  can  obtain  the 
power. 

And  in  this  very  hurried  letter  (to  go  with  an  officer  expected 
momentarily)  I  beg  to  add,  in  conclusion,  that  I  have  said  nothing,  sir, 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  59 

that  must  be  construed  into  any  lack  of  esteem  for  your  well-known  abil 
ities  or  my  appreciation  of  your  kindness  to  me,  a  stranger. 
And  I  am,  most  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  H.  DEVEREUX, 
Superintendent  Government  Railroads. 

In  consequence  of  my  arrangements  for  the  operation  of  the 
road  by  schedule  having  been  interfered  with  by  the  approval  of 
the  War  Department,  the  schedule  suspended,  and  the  use  of  the 
telegraph  resumed,  a  report  was  made  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
giving  reasons  for  the  action  that  had  been  taken : 

MANASSAS  GAP  K.  K.,  June  6, 1862. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR  :  As  much  difficulty  has  been  experienced  in  the  transportation 
over  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  I  consider  it  of  importance  that  the 
position  of  affairs  should  be  reported  to  and  understood  by  you. 

The  road  has  been  operated  heretofore  exclusively  by  the  use  of 
telegraph  without  any  schedule  or  time-table  for  running  the  trains. 
This  system  of  operating  a  road  may  answer  if  the  telegraph  is  always 
in  order,  operators  always  at  their  posts  and  the  line  exclusively  appro 
priated  to  railroad  purposes,  but  in  the  present  case  the  line  has  not  been 
in  operation  from  Alexandria  to  Front  Eoyal  for  a  single  hour  since  I 
came  here  until  yesterday.  When  in  operation  it  was  appropriated  for 
military  purposes.  I  have  been  compelled  to  go  eighteen  miles  to  put 
myself  in  telegraphic  communication  with  the  Superintendent  to  learn 
the  cause  of  the  detention  of  trains,  and  have  been  compelled,  after 
waiting  for  hours,  to  leave  without  answer,  the  line  being  occupied  or 
out  of  order. 

A  system  which  admits  of  such  irregularities  is  not  safe  and  reli 
able.  To  require  trains  to  lie  for  hours,  perhaps  for  days,  upon  sidings 
waiting  for  instructions,  when  there  is  no  possibility  of  communicating 
with  them,  I  cannot  approve  of,  and  it  was  under  the  pressure  of  such 
an  exigency  that  I  assumed  the  responsibility  of  suspending  the  use  of 
the  telegraph  and  issued  Order  No.  2  directing  trains  with  supplies  to 
continue  on  to  Front  Eoyal  as  rapidly  as  was  consistent  with  safety,  and 
requiring  empty  trains  returning  to  give  the  right  of  way  and  send  flag 
men  in  advance.  There  was  no  other  way  of  getting  supply  trains  in. 
In  one  instance  I  walked  eight  miles  to  order  trains  forward.  This  order 
I  withdrew  this  morning,  having  received  information  last  evening  that 
the  line  was  working  better.  I  directed  the  trains  to  be  run  as  formerly 
under  the  direction  of  the  Superintendent,  whose  duties  I  have  no  wish 
or  intention  to  interfere  with,  except  when  an  imperative  necessity  re 
quires  it. 

As  soon  as  the  bridge  can  be  rebuilt  across  Bull  Run  and  the  power 
properly  distributed,  a  suitable  time-table  must  go  into  operation.  Until 
that  is  done,  I  am  satisfied  that  the  operation  of  the  road  cannot  be  car 
ried  on  with  regularity  and  despatch.  Even  if  a  wire  and  operators 
should  be  provided  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the  road,  the  line  would  be 
liable  to  derangement  from  storms  and  other  causes,  and  generally  at  the 
time  when  most  urgently  required.  With  a  good  schedule  strictly  adhered 
to  the  line  can  be  operated  with  regularity  without  any  telegraph.  The 
telegraph  is  a  convenience  in  railroad  operations.  If  it  should  chance 
to  be  in  order  when  an  accident  occurs,  it  may  be  highly  useful,  but  it  is 


60  REMINISCENCES   OF 

not  a  necessity.  As  a  principal  or  sole  means  of  operations  I  consider 
the  telegraph  very  unreliable;  as  an  auxiliary,  highly  useful.  On  this 
line  and  during  the  last  week  a  dependence  upon  it  has  been  a  cause  of 
derangement  and  delay  to  an  extraordinary  degree. 

Another  serious  difficulty  which  arises  from  the  operation  of  a  line 
by  telegraph  alone  without  a  schedule,  is  the  fact  that  there  is  no  fixed 
time  for  starting  or  stopping  trains  at  any  point. 

If  officers  on  business,  sick  or  wounded  are  to  be  sent,  a  special  extra 
train  must  be  dispatched  with  them,  or  they  must  wait  for  hours  in  un 
certainty.  I  have  been  asked  repeatedly  when  the  next  train  would  start, 
and  to  the  surprise  of  those  who  asked  the  question,  I  have  been  com 
pelled  to  answer  "I  do  not  know." 

I  respectfully  request  a  perusal  of  the  following  extracts  from  my 
diary  for  the  last  week.  Respectfully  submitted, 

H.  HAUPT,  A.  D.  C., 
Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 

Department  of  the  RappahannocTc. 

As  the  telegraph  could  never  be  relied  upon  in  the  operation 
of  the  Military  Railroads,  my  policy  was  to  run  trains  in  sections 
by  schedule,  to  use  the  telegraph  to  give  orders  for  train  movements 
only  in  case  of  derangement,  and  if  the  telegraph  could  not  be  used 
then,  even  at  some  risk,  to  keep  the  trains  moving  by  sending  run 
ners  ahead  with  flags  and  relieving  the  runners  where  fatigued 
until  expected  trains  were  met,  then  side-track  empty  return  trains, 
and  let  eastward-bound  supply  trains  proceed.  I  considered  any 
thing  preferable  to  standing  still  for  hours  or  for  days  waiting  for 
telegraph  orders  that  could  not  be  transmitted. 

This  system  worked  well  after  the  trainmen  understood  it,  and 
by  it  we  were  subsequently  enabled  to  pass  thirty  trains  per  day 
during  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  over  a  road  that  had  capacity  for 
only  three  or  four  under  ordinary  conditions. 

j  By  Saturday,  May  31,  1862,  we  were  engaged  on  the  last 

bridge  across  Goose  Creek.  Five  of  these  bridges  had  been  de 
stroyed,  and  they  were  reconstructed  in  about  a  day  and  a  half.  In 
the  afternoon  I  received  a  note  from  General  McDowell,  then  at 
Front  Royal,  stating  that  an  engineer  officer  had  reported  a  bad 
break  on  a  high  embankment  west  of  the  summit;  track  torn  up, 
rails  and  ties  thrown  several  hundred  feet  down  the  side  of  the 
mountain,  and  a  pile  of  wrecked  cars  at  the  east  end  of  the  break ; 
also  that  two  days  or  more  would  be  required  to  repair  the  damage. 
I  sent  back  word  by  the  messenger  that  the  General  should  not  be 
uneasy.  If  the  rails  and  ties  were  within  reach  and  no  more 
bridges  broken,  a  few  hours  would  repair  the  damages. 

Next  morning,  Sunday,  June  1,  we  reached  the  summit  soon 
after  daylight  and  found  that  a  dozen  or  more  cars,  side  tracked  at 
that  point,  had  been  turned  loose  and  pushed  over  the  grade.  They 
had  run  as  far  as  the  high  bank,  where  the  rails  had  been  removed,, 
and  then  capsized,  making  a  bad  wreck. 


l!i   m 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  63 

The  first  tiling  to  be  done  was  to  tumble  the  broken  cars  over 
the  bank.  With  the  strong  force  at  hand,  this  was  soon  accom 
plished.  The  track  gang  was  then  divided  into  two  parties,  working 
towards  each  other  from  the  ends  of  the  break.  The  rails  and  ties 
were  hauled  up  by  ropes,  and  before  10  A.  M.  I  had  passed  over  the 
break  on  an  engine,  and  reported  to  General  McDowell,  who  was 
on  horseback  in  the  streets  of  Front  Royal. 

After  expressing  much  surprise  at  the  rapid  reconstruction 
of  the  road,  I  was  requested  by  him  to  return  and  hurry  forward 
General  Augur's  command.  This  was  done,  and  a  few  hours  later 
found  it  also  at  Front  Royal. 

But  it  was  too  late ;  Jackson  had  escaped.  McDowell's  pre 
dictions  had  been  verified.  Nothing  remained  but  to  send  some 
troops,  as  McDowell  said,  skedaddling  after  them  up  the  valley 
with  no  hope  of  catching  them,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  good  chance 
of  catching  a  Tartar  by  the  enemy  suddenly  turning  on  their  pur-  > 
suers,  if  found  without  support. 

The  move  had  been  a  horrible  one ;  rain,  mud  and  no  shelter, 
army  demoralized,  the  public  clamorous,  critics  numerous,  the 
President  discouraged,  a  victim  demanded.  McDowell  must  be 
relieved,  and  abput  three  weeks  later  General  John  Pope  was  in 
command,  but  it  is  some  satisfaction  to  know  that  the  Court  of 
Inquiry  did  McDowell  justice,  and  declared  in  their  official  report, 
Vol.  I,  Part  I,  p.  336  of  Records,  "His  conduct  at  Fredericksburg 
should  receive  unqualified  commendation." 

The  early  weeks  of  June  were  employed  in  the  return  of  the 
army  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  the  re-occupation  of  the  line 
of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad.  General  McDowell  estab 
lished  his  Headquarters  near  Manassas.  In  a  review  of  some  of 
his  troops  one  day,  his  horse  reared  and  fell  over  backward  on  his 
rider,  injuring  him  severely  and  rendering  him  unconscious.  I 
was  with  him  while  still  in  this  condition.  His  staff  surgeon  en 
deavored  to  get  some  brandy  into  his  mouth,  but  his  teeth  were 
rigidly  set  and  the  effort  was  unsuccessful.  On  mentioning  the 
circumstance  to  the  General  after  his  recovery,  he  remarked  that 
it  was  a  gratification  to  know  that  even  when  unconscious  brandy 
could  not  be  forced  down  his  throat. 

During  the  occupancy  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Road  efficient 
military  protection  was  afforded  by  the  command  of  General 
Geary,  who  had  been  ordered  to  confer  with  me  as  to  the  proper 
disposition  of  the  forces. 

The  lull  in  active  operations  gave  time  for  a  more  efficient  ^ 
organization  of  the  Construction  Corps,  which  was  still  composed 
of  details  of  soldiers.     Afterwards  the  Corps  was  composed  chiefly 
of  contrabands,  selected  from  the  thousands  of  refugees  in  Wash- 


64  REMINISCENCES   OF 

ington,  directed  by  civilians  as  foremen  and  superintendents  of 
gangs.  ^N~o  language  is  too  strong  to  commend  the  efficiency  of 
this  Corps,  or  the  importance  of  the  service  it  rendered  under  the 
following  regulations : 

June  11,  1862. 

1.  The  Construction  Corps  of  the  Department  of  the  Kappahan- 
nock  will  consist  of  such  commissioned  and  non-commissioned  officers, 
privates  and  civilians  as  may  be  detailed  from  the  force  under  the  orders 
of  the  Department  Commander,  or  especially  enlisted  or  employed  for  the 
service  of  the  Corps. 

2.  The  duties  of  the  Corps  will  consist  in  the  construction  and 
reconstruction  of  roads  and  bridges,  the  erection  of  buildings  required 
for  transportation  purposes,  the  preparation  of  materials  for  structures, 
and  generally  the  performance  of  any  duties  that  may  be  assigned  to 
them  by  the  Chief  of  the  Department. 

3.  The  Corps  will  be  organized  into  squads  of  ten  men  each.     Each 
squad  will  be  under  the  command  of  a  non-commissioned  officer,  each  two 
squads  under  command  of  a  lieutenant,  and  the  whole  under  command 
of  an  officer  designated  for  the  purpose  by  the  Department  Commander. 

4.  The  Adjutant  of  the  Corps  will  keep  a  register,  in  which  shall 
be  entered  the  names  of  the  men,  their  residence,  the  companies  from 
which  they  have  been  detailed,  their  former  occupations,  the  kind  of  work 
in  which  they  are  most  expert,  the  number  of  the  squad  to  which  they 
belong,  and  any  other  facts  or  particulars  that  may  be  worthy  of  note. 
Transfers  from  one  squad  to  another  will  be  made  when  required. 

5.  The  Adjutant  of  the  Corps  will  also  act  as  Commissary  and 
Quartermaster,  and  it  will  be  his  duty  to  see  that  the  Corps  is,  at  all 
times,  provided  with  rations,  suitable  in  quality  and  sufficient  in  quan 
tity;  also,  that  the  cooks  and  cooking  utensils,  tents,  and  transportation 
have  been  provided.    The  Adjutant  shall  also  publish  all  orders  and  keep 
a  record  of  all  reports;  he  shall  be  allowed  one  or  more  time-keepers  or 
clerks,  who  shall  report  to  and  receive  instructions  from  him;  he  shall 
prepare  pay-rolls  and  receive  time-reports  from  officers  of  squads,  and 
shall  perform  such  other  duties  as  may  be,  from  time  to  time,  pre 
scribed  by  the  officer  in  command  of  the  Corps. 

6.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  a  clerk,  acting  under  the  orders  of  the 
Adjutant,  to  keep  a  correct  record  of  all  tools,  implements,  and  public 
property  of  every  kind  belonging  to  or  used  by  the  Construction  Corps. 
Each  tool  or  implement  will  be  marked  with  the  words  "Construction 
Corps,  Rappahannock,"  branded  upon  the  handle,  and  also  numbered 
both  upon  the  handle  and  upon  the  iron,  by  means  of  stamps.    Each 
squad  should  have  a  separate  tool-box,  which  will  be  under  the  care  of  the 
non-commissioned  officer  in  charge  of  the  squad.     Each  individual  will 
be  charged  with  the  tool  furnished  him.    He  will  be  responsible  for  its 
condition,  and  will  retain  and  use  the  same  as  designated  by  its  number. 
To  one  of  the  squads  shall  be  assigned  the  duty  of  taking  care  of  ropes, 
pulleys,  blocks,   tackling,   and  hoisting   apparatus   generally.    Another 
squad  shall  take  care  of  all  materials,  lumber,  iron,  spikes,  nails,  etc., 
used  in  construction,  and  see  that  no  waste  is  permitted.     To  another 
will  be  assigned  the  duty  of  taking  care  of  and  collecting  together  tools 
used  in  common  and  not  chargeable  to  individuals,  such  as  sledges,  mauls, 
crow-bars,  rammers,  etc.,  but,  as  far  as  practicable,  individuals  must  use 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  65 

the  same  tools  and  be  responsible  for  them.     At  regular  periods  the  tools 
will  be  inspected  by  the  officer  in  command. 

7.  When  on  active  duty,  so  urgent  as  to  require  that  every  hour 
of  day-light  shall  be  employed,  the  time  for  breakfast  will  be  at  the 
dawn  of  day,  and  will  be  preceded  by  reveille  and  roll-call,  at  which  all 
who  are  late  or  absent  will  be  reported.     Cooks  must  rise  sufficiently 
early  to  prepare  the  meals  in  time.     Immediately  after  breakfast  the 
Corps  will  be  assembled  by  call  of  bugle,  squads  called  out  by  their 
numbers,  and  marched  to  their  work.     Those  who  are  not  employed  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  camp  must  take  dinners  with  them,  and  all  will 
be  expected  to  work,  if  necessary,  as  long  as  day-light  continues,  and  also 
at  night,  if  required  so  to  do.    Periods  of  excessive  exertion  will  gener 
ally  be  of  short  duration,  and  will  often  be  succeeded  by  long  intervals 
of  repose.    Men  who  are  not  willing  to  work,  even  for  16  hours  continu 
ously,  when  required,  are  not  wanted  in  the  Construction  Corps  of  the 
Rappahannock,  and  are  requested  to  leave  it  and  return  to  their  regi 
ments  at  once. 

8.  Extra  pay  will  be  given  for  all  time  actually  engaged  in  con 
struction  or  other  work.     Officers  in  charge  of  squads  will  keep  time  by 
the  hour,  and  return  the  same  weekly  by  the  Adjutant  of  the  Corps. 

9.  Officers  are  particularly  requested  to  make  constant  observa 
tions,  and  report  to  the  Adjutant  in  regard  to  the  skill,  industry,  habits, 
and  general  deportment  of  the  members  of  the  Corps ;  and  the  Adjutant 
will  keep  a  record  of  the  same.     All  who  habitually  use  profane  or 
obscene  language;  who  are  immoral,  vicious,  indolent,  or  insubordinate, 
and  especially  those  who  commit  depredations  upon  the  property  of  citi 
zens,  will  be  sent  to  their  regiments  with  a  statement  of  the  offense  com 
mitted,  and  will  be  otherwise  punished  as  circumstances  may  require. 
The  members  of  the  Construction  Corps  are  not  authorized  to  investi 
gate  and  decide  upon  the  loyalty  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country,  much 
less  to  condemn  them  as  rebels  and  appropriate  their  property  to  them 
selves.     Such  assumption  of  authority  will  not  be  permitted  in  any  one. 
All  who  are  not  in  arms  against  the  Government  are  entitled  to  protec 
tion  against  injury  or  insult. 

10.  Each  squad  will  occupy  its  own  tent,  and  will  be  responsible 
for  the  care  of  it,  as  also  for  the  tool-box,  cooking  utensils,  and  other 
property  appropriated  to  its  use.     Each  tent,  tool-box,  and  utensil  shall 
be  numbered  to  correspond  with  the  number  of  the  squad. 

11.  No  member  of  the  Corps  shall  discharge  fire-arms  without  the 
orders  of  a  commissioned  officer,  except  where  imperative  necessity  re 
quires  it. 

12.  Civilians,  who  may  be  employed  as  superintendents  in  charge 
of  construction,  will  be  considered  as  having,  while  so  employed,  the  rank 
of  a  captain,  and  foremen  as  having  the  rank  of  lieutenant,  and  will  be 
obeyed  and  respected  accordingly. 

13.  Civilians,  who  may  be  employed  as  ordinary  mechanics  and 
laborers,  will  be  entitled  to  the  same  pay  and  rations  as  enlisted  men 
detailed  for  service  in  the  Construction  Corps,  and  must  conform  to  the 
rules,  regulations,  and  discipline  of  the  Corps  in  every  particular.    In 
case  of  dismissal  for  improper  conduct,  neglect  of  duty,  or  other  cause, 
the  officer  in  command  may  require  the  forfeiture  of  any  back  pay  that 
may  at  the  time  be  due,  which  may  be  given  to  others  as  premiums  for 
good  conduct,  or  extra  services,  or  otherwise  appropriated  at  the  discre 
tion  of  the  officer  in  command. 


66  REMINISCENCES   OF 

14.  A  diary  shall  be  kept  by  the  Adjutant,  and  a  quarterly  report 
compiled  from  the  diary  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Department  Com 
mander,  in  which  shall  be  given  the  names  of  all  who  have  been  distin 
guished  by  efficient  services,  and  also  the  names  of  those  who  have  been 
sent  to  their  regiments  in  consequence  of  misconduct  or  inefficiency. 

15.  It  is  expected  that  all  who  have  volunteered  in  defense  of  their 
country  in  the  present  eventful  crisis  are,  and  will  show  themselves  to 
be,  gentlemen  as  well  as  soldiers.     No  one  whose  deportment  and  conver 
sation  prove  that  he  is  not  such,  can  remain  a  member  of  the  Construc 
tion  Corps  of  the  Rappahannock  for  a  longer  time  than  may  be  necessary 
to  procure  a  substitute. 

H.  HAUPT,  A.  D.  C., 

Colonel  of  Staff, 

Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 
Department  of  fiappahannock. 

Considering,  in  June,  that  I  had  performed  the  duties  for 
which  I  had  been  summoned  to  Washington,  and,  with  a  view  to 
retirement,  I  sent  this  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War : 

ALEXANDRIA,  June  20,  1862. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 

DEAR  SIR  :  It  is  now  two  months  since  I  was  summoned  to  Wash 
ington  by  your  telegram,  and  was  informed  that  the  service  required  of 
me  was  the  prompt  reconstruction  of  the  railroad  from  Acquia  Creek  to 
'  Fredericksburg,  to  facilitate  a  movement  against  Richmond.  I  consented 
to  perform  the  service  in  the  belief  that  the  time  required  would  not 
exceed  two  or  three  weeks,  and  that  necessity  for  my  continuance  would 
then  be  at  an  end ;  but  when  the  Fredericksburg  line  was  opened  and  put 
in  successful  operation,  it  became_an  urgent  military  necessity  that  the 
injured  portion  of  the  line  to  Front  Royal  should  be  reconstructed. 

This  was  promptly  done  by  the  Construction  Corps  under  my  direc 
tion.  I  then  found  that  the  transportation  was  in  a  state  of  great  con 
fusion,  and  required  reorganization;  this  duty  has  occupied  my  time 
since  the  opening  of  the  road  to  Front  Royal,  but  now  I  am  able  to  an 
nounce  that  the  communications  are  all  open,  the  roads  in  good  condition, 
the  trains  running  regularly  to  schedule,  abundant  supplies  of  stores  for 
a  week  or  more  in  advance  already  transported,  and  no  probability  of 
any  new  work  for  the  Construction  Corps  for  several  weeks.  Under  these 
circumstances  no  imperative  necessity  exists  for  my  personal  presence, 
and  I  propose  to  return  to  Massachusetts  and  give  some  attention  to  my 
financial  affairs,  which  are  in  much  confusion,  consequent  upon  my  long 
and  unexpected  absence. 

In  the  way  of  compensation,  I  desire  nothing.  I  cannot  draw  pay 
as  Colonel,  because  I  have  not  complied  with  the  forms  and  cannot  sub 
scribe  to  the  certificates.  All  I  ask  is  that  cash  I  have  actually  paid  out 
since  my  connection  with  the  service  shall  be  returned  to  me  from  the 
contingent  or  other  fund.  If  acceptable  to  the  Department,  I  will  con 
tinue  for  a  time  to  give  my  services  in  the  same  way;  that  is,  by  the  re 
payment  of  actual  expenditures,  but  the  condition  of  my  pecuniary  and 
domestic  affairs,  and  my  business  engagements  are  such  as  to  prevent  me 
from  accepting  any  permanent  position  in  connection  with  the  army 
that  will  remove  me  from  the  vicinity  of  Boston. 

I  find  that  my  pay  and  commutations  as  Colonel  would  amount,  for 
the  time  employed,  to  over  $500,  while  my  expenditures,  portions  of  which 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  67 

have  been  for  supplies  used  by  assistants  and  foremen,  do  not  much  ex 
ceed  $300,  including  traveling  expenses.     This  is  all  I  ask  to  be  repaid. 

With  many  thanks  for  your  kindness,  and  with  a  grateful  sense  of 
obligation  for  the  consideration  I  have  received  at  your  hands,  I  remain, 

Yours  very  respectfully, 

H.  HAUPT. 

To  this  letter  no  answer  was  returned. 

To  prevent  certain  abuses  by  officers,  I  was  compelled  to  issue 
the  following  in  reference  to  the  use  of  Military  Railroads : 

GENERAL  ORDERS,  June  25>  1862' 

No.  7. 

The  following  regulations  are  published  for  the  information  and 
government  of  all  concerned: 

Assistant  Quartermasters  and  Commissaries  are  positively  forbid 
den  to  load  cars,  or  parts  of  cars,  on  any  of  the  Military  Railroads  of  the 
Department  of  the  Rappahannock  with  any  freights  which  are  not 
strictly  and  properly  included  in  Quartermaster  and  Commissary  stores. 
They  shall  not  load,  or  permit  to  be  loaded  by  any  employee,  any  articles 
for  the  private  use  of  officers,  whatever  may  be  their  rank  or  position,  or 
for  sutlers  or  individuals. 

Sutlers  will  be  allowed  transportation  on  the  railroads  of  the  De 
partment  only  on  a  permit  from  the  Quartermaster-General.  They  shall 
certify  the  quantity  and  kind  of  goods,  and  the  contents  and  marks  of 
all  boxes,  barrels,  and  packages  for  which  transportation  is  desired.  Sut 
lers'  goods  shall  be  carried  only  at  the  convenience  of  the  Transportation 
Department,  and  must  not,  in  any  case,  be  allowed  to  interfere  with 
army  supplies.  They  shall  at  any  time,  and  in  any  place,  be  subject  to 
examination  so  long  as  they  are  under  the  control  of  the  Transportation 
Department ;  and  for  any  false  statement  or  concealment  of  facts,  all  the 
goods  of  said  sutler  will  be  liable  to  seizure  and  confiscation,  and  he  will 
forfeit  all  right  to  transportation  in  future. 

The  use  of  the  names  of  officers  upon  boxes,  trunks,  or  packages, 
shall  not  shield  them  from  examination,  or  confiscation,  if  found  to  con 
tain  improper  articles;  and  if  the  name  of  an  officer  shall  have  been  used 
without  his  consent,  the  goods  shall  be  confiscated,  and  the  party  using 
it  deprived  of  the  right  of  transportation. 

Hospital  stores  must  be  directed  to  the  senior  medical  officer  at  the 
place  of  destination,  and  to  the  care  of  the  Superintendent  of  the  road, 
who  will  use  his  discretion  as  to  examination. 

Any  officer  who  shall  allow  his  name  to  be  used  by  sutlers  or  others 
to  secure  transportation  for  that  which  is  not  his  own  personal  property, 
will  be  considered  as  guilty  of  conduct  unbecoming  an  officer  and  a  gen 
tleman. 

Articles  intended  for  private  use  of  officers  and  soldiers,  may  be 
sent  by  Adams'  Express  Company;  but  all  such  articles  will  be  subject 
to  examination  by  the  Provost  Marshal. 

Freights  for  individuals  residing  011  the  line  of  any  Military  Rail 
road  shall  not  be  carried  if  the  parties  are  known  to  be  disloyal ;  all  other 
individual  freights  which  it  may  be  proper  to  transport  over  the  Military 
Railroads  of  the  Department  shall  be  carried  by  Adams'  Express  Com- 


68  REMINISCENCES. 

pany,  subject  to  such  rules,  to  such  charges,  and  to  such  examination  as 
the  Chief  of  Transportation  may  approve. 
By  order  of  Major-Oeneral  McDowell. 

H.  HAUPT,  A.  D.  C., 

Colonel  of  Staff, 

Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 
Department  of  the  Rappahannock. 

The  within  regulations  have  been  submitted  to  me,  and  meet  with 
my  approval. 

JAS.  S.  WADSWOKTH, 

Brigadier-  General. 


CHAPTER  II. 
SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

NOTWITHSTANDING  my  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War  of 
Jime  20,  1862,  I  was  not  relieved.  So  long  as  General  Mc 
Dowell  remained  in  command,  he  was  not  willing  that  my  services 
should  be  dispensed  with,  but  on  June  26,  1862,  General  Pope  took 
command  and  McDowell  assumed  the  position  of  a  subordinate. 

General  Pope  did  not  recognize  me  in  any  way,  and  gave  me 
no  instructions.  After  this  state  of  things  had  continued  for  some 
time,  I  asked  McDowell  for  an  explanation.  He  said  that  the 
subject  had  been  frequently  discussed,  but  that  General  Pope  con 
sidered  that  a  separate  and  independent  department  for  the  con 
struction  and  operation  of  the  railroads  was  unnecessary.  Rail 
roads,  he  contended,  were  used  for  the  transportation  of  army  sup 
plies  and  should  be  under  the  direction,  control  and  management 
of  the  Quartermaster's  Department. 

McDowell  said  all  he  could  to  convince  Pope  of  his  error ;  had 
told  him  that  under  the  old  regime  his  army  had  never  been  prop 
erly  supplied ;  that  if  he  had  relied  entirely  upon  his  wagon  trains, 
his  movements  could  have  been  made  with  more  celerity  and  cer 
tainty  than  when  dependent  upon  the  railroads,  but  that  under  my 
administration  there  had  been  no  deficiencies  that  it  would  have 
been  possible  for  the  railroads  to  supply;  but  all  his  efforts  were 
futile  to  change  Pope's  opinion. 

I  thanked  General  McDowell  for  his  frank  explanation  and 
said  that,  as  I  was  no  longer  needed,  I  would  return  to  Massachu 
setts.  I  called  at  the  War  Department  and  explained  to  Assistant 
Secretary  Peter  H.  Watson  the  condition  of  affairs,  and  then  re 
turned  to  my  residence  in  Cambridge,  having  said  to  Watson  that 
if  I  was  again  needed  he  could  send  for  me,  and  requesting  him 
to  keep  me  posted  occasionally  as  to  movements. 

The  first  letter,  received  a  few  days  after  my  return  to  Cam 
bridge,  stated  that  things  were  still  working  smoothly,  and  re 
marked  that  if  other  departments  had  been  as  well  organized  and 
managed  as  the  Military  Railroads,  "the  war  chariots  would  not 
have  been  so  frequently  off  the  track;"  but  soon  after  I  received 
from  Assistant  Secretary  Watson  a  telegram  in  these  words: 

69 


70  REMINISCENCES   OF 

/   "Come  back  immediate!}- ;  cannot  get  along  without  you;  not  a 
wheel  moving  on  any  of  the  roads." 

I  returned  as  requested,  and,  after  an  interview  with  Watson, 
took  an  engine  and  rode  to  the  nearest  point  to  Pope's  Headquar 
ters,  which  was  at  a  farm  house  near  Cedar  Mountain,  where  the 
battle  had  occurred  a  few  days  before.  During  my  absence,  July 
\  23,  General  Halleck  had  been  placed  in  command  as  General-in- 
Chief  of  all  the  armies. 

I  arrived  at  Headquarters  at  Cedar  Mountain  August  18,  and 
found  Generals  Pope  and  McDowell  with  members  of  the  staff  in 
a  farm  house.  I  was  cordially  welcomed  back,  especially  by  Mc 
Dowell,  and  General  Pope  was  quite  civil.  After  a  brief  conver 
sation,  he  turned  to  his  chief  of  staff,  Colonel  Geo.  D.  Ruggles, 
and  directed  him  to  issue  any  orders  I  might  dictate,  and  then  told 
me  to  dictate  such  orders  as  I  considered  necessary.  They  were  as 
follows : 

CEDAR  MOUNTAIN,  August  18,  1862. 
GENERAL  OEDERS, 
No.  23. 

All  railroads,  and  especially  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad, 
within  the  limits  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  are  placed  under  the  exclusive 
charge  of  Colonel  Herman  Haupt. 

No  other  officer,  whatever  be  his  rank,  shall  give  any  orders  to  any 
employe  of  the  road,  whether  conductor,  engineer,  or  other  agent.  No 
orders  respecting  the  running  of  the  trains,  construction  or  repair  of 
the  roads,  transportation  of  supplies  or  troops,  shall  be  given,  except  by 
authority  of  these  Headquarters  through  Colonel  Haupt. 

All  persons  now  employed  in  any  way  on  these  railroads  will  imme 
diately  report  to  him,  and  will  hereafter  receive  instructions  from  him 
only. 

All  requisitions  for  transportation,  and  all  applications  for  con 
struction  or  repair  of  roads,  will  be.  made  directly  to  him  at  Alexan 
dria,  Va. 

All  passes  given  by  him  to  employes  will  be  respected  as  if  issued 
from  these  Headquarters. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Pope. 

GEO.  D.  RUGGLES, 
Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  D.  C.,  August  19,  1862. 

Ordered:  That  the  Department  of  Colonel  Herman  Haupt,  for 
merly  Aide-de-Camp  to  Major-General  McDowell,  and  Chief  of  Con 
struction  and  Transportation  in  the  Army  of  the  Rappahannock,  is  here 
by  extended  to  embrace  all  the  railroads  which  are  or  may  hereafter 
v  be  included  within  the  lines  of  operation  of  the  Army  of  Virginia;  and 
the  instructions  of  May  28, 1862  [see  page  54] ,  are  continued  in  full  force. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

After  giving  orders  to  Colonel  Ruggles,  General  Pope  mount 
ed  his  horse  and  rode  off  to  review  one  of  the  Corps,  but  returned 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  7S 

in  haste  in  about  an  hour  with  the  information  that  the  enemy  was 
in  full  force  in  front  and  advancing  rapidly.  He  ordered  an  im 
mediate  retreat,  and  turning  to  me  requested  that  I  would  do  all  in 
my  power  to  remove  the  stores  at  Culpepper,  where  a  large  amount 
had  been  collected. 

I  immediately  took  an  ambulance,  and,  in  company  with  Gen 
eral  B.  S.  Roberts,  Chief  of  Cavalry,  rode  to  Culpepper  and  suc 
ceeded  in  reloading  all  the  stores  and  sending  them  to  a  safe  dis 
tance  in  the  rear.  I  then  turned  my  attention  to  reorganizing  the 
transportation,  which  had  again  been  thrown  into  confusion  from 
the  usual  causes — military  interference,  neglect  to  unload  and 
return  cars,  too  many  heads,  and,  as  a  consequence,  conflicting  or 
ders.  General  Pope  had  at  last  discovered  that  a  railroad  could 
not  be  run  successfuHy  with  more  than  one  person  to  give  orders. 

The  retrograde  movement  commenced  August  18,  and  was  so 
expeditious  that,  as  General  Pope  reported  the  next  day  (August 
19),  his  whole  army  was  posted  behind  the  Rappahannock. 

On  the  21st  and  22d  the  enemy  made  unsuccessful  attempts 
to  force  a  passage  in  front,  and  then  commenced  a  flank  movement. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  22d  I  returned  to  the  front  to  ascer 
tain  the  condition  of  affairs  and  the  requirements  of  the  army  in 
the  way  of  transportation.  I  found  General  Pope  at  some  dis 
tance  from  the  railroad,  seated  under  a  tree  on  a  hill  which  over 
looked  the  valley  and  the  country  beyond.  I  remained  perhaps 
two  hours,  during  which  reports  were  made  to  the  General  to  the 
effect  that  the  enemy's  wagons  had  for  some  time  been  moving  up 
the  river. 

This  appeared  to  me  to  indicate  a  flank  movement,  and  I  asked 
General  Pope  how  far  he  had  his  scouts  up  the  river.  The  distance 
named  was  not  great,  and  I  then  asked:  "Is  that  far  enough? 
What  is  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  going  even  as  far  as  Thorough 
fare  Gap  and  getting  behind  you  ?" 

He  replied :  "There  is  no  danger."  I  did  not  wish  to  press 
him  with  further  questions,  thinking  he  might  consider  me  im 
pertinent  and  that  his  sources  of  information  were  better  than 
mine;  but  I  felt  uneasy,  and  soon  after  returned  to  the  railroad, 
and  started  towards  Alexandria. 

I  had  passed  Catlett's  and  reached  Manassas  when  the  opera 
tor  handed  me  a  telegram  from  General  Pope:  "The  enemy  in 
largely  superior  force  has  turned  my  right  flank/'  and  requesting 
me  to  retire  the  rolling  stock  to  a  safe  distance. 

The  next  train  following  me  had  been  fired  into  and  captured, 
and  about  the  same  time  Pope's  Headquarters  was  raided  by 
Stuart's  cavalry. 

I  could  not  withdraw  the  rolling  stock,  as  General  Pope  had 


74  REMINISCENCES   OF 

ordered  a  large  amount  to  the  front,  and  between  it  and  myself 
there  was  a  large  force  of  the  enemy.  I  should  myself  have  been 
captured  had  I  been  half  an  hour  later. 

At  Burkes  Station  I  met  General  Philip  Kearney  moving  in 
cars  to  the  front  with  part  of  his  command.  I  told  him  I  had  im 
portant  information,  and  asked  him  to  come  to  the  office  where  I 
could  have  a  private  conversation.  I  then  showed  him  the  tele 
gram  from  General  Pope,  and  explained  the  situation.  He  asked 
me  to  let  him  have  a  pilot  engine  and  two  flat  cars  to  send  with  a 
guard  in  advance  of  his  trains.  This  was  certainly  a  very  haz 
ardous  duty  for  train  men,  but  they  never  hesitated  on  this,  or  on 
any  other  occasion,  where  the  danger  was  as  great  as  if  they  had 
been  in  line  of  battle.  In  fact,  several  of  my  men  were  killed  and 
others  captured  during  the  war. 

The  engine  and  cars  were  furnished,  and  that  was  the  last  I 
saw  of  General  Kearney.  He  was  killed  at  Chantilly. 

Neither  did  I  see  Generals  Pope  or  McDowell  again  until 
after  the  battle.  A  few  telegrams  passed  between  us,  when  the 
wires  were  cut  and  all  communication  interrupted. 

Prom  General  Pope's  report,  I  make  a  few  extracts : 

On  the  night  of  the  24th  a  dispatch  was  received  from  Colonel 
Haupt  that  30,000  men  had  demanded  transportation  and  would  be 
shipped  this  afternoon  and  next  day.  *  *  * 

On  the  night  of  the  25th  I  sent  an  order  to  Colonel  Haupt  to  direct 
one  of  the  strongest  Corps  to  take  part  at  Manassas  Junction,  and  Gen. 
Franklin  to  march,  as  he  could  move  as  rapidly  as  by  rail  with  the  limited 
transportation.*  *  * 

At  8  p.  M.,  on  the  night  of  the  26th,  Jackson's  force  had  passed 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  Had  Franklin  been  at  Centreville,  or  Cox  and  Stur- 
gis  even  as  far  as  Bull  Run,  this  move  of  Jackson's  would  have  been  im 
practicable. 

From  August  18  to  the  morning  of  the  27th,  my  troops  had  been 
continuously  marching  and  fighting  night  and  day. 

August  31,  there  were  not  five  horses  to  a  company  that  could  be 
forced-  into  a  trot.  *  *  * 

September  1st,  near  sunset,  Kearney  and  Stevens  were  killed. 

The  forces  that  joined  General  Pope  were  Reynolds'  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves,  2,500,  August  23 ;  Heintzelman  and  Porter, 
August  26  and  27.  The  Pennsylvania  Reserves  and  Heintzel- 
man's  Corps,  consisting  of  Hooker's  and  Kearney's  commands, 
rendered  efficient  service.  Porter's  Corps  took  no  part  except  in 
the  action  of  August  30.  "This  small  fraction  of  20,500  men  was 
all  that  drew  trigger  of  the  91,000  veteran  troops  from  Harrison's 
Landing." 

September  1  General  Pope  reported  to  General  Halleck  that 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  demoralized  owing  to  a  change  of 
commanders,  and  added :  "Where  there  is  no  heart  in  the  leaders 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  75 

and  every  disposition  to  hang  back,  much  cannot  be  expected  from 
the  men." 

There  seemed  to  be  good  reasons  for  this  complaint.  The 
distance  from  Alexandria  to  Bull  Run  is  not  twenty  miles,  and  as 
most  of  the  camps  were  four  miles  south  of  Alexandria,  it  would 
have  been  but  a  short  day's  march  to  join  General  Pope ;  but  troops 
were  in  camp  several  days  demanding  transportation  by  rail  which 
could  not  be  furnished. 

As  General  Pope  says,  less  than  one-fourth  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  rendered  him  any  assistance.  Had  they  marched,  nearly 
all  could  have  rendered  good  service  in  the  action,  and  the  result 
would  probably  have  been  changed. 

It  does  not  admit  of  question  that,  if  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  ready  to  ride  into  action  on  railroad  trains,  it  would  have  been 
in  a  better  position  for  action  after  one  day's  march.  To  wait 
three  or  four  days,  as  was  the  case,  demanding  rail  transportation, 
seems  to  have  been  only  an  excuse.  The  trouble  seems  to  have  been 
an  indisposition  on  the  part  of  McOlellan  to  assist  Pope  in  gaining 
a  victory.  In  one  case  where  I  furnished  them,  cars  remained  for 
hours  unused,  and  were  then  withdrawn  and  used  to  forward 
supplies. 

The  successful  flank  movements  of  Lee's  Army  cut  off  all 
telegraphic  communication  with  General  Pope,  and  no  further  in 
struction  could  be  received  from  him.  I  was  compelled  to  use  my 
own  judgment  and  to  assume  much  responsibility.  I  sent  out 
operators  with  pocket  instruments  to  push  their  way  to  the  front, 
climb  trees,  make  observations,  and  report  all  they  saw  and  heard, 
and  for  some  time  all  the  information  received  at  Washington  came 
through  my  office. 

During  this  time  the  President  was  in  a  state  of  great  anxiety, 
and  frequently  telegraphed  to  know  if  any  further  information 
had  been  received. 

The  following  letters  and  telegrams,  many  of  which  are  not 
found  in  the  records  of  the  office,  will  throw  light  upon  the  opera 
tions  of  the  campaign : 

KAPPAHANNOCK  CROSSING,  August  20,  1862. 
Col.  Herman  Haupt,  Superintendent  of  Railroads,  Alexandria: 

I  wish  a  train  of  20  cars  for  subsistence  to  be  kept  constantly  at  the 
order  of  E.  G.  Beckwith,  Chief  of  Commissary,  at  these  Headquarters. 

This  train  is  required  to  keep  the  troops  supplied  with  rations,  as 
I  am  about  to  send  back  all  my  wagons  and  wish  no  depot.  I  wish  you 
would  see  that  this  train  runs  regularly  according  to  its  orders,  as  we 
depend  upon  it  for  the  daily  bread  of  this  command.  I  desire  also  that 
you  send  nearly  the  whole  of  the  rolling  stock  of  the  road  to  be  switched 
off  on  the  side-tracks,  either  at  Catlett's  or  Warrenton  Junction,  so  that 
in  case  of  necessity  I  can  carry  off  all  the  baggage  and  material  of  the 


76  REMINISCENCES   OF 

army  by  railroad  at  the  shortest  notice.    I  shall  have  no  wagons  left 
here  for  that  purpose. 

Inform  General  Halleck  whether  you  station  the  trains  at  Catlett's 
or  Warrenton  Junction.  JOHN  POPE, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

August  20,  1862. 
Major-General  Pope: 

I  am  sending  to  Manassas  to-night  all  cars  loaded  with  stores  not 
immediately  required.  \Ve  will  have  60  cars  sent  to  Warrenton  Junction 
to-morrow.  Forage  has  all  been  sent  forward,  and,  taking  it  for  granted 
that  you  will  want  more,  I  have  ordered  a  part  of  the  60  cars  to  be  loaded 
with  forage.  1  have  informed  General  Halleck  that  60  cars  will  be  at 
Warrenton  Junction  to-morrow  for  use  in  case  of  need.  You  will  under 
stand  that  this  will  concentrate  our  power  at  this  end,  and  we  will  be 
short  at  Alexandria  if  troops  are  to  be  forwarded. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  20,  1862. 
Major-General  Hailed: : 

I  have  ordered  the  siding  at  Rappahannock  to  be  immediately  ex 
tended  to  hold  20  cars  of  commissary  stores.  20  cars  more  will  be  kept 
back  at  next  station  to  replace  the  first  when  empty.  Stores  not  imme 
diately  required,  I  have  sent  and  am  sending  to  Manassas.  To-morrow 
morning  60  empty  cars  will  be  at  Warrenton  Junction  to  use  in  case  of 
necessity.  If  you  intend  to  order  Sturgis'  command  forward,  please  let 
me  know,  as  there  will  be  some  trouble  in  arranging  transportation;  all 

our  power  may  be  at  this,  the  south  end.  -rrorri 

H.  rTA  UJrT, 

August  21, 1862. 
Colonel  Geo.  D.  Ruggles: 

Sixty  empty  cars  await  your  orders  at  Warrenton  Junction.  I  have 
stationed  J.  D.  Irish  at  Rappahannock  Station,  who  will  receive  and 
carry  out  your  directions  about  cars.  Do  you  wish  to  move  the  baggage 
of  the  whole  command?  If  so,  how  far — to  Catlett's,  to  Manassas,  or 
where  ?  I  am  coming  back  this  morning ;  where  will  I  find  you  ? 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  21, 1862. 
Major-General  Pope: 

Troops  under  command  of  General  Kearney  are  understood  to  be 
lying  in  transports  at  Alexandria.  No  applications  for  transportation, 
and  no  replies  to  my  inquiries  about  destination.  Only  orders  received 
have  been  to  remove  the  34th  Massachusetts  to  Banks  this  afternoon.  At 
what  point  shall  they  leave  the  cars  ?  I  am  returning  to  Rappahannock. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  21, 1862. 
P.  H.  Watson,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Please  request  the  proper  officer  to  keep  me  advised  of  troops  that 
are  coming,  who  is  in  command,  what  are  their  numbers,  what  their  des 
tination,  and  other  particulars  required  to  arrange  transportation.  20,000 
men  have  just  been  thrown  upon  us  when  we  require  another  day  of  regu 
lar  movement  to  remove  those  previously  on  our  hands. 

H.  HAUPT. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  77 

August  21, 1862. 
Major-General  Halleclc,  Washington,  D.  C.: 

General  Pope  has  this  day  informed  me  that  he  expects  reinforce 
ments  from  the  West  and  from  other  sources.  Will  you  please  inform 
me  as  early  in  advance  as  practicable,  what  will  be  the  probable  demands 
for  transportation,  and  at  what  time,  as  it  will  be  necessary  to  return 
power  from  the  south  end  of  the  line,  where  it  is  held  in  reserve  to  meet 

the  demand  when  it  arises.  TT   TT  .  TTTirr( 

±1.  JtiAUlr  1. 

August  21, 1862. 
D.  C.  McCallum,  Washington: 

I  received  your  telegram  on  the  field  with  General  Pope;  referred 
it  at  once  to  him.  The  condition  of  affairs  is  such  that  no  reliable  infor 
mation  can  be  given  in  regard  to  the  permanent  demands  of  transporta 
tion.  At  present  all  the  capacity  of  cars  and  engines  is  taxed  to  the 
utmost.  Nothing  is  unloaded;  no  depots  made;  forage  and  commissary 
stores  delivered  from  cars — a  large  number;  60  empty  cars  held  at  War- 
renton  Junction  to  meet  a  sudden  demand.  Cars  also  required  at  Alex 
andria  to  forward  troops  expected  to  arrive  as  reinforcements.  General 
Pope  says  send  no  rolling  stock  away  at  present. 

H.  HAUPT. 

RAPPAHANNOCK,  11 :40  p.  M.,  August  21, 1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

I  wish  you  to  send  engines  enough  to  take  away  all  the  cars  here 
early  in  the  morning,  should  it  become  necessary. 

JOHN  POPE, 

Major-  General. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  August  22,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Troops  will  be  arriving  to-day  or  to-morrow  at  Alexandria  for  the 
line  of  the  Rappahannock,  probably  in  the  next  forty -eight  (48)  hours 

from  ten  to  fifteen  thousand  (15,000).  ^mr 

JQ.  W.  xiA.L.Lli.OiV, 

General-in-Chief. 

ALEXANDRIA,  August  22. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

General  Kearney  is  here,  and  Major  Keyes  with  orders  from  Gen 
eral  Halleck  to  send  the  soldiers,  now  waiting  here,  forthwith.  They  will 
insist  on  getting  them  off  without  regard  to  schedule. 

J.  H.  DEVEREUX. 

August  22,  1862. 
J.  H.  Devereux: 

We  must  conform  to  your  present  arrangement,  but  it  is  all  wrong. 
Neither  General  Halleck  or  anyone  else  has  any  right  to  give  orders  in 
regard  to  trains  in  opposition  to  my  instructions.  I  want  the  schedule 
restored  to-morrow.  You  can  run  extras  between,  but  the  regulars  must 
run,  or  I  will  decline  all  responsibility.  The  doctors  have  been  assured 
that  the  schedule  would  be  conformed  to,  and  they  must  have  their  sick 
and  wounded  ready.  I  hope  to  reach  Alexandria  some  time  or  other, 
when  I  will  ascertain  particulars.  TTT»m 

M.  HAuJrl. 


78  REMINISCENCES   OF 

RAPPAHANNOCK  CROSSING,  10 :30  p.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Push  forward  the  troops  to  Catlett's  at  daybreak  in  the  morning. 
Halt  all  troops  coming  up  at  Catlett's.    Keep  the  road  open. 
By  command  of  Major-General  Pope. 

GEO.  D.  EUGGLES, 
Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

August  22,  1862. 
Geo.  D.  Ruggles,  Chief  of  Staff: 

^  I  had  made  arrangements  to  use  all  the  power  necessary  before  the 
receipt  of  your  telegram,  leaving  only  two  engines  at  lower  end  to  supply 
forage  and  commissary  stores.  My  arrangements  have  been  interfered 
with  by  orders,  which  the  Superintendent  says  came  from  General  Hal- 
leek,  to  forward  troops  as  fast  as  they  could  be  loaded.  The  schedule 
has  been  set  aside,  and  everything  is  in  confusion ;  trains  are  on  the  road, 
and  we  cannot  tell  where,  and  cars  cannot  be  sent  in. 

I  have  censured  the  Superintendent  in  strong  terms,  and  would 
suspend  him  if  I  had  any  one  else  capable  of  performing  his  duties.  So 
long  as  I  am  responsible  for  the  management,  no  orders  except  from  my 
self  or  through  me  must  be  respected. 

I  will  investigate  this  matter,  if  I  can  succeed  in  reaching  Alexan 
dria.  The  train  which  left  Rappahannock  before  noon  is  still  detained 
here,  as  well  as  three  others  that  came  after  it ;  all  of  them  waiting  orders. 
I  fear  much  trouble,  but  will  do  all  I  can  to  keep  things  moving. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  22. 
J.  H.  Devereux: 

General  Pope  orders  all  the  rolling  stock  to  Alexandria  to  bring  up 
troops.  You  can  order  it  forward  as  you  can  use  it.  We  have  several 
engines  and  cars  at  Manassas  waiting  orders  to  go  to  Alexandria.  Is  it 
probable  that  they  will  be  received  before  morning  ?  If  not,  do  not  keep 

train  hands  waiting  all  night.  .  ^^^ 

M.  MAUJrl. 

August  22,  1862. 
McCriclcett: 

Forward  such  troops  as  General  Robinson  may  wish  to  send  imme 
diately;  send  light  engine  in  advance  as  pilot;  examine  well  the  bridges 
and  the  cut  near  Bristoe.  Send  flat  car  with  engine. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  22, 1862. 
Major-General  Pope: 

The  34th  Massachusetts  were  not  in  a  condition  for  immediate 
service,  and  I  did  not  consider  it  proper  to  send  them  up.  They  were 
without  caps  and  without  cooked  rations.  By  9  A.  M.  5,400  men  in  all 
will  have  reached  Manassas.  We  will  continue  to  send  forward  as  rap 
idly  as  cars  can  be  returned.  We  have  sent  all  who  have  applied  for 
transportation,  except  the  34th  Massachusetts,  and  they  will  go  at  noon. 
I  have  made  inquiries,  but  cannot  find  General  Heintzelman;  will  send 
again.  The  troops  sent,  I  understand,  belong  to  General  Kearney.  Do 
you  wish  the  instructions  given  to  Colonel  Wells,  34th  Massachusetts, 
changed?  H.  HAUPT. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  79 

August  22,  1862. 
Major-General  Pope: 

The  whole  number  of  men  sent  to  Catlett's  at  9  A.  M.  was  6,600. 
Watson  telegraphs  that  Cox's  Division  will  reach  the  Avenue  in  two 
hours,  and  engines  will  be  sent  to  bring  the  cars  without  unloading;  this 
will  help  some.  If  we  can  get  our  engines  back,  we  will  be  in  shape  to 
rush  troops  ahead  with  great  rapidity,  but  none  have  as  yet  been  re 
turned.  I  have  a  messenger  out  in  search  of  General  Heintzelman,  but 

he  has  not  yet  been  found.  TT   -n-  A  -rmrn 

±1.  MAUlrl. 

WASHINGTON,  August  22,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

If  you  cannot  move  the  trains  beyond  Catlett's  Station,  land  all 
the  troops  at  that  place,  and  keep  your  rolling  stock  this  side  and  out  of 
danger.  Expect  large  arrivals  at  Alexandria  to-morrow,  and  make  prep 
arations  to  take  them  forward  to  General  Pope. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

General-in-Chief. 

August  22,  1862. 
Major-General  Hallecfc: 

What  you  order  in  regard  to  subsistence  is  precisely  in  accordance 
with  my  directions.  What  is  needed  for  subsistence  must  take  pre 
cedence  of  everything  else,  but  no  accumulation  of  stores  in  front  to  be 
permitted. 


RAPPAHANNOCK  CROSSING,  11:20  p.  M. 

August  22,  1862, 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Let  no  train  pass  Manassas  except  those  containing  troops.  Trains 
containing  troops  will  be  sent  forward  to  Catlett's  at  once.  You  had 
best  send  down  to  get  the  cars  that  are  here,  if  there  are  no  locomotives 
here;  otherwise,  telegraph  to  the  proper  person  here  to  have  them  sent 
immediately  to  Catlett's.  Everything  that  has  to  be  transported  by  cars 

must  be  loaded  before  they  leave  here.  -n^-n-n 

JUJtLISJ  JrOJrJcj, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

RAPPAHANNOCK  CROSSING,  11  :40  p.  M. 

August  22,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt  : 

Say  to  Generals  Heintzelman,  Ccx  and  Sturgis,  as  they  come  for 
ward  with  their  troops,  to  halt  them  at  Warrenton  Junction,  or  on  Cedar 
Creek,  and  take  up  a  position  there  against  any  force  of  the  enemy 
advancing  in  the  direction  of  Warrenton.  The  enemy  has  succeeded,  in 
greatly  superior  numbers,  in  turning  our  right  in  the  direction  of  Sul 
phur  Spring  and  Warrenton.  Ask  General  Heintzelman  to  endeavor  to 
keep  open  the  railroad  communication  between  Cedar  Creek  and  Rap- 
pahannock  Station.  I  have  ordered  a  force  back  to  Catlett's  Station. 
Send  forward  the  provision  trains  to  this  point. 

JOHN  POPE, 
Major-General  Commanding. 


80  REMINISCENCES   OF 

August  22,  1862. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

I  have  not  been  able  to  find  General  Heintzelman,  and  am  now  told 
that  he  is  in  Washington.  You  can  possibly  give  him  the  message. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  22. 
Major-General  Pope: 

Conductor  of  train  No.  6  from  Catlett's  just  in  ;  reports  train  fired 
into  by  rebels  at  Catlett's.  He  says  they  opened  throttle,  ran  through 
rebels  at  full  speed,  and  have  just  arrived.  The  train  hands  laid  down 
to  escape  bullets.  I  will  hold  trains  here  for  instructions.  I  can  only 
explain  the  occurrence  by  supposing  it  to  be  a  cavalry  dash.  We  have 
2,100  troops  here  in  cars. 

The  fire  was  from  both  sides,  but  most  heavy  from  the  east  side  of 
the  track.  H  HAUPT. 

August  22,  1862. 
P.  H.  Watson,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War: 

I  fear  that  I  may  be  compelled  to-night  to  do  that  which  may  ap 
pear  inhuman  —  turn  out  the  sick  in  the  street.  Doctors  will  persist  in 
sending  sick,  often  without  papers,  to  get  them  off  their  hands,  and  we 
cannot  send  forward  the  troops  if  we  must  run  our  trains  to  Washington 
with  sick,  to  stand  for  hours  unloaded.  My  first  care  is  to  send  forward 
troops,  next  forage  and  subsistence.  I  hope  to  start  forage  to-morrow 
noon.  Have  you  any  suggestions? 


About  midnight  I  had  been  waiting  in  much  anxiety  for  the 
arrival  of  four  trains,  then  some  hours  overdue,  when  a  conductor 
came  in  with  a  lantern  in  hand  and  reported  that  the  trains  had 
been  stopped  four  miles  out  of  town  by  order  of  General  Sturgis, 
who  had  assumed  control,  and  would  not  permit  them  to  be  moved. 
I  immediately  reported  the  situation  to  General  Halleck,  and  then 
started,  in  company  with  Superintendent  J.  H.  Devereux,  to  see 
the  officer  personally. 

When  I  reached  his  Headquarters,  the  General  was  seated  in 
an  arm-chair  surrounded  by  his  staff.  His  salutation  was,  "Well  ! 
I  am  glad  you  have  coine,  for  I  have  just  sent  a  guard  to  your  office 
to  put  you  in  arrest  for  disobedience  of  my  orders  in  failing  to 
transport  my  command." 

I  replied  that  I  was  acting  under  the  orders  of  General  Hal 
leck  ;  that  so  far  as  my  personal  comfort  was  concerned,  the  arrest 
would  be  quite  a  relief,  if  he  could  lend  me  a  blanket  and  allow  me 
a  corner  of  the  floor,  as  I  had  not  been  able  to  sleep  for  a  consider 
able  time,  and  a  few  hours  of  rest  would  be  quite  refreshing,  but 
he  must  understand  that  he  was  assuming  a  very  grave  responsibil 
ity  ;  the  trains  were  loaded  with  wounded  ;  the  surgeons  with  am 
bulances  were  waiting  for  them  at  the  depot;  the  engines  would 
'^'  soon  be  out  of  wood  and  water,  and  serious  delays  would  be  caused 
in  the  forwarding  of  troops  to  General  Pope. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  83 

The  General  exclaimed  in  an  excited  tone :  "I  don't  care  for 
John  Pope  a  pinch  of  owl  dung !" 

He  then  called  one  of  his  staff  and  whispered  something  which 
I  did  not  hear,  but  learned  subsequently  that  he  had  sent  an  order 
to  the  engineers  to  cut  loose  from  their  trains,  run  to  Alexandria 
for  wood  and  water  and  then  return.  As  there  was  but  a  single 
track  and  no  one  capable  of  performing  the  Munchausen  feat  of 
picking  up  the  engines  and  carrying  them  around  the  trains,  the 
order  could  not  be  executed. 

Soon  after,  an  Orderly  rode  up  and  delivered  to  me  a  dispatch 
from  General  Halleck  in  these  words:  "Eo  military  officer  has 
any  authority  to  interfere  with  your  control  over  railroads.  Show 
this  to  General  Sturgis,  and  if  he  attempts  to  interfere,  I  will 
arrest  him." 

I  tried  to  make  the  General  comprehend  this,  but  he  seemed 
to  think  that  the  dispatch  was  from  General  Pope,  and  several 
times  repeated  his  former  declaration:  "I  don't  care  for  John 
Pope  a  pinch,"  etc. 

At  last  Devereux  took  the  paper  from  my  hands  and  gave  it  to 
the  Chief  of  Staff  with  the  request  that  he  try  to  make  his  chief 
acquainted  with  the  contents. 

He  was  successful  at  length  in  conveying  the  information  that 
the  telegram  was  not  from  General  Pope  but  from  General  Halleck. 
"Who  did  you  say,  General  Halleck  ?  Yes,  I  respect  his  authority. 
What  does"he  say  ?" 

"He  says  if  you  interfere  with  the  railroads  he  will  put  you 
in  arrest." 

"He  does,  does  he  ?     Well,  then,  take  your  d d  railroad !" 

This  interference  deranged  the  trains  for  some  time  and  kept 
at  least  10,000  men  out  of  the  battle.  Assistant  Secretary  Watson 
wished  me  to  prefer  charges  and  have  the  General  court-martialed, 
but  as  he  was  not  in  his  normal  condition  at  the  time,  and  was  after 
wards  willing  to  carry  out  instructions  and  acknowledged  that  the 
delay  had  been  his  own  fault,  I  let  the  matter  drop. 

There  were  doubtless  others  who  entertained  the  same  feelings 
towards  General  Pope,  and  who  remained  in  camp  demanding  rail 
road  transportation,  knowing  they  could  march  to  the  field  in  one- 
third  of  the  time  required  to  furnish  it. 

The  road  was  but  a  single  track,  with  a  limited  equipment  of 
cars  and  engines,  and  these  were  detained  for  long  periods  at  the 
front  by  failure  of  the  proper  officers  to  unload  and  return  cars. 
As  a  consequence  it  was  impossible  to  forward  troops  with  the 
rapidity  that  would  otherwise  have  been  practicable;  besides,  it 
was  simply  absurd  to  wait  for  days  to  secure  rail  transportation 
when  a  march  of  a  single  day  would  have  carried  them  to  the  battle- 


84  REMINISCENCES   OF 

field,  particularly  when  it  is  considered  that  in  marching  they 
would  have  been  in  position  for  prompt  action,  while  in  cars  they 
were  defenseless. 

These  official  telegrams  are  instructive  : 

August  23,  1862. 
McCrickett  : 

General  Pope  orders  to  push  forward  all  troops  at  Catlett's  at  day 
break.  Have  everything  ready,  that  there  is  no  delay.  Start  before  day 
light  rather  than  later. 


August  23,  1862. 
McCrickett: 

As  it  is  now  day  there  seems  to  be  no  necessity  for  the  pilot  engine. 
The  troops  should  all  go  forward  as  far  as  the  track  is  in  order,  then 
march;  there  should  be  no  delay.  See  General  Kearney  immediately. 
Let  engine  return  and  report  the  condition  of  affairs,  which  you  will 
please  telegraph  immediately. 


August  23,  1862. 
P.  H.  Watson,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

We  have  forwarded  up  to  this  time,  since  yesterday  afternoon,  6,600 
men  to  Catlett's.  This  throws  our  power  at  the  other  end.  Until  it  can 
be  returned  our  capacity  is  very  limited.  We  will  send  an  engine  over 
to  bring  troops  of  Cox's  Division  to  Alexandria  and  make  up  train  in 
readiness  to  send  forward  when  engines  return.  Devereux  is  active  and 
efficient.  Being  compelled  to  hold  rolling  stock  in  readiness  to  remove 
supplies  in  case  of  an  attack  in  front,  this  flank  movement  puts  us  in 
bad  shape.  I  have  not  been  able  as  yet  to  hear  from  Catlett's  this  morn 
ing.  The  confusion  there  last  night  must  have  been  awful.  Nearly  all 
our  wagons  are  there.  Your  offer  to  send  cars  will  expedite  matters 
some.  I  will  keep  you  advised  of  everything  of  importance. 

H.  HAUPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  23,  1862,  9  :45  A.  M. 
Colonel  H.  Haupt: 

Is  it  not  of  the  utmost  importance  to  prevent  a  great  accumulation 
of  power  and  rolling  stock  at  the  outer  end  of  the  road?  If  the  enemy 
should,  by  sudden  dash,  burn  a  bridge  or  set  the  trains  on  fire,  it  would 
for  the  time  being  put  it  out  of  our  power  to  send  forward  either  regi- 
ments  or  supplies.  P.H.WATSON, 

Assistant  Secretary. 

August  24,  1862,  10:20  A.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

You  are,  as  usual,  perfectly  right.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  accu 
mulate  power  at  the  other  end.  The  orders  are,  run  up,  unload  and 
return  immediately  to  Manassas  ;  there  pass  trains  and  proceed  to  Alex 
andria.  None  of  the  power  has  yet  been  returned,  and  I  have  not  to  this 
time  been  able  to  get  an  answer  why. 

H.  HAUPT. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  85 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  23,  1862, 10:45  A.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Can  you  manage  in  some  way  to  make  it  understood  at  the  other 
end  of  the  road  that  cars  can  be  used  either  for  transportation  or  for 
warehouses,  but  not  for  both;  that  they  can  receive  reinforcements  and 
supplies  only  by  returning  the  cars?  p  H  WATSON 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 

August  23, 1862. 
General  Pope  : 

The  number  of  troops  now  sent  forward  is  6,600;  1,500  more  now 
marching  up  and  transportation  ready  for  them.  After  repeated  attempts 
for  hours  to  get  answer,  I  learned  that  the  track  is  clear,  the  bridges 
safe,  and  that  six  engines  and  trains  are  now  ready  to  return  to  Alexan 
dria.  There  must  have  been  great  delay  somewhere.  Please  order  some 
competent  officer  to  see  that  the  cars  are  unloaded  and  returned.  There 
will  be  no  relaxation  of  effort  on  our  part  so  long  as  we  can  hold  out. 
Shall  the  place  of  unloading  be  Warrenton  or  Catlett's  for  the  re 
mainder?  Nine  trains  will  be  returned  in  three  hours,  if  no  accident 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  23, 1862. 
Major-General  Pope: 

After  consulting  with  General  Kearney  I  have  ordered  one  regiment 
to  be  sent  to  Catlett's  immediately  with  a  small  engine,  one  flat  car, 
and  fifty  men  in  advance.  The  other  troops  will  be  advanced  as  rapidly 

as  possible'  H.  HAUPT. 

August  23, 1862.      "1 
McCrickett: 

After  reaching  Catlett's  General  Eobinson  will  send  back  a  pilot 
engine  to  give  you  notice,  when,  if  the  coast  is  clear,  send  forward  the 
whole  force  to  Warrenton,  or  as  near  it  as  they  can  get. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  23, 1862. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

If  General  Hooker  is  in  Washington,  please  ask  him  if  it  will  suit 
him  to  start  in  the  morning  instead  of  this  night.  Calls  have  been  made 
on  transportation,  which  were  not  expected,  and  delays  from  various 
causes  make  returns  of  power  slow.  We  keep  running  day  and  night, 
eat  little  and  sleep  almost  none.  20,000  more  troops  just  arrived. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  23,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Where  is  General  Heintzelman's  command  ?  Have  any  of  his  troops 
passed  Manassas  Junction  ?  What  troops  and  whose  are  on  the  way  ? 

JOHN  POPE, 

Major-General. 


86  REMINISCENCES   OF 

RAPPAHANNOCK,  August  23,  1862,  1  ill  A.  M. 
Colonel  H.  Haupt : 

Run  all  the  trains  here  back  till  they  meet  the  first  troops  at  War- 
renton  Junction  or  Catlett's.     Unload  them  there  and  then  send  all  the 
cars  and  locomotives  back  to  Alexandria  to  bring  up  troops. 
By  command  of  Major-General  Pope. 

GEO.  D.  RUGGLES, 
.,, .  Colonel  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

August  23,  1862,  M. 
Colonel  Haupt : 

Brought  all  the  cars  and  stores  away  excepting  about  three  loads 
forage  which  were  unloaded  last  night  and  burned  this  p.  M.  General 
Pope  is,  I  think,  going  towards  Warrenton  with  his  army;  has  given  in- 
stmctions  for  train  of  wagons  to  be  unloaded  here  with  C.  S.,  and  then 
sent  there  under  a  strong  escort;  will  do  what  we  can  to  work  empty 
cars  back  promptly.  J.D.IRISH. 

RAPPAHANNOCK  STATION,  August  23,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Hurry  forward  those  troops  from  Catlett's  to  Warrenton  to-night 
as  fast  as  you  possibly  can.  JOHN  POPE, 

Major-General. 

MANASSAS,  August  23,  1862. 
H.  Haupt  and  J.  H.  Devereux: 

It  is  expected  that  an  attack  will  be  made  on  this  place  to-night  by 
strong  cavalry  force,  and  that  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  burn  the  com 
missary  and  destroy  the  stores  lying  at  this  place.  I  have  one  loaded 
and  a  few  empty  cars  here.  Colonel  Pierce  has  telegraphed  to  General 
Sturgis  for  reinforcements.  I  do  not  know  how  reliable  this  may  be, 
but  consider  it  a  duty  to  advise  you.  McCRICKETT 

August  23, 1862, 11 :30  p.  M. 
McCriclcett: 

You  are  not  right  in  holding  trains  at  Junction.  You  cannot  be 
at  a  loss  for  sidings  when  you  have  the  Gap  and  Centreville  Roads  to 
stand  cars  upon.  The  Gap  intersection  is  at  some  distance,  but  it  would 
be  very  easy  to  order  trains  forward  by  a  preconcerted  signal  with  light. 
A  very  moderate  amount  of  ingenuity  should  devise  expedients  to  avoid 
delay  which  is  excessive.  H.  HAUPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  23, 1862. 
Colonel  H.  Haupt: 

Two  (2)  regiments  of  Cox's  Division  will  reach  here  within  an  hour 
or  two.  Can  they  be  sent  forward  to  Manassas,  or  such  other  point  as 
they  are  required,  in  the  same  cars  in  which  they  came  here?  Do  you 
find  any  difficulty  in  managing  the  railroad  ?  If  Quartermaster  or  other 
officers  refuse  or  neglect  to  obey  your  orders,  report  them  immediately, 
and  a  prompt  and  effectual  remedy  will  be  applied.  Answer  immedi 
ately.  P.  H.  WATSON, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  87 

HEADQUARTERS,  August  23, 1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Hurry  forward  with  all  possible  despatch  the  trains  of  troops,  or  our 
trains  will  be  in  danger.  JOHN  POPE, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

ALEXANDRIA,  VA.,  August  23,  1862. 
Colonel  H.  Haupt: 

I  have  very  peremptory  orders  from  the  General-in-Chief  to  get  my 
Division  off  by  railroad  to-night.  The  General  hoped  that  I  would  be 
able  to  get  in  behind  Kearney  and  ahead  of  Hooker.  The  greater  part  of 
my  Division  is  now  lying  along  the  road  waiting  for  transportation,  and 
I  trust  you  will  enable  me  to  report  to  the  General  that  I  have  left. 

S.  STURGIS, 

M  ajor-  General. 

ALEXANDRIA,  August  23,  1862. 
General  S.  Sturgis: 

If  ordered  by  either  General  Halleck  or  General  Pope,  I  will  be 
most  happy  to  comply  with  your  wishes,  and  give  your  command  prece 
dence  of  all  others,  but  until  so  ordered,  or  until  I  have  reason  to  believe 
that  these  officers  desire  General  Hooker's  command  to  be  separated  and 
carried  forward  at  intervals,  I  see  no  propriety  in  the  course  you  wish 
me  to  pursue.  I  beg  leave  respectfully  to  direct  your  attention  to  the 
enclosed  copy  of  General  Halleck's  order  forbidding  interference.  We 
will  be  able  to  load  your  troops  at  daylight  to-morrow  morning. 
Very  respectfully  yours,  H.  HAUPT, 

Colonel  and  Chief  of  Transportation. 

ALEXANDRIA,  VA.,  August  23,  1862. 
Colonel : 

In  order  to  get  my  Division  off  to  the  field  and  to  relieve  you  of  any 
responsibility  in  the  matter,  I  hereby  assume  military  control  of  such 
cars  as  may  arrive  from  whatever  direction,  as  far  as  placing  my  Division 
on  board  may  go.  I  trust,  therefore,  that  you  will,  regardless  of  what 
troops  may  arrive,  place  a  sufficient  number  of  cars  near  Clouds  Mills  to 
transport  eight  regiments  to  Warrenton  Junction. 

I  am,  Colonel,  very  respectfully  yours,          S.  STURGIS, 

Major-General. 
Colonel  Haupt,  Superintendent  Railroads. 

!N"o  communications  were  received  on  August  24  or  afterwards 
from  General  Pope;  my  reports  were  made  and  instructions  re 
ceived  until  the  close  of  the  campaign  from  the  President,  Secre 
tary  Stanton,  Assistant  Secretary  Watson  and  Generals  Halleck 
and  McClellan. 

WASHINGTON,  August  23,  1862. 
Colonel  H.  Haupt: 

No  military  officer  will  give  any  orders  to  your  subordinates,  except 
through  you ;  nor  will  any  of  them  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  running 
of  trains.  Your  orders  must  come  from  General  Pope,  or  myself,  except 
in  case  of  an  attack  on  the  road,  when  you  will  consult  with  the  Com 
mander  of  the  nearest  forces.  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Commander-in-Chief. 


88  REMINISCENCES   OF 

WASHINGTON,  August  24,  1862. 
Colonel  H.  Haupt: 

The  railroad  is  entirely  under  your  control.  No  military  officer 
has  any  right  to  interfere  with  it.  You  were  notified  to  this  effect  this 
morning.  Your  orders  are  supreme.  By  order 

MAJOK-GENEKAL  HALLECK. 

August  24,  1862,  4:35  A.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

As  I  receive  no  answer  to  telegrams  to  General  Pope,  I  will  ask 
if  all  the  troops  are  to  be  sent  to  Warrenton  Junction.  Is  not  Catlett's 
preferable?  The  shorter  the  distance  the  less  will  be  the  time  required 
to  unload  and  return  cars.  The  number  of  trains  is  so  large  that 
Manassas  is  the  only  place  at  which  they  can  be  passed. 

We  have  advices  of  ten  trains  now  returning,  but  none  are  in  yet. 
As  soon  as  they  are  in,  we  can  return  10,000  men.  We  are  just  starting 
1,000  men,  38th  Ohio,  in  Baltimore  &  Ohio  cars.  I  suppose  it  is  your 
wish  that  commands  should  go  as  much  as  possible  together. 

Have  you  directed  that  Sturgis'  command  should  take  precedence 
of  all  others  ?  It  is  so  stated,  but  the  orders  should  be  sent  to  me. 

The  agent  at  Manassas  reports  that  it  is  expected  that  an  attack 
will  be  made  on  that  place  to-night  by  a  strong  cavalry  force.  I  report 
the  statement,  but  attach  no  importance  to  it.  I  do  not  learn  that  it 
rests  on  any  good  foundation. 

A  note  from  General  Sturgis  has  just  been  received;  he  says  you 
gave  peremptory  orders  that  he  should  be  sent  after  Kearney's  batteries. 
Whatever  you  direct  will  be  carried  out.  In  the  absence  of  instructions 
we  will  finish  Hooker  and  Kearney  before  commencing  on  Sturgis. 
We  can  get  all  away  by  to-morrow  morning  if  no  accident  occurs. 

H.  HAUPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  24,  1862,  6:30  A.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt  : 

It  is  thought  probable  that  not  only  cannon,  but  also  infantry  will 
have  to  march  out  to  Warrenton  Junction.  It  is  obvious  that  the  capac 
ity  of  the  railroad  is  unequal  to  the  transportation  of  one-half  the  troops 
that  will  have  to  go  out.  P.  H.  WATSON, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War.- 

August  24,  10 :20  A.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

Just  received  answer  from  Manassas  that  none  of  the  engines  sent 
to  Catlett's  with  troops  have  returned.  I  have  ordered  an  empty  engine 
to  go  forward  cautiously,  ascertain  cause  of  detention  and  report. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  24,  1862,  10:35  A.  M. 
Major-General  Pope: 

We  expect  to  clear  out  all  the  troops  now  here  and  all  that  are  ex 
pected  to-day  as  at  present  advised.  Forage  and  commissary  also  will  be 
sent.  No  trains  were  dispatched  since  yesterday  afternoon  in  conse 
quence  of  interference  of  General  Sturgis,  who  took  military  possession 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  89* 

of  the  railroads  and  ordered  me  in  arrest.  I  appealed  to  General  Hal- 
leek,  who  ordered  General  Sturgis  to  cease  further  interference,  or  he 
would  be  placed  in  arrest  himself.  Details  when  I  see  you. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  24, 1862,  11:07  A.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

If  you  can  find  General  Hooker,  who  is  said  to  be  in  Washington, 
please  say  to  him  that  we  expect  to  carry  his  whole  force  to-morrow ;  but,, 
to  do  it,  the  trains  must  be  loaded  in  15  minutes,  and  everything  should 
be  beside  the  track.  To-night  we  carry  supplies,  ammunition  and  forage ; 
four  or  five  trains.  I  have  informed  General  Sturgis  that  he  has  for 
feited  all  claim  for  transportation  until  others  are  supplied  and  can  have 
no  more  cars;  he  says,  all  right.  I  will  try  to  see  General  Halleck  to 
morrow.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  24, 1862, 11:15  A.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

I  am  waiting  in  intense  anxiety  to  know  what  has  become  of  return 
trains.  I  ordered,  some  time  ago,  a  reconnoitering  engine  to  go  forward ; 
no  report  as  yet.  If  power  is  returned  we  can  forward  large  numbers — 
10,000  per  day.  Until  I  can  get  answer  I  can  give  no  information.  Not 
an  engine  has  yet  returned  of  all  that  went  up  the  road.  I  learn  that 
some  reached  Warrenton  Junction,  which  is  very  favorable  intelligence 
thus  far,  but  why  they  are  not  sent  back  I  am  as  yet  unable  to  ascertain. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  24, 1862, 11:25  A.  M. 

General  Kearney : 

You  telegraphed  to-day  for  another  battery;  it  cannot  be  sent  in- 
morning,  as  it  is  not  unloaded  from  boats.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  24, 1862, 1:05  p.  M. 
Major-General  Pope: 

None  of  the  engines  sent  from  Manassas  to  Catlett's  have  returned 
to  Manassas.  I  have  ordered  an  engine  to  go  forward  to  reconnoiter^. 
return  and  report  cause  of  detention. 

Sturgis  asks  transportation  for  10,000  men,  horses  and  baggage. 
It  is  clear  that  his  command  should  march  to  Manassas,  18  miles,  and 
leave  the  transportation  to  those  who  need  it  more. 

Hooker's  advance,  2,000  men,  is  now  in  transports. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  24,  1862,  1:15  p.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

Your  dispatch  enables  me  to  resume  operations  on  the  road  this 
morning.  The  blockade,'  consequent  upon  the  interference,  continued 
half  a  day.  I  have  commenced  sending  forward  General  Sturgis'  Divis 
ion,  as  General  Hooker  informed  me  that  all  of  his  troops  had  not 
arrived,  and  he  would  be  satisfied  to  get  off  this  evening.  We  expect 
during  the  day  and  night  to  clear  out  all  the  troops  here  except  the  fresh 
arrivals,  and  take  also  some  forage  and  stores,  two  trains  of  which  are 
now  going  forward.  The  Quartermaster  informs  me  of  20,000  more 
troops  by  transport,  and  also  a  lot  by  rail.  Our  capacity,  under  favor- 


90  REMINISCENCES   OF 

able  circumstances,  is  20,000  troops  per  day,  but  accidents  and  detentions 
will  greatly  reduce  it.  If  the  troops  are  to  go  by  rail,  I  should  know  the 
order  in  which  they  are  to  go,  and  the  points  of  destination.  Please 
direct  that  the  information  be  communicated  to  me  so  that  I  may  arrange 
for  it.  H.  HAUPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  24,  1862,  1:25  p.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

General  Hooker  was  in  Alexandria  last  night,  but  I  will  send  to 
Willard's  and  see  if  he  is  there.  I  do  not  know  any  other  place  that  he 
frequents.  Be  patient  as  possible  with  the  Generals ;  some  of  them  will 
trouble  you  more  than  they  will  the  enemy. 

You  can  accomplish  more  than  I  expected  you  could  under  the 
adverse  circumstances  against  which  you  have  had  to  work. 

If  General  Hooker  is  not  heard  from  within  an  hour,  give  direction 
to  the  next  officer  under  him,  or  to  the  Colonels  of  the  regiments,  who, 
wherever  they  are,  must  have  their  men  ready  to  embark.  If  they  refuse 
to  go,  report  the  fact,  and  load  up  the  train  with  other  troops  and  send 
them  forward.  There  must  be  no  stop  to  the  movement  of  the  troops  out 
ward,  except  to  send  supplies.  P.  H.  WATSON> 

Assistant  Secretary. 

August  24,  1862,  3 :30  p.  M. 
McCrickett: 

We  are,  of  course,  perfectly  powerless  to  send  a  man  until  you  can 
return  us  the  power  now  up  the  road.  We  have  been  waiting  all  day 
for  it  in  a  state  of  the  greatest  anxiety  and  impatience.  Cannot  you 
contrive  in  some  way  to  return  it  sooner?  Not  a  train  yet  back,  and 
some  out  24  hours.  The  trains  are  run  on  your  orders.  Where  do  you 
get  your  information  about  the  enemy  ?  H.  HAUPT. 

August  24,  1862,  7 :30  p.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

Please  inform  Secretary  Stanton  and  General  Halleck  that  another 
day  is  lost  in  our  transportation  by  the  neglect  of  General  Sturgis'  officers 
to  load  the  cars  furnished  to  them.  Hearing  nothing  from  the  trains,  I 
went  in  search  of  them  and  found  them  still  unloaded  and  no  possibility 
of  moving  anything  until  they  are  out  of  the  way.  I  have  seen  General 
Sturgis  and  informed  him  that  no  more  cars  can  be  furnished  him  until 
others  are  supplied. 

He  frankly  admitted  that  the  fault  was  in  his  men;  he  ordered 
them  to  unload,  but  they  did  not. 

I  ordered  back  nearly  all  the  trains,  and  will  load  them  to-night 
with  supplies  and  ammunition,  and  send  forward  as  fast  as  possible  in 
preference  to  troops.  I  must  go  to  the  Department  and  explain  position 
of  affairs,  but  have  been  incessantly  engaged  day  and  night  for  a  week. 
Will  try  to  come  to-morrow.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  25,  1862,  5 :05  A.  M. 
Major-General  Pope: 

We  will  get  off  Hooker's  command  during  the  day  and  night. 
Sturgis  has  been  the  cause,  directly  and  indirectly,  of  more  than  24  hours' 
delay  in  transportation  of  troops  and  supplies. 


UNIVERSITY 

I&L/C.-^MV^ 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  93 

A  Baltimore  &  Ohio  engine,  sent  forward,  blocked  the  track  six 
hours  by  getting  out  of  order  on  the  road.  When  cleared,  an  engine  got 
off  the  track ;  this  caused  more  delay.  I  have  now  ordered  that  no  more 
cars  shall  be  loaded  on  track  south  of  Alexandria.  The  loading  of  troops 
must  all  be  done  on  Washington  track,  so  as  to  keep  main  track  clear. 

We  have  just  dispatched  six  trains  for  Hooker.  General  Heintzel- 
man  and  staff  are  in  car  just  moving  off.  Cox  will  go  forward  in  morn 
ing. 

Long  bridge  broke  with  Baltimore  engine  yesterday;  it  is  now  re 
paired. 

Transportation  will  be  furnished  in  the  following  order:  Sub 
sistence  for  men,  forage,  ammunition,  hospital  stores,  troops,  artillery, 
horses,  wagons. 

Artillery  and  some  of  the  infantry  should  march;  horses  should  be 
driven. 

I  have  requested  General  Halleck  to  detail  Major  Keyes  to  settle 
question  of  priority  of  troops,  and  say  in  what  order  they  shall  be  for 
warded.  There  is  a  constant  contest  for  priority  of  transportation.  We 
will  keep  moving  night  and  day.  All  stores  have  been  forwarded  as  fast 
as  delivered  to  us;  the  yard  is  quite  clear  of  any  forage  and  subsistence. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  25,  1862,  9 :45  A.  M. 
Major-General  Pope : 

I  have  not  only  sent  forward  every  car  loaded  with  forage  and  com 
missary  stores  that  has  been  delivered  to  us,  but  I  have  gone  personally 
late  at  night  to  the  Commissary  and  Quartermaster  to  urge  them  to  load 
cars,  even  beyond  their  requisitions,  that  there  should  be  no  deficiency. 

The  trouble  is  that  Ferguson  has  not  the  grain  to  send.  We  are 
this  moment  advised  of  the  arrival  of  some  in  Washington.  An  engine 
is  already  there  to  bring  it.  It  shall  have  precedence  over  all  other 
transportation. 

All  of  Hooker's  command  did  not  get  off  last  night.  The  number 
of  men  was  not  correctly  reported  at  this  office,  and  the  cars  sent  were 
not  fully  loaded.  This  will  detain  Cox's  command  perhaps  until  even 
ing.  We  will  keep  moving  and  do  all  we  can. 

H.  HAUPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  25,  1862,  10 :40  A.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

When  you  cannot  get  orders  from  General  Pope,  land  the  troops 
where  you  deem  most  convenient,  but  as  near  to  General  Pope's  army  as 

youean-  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

General-in-Chief. 

August  25, 1862, 11 :36  p.  M. 
Major-General  Pope: 

Your  servant  Anderson  has  not  reported  at  this  hour,  11:20  p.  M. 
We  can  send  him  at  6.  A.  M.  If  he  is  not  here,  then  he  can  go  at  11  A.  M. 
We  have  arranged  to  resume  schedule  to-morrow.  Some  of  General 
Hooker's  command,  I  am  just  informed,  are  still  here.  He  had  5,600 
men  to  forward,  and  we  sent  cars  for  6,000.  They  could  not  have  been 
properly  loaded.  I  will  ask  General  Halleck  to  send  Major  Keyes  to 


94  REMINISCENCES   OF 

superintend  the  loading  hereafter,  and  insist  on  a  proper  number  to  each 
car.  Our  conductors  can  do  nothing;  they  are  not  obeyed.  Cars  have 
carried  60  each,  but  I  estimate  capacity  at  50  only. 

H.  HAUPT. 

I  find  but  few  telegrams  throwing  light  upon  important  move 
ments  this  day.  Many  of  my  papers  have  been  lost  in  consequence 
of  handling  by  other  parties  in  my  absence.  It  appears,  however, 
that  I  sent  a  communication  to  General  Halleck  making  sugges 
tions  as  to  certain  movements,  which  were  approved,  and  I  was 
directed  to  call  upon  Generals  Smith,  Sturgis,  Slocum  or  any  other 
General  Officer  I  could  find  for  forces  necessary  to  carry  out  the 
suggestions.  I  find  a  copy  of  a  telegram  from  General  Hancock  to 
General  Halleck  which  ref  ers  to  this  order. 

August  26, 1862,  8 :50  A.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

In  addition  to  the  transportation  for  1,200  men,  some  other  trains 
are  coming  and  are  this  side  of  Manassas.  We  may  have  in  a  few  hours 
transportation  for  3,000  or  4,000.  They  can  be  advanced  as  far  as  pos 
sible  by  rail,  then  marched  forward. 

I  am  just  informed  that  the  four  trains  following  the  engine  Sec 
retary  are  captured,  and  that  the  rebels  are  approaching  Manassas  with 
artillery.  These  may  be  exaggerations,  but  the  operator  and  agent  are 
leaving,  and  prompt  action  is  required. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  a  portion  of  our  forces  did  not  march.  I 
await  instructions.  H.  HATJPT. 

August  26,  1862. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

Two  soldiers  just  arrived  from  Manassas  at  Fairfax ;  report  bridges 
all  right  between  these  points.  Good,  very  good  so  far.  This  was  my 
greatest  source  of  anxiety.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  26,  1862. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

The  following  telegram  has  just  been  received  from  Manassas : 
The  engine  Secretary  was  being  followed  by  four  other  trains, 
which  are  in  great  danger,  as  there  is  no  communication.  The  wire  is  cut 
between  Manassas  and  Warrenton.  We  have  transportation  for  1,200 
men;  this  number  might  be  sent  to  Manassas  to  protect  the  road  while 
we  repair  it.  I  suppose  the  bridge  at  Bristoe  will  be  destroyed. 

H.  HATJPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  26,  1862,  9 :25  A.  M. 
Colonel  H.  HaupL- 

General  Smith,  General  Slocum,  General  Sturgis,  or  any  other 
General  Officer  you  can  find,  will  immediately  send  all  the  men  you  can 
transport  to  Bristoe  Bridge  or  Manassas  Junction.  Show  this  order. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

General-in-Chief. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  95 

August  26,  1862. 
General  Halleck  : 

Operator  at  Manassas  just  says  :  "I  am  off  now  sure."  I  directed 
the  agent  to  run  the  two  engines  at  Manassas  forward,  wait  until  the  last 
moment,  and  then  escape  on  the  engine  if  a  real  necessity  existed. 
Operator  had  just  commenced  message  to  Headquarters  of  General  Pope 
when  wire  was  cut.  It  is  clear  now  that  the  railroad  can  be  relied  upon 
only  for  supplies.  No  more  troops  can  be  forwarded;  by  marching  they 
will  protect  communication;  in  cars  they  are  helpless.  Our  capacity 
by  this  raid  will  be  much  reduced. 


HEADQUARTERS,  August  26,  1862. 
General  Halleclc. 

SIR:  I  have  just  received  your  dispatch  addressed  to  Generals 
Smith,  Sturgis  and  Slocum,  or  any  General  Officers  you  can  find,  and 
being  senior  officer  here,  will  send  forward  all  the  infantry  the  railroad 
can  furnish  transportation  for,  and  as  much  artillery  as  can  be  moved 
to  the  point  or  points  designated.  Colonel  Haupt  has  requested  a  force 
to  protect  the  bridge  at  Bull  Run,  which  I  will  furnish  unless  otherwise 
instructed  by  you.  W.S.HANCOCK, 

Brigadier-General  Commanding  Sixth  Army  Corps. 

The  above  telegram  appears  to  have  been  forwarded  by  Gen 
eral  Hancock  at  12  :15  A.  M.  on  the  morning  of  the  26th,  received 
at  2  :40  A.  M.  and  copy  sent  to  me  from  War  Department  and 
received  at  Alexandria  11  :30  p.  M. 

August  26,  1862,  11  A.  M. 
D.  C.NcCallum: 

So  far  Bull  Run  is  safe.  Four  trains  empty  cars  lost  at  Bristoe. 
Rebels  have  possession  of  Manassas.  Some  of  our  artillery  taken  and 
used  against  us.  Damage  at  Manassas  not  known.  Sent  out  3,000  men 
last  night,  also  a  large  wrecking  and  construction  force  to  Union  Mills, 
where  track  is  blocked  by  a  collision  in  rear.  -a-  HAUPT 

August  26,  1862. 
J.  H.  Devereux: 

No.  6  train,  engine  Secretary,  was  fired  into  by  a  party  of  Secesh 
cavalry,  some  say  about  500  strong.  Ties  were  piled  on  track,  but  engine 
took  good  run  at  them  and  scattered  them  from  track.  Engine  well 
riddled  by  bullets. 

NOTICE. 

ALEXANDRIA,  August  26,  1862. 

Transportation  on  the  Military  Railroads  of  Virginia  will  be  fur 
nished  in  the  following  order  : 

1.  Subsistence  for  men  in  the  field. 

2.  Forage  for  horses. 

3.  Ammunition. 

4.  Hospital  stores. 

5.  Infantry  regiments  that  have  seen  service,  with  Staff  horses. 

6.  Infantry  regiments  composed  of  raw  troops. 


96  REMINISCENCES    OF 

7.  Batteries,  except  in  cases  of  urgent  necessity,  will  march. 

8.  Cavalry  will  march. 

9.  Mules  and  wagon-horses  will  be  driven. 

10.  Wagons,  ambulances  and  other  vehicles  will  be  hauled  over  the 
common  roads. 

It  must  be  understood  distinctly,  that  nothing  required  for  the  use 
of  the  Army  will  ever  be  refused  transportation  wrhen  it  can  be  afforded 
without  excluding  other  transportation  entitled  to  priority. 

The  proper  duty  of  the  railroad  is  to  forward  supplies.  It  cannot, 
in  addition  thereto,  transport  large  armies  on  short  notice,  but  it  can, 
with  present  facilities,  remove  ten  thousand  men  per  day  if  no  accident 
occurs,  and  if  there  is  no  delay  in  loading  and  unloading. 

No  cars  will  hereafter  be  loaded  on  the  main  track  south  of  Alex 
andria.  The  proper  place  of  shipment  is  on  the  Washington  track  west 
of  Alexandria. 


Colonel  and  Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 

Army  of  Virginia. 

August  27  was  a  very  eventful  day,  and  the  telegrams  are  of 
much  interest.  Unfortunately  the  operators  neglected,  in  most 
cases,  to  record  on  the  face  of  the  dispatch  the  hour  of  forwarding 
and  receiving. 

It  appears  that  in  consequence  of  orders  from  General  Halleck 
I  made  search  for  some  General  Officer  to  whom  his  instructions 
could  be  communicated,  but  could  find  none.  The  attractions  of 
Washington  kept  most  of  the  General  Officers  in  that  city. 

Colonel  Scammon,  of  Cox's  brigade,  was  sent  out  after  mid 
night.  In  Colonel  Scammon's  report  he  states  that,  in  obedience 
to  the  orders  of  the  General  commanding  the  Army,  received 
through  Colonel  Haupt,  he  went,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  to 
Bull  Run  bridge  with  the  llth  and  12th  Ohio  Volunteers.  General 
Taylor  was  found  severely  wounded  and  turned  over  the  command 
to  Colonel  Scammon. 

Fight  was  maintained  by  Colonel  Scammon  from  8  :30  A.  M. 
until  3  :30  p.  M.,  when  he  was  forced  to  retire,  marching  to  Alexan 
dria,  which  he  reached  next  day  10  A.  M.,  August  28. 

He  reported  the  force  of  the  enemy  actually  engaged  to  be 
six  regiments  of  infantry,  six  pieces  of  artillery,  and  also  a  stray 
force  of  cavalry  of  from  1,000  to  5,000. 

The  conduct  of  the  New  Jersey  brigade,  after  General  Tay 
lor's  fall,  was  reported  to  be  discreditable.  They  retreated  in  dis 
order  along  the  railroad  ;  only  one  lieutenant  and  twelve  or  four 
teen  men  remained  to  help  fight  the  enemy. 

At  4:25  A.  M.  a  telegram  was  sent  to  President  Lincoln  in 
forming  him  that  the  forces  sent  out  the  previous  night  had  held 
Bull  Run  bridge  until  twenty  minutes  of  the  time  of  filing  the 
message,  but  if  not  then  destroyed,  it  probably  would  be,  which 
elicited  in  reply  the  inquiry  : 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  97 

"What  became  of  our  forces  which  held  the  bridge  until  20 
minutes  ago,  as  you  say  V 

At  6 :35  A.  M.  General  Halleck  was  notified  of  the  situation, 
and  complaint  made  of  the  indisposition  of  troops  to  go  forward. 
Several  other  telegrams  were  sent  to  the  President  and  to  General 
Halleck  advising  them  of  the  situation,  and  at  11  A.  M.  I  ventured 
to  suggest  a  movement  of  considerable  importance,  with  a  view  to 
protect  the  communication  and  force  supplies  forward.  At  11 :50 
A.  M.  General  Halleck  replied :  "If  you  can  see  General  McClel- 
lan,  consult  him.  If  not,  go  ahead  as  you  propose." 

The  situation  in  which  I  was  placed  at  this  time  was  one 
which  compelled  me  to  assume  responsibilities.  I  was  cut  off  from 
all  communication  with  General  Pope,  and  the  only  information 
that  could  be  received  at  Washington  was  through  operators  and 
assistants  connected  with  my  department,  who  were  directed  to 
advance  as  far  as  possible  under  cover  of  the  brush,  climb  trees, 
and  report  observations.  General  Halleck  took  no  offense  at  what 
might  have  been  considered  an  impertinence  in  suggesting  military 
movements. 


CHAPTEE  III. 

RESULTS  OF  McCLELLAN'S  CONDUCT. 

AFTER  receiving  instructions  to  consult  General  McClellan,  of 
whose  expected  arrival  I  had  not  been  advised,  I  repaired  to 
the  wharf,  procured  a  row-boat  and  searched  for  him  amongst  the 
transports  that  had  arrived.  I  found  the  General  in  the  cabin  of 
a  steamer  some  distance  below  Alexandria,  surrounded  by  members 
of  his  staff.  I  showed  him  the  telegrams,  and  he  came  with  me 
in  my  boat  to  the  office.  Here  I  explained  fully  the  situation. 
Taylor's  brigade  had  been  cut  up;  Colonel  Scammon  had  been 
holding  the  bridge  at  Bull  Run  and  was  in  great  danger;  Pope's 
army  was  out  of  forage  for  horses  and  rations  for  men,  and  to  re 
lieve  them  was  an  imperative  necessity.  I  explained  my  plans  for 
giving  them  relief,  but  a  strong  force  was  necessary  to  protect  the 
trains. 

General  McClellan  listened,  and,  when  I  ceased,  remarked 
that  he  could  not  approve  the  plan ;  that  it  "would  be  attended  with 
risk." 

I  reminded  the  General  that  military  operations  were  usually 
v  attended  with  risk,  but  that  I  did  not  consider  the  risk  in  this  case 
excessive.  The  railroad  was  in  our  possession  nearly  to  Bull  Run. 
We  could  go  as  far  as  it  was  quite  safe  on  the  trains,  then  dis 
mount  skirmishers  to  advance  and  feel  their  way,  keeping  the 
trains  in  rear.  If  the  enemy  was  found  in  force,  they  could  retire, 
take  the  trains  and  be  run  back  to  a  safe  distance. 

My  representations  and  arguments  availed  nothing ;  the  Gen 
eral  would  not  give  his  consent,  or  assume  any  responsibility,  and 
would  give  no  orders,  instructions,  or  suggestions  of  any  kind ! ! 

After  a  time  the  General  had  a  sudden  attack  of  indisposition, 
became  very  pale,  and  asked  if  I  had  any  brandy. 

I  replied  that  I  did  not  use  it,  but  would  send  for  some. 

On  its  arrival  he  drank  a  portion,  which  revived  him.  He 
then  wrote  a  dispatch  to  General  Halleck,  which  original  dispatch, 
in  his  own  handwriting,  is  now  before  me,  forwarded  at  2  p.  M. 
In  it  he  reports,  from  information  I  had  given  him,  that  Taylor's 
brigade  is  either  cut  to  pieces  or  captured,  and  that  some  of  Cox's 
troops  were  engaged  with  the  enemy.  He  recommended  the  de- 

98 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  99 

fense  around  Washington  be  made  secure;  that  some  cavalry  be 
sent  out  towards  Gainesville  to  mobilize  a  couple  of  corps  as  soon 
as  possible,  but  not  to  advance  there  until  they  could  have  artillery 
and  cavalry. 

I  do  not  wish  to  criticise  General  McClellan  or  any  one  else. 
There  have  been  too  many  critics,  but  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  in 
this  dispatch,  the  first  sent  after  landing,  there  is  no  suggestion  of 
any  relief  for  the  army  fighting  in  the  field  against  superior  num 
bers  and  out  of  supplies. 

If  General  Pope's  report  is  reliable,  there  were  over  90,000 
troops  returned  from  the  Peninsula,  and  only  about  20,000  in  the 
fight,  leaving  the  balance  to  be  protected  by  the  forts  around  Wash 
ington. 

After  sending  this  telegram,  General  McClellan  mounted  his 
horse  and  rode  off,  leaving  me  in  a  condition  of  great  dissatisfaction 
and  uncertainty.  I  had  been  directed  to  consult  with  him,  and 
the  consultation  had  resulted  in  no  decision  whatever. 

Had  I  been  so  fortunate  as  not  to  have  found  General  McClel 
lan  I  could  have  acted,  but  my  hands  were  tied.  The  army  was 
suffering  and  in  danger.  I  could  not  remain  quiet.  I  determined 
to  assume  responsibility,  but  as  I  considered  it  proper  to  notify 
General  McClellan,  I  sent  him,  at  9 :50  p.  M.,  a  notice  that  at  4 
A.  M.  I  proposed  to  start  a  wrecking  and  construction  train  bound 
for  Bull  Run ;  also  train  with  forage  and  subsistence.  I  asked  for 
200  sharpshooters  only  as  train  guard  to  report  at  4  A.  M.,  and 
stated  that  if  the  troops  did  not  report,  ive  would  go  without  them. 

No  answer  was  received  to  this  dispatch,  and  near  midnight  I 
took  a  lantern  and  visited  the  camps  four  miles  down  the  road  to 
see  if  I  could  not  get  a  guard.  I  found  General  Hancock  in  bed 
in  his  tent.  He  arose  immediately  and  cheerfully  agreed  to  give 
me  the  force  I  required,  promising  that  they  should  be  on  hand  at 
4  A.  M.  punctually.  They  were  there  on  time  and  performed  good 
service  in  the  operations  of  the  next  day. 

August  27,  1862. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

I  have  been  on  the  search  for  some  general  officers,  but  can  find 
none.  Cox  is  in  Washington;  Sturgis  is  in  the  field;  Smith  I  can  learn 
nothing  about.  I  have  found  Colonels  Scammon  and  White,  of  Cox's 
command,  who  will  be  ready  in  an  hour.  I  will  now  go  to  other  camps 
and  endeavor  to  drum  up  more.  The  engine  Secretary,  two  miles  this 
side  of  Bull  Run  bridge,  ran  into  the  rear  end  of  another  train,  doing 
serious  damage.  The  track  is  blocked.  I  will  send  out  3,000  or  4,000 
troops,  but  they  can  do  no  more  to-night  than  hold  Bull  Run  bridge.  The 
damage  at  Manassas  cannot  now  be  helped.  Whatever  it  is,  has  been 
already  done. 


100  REMINISCENCES   OF 

August  27,  1862,  4:25  A.  M. 
A.  Lincoln,  President: 

Intelligence  received  within  twenty  minutes  informs  me  that  the 
enemy  are  advancing  and  have  crossed  Bull  Run  bridge;  if  it  is  not 
destroyed,  it  probably  will  be.  The  forces  sent  by  us  last  night  held  it 
until  that  time.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  27,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

What  became  of  our  forces  which  held  the  bridge  till  twenty 
minutes  ago,  as  you  say  ?*  A.  LINCOLN. 

August  27,  1862,  6:35  A.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

I  have  been  using  incessant  exertions  all  night  to  get  the  3,000' 
troops  off,  but  the  last  did  not  leave  until  daylight. 

There  appeared  to  be  a  disposition  to  use  up  the  night  before  get 
ting  to  the  scene  of  action. 

Three  thousand  men,  with  abundance  of  ammunition,  have  gone 
forward.  Information  from  Fairfax  during  the  night  stated  that  two  pieces- 
of  one  of  our  batteries  were  taken  at  Manassas,  our  men  cut  up,  number 
not  stated.  They  were  surrounded,  one  man  escaping  wounded  to  Fair 
fax.  The  enemy  had  scouts  out  in  every  direction.  A  party  appeared  to- 
be  moving  toward  Union  Mills,  where  our  track  is  blocked;  if  so,  Bull 
Run  bridge  may  be  destroyed.  I  give  the  information  as  I  received  it* 
As  intelligence  comes  in,  I  will  transmit  it  to  you. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  27,  1862,  10:05  A.  M. 
General  Halleck : 

I  ordered  troop  trains  to  proceed  to  Union  Mills,  four  miles  north 
of  Manassas,  where  collision  occurred,  then  march  troops  to  Bull  Run; 
leave  500  men  to  protect  bridge,  and  balance,  2,500,  to  proceed  ta 
Manassas.  The  last  of  the  troop  trains  was  unloaded  at  Union  Mills  and 
returned  to  Fairfax  Station,  six  miles;  report  fighting  two  miles  beyond 
Bull  Run  bridge,  and  cannonading  in  direction  of  Manassas.  Further 
information  as  soon  as  received.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  26, 1862. 
.  President  Lincoln:' 

Two  operators  from  Manassas  have  gone  up  the  Gap  road  towards 
Gainesville,  with  instruments,  to  get  as  near  as  possible  to  the  scene  of 
action,  make  connection  with  the  wire  and  report.  You  are  probably  ad 
vised  of  this  fact,  but  if  you  are,  there  is  no  harm  in  repeating,  and  if 
you  are  not,  it  will  be  of  interest  to  you.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  27,  1862,  11  A.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

I  venture  the  suggestion :  As  soon  as  the  cars  return  which  carried 
troops  to  Union  Mills,  I  propose  to  load  the  whole  with  subsistence,  put 
on  top  and  inside  1,500  or  2,000  more  men,  and  endeavor  by  all  means  to 
work  the  trains  through. 

»  NOTE. — See  answer  August  28,  page  107. 


HAUPT'S  TORPEDO  FOR  QUICKLY  WRECKING  WOODEN  BRIDGES. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  103 

The  most  serious  matter,  if  true,  is  the  capture  of  some  pieces  of 
our  artillery,  which,  if  turned  against  our  train,  would  render  our  ad 
vance  impossible. 

I  am  told  that  a  battery  left  here  yesterday,  and  should  this  morn 
ing  be  near  Manassas,  but  I  fear  it  has  no  infantry  support. 

I  am  not  advised  of  any  movements  except  those  made  under  my 
direction  by  rail. 

Do  you  approve  sending  forward  the  subsistence  train  in  the  man 
ner  proposed  ?  If  so,  please  answer. 

I  would  suggest  that  artillery  with  a  good  infantry  support  should 
be  sent  forward  immediately.  I  propose  this  plan:  Load  a  battery,  or 
part  of  a  battery,  on  cars;  carry  with  it  a  sufficient  infantry  support. 
Let  this  precede  the  supply  trains  to  some  point  where  the  battery  can 
be  unloaded  and  advanced  by  common  road  to  Manassas  to  recapture,  if 
possible,  the  pieces  taken  and  prevent  them  from  being  used  against  the 
train.  I  have  a  strong  force,  one  wrecking  and  one  construction  train, 
now  on  the  ground,  with  very  efficient  men.  The  track  will  be  cleared 
and  reconstructed  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  so  as  to  advance  trains. 

H.  HAUPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  27, 1862, 11:50  A.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

If  you  can  see  General  McClellan,  consult  him.  If  not,  go  ahead 
as  you  propose.  H.  W.  HAIXECK.  . 

General-in-Chief. 

General  Halleck,  Alexandria: 

I  learn  that  Taylor's  brigade,  sent  this  morning  to  Bull  Kun  bridge, 
is  either  cut  to  pieces  or  captured ;  that  the  force  against  them  had  many 
guns  and  about  five  thousand  (5,000)  infantry,  receiving  reinforcements 
every  moment ;  also  that  Gainesville  is  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  Please 
send  some  cavalry  out  towards  Dranesville  via  Chain  Bridge  to  watch 
Lewinsville  and  Dranesville,  and  go  as  far  as  they  can.  If  you  can  give 
me  even  one  squadron  of  good  cavalry,  then  I  will  ascertain  state  of  case. 
I  think  our  policy  now  is  to  make  these  works  perfectly  safe,  and  mobilize 
a  couple  of  corps  as  soon  as  possible,  but  not  to  advance  them  until  they 
can  have  their  artillery  and  cavalry.  I  have  sent  for  Colonel  Tyler  to 
place  his  artillery  men  in  the  works.  Is  Fort  Harney  securely  held? 
Some  of  Cox's  troops  are  also  engaged  with  another  force  of  enemy. 

McCLELLAST. 

August  27,  1862,  9 :50  p.  M. 
Major-General  McClellan: 

I  propose  to  start  at  4  o'clock  precisely,  a  wrecking  and  construc 
tion  train  bound  for  Bull  Run;  also  a  forage  train  and  a  subsistence 
train.  It  is  perhaps  proper  that  200  good  skirmishers  should  be  sent 
with  the  trains,  who  should  be  at  the  depot  at  Alexandria  before  4  A.  M. 
to-morrow  morning.  General  Pope  will  be  notified  by  courier  to-night 
to  have  his  wagons  at  Sangster's  Station  by  daylight  to-morrow.  If  the 
troops  are  not  here  by  4  A.  M.,  we  propose  to  go  ahead  without  them. 

H.  HAUPT. 


104  REMINISCENCES    OF 

BURKES,  August  27,  1862. 
J.  H.  Devereux: 

Engine  Dover  here  waiting;  cannot  go  to  Fairfax;  was  fired  into 
one  and  a  half  or  two  miles  west  of  here  by  cavalry  or  band  of  guerrillas. 

McCRICKETT. 

August  27, 1862,  6 :50  p.  M. 
Major-General  McClellan: 

General  Taylor  is  on  his  way  to  Alexandria,  having  been  brought 
to  Burkes  on  hand-car.  I  sent  construction  train  forward  with  orders, 
if  possible,  to  bring  off  wounded  from  Fairfax.  The  engine  was  fired 
upon  two  miles  west  of  Burkes  and  compelled  to  return;  firing  by  cav 
alry  or  guerrillas.  Burkes  Station  abruptly  closed  this  moment.  Opera 
tor  leaving  indicates  approach  of  the  enemy.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  27, 1862. 
Colonel  Stager: 

We  are  about  to  send  out  a  railroad  reconnoissance,  with  an  opera 
tor  and  men  to  repair  the  line.  Will  you  permit  Conway,  Bickford  and 
Boyle  to  accompany  it  at  their  request?  An  immediate  answer  is  de 
sired.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  27, 1862. 
Major-General  Halleclc: 

General  Taylor  was  sent  to  Burkes  on  hand-car,  and  is  now  on  his 
way  to  Alexandria.  I  sent  engine  and  cars  of  construction  train  with 
orders  to  proceed  to  Fairfax  and  bring  off  wounded  if  possible.  The 
engine  was  fired  into  by  cavalry  two  miles  west  of  Burkes  and  com 
pelled  to  return  without  wounded.  Operator  at  Burkes  has  this  moment, 
6:50,  broken  off  suddenly;  probably  compelled  to  evacuate. 

H.  HAUPT. 

FAIRFAX,  August  27,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

We  have  a  number  of  wounded.  General  Taylor  wishes  you  to 
send  a  train  immediately.  g.  HUDSON, 

Assistant  Surgeon  llth  0.  V.  7. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  27,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt : 

Is  the  railroad  bridge  over  Bull  Run  destroyed  ? 

A.  LINCOLN. 

August  27. 
J.  J.  Moore,  Burkes: 

If  you  can  reconstruct  the  bridge  so  as  to  pass  over  the  train,  reach 
Fairfax,  and  bring  off  the  wounded  before  night,  do  so;  if  not,  return 
immediately.  Bull  Run  bridge  is  burned  and  the  enemy  had  20,000 
men  in  and  about  Manassas  last  night.  At  least  one  of  the  bridges  be 
yond  Fairfax  is  destroyed,  perhaps  others.  It  is  not  probable  that  we 
can  use  the  road  again  for  some  time,  and  the  army  must  cut  its  way 
through.  H.  HAUPT. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  105 

FAIRFAX,  August  27,  1862. 
J.  H.  Devereux  : 

Jersey  brigade  reported  to  be  cut  up  and  surrounded;  200  or  300 
soldiers  have  left  field  and  all  coming  down  road.  Rebel  position  on 
hill  commanding  Bull  Run  bridge.  It  is  reported  that  rebel  cavalry  are 
trying  to  cut  us  off.  I  have  returned  here  for  orders  to  know  if  you 
think  it  advisable  to  go  up  to  wreck  and  clear  track.  I  have  just  arrived 
from  Manassas,  and  cannot  say  how  reliable  these  reports  are. 

McCRICKETT. 

FAIRFAX  STATION,  August  27, 1862. 
J.  H.  Devereux: 

Fairfax  office  opened  for  business ;  news  favorable ;  holding  position 
this  side  Bull  Run  bridge  until  reinforcements  arrive.  General  Taylor 
and  number  of  others  are  here  wounded.  Can  we  take  engine  and  run 
to  Bull  Run  for  further  information?  Mr.  Moore  is  still  here  and  was 
about  walking  to  Bull  Run.  McCRICKETT. 

August  27,  1862. 
McCrickett: 

To  run  an  engine  may  attract  too  much  attention  if  there  is  an 
enemy  in  the  vicinity,  but  if  you  deem  it  safe,  you  might  take  an  instru 
ment,  go  part  way  on  an  engine,  make  a  connection  at  some  point  in  the 
woods  and  communicate  with  me  as  soon  as  possible. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  27, 1862. 
McCriclcett: 

If  we  send  reinforcements,  the  wounded  can  return  in  same  cars. 
We  have  asked  instructions  from  General  McClellan. 

H.  HAUPT. 
NOTICE. 

ALEXANDRIA,  August  27,  1862. 

The  demands  for  transportation  at  the  present  time  greatly  exceed 
the  capacity  of  the  road  and  rolling  stock,  even  with  regularity  of  opera 
tion.  Without  regularity,  the  duty  of  the  road  cannot  be  performed, 
and  the  army  cannot  receive  its  regular  supplies. 

The  schedule,  which  has  been  interrupted  by  derangement  of  train 
movements,  will  be  resumed  to-day,  and  must  be  rigidly  adhered  to.  No 
detention  will  be  permitted  from  any  cause.  Agents  will  inform  Medi 
cal  Directors  and  others  of  the  hours  of  starting  of  trains,  and  impress 
upon  them  the  importance  of  having  sick  and  wounded  loaded  in  time; 
that,  whether  they  are  in  the  cars  or  not,  the  orders  are  peremptory  to 
start  trains  at  schedule  time,  and  these  orders  must  be  obeyed  under 
penalty  of  dismissal.  £j  HAUPT 

Colonel  and  Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 

Army  of  Virginia. 

Having  received,  as  stated,  no  reply  from  General  McClellan 
to  the  request  to  send  a  train  guard  for  the  proposed  expedition  to 
Bull  Run,  application  was  made  to  General  Hancock,  who  re 
sponded  promptly  and  promised  that  the  required  force  should  be 


106  REMINISCENCES    OF 

ready  at  4  A.  M.,  at  which  time  the  train  started.  The  train  move 
ments  were  under  the  charge  of  an  experienced  conductor,  C.  M. 
Strein;  the  construction  force  under  James  J.  Moore,  assistant 
engineer;  the  military  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Chandler,  and 
accompanied  by  three  telegraph  operators  who  had  volunteered  for 
the  same.  The  instructions  were  as  follows : 

August  28, 1862. 
Conductor  Strein : 

The  expedition  for  railroad  reconnoissance  this  morning,  so  far  as 
concerns  the  advance  or  return  of  the  train  and  rate  of  speed,  will  be 
under  direction  of  the  officer  in  command  of  skirmishers.  I  would  rec 
ommend  that  the  train  proceed  at  the  usual  speed  to  a  point  near  Burkes 
Station,  being  careful,  however,  not  to  run  too  fast,  as  the  cars  will  be 
in  advance  of  the  engine.  Beyond  Burkes  the  train  will  proceed  with 
great  caution,  the  skirmishers  advanced  on  both  sides  and  particularly 
in  the  woods.  The  officer  in  charge,  or  some  other  detailed  for  that  pur 
pose,  to  signal  the  conductor  as  to  the  movements  of  the  train.  Proceed 
in  this  way,  if  possible,  as  far  as  Bull  Kun  bridge;  ascertain  its  condi 
tion,  and  also  the  position  and  condition  of  Colonel  Scammon's  force. 
If  an  enemy  be  found  in  superior  numbers,  retire  and  telegraph  the  fact. 
If  no  enemy  be  found  when  Bull  Run  is  reached,  and  the  bridge  is  safe, 
proceed  at  the  discretion  of  the  officer  to  Manassas  and  ascertain  condi 
tion  of  property.  Report  every  observation  of  importance  by  telegraph. 
An  operator  will  be  sent  with  the  expedition,  and  also  men  to  repair  the 

line-  H.  HAUPT. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Chandler  will  cooperate  with  the  conductor  in 
carrying  out  the  within  instructions.  ^-^  -^  g^jTH 

Major-Geneml  Commanding  Division. 

The  train  proceeded  without  interruption  as  far  as  Burkes 
Station,  thirteen  miles  from  Alexandria,  when  a  telegram  was  sent 
by  Moore  with  the  information  that  a  bridge  of  twenty-four  feet 
span  across  Pohick  Creek,  one  mile  west,  was  destroyed,  and  that 
there  was  no  lumber  to  repair  it.  He  was  ordered  to  reconstruct 
the  bridge,  even  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  tear  down  buildings  to 
get  material,  and  proceed,  if  possible,  to  Fairfax,  sixteen  miles, 
and  bring  off  the  wounded  before  night. 

By  10  A.  M.  the  bridge  had  been  rebuilt,  and  the  wounded  at 
Fairfax  brought  off  safely.  Important  information  was  also  ob 
tained  and  reports  made  to  the  President  and  to  Generals  McClel- 
lan  and  Halleck.  This  movement  was  made  by  men  who  knew  that 
20,000  of  the  enemy  were  in  front  of  them ! 

On  the  receipt  of  my  dispatch,  General  McClellan  sent  a  note 
stating  that  "he  was  very  glad  that  I  had  sent  out  the  reconnois 
sance."  He  had  not  given  his  approval  to  the  movement,  but  he 
claimed  to  be  glad  that  it  had  been  successful.  « 

The  history  of  the  subsequent  operations  for  the  day  will  be 
found  in  the  telegrams  and  reports  hereto  annexed  : 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  107 

August  28, 1862. 
Major-General  HallecJc: 

Having  had  no  instructions  since  the  telegram  from  you  yesterday 
morning  directing  me  to  consult  with  General  McClellan,  and  having  had 
no  word  from  General  McClellan  since  my  interview  with  him  last  night,  I 
went  this  morning  to  the  camp  and  made  some  suggestions  to  Generals 
Franklin  and  Hancock,  which,  having  been  approved,  are  now  being  car 
ried  into  effect.  The  following  instructions  [see  page  106]  to  the  con 
ductor  will  give  you  particulars.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  28,  1862,  1:15  A.  M. 
General  Halleck: 

I  found  General  Hancock  in  his  camp ;  he  will  send  1,500  men,  and 
1,500  of  Cox's  command  will  go  forward  immediately.  I  have  recom 
mended  that  500  men  be  left  at  Bull  Run,  and  the  balance  go  forward 
to  Manassas  and  await  orders.  A  wrecking  and  construction  train  will 
proceed  at  same  time  to  clear  track  and  repair  damages.  Should  not 
orders  be  given  to  march  forward  forces  to  Manassas  to-morrow  ? 

•     H.  HAUPT. 

BURKES,  August  28,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Bridge  across  Pohick,  one  mile  west,  is  destroyed.  The  clear  span 
is  24  feet.  We  have  no  lumber  here  to  repair  it. 

J.  J.  MOORE. 

August  28, 1862. 
Major-General  HallecTc: 

The  train  sent  out  to  reconnoiter  found  a  bridge  of  24  feet  span 
destroyed  one  mile  beyond  Burkes  Station.  Operator  sent  with  train 
made  connection  and  telegraphed  for  instructions.  I  replied:  "Recon 
struct  the  bridge,  even  if  you  must  tear  down  buildings  to  get  material, 
and  proceed.  If  you  can,  reach  Fairfax  and  bring  off  wounded  before 
night."  I  have  just  received  the  announcement,  "We  are  at  Fairfax." 
This  was  done  by  our  men  with  a  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  a  force  of 
20,000  rebels  were  probably  in  front  of  them.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  28, 1862. 
Haupt : 

Have  you  heard  anything  since  I  saw  you  last  night  ? 

MCCLELLAN. 

August  28,  1862. 
Major-General  McClellan: 

I  have  just  sent  a  messenger  to  you  with  dispatches.  We  have  no 
intelligence  from  the  front,  except  through  General  Clough,  that  a  com 
pany,  Co.  A,  16th  Virginia,  acting  as  guards  on  the  road,  has  been  cap 
tured.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  28, 1862. 
President  Lincoln: 

I  am  much  gratified  to  be  able  to  inform  you  that  Colonel  Scammon 
is  safe  and  has  returned  to  Alexandria.  I  went  out  on  an  engine  to  meet 
him  and  bring  him  in.  He  held  Bull  Run  bridge  a  long  time  against  a 


108  REMINISCENCES    OF 

very  superior  force,  retired  at  last  in  perfect  order,  eluded  the  efforts  of 
the  enemy  to  surround  him,  and  brought  off  his  whole  command  with  but 
little  loss.  I  have  advised  General  McClellan  of  his  presence;  he  has 
important  information  to  communicate. 

The  rebel  forces  at  Manassas  were  large  and  several  of  their  best 
Generals  were  in  command.  I  have  sent  out  a  reconnoitering  party  of 
200  sharpshooters  by  rail,  with  operators  and  wire  to  repair  telegraph, 
make  communication  and  report  observations.  H.  HAUPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  28,  1862,  2 :40  p.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Yours  received.  How  do  you  learn  that  the  rebel  forces  at  Manas 
sas  are  large,  and  commanded  by  several  of  their  best  Generals  ? 

A.  LINCOLN. 

August  28, 1862. 
President  Lincoln: 

One  of  Colonel  Scammon's  surgeons  was  captured  and  released; 
he  communicated  the  information.  One  of  our  firemen  was  captured 
and  escaped;  he  confirms  it,  and  gives  important  details.  General  Mc- 
Clellan  has  just  seen  him;  also  Colonel  Scammon. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  28,  1862. 
General  McClellan: 

I  have  brought  back  Colonel  Scammon ;  am  getting  him  something 
to  eat.  He  can  communicate  important  intelligence  as  to  the  number 
and  position  of  the  enemy.  He  is  at  my  quarters  near  my  office,  where 
an  interview  will  be  quiet  and  undisturbed.  He  can  see  you  in  half  an 
hour,  or  at  your  convenience.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  28,  1862. 
President  Lincoln  and  General  Hallec'k: 

One  of  our  men  who  is  just  in,  left  Bristoe  yesterday  noon,  says 
our  carpenters  had  nearly  finished  repairing  Kettle  Run  bridge.  A  large 
number  of  cars  with  four  engines  were  the  other  side  of  Kettle  Run 
bridge  ready  to  come  over  as  soon  as  possible.  One  of  the  engines,  the 
one  in  advance,  had  12  cars  of  ammunition  and  more  behind. 

After  the  completion  of  Kettle  Run,  the  train  can  advance  to  Bris 
toe;  they  are  probably  there  now.  This  intelligence  is  extremely  grati 
fying.  I  learn,  too,  that  Broad  Run  bridge  has  been  attempted  to  be 
destroyed  by  cutting  off  the  legs  of  all  the  trestles.  The  rebels  could 
not  have  done  mischief  in  a  way  that  would  render  it  more  easy  and 
expeditious  for  us  to  repair  the  damage.  A  very  few  hours  should  make 
Broad  Run  passable,  and  then  Bull  Run  will  remain  the  only  obstacle. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  28,  1862. 

Enemy  is  advancing  with  120,000  men,  via  Arlington  and  Chain 
Bridge,  to  attack  Washington  and  Baltimore.  General  Barnard  tele 
graphs  me  to-night  that  the  length  of  line  on  fortifications  this  side 
Potomac  requires  2,000  artillerymen  and  additional  troops  to  defend 
intervals  according  to  circumstances.  At  all  events,  he  says  an  old  regi 
ment  should  be  added  to  the  force  at  Chain  Bridge,  and  few  regiments 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  109 

distributed  along  the  lines  to  give  confidence  to  our  new  troops.  I  agree 
with  him  fully,  and  think  our  fortifications  along  the  upper  part  of  our 
line  on  this  side  of  river  unsafe  with  their  present  garrisons,  and  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  seem  to  indicate  an  attack  upon  those  works. 

G.  B.  McCLELLAN. 

This  dispatch  was  probably  sent  to  General  Halleck  and  a 
copy  to  me.  It  is  quite  characteristic  of  General  McClellan.  With 
70,000  of  his  own  men  from  the  Peninsula  not  in  action,  he  was 
asking  for  reinforcements  to  put  in  the  fortifications  around  Wash 
ington,  and  over-estimating  the  forces  of  the  enemy. 

He  knew,  or  should  have  known,  that  the  only  forces  available 
for  any  purpose  were  his  own.  Most  of  them  were  lying  in  camp, 
apparently  indisposed  to  aid  Pope  to  gain  a  victory. 

August  28,  1862. 
J.  J.  Moore : 

You  have  done  yourselves  infinite  credit.  Bring  the  wounded  and 
return  immediately.  How  many  wounded  are  there?  Please  answer. 

H.  HAUPT. 

ALEXANDRIA,  August  28, 1862, 11  A.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck: 

The  result  of  our  railway  reconnoissance  to-day  was  extremely 
gratifying.  The  Construction  Corps  reconstructed  the  bridge  across  Po- 
hick,  the  operators  repaired  telegraph  lines,  and  wounded  at  Fairfax  were 
all  brought  off  safely. 

Important  intelligence  was  obtained  from  a  soldier  who  came  on 
foot  ^from  Warrenton  Junction.  He  confirms  the  statements  of  the 
burning  of  Bull  Eun  bridge,  and  of  the  other  bridges  between  Warrenton 
Junction  and  Bull  Kun.  He  says  that  Generals  Siegel  and  Hooker 
occupy  Manassas. 

From  a  chaplain  captured  and  released  on  parole,  our  Superintend 
ent  Devereux  elicited  the  information  that  the  enemy  became  alarmed 
last  night  at  Manassas,  and  went  off.  He  saw  General  Lee  to-day  at 
Fairfax  about  1  o'clock,  who  took  the  road  towards  Vienna  with  a  large 
force,  accompanied  by  artillery.  I  am  now  sending  the  chaplain  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan ;  also  copy  of  report  of  conductor. 

I  have  arranged  with  General  McClellan  to  send  out  to-morrow  a 
strong  reconnoissance  by  rail  to  Bull  Kun,  accompanied  by  artillery  and 
cavalry,  with  a  wrecking  and  construction  party,  to  clear  the  way  and 
open  communication  with  Bull  Run,  into  which,  if  our  forces  occupy 
Manassas,  I  will  endeavor  to  pour  supplies  without  delay;  will  recon 
struct  Bull  Eun  bridge  in  the  shortest  time  possible. 

H.  HAUPT. 

ALEXANDRIA,  August  28,  1862,  10:45  A.  M. 
My  Dear  Colonel: 

Your  note  with  enclosure  is  just  received.  I  am  very  glad  you 
have  sent  out  the  reconnoissance.  I  hope  to  collect  sufficient  cavalry  and 
artillery  to-day  to  send  at  least  a  portion  of  the  forces  to  the  front.  As 


110  EEMINI8CENCE8   OF 

soon  as  I  can  communicate  with  my  cavalry,  I  will  send  some  Orderlies 
to  your  office.     Will  probably  call  there  myself  on  way  to  camp. 
Very  truly  yours, 

GENERAL  GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN. 
Colonel  Haupt,  Chief  of  Construction,  etc. 

August  28,  1862. 
General  NcClellan: 

I  just  learn  that  Colonel  Scammon  has  returned  with  his  command, 
and  is  at  this  moment  at  General  Franklin's  Headquarters.  I  will  go 
immediately  on  engine  to  see  him  and  report. 


August  28,  1862,  4:40  p.  M. 
President  Lincoln: 

The  latest  news  is  that  our  men  are  busy  reconstructing  bridges 
beyond  Bull  Run.  One  of  my  assistants,  just  returning  from  Bristoe  to 
Manassas,  reports  bridges  across  Kettle  Run  finished,  a  good  force  at 
work  at  Broad  Run  and  another  at  Bull  Run,  one  train  of  supplies  sent 
out  and  unloaded,  another  of  thirteen  cars  of  bread  and  meat  just  starting. 
The  track  to  Bull  Run  should  be  clear  by  this  time,  but  I  have  no  advices 
of  the  fact.  Major  Fifield  has  this  moment  arrived  on  return  train,  and 
gives  it  as  his  opinion,  from  the  position  of  affairs  when  he  left,  that 
Jackson  has  by  this  time  surrendered;  this  is  doubtful,  as  we  can  still 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  28,  1862. 
Major-General  McClellan. 

SIR:  I  have  just  received  through  General  Clough  the  following 
items  of  information  : 

A  private  of  Company  C,  68th  Illinois,  employed  on  picket  duty  in 
guarding  the  telegraph  line  between  Washington  and  Acquia  Creek,  came 
to  Alexandria  yesterday.  Was  returning  last  night  to  join  his  squad, 
about  16  miles  from  Alexandria  on  telegraph  line;  reached  a  point  one 
mile  from  his  squad.  On  the  way  he  passed  cavalry,  citizens  and  contra 
bands  fleeing  towards  Alexandria.  Being  unarmed  and  seeing  a  man 
near  the  road  who  had  just  been  killed,  he  returned.  The  fugitives  re 
ported  that  rebel  cavalry  in  considerable  force  was  behind. 

This  is  probably  the  Prince  William  Cavalry,  of  which  a  scout  gave 
information  last  night.  I  have  just  ascertained  that  the  telegraph  is  not 
cut  yet. 

Colonel  Close  reports  to  General  Clough  this  morning,  on  the  au 
thority  of  three  men  who  escaped,  that  Company  A,  16th  Virginia,  sent 
on  guard  duty  at  some  point  on  the  railroad  between  this  place  and 
Manassas,  were  all  captured  some  time  last  night. 

H.  HAUPT. 

ALEXANDRIA,  August  28,  1862. 
J.  H.  Devereux. 

DEAR  SIR:  In  accordance  with  orders  from  Colonel  Haupt,  I  pro 
ceeded  west  with  engine  Vulcan  and  a  detachment  of  soldiers  this  A.  M., 
finding  the  road  in  good  order  and  unobstructed  to  Burkes.  One  mile 
west  of  Burkes  the  bridge  across  Pohick  Run  we  found  burned.  The 
construction  force  on  my  train  proceeded  at  once  to  repair  this,  and  we 


STEEL  HOOKS,  AND  PIECE  OK  RAIL  TWISTED  BY  THKIK  USE. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  113 

proceeded  to  Fairfax.  From  here  to  Fairfax  the  road  was  in  good  order. 
The  telegraph  being  cut  about  midway  between  Burkes  and  Fairfax,  the 
repairer  on  my  train  put  this  in  order.  At  Fairfax  I  proceeded  and 
placed  on  my  train  the  wounded  of  yesterday's  engagement.  I  have 
brought  them  to  Alexandria.  A  soldier  came  to  Fairfax,  who  reports 
that  he  left  Warrenton  Junction  this  morning  and  came  on  foot  to  Fair 
fax;  that  the  bridges  over  Broad  Run,  between  Bristoe  and  Manassas,. 
and  over  Bull  Run  were  burned,  and  the  engines  and  cars  at  Bristoe 
were  burned  and  destroyed,  and  that  the  cars  at  the  scene  of  the  col 
lision  of  night  before  last  were  burned.  The  engines  Maryland  and 
Waterford  are  still  uninjured.  He  states  also  that  Generals  Hooker  and 
Siegel  occupy  Manassas.  This  soldier,  whose  name  and  company,  from 
a  press  of  business,  I  could  not  learn,  was  taken  charge  of,  I  think,  by  the 
Colonel  commanding  the  force  on  my  train. 

Respectfully,  C.  M.  STREIN, 

Conductor. 

P.  S. — The  soldier  referred  to  reports  heavy  firing  during  the  time 
he  was  in  hearing,  in  the  direction  of  Gainesville,  west  from  Manassas. 

C.  M.  S. 

Edwin  M.  Markham,  brakeman  Orange  &  Alexandria  Rail 
road,  states : 

Left  Warrenton  on  Engine  136,  with  empty  train,  on  Tuesday, 
August  26,  about  5  o'clock.  On  reaching  Catlett's,  met  engine  McCal- 
lurn,  which  had  backed  up  from  Bristoe  with  the  report  that  the  trains 
ahead  of  her  had  been  thrown  off  track,  and  fired  into  by  the  rebels. 
Stayed  at  Catlett's  all  night,  and  next  morning,  August  27,  went  back  to 
Warrenton. 

But  on  Tuesday  night  Engine  136  added  to  her  train  the  empty  cars 
of  the  McCallum,  and  went  to  Warrenton,  taking  a  regiment  of  Kear 
ney's  Division,  with  which  it  proceeded  nearly  to  Bristoe,  or  to  Kettle 
Run  bridge.  The  said  regiment  did  not  disembark  at  all,  but  after 
challenging  the  rebels,  and  getting  for  answer :  "By  G — d,  come  on,  and 
we'll  show  you  who  we  are,"  the  said  regiment  returned  to  Catlett's,  get 
ting  there  about  daylight. 

From  Warrenton,  on  morning  of  August  27,  after  getting  trains 
ready,  came  down  on  train  of  McCallum,  and  got  to  Catlett's  about 
noon;  walked  down  track  and  saw  fighting.  Saw  Hooker's  battery  get 
into  position  and  causing  the  rebel  battery,  opposing,  to  skedaddle  from 
two  positions,  and  finally  to  take  off  towards  Thoroughfare  Gap. 

P.  H.  Watson,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  sent  me  an  armor- 
clad,  bullet-proof  car  mounting  a  cannon.  The  kindness  was  ap 
preciated,  but  the  present  was  an  elephant.  I  could  not  use  it  and, 
being  in  the  way,  it  was  finally  side-tracked  on  an  old  siding  in 
Alexandria.  The  bullet-proof  cabs  on  locomotives  were  very  use 
ful  ;  in  fact,  indispensable.  I  had  a  number  of  them  made  and  put 
on  engines,  and  they  afforded  protection  to  engineers  and  firemen 
against  the  fire  from  guerrillas  from  the  bushes  that  lined  the 
roads. 

General  McClellan  sent  word  to  General  Pope  that  he  would 


114  EEMINISCENCES    OF 

t 

have  all  the  available  wagons  and  cars  loaded  with  rations  for  his 
troops  when  he  (Pope)  should  send  a  cavalry  escort  as  guard  to  the 
trains.  General  Pope  had  not  five  horses  to  a  company  able  to 
trot,  and  could  not  understand  of  what  use  cavalry  could  be  to  rail 
road  trains. 

WASHINGTON,  August  29,  1862,  12  :15  p.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt  :  • 

An  armor-clad  car,  bullet  proof,  and  mounting  a  cannon,  has  ar 
rived  here,  and  will  be  sent  down  to  Alexandria. 

WASHINGTON,  August  29,  1862,  12  :15  p.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

After  you  see  the  bullet-proof  car,  let  me  know  what  you  think  of 
it.  I  think  you  ought  at  once  to  have  a  locomotive  protected  by  armor. 
Can  you  have  the  work  done  expeditiously  and  well  at  Alexandria,  or 
shall  I  get  it  done  at  Philadelphia  or  Wilmington  ? 

P.  H.  WATSON, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 

August  29,  1862. 
Colonel: 

General  McClellan  has  received  an  order  from  General  Halleck  to 
have  construction  trains  sent  out  at  once  to  repair  the  railroad  to 
Manassas. 

General  Tyler  has  been  ordered  to  furnish  you  such  guards  as  you 
may  think  necessary.  Please  see  General  Tyler  and  arrange  with  him, 
so  as  to  start  off  the  construction  parties  as  soon  as  possible.  General 
Pope's  troops  are  at  Centreville,  and  he  says  that  the  enemy  has  for  the 
most  part  retreated,  so  that  I  do  not  think  that  you  will  meet  with  much, 
if  any,  opposition. 

Please  have  your  trains  with  supplies  for  General  Pope  ready  to 
push  out  as  soon  as  the  road  is  clear. 

Very  respectfully,  E.  B.  MARCY, 

Chief  of  Staff. 
Colonel  Haupt,  Railroad  Superintendent. 

August  29,  1862,  3  :40  p.  M. 
Major-General  McClellan: 

I  think  that  about  200  men  should  ride  in  and  out  on  top  of  the 
cars,  and  that  200  more  should  protect  the  depot  where  we  unload  ammu 
nition  and  supplies.  This  is  in  addition  to  the  200  sent  out  by  General 
Tyler  this  morning  to  act  as  scouts  and  protect  construction  parties. 
We  will  be  sending  out  trains  constantly  during  the  day  and  night. 
Where  are  the  men,  and  where  can  they  be  loaded?  General  Tyler  has 
just  come  into  the  office  and  says  he  can  give  us  all  the  men  we  want, 
except  the  sharpshooters.  -o- 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

August  29,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt  : 

What  news  from  direction  of  Manassas  Junction?    What  gener- 

A.  LINCOLN. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  115 

August  29,  1862. 
President  Lincoln  and  General  Halleck: 

General  Pope  was  at  Centreville  this  morning  at  6  o'clock  ;  seemed 
to  be  in  good  spirits;  Hooker  driving  the  enemy  before  him,  McDowell 
and  Siegel  cutting  off  his  retreat;  army  out  of  forage  and  subsistence; 
force  of  enemy  60,000.  This  is  the  substance  of  information  communi 
cated  by  two  ambulance  drivers  who  came  from  Centreville,  and  who 
also  gave  many  particulars  confirming  previous  statements.  I  have  or 
dered  a.  train  of  forage  and  another  of  subsistence  to  be  got  ready  to 
start  before  daylight,  and  will  notify  General  Pope  to-night  by  courier 
that  he  can  have  wagons  to  receive  it  at  Sangster's  Station  by  daylight 
to-morrow  morning. 


The  ambulance  driver  mentioned  made  the  following  state 
ment  : 

August  29,  7  P.  M. 

Robert  I.  Johnson,  ambulance  driver,  went  a  week  ago,  August  22, 
with  75  ambulances  to  Pope's  Headquarters,  delivered  them  to  Colonel 
Cleary  Tuesday,  and  stopped  at  Warrenton  Junction  Tuesday  night,  the 
night  of  the  raid  on  Catlett's.  On  Wednesday  night  came  on  foot  to 
where  the  battle  was  near  Bristoe.  Forces  engaged,  Sickles  and  Hooker  ; 
about  30  men  killed,  rebels  about  the  same;  don't  know  how  many 
wounded.  Thursday  morning  went  on  battlefield  and  stayed  at  Bristoe 
until  1  P.  M.  Came  on  to  Bull  Run  at  the  bridge  on  the  road  between 
Manassas  and  Centreville  ;  heard  firing  in  direction  of  Gainesville.  Judge 
from  the  shells  and  ammunition  that  the  guns  of  the  rebels  were  not 
heavy.  Heard  firing  in  direction  of  Centreville  from  5  p.  M.  to  dark. 
Saw  General  Pope  at  Bristoe,  and  he  came  down  railroad  towards 
Manassas. 

Came  to  Centreville  at  6  A.  M.;  saw  General  Pope  at  Centreville. 
Fighting  towards  the  mountains  ;  had  fifty  prisoners.  Hooker  was  in 
rear  of  rebels;  appeared  to  be  driving  them,  and  heard  from  some  of 
Pope's  aides-de-camp  that  Siegel  and  McDowell  were  heading  them  off. 
Saw  some  of  the  wounded,  who  said  they  came  in  by  Manassas  Gap  ;  they 
said  the  force  might  be  fifty  or  sixty  thousand,  commanded  by  Jackson, 
Longstreet,  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill. 

We  came  through  Fairfax  C.  H.  to-day.  We  saw  a  lady  who  said 
Generals  Lee  and  Stuart  were  at  her  nouse  yesterday;  they  had  500  cav 
alry;  they  came  close  to  the  14th  Massachusetts,  but  were  not  seen  by 
them,  a  small  hill  screening  them.  When  we  got  to  Fairfax  C.  H.,  about 
10  or  12,  we  still  heard  firing  in  direction  of  Centreville  and  beyond. 
Met  Smith's  Division  seven  or  eight  miles  from  Alexandria. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
TWO  PERILOUS  DAYS  AT  BULL  RUN. 

O!N"E  of  the  prominent  incidents  of  this  day's  operations  was  an 
invitation  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  clerks  in  the  depart 
ment,  citizens  of  Washington  and  citizens  of  Baltimore  to  volun 
teer  as  nurses  to  assist  in  caring  for  the  wounded  on  the  battlefield. 

It  was  an  impulsive  and  kind-hearted  but  ill-advised  act.  At 
a  time  when  passes  were  refused  to  every  applicant,  when  com 
munication  with  the  enemy  was  rigorously  guarded,  the  gates  were 
opened  and  trains  required  for  military  supplies  and  reinforce 
ments  were  ordered  to  Washington  to  bring  forward  a  promiscuous- 
rabble,  and  scatter  them  broadcast  over  the  country. 

Upon  receiving  orders  through  Assistant  Secretary  Watson  to 
send  trains  to  Washington  for  this  purpose,  I  protested  against  it,, 
and  begged  him  to  use  his  influence  to  have  the  invitations  recalled. 
This  could  not  be  done ;  they  had  gone  out  and  the  Secretary  felt 
that  he  could  not  rescind  the  order,  even  though  it  might  be  a  mis 
take. 

I  sent  on  a  train,  and  when  it  reached  Alexandria  it  was 
packed  full,  inside  and  on  top.  Some  women  even  had  forced 
themselves  into  the  cars,  which  were  ordinary  freight  cars  without 
seats.  It  was  night.  Superintendent  Devereux  came  to  me,  after 
inspecting  the  train,  and  begged  to  have  it  side-tracked;  that  it 
would  not  do  to  send  it  forward ;  that  half  the  men  were  drunk  and 
nearly  every  one  had  a  couple  of  bottles  of  whisky. 

I  replied  that  we  were  not  responsible  for  results;  we  must 
obey  orders,  which  were  peremptory,  but  I  would  delay  the  train 
as  long  as  possible,  and  he  should  send  a  conductor  to  announce  ta 
its  passengers  that  the  enemy  was  near  Fairfax,  where  they  were  to 
be  unloaded,  and  that  a  proper  regard  for  their  safety  required 
that  a  train  with  troops  should  be  sent  in  advance.  This  quieted 
them  and  they  were  very  patient. 

When  sent  forward,  I  telegraphed  the  officer  in  command  at 
Fairfax  to  arrest  all  who  were  drunk  and  put  a  guard  over  them. 
Those  who  were  sober  enough  straggled  off  as  soon  as  it  was  light 
enough  to  see  and  wandered  around  until  whisky  and  provisions 
became  exhausted,  when  they  returned  to  the  station  to  get  trans 
portation  back.  In  this,  most  of  them  were  disappointed.  The 

116 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  117 

orders  had  been  to  take  them  out,  but  none  to  bring  them  back,  and 
although  it  seemed  cruel  to  compel  them  to  walk,  cold,  hungry  and 
wet  with  rain,  it  would  have  been  far  more  cruel  to  let  the  wounded 
lie  on  the  ground  to  perish  in  order  to  furnish  transportation  to 
those  whose  necessities  were  not  so  great. 

Xo  doubt  some  were  induced  to  volunteer  from  proper  mo 
tives,  but  generally  it  was  a  hard  crowd,  and  of  no  use  whatever  on 
the  field.  In  fact,  I  was  told  that  in  some  instances  parties  who 
had  money  bribed  ambulance  drivers  to  take  them  back  to  the  sta 
tion,  thus  compelling  the  wounded  to  lie  longer  upon  the  field. 
Telegrams  came  in  from  officers,  "don't  send  out  any  more  civil 
ians." 

August  30, 1862. 
Colonel  II.  Haupt: 

J.  W.  Garret,  President  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Company, 
came  in  this  moment,  by  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  having  arrangements  made  for  the  prompt  transportation  by  rail, 
from  Washington  to  Bull  Run,  of  surgeons  and  volunteers  who  go  to 
care  for  the  wounded  of  General  Pope's  army. 

P.  S. — A  notice  is  posted  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  the  hotels, 
calling  on  all  able-bodied  men  to  volunteer  as  nurses,  and  go  out  to  the 
battlefield,  saying  that  transportation  will  be  furnished  to  them.  You 
may  have  a  large  number  to  go,  and  the  arrangements  you  make  I  will 

have  posted  on  the  hotel  bulletins.  _.    ~  ..-.  _,ATTTT^r 

D.  C.  McCALLUM. 

August  30, 1862. 
P.  H,  Watson: 

Surgeons  must  be  accommodated  by  all  means,  but  I  would  ask 
whether  the  several  hundred  volunteers  who  propose  to  go  are  needed, 
and  whether  they  will  not  be  in  the  way,  and  possibly  help  to  produce  a 
stampede.  I  fear  if  we  send  a  train  it  will  be  filled  with  a  rush,  and 
possibly  the  surgeons  excluded. 

Our  trains  sent  out  this  morning  at  daylight  have  not  yet  returned ; 
until  they  do,  we  are  in  the  dark,  as  we  have  no  operators  at  intermediate 
points.  An  operator  will  go  in  next  train.  Washington  track  is  encum 
bered  with  Richardson's  baggage  and  must  be  cleared  before  we  can  send 
train  to  Washington;  in  the  meantime,  while  getting  ready  the  trains, 
you  can  give  your  opinion  whether  it  would  not  be  best  to  send  the  doc 
tors  to  Alexandria  for  shipment,  and  leave  all  the  rest  at  home. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  30,  1862. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

We  obey  orders  and  will  send  train  to  Washington  as  soon  as  track 
is  clear,  but  there  should  be  some  way  of  keeping  back  those  who  are 
impelled  by  mere  curiosity,  and  sending  only  those  who  will  be  useful. 
I  think  time  would  be  saved  by  sending  to  Alexandria.  The  hour  of 
sending  trains  from  this  place  will  depend  on  the  time  of  return  trains, 
which  is  uncertain.  We  will  be  running  out  and  in  all  night.  I  sup 
pose  the  wounded  will  soon  be  pouring  in,  and  the  removal  of  them  must 

7 


118  REMINISCENCES    OF 

be  carefully  managed,  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  supplies.  It  seems  to 
me  that  if  the  battle  is  over,  we  have  men  enough  to  act  as  nurses ;  if  it 
is  not  over,  we  do  not  want  any  citizens  to  skedaddle  and  create  a  panic. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  30,  1862,  10  p.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

A  train  of  16  cars,  containing  about  800  persons,  has  arrived.  I 
do  not  wish  them  to  go  ahead  of  the  ammunition  train,  as  they  will  be 
very  much  in  the  way,  so  I  have  told  them  that  a  proper  regard  for  their 
safety,  and  a  desire  to  protect  them  against  attack,  induces  me  to  delay 
them,  to  send  an  ammunition  train  with  troops,  and  to  place  guards  on 
top  of  each  of  their  cars.  They  are  very  patient  with  this  information. 
I  hope  to  forward  General  Couch's  regiment  without  special  train,  by 
placing  the  men  on  top  of  the  cars.  Abundance  of  commissary  stores 
have  been  sent  forward — 18  carloads  commissary  and  36  of  forage. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  30,  1862,  11 :15  p.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

A  large  portion  of  the  nurses  who  came  on  last  night  were  drunk 
and  very  disorderly.  I  sent  them  off  with  written  directions  to  the 
officer  in  command  at  Fairfax,  to  arrest  every  one  who  was  drunk  and 
return  him  by  the  next  train.  I  understand  that  a  large  number  are  on 
their  way  back.  They  are  much  in  the  way.  Can  you  not  place  a  guard 
on  Long  Bridge?  We  are  now  using  care  to  bring  back  nurses  who  are 
satisfied  with  the  experience  of  one  night  and  are  skedaddling  back  again. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  30, 1862,  9  A.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

What  news  ?  A.  LINCOLN. 

August  30,  1862. 
President  Lincoln: 

Firing  this  morning  is  heard  in  direction  of  Centreville.  I  have 
sent  out  four  trains.  The  first  left  at  4:30  A.  M.,  the  others  following 
immediately — a  wrecking  train  to  clear  track,  a  construction  train  to 
repair  bridges,  a  train  of  forage  and  one  of  bread  and  meat. 

A  courier  returning  to  General  Pope  last  night  was  to  convey  the 
information  that  the  trains  would  be  at  Sangster's  Station  soon  after 
daylight  with  supplies.  This  point  is  four  miles  only  from  Centreville. 
I  have  directed  that  when  a  party  arrives  at  Bull  Run,  a  detachment 
shall  be  sent  forward  on  foot  with  such  tools  as  they  can  carry  to  reach 
the  engines  and  cars  now  cut  off  from  communication  at  Catlett's,  with 
instructions  to  work  towards  Bull  Run,  repair  bridges,  and  telegraph 
call  upon  General  Banks  or  any  other  officer  for  assistance  and  protec 
tion,  and  work  along  opening  communications  with  Bull  Run.  When 
this  is  done,  we  can  forward  supplies  by  carrying  them  across  Bull  Run 
and  reshipping. 

I  have  also  sent  wire,  operator  and  instrument  with  the  expedition, 
and  a  force  of  200  riflemen,  with  directions  to  keep  with  the  working 
party  in  the  advance,  send  out  scouts  and  report  everything. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  119 

The  intelligence  last  evening  was  that  Hooker  and  Pope  were  push 
ing  the  enemy  towards  the  Gaps  in  the  mountains  through  which  they 
had  advanced,  and  that  McDowell  and  Siegel  were  heading  them  off. 
This  morning  the  direction  of  the  firing  seemed  to  be  changing,  and  it 
is  not  impossible  that  the  enemy's  forces  may  be  changing  direction  and 
trying  to  escape  towards  Fredericksburg.  In  this  case  my  trains  will  be 
in  great  danger.  I  await  intelligence  with  some  anxiety,  and  will  com 
municate  anything  of  importance  that  I  hear. 

H.  HAUir-L. 

August  30, 1862,  8 :50  p.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Please  send  me  the  latest  news.  A.  LINCOLN. 

August  30,  1862. 
A.  Lincoln,  President: 

Our  operator  has  reached  Manassas ;  hears  no  firing  of  importance. 
I  have  directed  part  of  the  200  riflemen  to  go  out  as  scouts,  make  obser 
vations  and  report  constantly.  Two  or  three  flashes  just  seen  from 
Manassas  in  direction  of  Centreville. 

Our  expedition  this  morning  appears  to  have  been  completely  suc 
cessful.  We  have  re-established  telegraphic  communications  with 
Manassas,  will  soon  have  cars  running,  but  the  military  authorities  here 
tofore  have  never  extended  to  us  the  protection  that  was  necessary,  and 
we  have  assumed  the  responsibility  of  going  ahead  without  it. 

Our  telegraph  operators  and  railway  employes  are  entitled  to  great 
credit.  They  have  been  advanced  pioneers,  occupying  the  posts  of  dan 
ger,  and  the  exploit  of  penetrating  to  Fairfax  and  bringing  off  the 
wounded  when  they  supposed  that  20,000  rebels  were  on  their  front  and 
flanks,  was  one  of  the  boldest  performances  I  have  ever  heard  of. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  30, 1862. 
President  Lincoln: 

We  escaped  any  injury  to  the  track  and  bridges  last  night.  We 
sent  forward  trains  until  2  A.  M.  They  all  reached  their  destination, 
which  affords,  I  think,  an  ample  present  supply  of  subsistence  and  ammu 
nition.  We  sent  88  cars.  The  trains  were  all  guarded,  the  tops  filled 
with  riflemen  and  strong  guards  at  all  the  bridges.  We  asked  Manassas 
a  short  time  ago  if  firing  was  heard;  he  said  no.  Fairfax  just  answers 
no  firing  heard.  I  sent  out  one  of  General  Couch's  regiments  about  12 
last  night ;  the  other  reported  for  duty  after  2  A.  M.  It  was  of  no  use  to 

send  it  at  that  hour,  and  no  train  was  ready.  -rmm 

JcL  HAUJrJL. 

August  30,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt : 

There  has  been  heavy  and  rapid  firing  in  the  direction  of  Fairfax 
for  some  time.  I  have  sent  out  to  ascertain  what  it  is.  I  thought  per 
haps  you  might  learn  something  by  telegraphing  to  the  front. 

G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

Major-General. 


120  REMINISCENCES   OF 

August  30,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Do  you  know  what  that  firing  is  ? 

GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

Major-  General. 

MANASSAS,  August  30,  1862. 
General  McClellan: 

There  was  a  camp  rumor  as  I  came  in  from  Bristoe  that  Jackson 
had  moved  towards  Alexandria.  Colonel  J.  C.  Clarke,  one  of  my  aides, 
who  has  been  out  to  the  front,  reports  that  Jackson  has  fallen  back  about 
five  (5)  miles  towards  the  mountains.  He  judges  mainly  by  the  sounds 
of  the  guns.  There  has  been  an  entire  change  of  position,  I  judge.  A 
scout  reports  at  ten  (10)  A.  M.  that  Jackson  was  at  Gainesville  with  about 
30,000.  He  said  that  he  saw  and  knew  him.  My  corps  is  moving  up 
from  Bristoe;  no  enemy  near. 


Major-General. 

August  30,  1862. 
Colonel  Stager: 

Please  order  Flagg,  Graham,  and  Waterhouse  to  return  and  reopen 
Burkes  and  Fairfax  Stations,  and  ask  General  Halleck  to  direct  that  a 
company  of  riflemen  and  a  few  cavalry  be  sent  to  each  station  for  infor 
mation  and  protection.  When  we  are  sending  supplies  to  Sangster's 
Station,  I  consider  it  very  important  that  we  should  have  a  temporary 
connection  and  operator  at  that  point.  Please  send  some  one  for  that 

H.  HAUPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  30,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Have  telegraphed  Flagg  to  go  immediately  to  Fairfax  Station. 
Our  advices  are  that  fighting  is  still  going  on.     The  firing  has  been 

rapid  and  heavy  during  the  last  two  hours.  nr^-o 

A.  olACr-Llv. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  30,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

I  have  directed  operators  to  resume  their  places  at  Burkes  and 
Fairfax.  Will  have  temporary  office  at  Sangster's,  as  you  request. 

Pope  fought  enejny  all  day  yesterday  and  drove  them  in  every  in 
stance,  and  has  more  prisoners  than  he  can  count.  He  was  to  resume 
the  fight  this  morning.  Pope's  loss  heavy,  8,000;  enemy  much  larger. 
This  comes  by  courier  from  General  Pope.  General  Halleck  directed 
me  to  give  you  all  information  I  can,  which  I  shall  cheerfully  do. 

A.  STAGER. 

August  30,  1862,  5:48  p.  M. 
McCricfcett  and  Major  Haller: 

You  are  in  much  less  danger  of  any  attack  than  you  were  last 
night.  The  guards  are  strengthened  by  Carroll's  brigade,  and  General 
Tyler  will  have  skirmishers  out  in  every  direction.  We  must  send  sup- 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  123 

plies  as  long  and  as  fast  as  there  are  wagons  to  take  them  away.  If  you 
have  any  information  from  any  source  that  is  really  reliable,  it  may 
change  our  plans.  What  do  you  know  ?  We  cannot  act  on  surmises. 

H.  HAUPT. 

MANASSAS,  August  30,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

I  left  force  to  work  at  Bull  Run,  and  walked  to  Bristoe  Station. 
Churchill  and  the  force  of  contrabands  finished  Kettle  Run  bridge  last 
night,  and  will  be  working  at  Broad  Run  this  afternoon.  The  track 
stringers  are  destroyed  and  most  of  the  posts  cut  off.  Will  do  the  best 
to  repair  it  until  we  get  lumber.  They  attempted  to  burn  Conner's  Run, 
but  did  little  injury.  Can  be  repaired  soon.  I  return  to  Bull  Run 
bridge  this  evening.  I  can  hear  nothing  of  the  Construction  Corps. 

J.  J.  MOORE. 

August  30, 1862, 12 :25  p.  M. 
General  HallecJe: 

The  chief  danger  to  our  trains  and  construction  forces  arises  from 
the  cavalry  companies  of  Prince  William.  I  would  be  pleased  if  you 
could  order  some  cavalry  immediately  to  patrol  the  country  east  of  the 
railroad  towards  the  Occoquan ;  also  to  have  a  force  of  not  less  than  200 
sharpshooters  to  ride  on  top  of  the  cars  and  assist  in  unloading  the 
trains.  H.  HAUPT. 

August  30, 1862,  3  p.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

I  have  just  received  the  following  from  General  Halleck:  "Send 
some  sharpshooters  and  trains  to  Bull  Run;  the  bridges  and  property 
are  threatened  by  band  of  Prince  William  Cavalry.  Give  Colonel  Haupt 
all  the  assistance  you  can ;  the  sharpshooters  on  top  of  the  cars  can  assist 
in  unloading  trains." 

What  trains  are  you  to  send,  and  how  many  men  do  you  want  to 
carry  out  General  Halleck's  order?  I  have  300  good  men,  including 
about  fifty  sharpshooters,  armed  with  Sharp's  rifles.  At  what  time  do 
you  want  these  men?  If  you  require  any  more,  they  will  have  to  be 
taken  from  raw  troops  armed  at  once.  Q.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

Major-General. 

August  30,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

The  General-in-Chief  considers  the  protection  of  the  railroad  to 
night  as  one  of  the  most  importance.  General  McClellan,  therefore,  de 
sires  that  you  will  throw  forward  to  the  exposed  front  General  Couch's 
Division,  just  arrived  at  Alexandria,  as  rapidly  as  the  capability  of  the 
road  will  permit.  General  Couch  has  been  instructed  to  confer  with 
you.  S.  WILLIAMS, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

August  30,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Major-General  Couch  has  been  ordered,  by  direction  of  the  Gen 
eral-in-Chief,  to  send  the  regiment  of  his  command,  which  is  now  dis- 


124  REMINISCENCES    OF 

embarking,  at  once  to  Sangster's  and  other  exposed  stations  by  rail. 
General  Couch  is  ordered  to  confer  with  you  as  to  the  points  to  be 
guarded  and  the  strength  of  the  guard. 

General  Halleck  fears  that  the  marauders  may  attempt  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  road  to-night.  No  time,  therefore,  is  to  be  lost.  Please 
acknowledge. 

By  command  Major-General  McClellan. 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

August  30,  1862,  5:15  p.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

Please  direct  General  Clough,  Military  Governor  of  Alexandria, 
to  arrest  and  hold  for  examination  until  exigencies  of  the  service  will 
permit  it,  William  Hook,  a  workman  in  machine  shop,  believed,  from 
recent  developments,  to  be  a  rebel,  and  charged  with  secreting  parts  of 

engines  to  render  them  unfit  for  service.  -rr-om 

H.  JdLAUJ:  1. 

August  30,  1862,  11 :45  A.  M. 
P.  H.  Watson: 

I  have  just  had  a  conversation  with  M.  P.  Wood,  Master  Machin 
ist,  who  has  had  charge  of  the  machine  shop  in  Fredericksburg.  He 
says  that  after  having  used  the  forges  two  days,  it  was  discovered  that  a 
loaded  shell  had  been  placed  in  each.  I  think  the  proprietor,  John  Scott, 
now  under  arrest,  should  not  be  released.  His  is  an  aggravated  case. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  30,  1862. 
General  Salleck: 

From  the  conductor  of  the  wrecking  and  construction  trains,  I 
learn  that  the  wreck  at  Bull  Run  is  nearly  cleared.  The  bridges  will  be 
commenced  to-morrow  and  probably  finished  next  day.  I  have  just  sta 
tioned  200  men  at  the  bridges  as  a  protection.  The  track  is  clear  to  Bull 

H.  HATJPT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  31,  1862,  7 :10  A.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

What  news?    Did  you  hear  any  firing  this  morning? 

A.  LINCOLN. 

August  31,  1862. 
President  Lincoln: 

No  news  received  as  yet  this  morning;  firing  heard  distinctly  in 

direction  of  Bristoe  at  6  o'clock.  TTT>T< 

ad..  JzLAUJL  -L. 

August  31,  1862. 
McCricJcett: 

Please  send  telegraph  operator  to  Bull  Run  to  make  connection 
and  report  all  that  he  learns ;  let  him  go  on  first  train. 

H.  HAUPT. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  125 

August  31,  1862. 
Generals  Halleck  and  McClellan: 

I  am  just  informed  that  Manassas  is  being  evacuated  again  by  our 
men,  and  that  Banks'  forces  are  moving  towards  Centreville.  I  know 
very  little  of  what  is  going  on,  but  this  movement  would  seem  to  indi 
cate  large  reinforcements  of  the  enemy  from  the  direction  of  the  Rap- 
pahannock,  particularly  as  our  own  cars  and  engines  at  and  near  Bristoe 
were  destroyed  by  our  own  men  this  morning. 

As  our  forces  occupy  Centreville,  Fairfax,  Vienna  and,  in  fact,  the 
whole  line  north  of  the  railroad,  there  should  be  but  little  difficulty  in 
our  retaining  possession  of  the  triangle  formed  by  the  line  of  railroads 
from  Bull  Run  to  Alexandria,  the  streams  of  Bull  Run  and  Occoquan 
and  the  Potomac.  If  the  bridges  and  fords  on  the  Occoquan  and  Bull 
Run  are  guarded  and  cavalry  scouts  patrolling  this  triangle,  no  enemy 
could  approach  the  line  of  road.  A  stronger  force  is  required  at  Bull 
Run. 

Our  men  are  at  work  and  expect  to  have  Bull  Run  bridge  passable 
to-morrow  morning.  Without  artillery  we  cannot  defend  the  bridge 
against  artillery.  If  the  crossings  of  the  Occoquan  are  guarded,  Bull 
Run  bridge  is  our  most  exposed  point. 

Please  give  a  thought  to  these  suggestions. 

H.  HAUPT. 

August  31,  1862. 
Major-General  HallecTc: 

Your  telegram  in  regard  to  orders  of  General  Couch  has  been  re 
ceived.  As  soon  as  the  officer  reports  I  will  make  the  arrangement.  We 
have  already  stationed  200  men  at  Bull  Run,  150  at  Fairfax,  and  150 
more  will  be  sent  by  next  train.  200  travel  with  trains  as  guards.  The 
regiments  of  General  Couch  will  be  placed  at  bridges  along  the  road  be 
tween  Alexandria  and  Fairfax,  beyond  which  points  trains  will  not  run 
to-night.  To-morrow  there  should  be  a  better  organization  of  guards 
than  now  exists.  The  attacks  are  usually  made  before  midnight,  and 

guards  to  be  of  use  should  be  already  posted.  -rr-om 

Jd.  MAUirl. 

August  31,  1862. 
Major-General  McClellan: 

We  have  been  waiting  perhaps  an  hour  and  a  half  for  General 
Couch's  regiment,  and  they  have  not  been  heard  from.  They  are 
assigned  to  duty  as  follows : 

3  companies  to  strengthen  guards  at  Fairfax. 
3  at  Accotink  bridge. 

1  at  bridge  at  Springfield. 

2  seven  miles  from  Alexandria. 
1  at  bridge  near  Burkes. 

It  is  now  so  late  that  these  guards  will  be  of  little  use  for  to-night, 
and  if  they  do  not  report  soon,  I  must  send  off  trains  now  waiting  with 
out  them.  The  ammunition  must  go  forward  immediately.  We  have 
200  men  at  Bull  Run,  and  I  consider  it  inexpedient  to  send  any 
more  beyond  Fairfax  to-night.  At  this  point  all  supplies  will  be  un- 

loaded-  H.  HAUPT. 


126  REMINISCENCES   OF 

August  31,  1862,  10:30. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Was  ordered  out  of  my  car  this  morning  with  the  word  that  OUT 
cars  and  engine  were  to  be  burned,  and  before  I  had  picked  up  my  traps 
the  trains  were  on  fire.  Am  now  trying  to  come  to  Alexandria. 

J.  D.  IRISH. 

August  31,  1862. 
President  Lincoln  and  Generals  Halleck  and  McClellan: 

One  of  our  train  dispatchers  reports  from  Manassas  that  he  was 
ordered  out  of  his  car  at  Bristoe  this  morning  by  our  troops  with  the 
information  that  they  were  ordered  to  destroy  the  cars  and  engines,  and 
they  have  been  burned.  I  suppose  that  this  was  done  by  command  of 

H.  HATJPT. 

August  31,  1862,  11  A.  M. 

General  Tyler,  care  Colonel  Haupt : 

The  Commanding  General  directs  that  you  furnish  such  guards  for 
railroad  and  trains  as  Colonel  Haupt  may  call  for. 

K.  B.  MAECY, 

Chief  of  Staff. 

August  31,  1862, 11  A.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Should  you  require  any  more  troops  to  guard  railroad  or  trains, 
please  call  upon  General  Tyler  for  them.  He  will  be  directed  to  furnish 
them.  Can  you  send  out  any  troops  to  Fairfax  Station  to-day  and  not 
interfere  with  the  transit  of  subsistence  ?  If  so,  how  many  ? 

E.  B.  MAKCY, 

Chief  of  Staff. 

August  31,  1862. 
General  G.  B.  McClellan: 

I  have  arranged  with  General  Tyler  for  guards  to  roads  and  sta 
tions.  He  will  strengthen  the  force  at  Bull  Run  bridge,  and  add  a  sec 
tion  of  artillery.  We  still  need  about  500  cavalry  between  the  railroad 
and  the  Occoquan.  The  troops  asked  transportation  for,  have  not  yet 

been  sent.    A  regiment  has  just  reported.  _  _.   ^.^^ 

M.  H  A  LI  Jr  I  . 

August  31,  1862. 
General  R.  B.  Marcy: 

I  do  not  think  that  any  additional  force  to  guard  the  roads  will  be 
required.  We  have  enough  to  protect  against  small  parties,  and  we 
cannot  be  furnished  enough  to  defend  the  road  against  an  army.  Cavalry 
scouts  would  be  very  useful  if  we  could  get  them. 

As  to  troops,  our  means  of  transportation  depend  entirely  on  the 
rapidity  with  which  cars  are  unloaded  and  returned.  We  can  probably 
send  out  5,000  men  in  five  hours. 

We  are  annoyed  by  a  drunken  rabble  who  came  out  as  nurses,  by 
permission  of  the  War  Department.  I  telegraphed  that  if  the  battle 
was  over,  the  companions  of  the  wounded  could  attend  to  them.  If  it 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  127 

was  not  over,  the  presence  of  citizens  was  highly  objectionable.  I  have 
requested  that  guards  be  placed  at  end  of  Long  Bridge  to  keep  any  but 
physicians  from  coming  over.  _  HATTPT 

August  31,  1862. 
Colonel  H.  Haupt: 

Confusion  worse  confounded.  Here  are  hundreds  of  men  who  want 
to  go  to  the  battlefield.  No  passes  being  required,  all  claim  the  right. 
We  have  in  the  train  five  passenger  cars  and  two  freight  cars  full.  I 
fear  there  are  more  persons  going  to  satisfy  a  morbid  curiosity  than  for 
any  other  purpose.  p  Q  McCALLIJM 

August  31,  1862. 
D.  C.  McCallum: 

Can  you  not  get  an  order  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  prevent 
any  more  people  from  coming  over  ?  Near  a  thousand  came  last  night, 
half  of  them  drunk.  We  do  not  want  any  more  of  them.  I  said  to 
Watson  that  if  the  battle  was  over,  the  companions  of  the  wounded 
could  attend  to  them.  If  it  was  not  over,  the  presence  of  such  a  crowd 
might  create  a  panic  and  do  immense  harm;  in  either  case  they  were 
worse  than  useless.  Have  guards  placed  to  keep  them  away,  if  possible. 

H.  HAUPT. 

FAIRFAX,  August  31,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Send  no  more  citizens.  G.  O.  HALLER, 

Major  Seventh  Infantry,  Commanding. 

FAIRFAX,  August  31,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Recent  news  induces  me  to  ask  whether  it  would  not  be  better  to 
send  all  our  wounded  rapidly  to  Alexandria,  and  not  ship  here  supplies 
until  further  notice.  I  can  send  the  unfortunate  far  more  rapidly  and 
there  may  be  yet  a  better  reason  for  not  sending  citizens.  They  have 
overwhelmed  us,  and  they  retard,  instead  of,  as  they  intended,  assist- 

ingus-  G.O.  HALLER, 

Major  Seventh  Infantry. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  31,  1862,12:55. 
Colonel  Haupt  : 

I  placed  your  telegrams  in  the  hands  of  the  Secretary  and  General 
Halleck  for  answer  early  this  morning.  I  gave  an  order  to  the  Military 
Governor,  General  Wadsworth,  to  place  guards  at  the  bridges  and 
wharves,  and  stop  and  turn  back  all  nurses  who  might  attempt  to  cross; 
also  to  stop  and  turn  back  all  other  civilians  who  have  no  proper  passes. 
Let  the  drunken  and  other  nurses  in  Alexandria  be  sent  back  by  cars  or 
steamers  as  may  suit  or  be  most  convenient. 

P.  H.  WATSON, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 


1  28  REMINISCENCES. 

FAIRFAX,  August  31,  1862. 
Colonel  Haupt  and  J.  H.  Devereux: 

A  slight  misunderstanding  existed  for  a  short  time  between  Major 
Haller  and  myself.  He  was  going  to  take  military  control  of  every 
thing  here.  Told  him  he  must  make  an  exception  of  railroad.  We  now 
understand  each  other  and  it  is  settled  all  right. 

Told  him  we  were  here  to  do  all  in  our  power  to  advance  the  busi 
ness  of  the  Government,  and  that  I  will  do  anything  that  does  not  con 
flict  with  your  orders.  There  has  been  awful  confusion  here  this  morn 
ing;  unloading  was  progressing  very  slowly.  Major  has  set  to  work 
and  will  have  cars  unloaded  promptly.  He  has  ordered  all  citizens  back 
to  Alexandria  who  refuse  to  go  to  Bull  Run  with  train.  They  are  in 
Devereux's  train;  eight  or  ten  wounded  are  in  same  train;  277  wagons 
of  wounded  are  just  in.  They  are  now  being  loaded. 

This  misunderstanding  took  place  before  Major  received  your  mes- 

McCRICKETT. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
August  31,  1862,  6  p.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

I  have  directed  General  Clough  to  arrest  Hook,  as  you  requested. 
You  or  General  Clough  are  both  authorized  to  arrest  and  send  to  the  Old 
Capitol  Prison,  in  Washington,  any  person  whom  you  may  deem  danger 
ous  to  remain  at  large.  You  will  report  any  such  arrest,  and  the  cause 
thereof,  to  this  Department. 


Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 

August  31,  1862,  11  :05  p.  M! 
Major-General  HallecTc: 

A  young  man  has  just  returned  from  the  battlefield  who  gives  in 
formation  of  the  position  of  affairs  which,  it  seems  to  me,  may  influence 
your  movements.  I  feel  it  to  be  my  duty  to  send  him  to  you,  and  am 
getting  an  engine  ready  for  that  purpose.  I  will  send  him  to  the  War 
Office.  Please  direct  the  door-keeper  to  admit  him,  or  direct  where  he 

can  see  you.     He  will  be  on  hand  before  1  A.  M.  TT-nrr. 

JtL.  xlAUir  -L. 


CHAPTEK  Y. 
GENERAL  POPE  POUNDED  TO  PIECES. 

THE  oncoming  disaster  to  Pope  and  his  army,  which  General 
McClellan  was  doing  nothing  to  avert,  was  already  discernible, 
though  the  authorities  at  Washington  were  not  yet  without  hope. 

Major-General  McClellan:  _  About  September  1,  1862. 

Have  you  ordered  Major  Haller's  command  to  be  withdrawn  from 
Fairfax  ?  If  you  have,  do  you  wish  them  to  be  transported  on  cars  this 
afternoon,  or  can  they  remain  until  to-morrow?  I  would  prefer,  if  you 
can  spare  them,  that  no  part  of  the  force  at  Fairfax  be  removed  while- 
the  depot  continues  at  that  point.  jj  JJAUPT 

Colonel  Haupt :  September  1,  1862. 

I  have  reason  to  believe,  from  reports  received,  that  the  enemy 
were  to-night  in  possession  of  Fairfax  Court  House,  and  I  very  much 
fear  that  they  will  try  to  take  possession  of  Fairfax  Station.  Please 
look  at  the  instructions  I  have  just  sent  over  the  wire  to  Major  Hallerr 
commanding  at  Fairfax  Station.  I  think  all  the  supplies  that  can  be 
withdrawn  from  there  should  be  withdrawn  at  once.  Provide,  if  possible, 
the  means  for  the  retirement  of  Major  Haller's  command  by  rail ;  at  least,, 
to  facilitate  it.  GEO>  B  McCLELLAN, 

Major-General. 

Major  Hatter,  Fairfax:  September  1,  1862,  12 :30  A.  M. 

It  is  reported  that  a  large  force  of  cavalry  and  three  light  bat 
teries  of  the  enemy  were  this  afternoon  near  Fairfax  Court  House.  They 
may  visit  you  to-night.  Be  ready  for  them.  Infantry  ought  to  handle' 
cavalry  anywhere  in  such  a  country  as  this.  Be  careful  to  secure  your 
retreat,  and  in  God's  name  do  not  be  captured.  Keep  me  constantly 
posted.  If  you  find  your  communication  with  Fairfax  Court  House 
irretrievably  cut  off,  destroy  the  stores  and  make  good  your  retreat  to 
Alexandria.  Communicate  the  same  orders  to  the  detachment  near  you 
and  personally  in  your  front.  If  possible,  fall  back  by  the  railroad, 
retreating  only  step  by  step,  as  you  are  forced  to  do  so.  Don't  allow  a 
mere  cavalry  raid  to  drive  you  off.  Give  ground  only  when  you  are- 
absolutely  forced  to  do  so.  Communicate  by  telegraph  with  Colonel 
Haupt,  Superintendent  Railroads. 

By  order  General  McClellan.  A.  V.  COLBURN, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

n  7       T  „  T,  September  1,  1862. 

Colonel  Colburn: 

Will  you  please  continue  to  send  out  scouts  at  short  intervals  and 
report  observations?  jj  HAUPT. 

129 


130  REMINISCENCES   OF 

September  1,  1862. 
McCrickett: 

We  are  informed  that  an  attack  may  be  made  upon  you  to-night  by 
cavalry.  Send  down  immediately  any  cars  that  are  at  the  station  as 
fast  as  they  can  be  loaded  with  wounded.  We  cannot  send  back  any 
more  cars  and  engines,  because  it  would  attract  too  much  attention. 
Major  Haller's  command  can  retire  much  more  safely  on  foot  than  they 
can  in  cars. 

Send  some  one  on  foot  to  Bull  Run  to  warn  our  railroad  men  and 
guards  to  retire  if  you  are  compelled  to  retire  from  Fairfax.  Burn  any 
stores,  and  particularly  any  ammunition  that  you  may  find  it  necessary 
to  leave. 

Do  not  communicate  this  intelligence  to  any  of  the  nurses,  or  a 
rush  will  be  made  and  a  panic  created.  Get  the  wounded  off  first. 

Keep  cool  and  trust  your  legs  and  the  bushes  for  escape. 

H.  HAUPT. 

FAIRFAX,  September  1, 1862. 
J.  H.  Devereux: 

All  right;  I  feel  perfectly  cool  and  wet;  have  been  fording  streams 
and  wading  ditches  since  4  A.  M.  McC 

FAIRFAX,  September  1,  1862,  4 :30  A.  M. 
Colonel  Haupt: 

Then  I  may  expect  no  engine  to  haul  away  the  13  cars  still  loaded 
with  forage.  It  will  be  almost  impossible  to  send  messenger  to  Bull  Run 
to-night.  Will  it  answer  about  daylight?  McCRICKETT 

September  1,  1862. 
McCrickett: 

Take  care  of  your  wounded  in  preference  to  forage ;  destroy  all  that 
you  cannot  bring  away.  You  cannot  now  stop  to  reload  forage ;  you  may 
risk  the  capture  of  the  party;  the  forage  is  not  worth  it. 

H.  HAUPT. 

September  1,  1862,  2:30  A.  M. 
Major-General  McClellan: 

If  the  enemy  are  at  Fairfax  Court  House  it  will  not  answer  to  send 
any  more  engines  from  Alexandria  to  Fairfax  Station.  The  noise  made 
in  going  out  would  attract  so  much  attention  that  they  would  be  sure 
to  be  captured  in  coming  in.  I  think  it  imprudent  also  to  put  the 
command  of  Major  Haller  in  the  cars,  where  they  would  be  defenseless. 
I  have  therefore  directed  that  empty  cars  shall  be  loaded  with  wounded 
and  returned;  that  stores  and  ammunition,  if  any  remain,  shall  be 
burned  in  case  of  attack,  and  that  men  who  have  legs  shall  depend  on 

them  and  the  bushes  for  escape.  _  ^  .  T^,- 

Jd.  MAUJrl. 

September  1,  1862,  2 :40  A.  M. 
Generals  Tyler  and  dough  : 

I  am  advised  by  telegram  from  General  McClellan  that  Fairfax 
Court  House  is  probably  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  I  have  ordered 
the  cars  and  engines  with  wounded  to  be  withdrawn  from  Fairfax 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  133 

Station  and  no  more  trains  to  be  sent  out.  In  case  of  attack  by  cavalry, 
which  is  expected,  destroy  the  stores  and  retire.  It  is  not  impossible 
that  a  dash  may  be  made  in  the  direction  of  Alexandria,  and  you  should 
be  advised  of  the  position  of  affairs. 


Major  Haller,  in  command  at  Fairfax  Station,  marched  his 
command  towards  Alexandria,  thus  withdrawing  all  protection. 
McCrickett  remained  until  after  5  p.  M.,  having  succeeded  in  send 
ing  to  Alexandria  all  the  wounded  and  all  the  stores,  except  a  few 
loads  of  forage,  and  then,  in  obedience  to  instructions,  set  fire  to 
the  building,  and  made  his  escape  as  the  enemy  was  approaching, 
his  last  telegram  being  :  "Have  fired  it.  Good  by." 

FAIRFAX,  September  2,  1862,  1  :05  p.  M. 
General  McClellan  ' 

Major  Haller's  command  just  marching  towards  Alexandria. 

H.  HAUPT. 

September  2,  1862. 
S.  Williams,  A.  A.  G.: 

We  have  ordered  all  cars  forward  immediately  from  Fairfax  Sta-f 
tion.  Major  Haller's  command  started  some  time  ago.  Your  informa 
tion  comes  too  late  to  send  additional  cars  from  Alexandria  to  Fairfax. 
We  are  just  advised  that  the  last  of  our  army  has  passed,  and  the  depot 
is  already  in  the  rear.  I  have  directed  that,  in  case  this  information  is 
correct,  to  start  with  all  the  cars  at  Fairfax,  put  in  the  wounded  as  rap 
idly  as  possible,  and  return  to  Alexandria.  To  send  trains  now  from 
here  to  Fairfax  would  be  certain  capture.  - 


September  2,  1862. 
McCricJcett: 

If  the  last  of  our  army  has  already  passed,  and  you  are  now  in  the 
rear,  it  would  be  folly  to  send  more  cars  and  engines  with  a  certainty  of 
destruction.  If  the  position  of  affairs  be  as  you  represent  it,  all  you  have 
to  do  is  to  load  the  cars  you  have,  pile  in  the  wounded  on  top,  inside, 
anywhere,  as  you  best  can,  destroy  any  stores  you  cannot  load,  and  come 
on  to  Burkes  and  Alexandria.  jj  JJAUPT 

September  2,  1862. 
Colonel  Colburn,  Fairfax: 

I  do  not  know  from  whom  you  should  receive  instructions,  but  it 
will  certainly  be  proper  for  you  immediately  to  withdraw  your  command. 
If  our  troops  have  all  passed,  your  position  will  be  much  exposed.  If  I 
can  reach  you  with  cars,  I  will  do  so.  Leave  no  supplies,  destroy  what 
you  cannot  bring;  let  the  road  guards  fall  in  and  retire  with  you  as  you 
meet  them.  H  HAUPT. 

September  2,  1862. 
McCricJcett: 

What  property  is  left  at  station  destroy  it  and  retire  immediately. 
It  is  too  late  to  send  up  a  train.  H.  HAUPT. 


134  REMINISCENCES   OF 

September  2,  1862. 
McCricTcett: 

After  destroying  Fairfax,  come  on  foot  to  Burkes,  and  in  the  train 
there  come  to  Alexandria.  - 


FAIRFAX,  September  2,  1862. 
J.  H.  Devereux: 

Have  fired  it.     Good-by.  McC.* 

The  record  of  the  campaign  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  so  far 
as  the  operations  of  the  Military  Railroad  Department  are  con 
cerned,  ends  with  the  evacuation  of  Fairfax  September  2,  1862  ; 
and  on  the  same  day  the  Army  of  Virginia  was  merged  into  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  under  General  McClellan. 

From  June  26,  1862,  to  August  9,  when  the  battle  of  Cedar 
Mountain  was  fought,  I  was  not  an  active  participant  in  military 
operations.  The  experiment  of  a  hydra-headed  management  of 
the  railroads  had  been  tried  and  failed.  I  was  recalled  from  Cam 
bridge  with  the  information  that  not  a  wheel  was  moving  on  any  of 
the  roads,  and  was  reinstated  with  the  official  distinction  from  the 
General-in-Chief  that  my  authority  was  to  be  supreme. 

The  brief  intervening  period  until  September  2,  was  one  of 
intense  activity  and  anxiety.  The  operations  of  the  railroad  were 
subject  to  constant  interruption  from  guerrilla  bands,  some  of  them 
mounted  ;  bridges  were  destroyed,  rails  removed,  track  obstructed, 
every  possible  impediment  placed  in  the  way  of  successful  opera 
tion. 

The  flank  movement  of  Lee  placed  him  in  a  very  critical  posi 
tion,  and  I  have  always  been  of  the  opinion  that  if  Pope  had  been 
properly  supported  by  McClellan's  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Lee 
would  have  been  crushed  between  the  upper  and  nether  millstones. 

It  would  not  have  required  a  very  large  portion  of  the  force 
to  defend  the  fortifications  around  Washington,  and  Lee  would 
have  been  insane  to  have  made  an  attack  upon  them  with  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  on  his  flank  and  the  Army  of  Virginia  in  his  rear. 

The  veterans  of  the  Potomac  Army  could  have  been  mobilized, 
and  one  day's  march  would  have  brought  them  to  the  battlefield. 
Some  of  them,  a  very  small  proportion,  did  perform  efficient  serv 
ice  ;  but  as  Pope  reported,  more  than  60,000  never  drew  a  trigger 
in  the  battles. 

I  do  not  consider  myself  a  competent  military  critic,  but  no 
man  who  reasons  can  avoid  forming  opinions.  It  is  claimed,  in 
excuse  for  inactivity,  that  the  commands  lying  in  camp  south  of 
Alexandria  were  waiting  for  something  ;  that  the  artillery  had  not 

*  The  brave  McCrickett,  who  was  the  last  man  to  leave  the  bloody  field  of  Bull  Run, 
soon  after  lost  his  life  in  the  line  of  duty. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  135 

arrived,  and  they  had  not  sufficient  cavalry  support ;  but  it  is  cer 
tain  that  they  were  demanding  transportation  by  rail  which  it  was 
impossible  to  furnish,  and  if  they  were  ready  to  move  by  rail,  they 
were  certainly  ready  to  march  less  than  twenty  miles. 

The  General"*  who  declared  that  he  "did  not  care  a for 

John  Pope,"  and  pretended  to  be  so  anxious  to  get  to  the  front  that 
he  took  military  possession  of  the  railroad  and  undertook  to  put 
me  in  arrest,  did  not  even  load  his  cars  when  they  were  furnished 
to  him  the  next  morning  in  sufficient  numbers  for  his  whole  com 
mand.  After  waiting  for  him  half  a  day  the  cars  were  withdrawn 
and  used  for  other  service ! 

General  Pope  complained  in  strong  terms  of  the  demoraliza 
tion  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  expressed  the  opinion  that, 
if  Franklin,  who  had  been  ordered  to  march  on  the  24th,  had  been 
at  Centreville,  or  Cox  and  Sturgis  even  as  far  as  Bull  Run,  Jack 
son's  move  through  Thoroughfare  Gap  on  the  26th  would  have  been 
impracticable. 

During  this  protracted  engagement  the  President  was  in  a 
state  of  extreme  anxiety  and  could  have  slept  but  little.  Inquiries 
came  from  him  at  all  hours  of  the  night,  asking  for  the  latest  news 
from  the  front. 

As  soon  as  practicable  after  the  cessation  of  active  operations, 
I  returned  to  my  Headquarters  Office  in  Washington  and  called 
upon  Secretary  of  War  Stanton.  I  was  received  with  much  cor 
diality,  addressed  as  General  Haupt,  and,  in  the  presence  of  the 
President  and  most  of  the  Cabinet,  who  were  in  the  office  at  the 
time,  warmly  thanked  for  what  he  was  pleased  to  consider  the  im 
portant  service  rendered.  The  next  day  I  received  an  appointment 
as  Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers,  "for  meritorious  services  in 
the  recent  operations  against  the  enemy  near  Manassas,"  dated 
September  5,  1862. 

I  returned  thanks  for  the  honor  conferred  and  agreed  to  sub 
scribe  to  the  form  of  oath  and  accept  the  appointment  with  the 
single  condition  that  when  no  public  duty  required  my  presence,  I 
should  have  leave  of  absence  to  protect  my  interests  and  reputa 
tion,  which  were  at  stake  in  Massachusetts,  in  the  Hoosac  tunnel 
contract.  The  Secretary  fully  understood  the  situation,  which 
had  become  more  and  more  complicated  during  my  absence;  but 
he  replied  that  he  was  not  permitted  to  include  conditions  in  the 
commission,  and  I  expressed  a  willingness  to  rest  upon  a  simple 
verbal  promise  without  making  a  record  that  might  establish  a 
troublesome  precedent.  No  further  objections  were  made,  and  I 
continued  to  perform  service,  as  before,  without  pay. 

*  General  Sturgis. 


CHAPTEK  VI. 

AIDING  McCLELLAN'S  CAMPAIGN. 

A  FTER  the  Army  of  Virginia  was  merged  into  the  Army  of  the 
/"\  Potomac  under  General  McClellan,  I  was  occupied  for  con 
siderable  time  in  the  work  of  reorganization.  The  Federal  Army 
remained  in  the  defenses  around  Washington,  while  the  Confed 
erates  occupied  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  the  south  side  of  the 
Potomac.  During  this  period  active  operations  on  the  part  of  the 
Military  Railroads  Construction  Corps  were  suspended,  and  the 
records  furnish  no  information  of  special  importance. 

General  Halleck  had,  on  several  occasions,  spoken  to  me  of 
the  importance  of  a  thorough  organization  of  all  the  Military  Rail 
roads  of  the  United  States.  He  was  satisfied  that  great  abuses 
existed,  and  had  caEed  the  attention  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  the 
fact,  but  no  action  had  been  taken.  As  a  result  of  another  con 
versation  on  the  subject  on  the  morning  of  Septemebr  16,  I  ad 
dressed  the  following  communication  to  General  Halleck,  accom 
panied  by  a  plan  of  organization,  for  his  consideration : 

WASHINGTON,  September  16, 1862. 
Major-General  Halleck. 

SIR  :  Since  my  interview  with  you  this  morning  I  have  been  giving 
some  thought  to  the  subject  of  our  conversation,  and  have  concluded  to 
venture  some  suggestions. 

As  at  present  informed,  the  Department  of  Military  Railroads,  ex 
cepting  perhaps  for  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  capital,  is  without  a 
head. 

If  you,  or  the  Secretary  of  War,  should  desire  to  be  informed  as  to 
what  roads  are  in  the  possession  of  the  United  States;  how  far  they  are 
in  operation ;  by  whom  operated ;  what  their  condition ;  what  the  amount 
of  rolling  stock;  what  prices  are  paid  for  materials  and  supplies; 
whether  a  judicious  economy  or  a  lavish  expenditure  characterizes  their 
operation,  it  would  be  impossible  to  procure  any  direct  information  on 
any  of  these  subjects,  and  abuses  of  great  magnitude  may  exist  without 
the  power  of  discovering  them. 

To  procure  information,  put  it  in  shape  to  be  readily  accessible; 
secure  system  and  uniformity  in  administration,  correct  abuses  and  pro 
mote  efficiency,  the  following  arrangements  appear  to  be  proper. 

Yours  respectfully,  H.  HATJPT. 

With  this  letter  a  detailed  plan  of  organization  and  operation 
was  submitted,  but  no  action  was  at  that  time  taken.  However, 
during  the  lull  in  active  operations  that  followed  the  return  of 

136 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  137 

General  McClellan  on  September  1,  rny  Corps  was  not  idle.  It 
was  engaged  in  repairing  cars  and  engines,  providing  material  and 
experimenting  on  devices  and  expedients  for  the  destruction  and 
reconstruction  of  roads  and  bridges. 

On  Friday,  September  19,  at  Hagerstown,  I  found  Governor 
Curt  in,  General  John  F.  Beynolds,  John  A.  Wright,  and  Edward 
McPherson,  acting  aids  to  the  Governor,  and  several  other  officers 
in  command  of  the  Pennsylvania  Militia. 

At  night  there  was  quite  a  scare  from  a  rumor  that  the  enemy 
was  marching  to  attack  Hagerstown.  A  council  was  held  to  con 
sider  the  expediency  of  withdrawing  the  Pennsylvania  forces  be 
yond  the  Pennsylvania  line.  As  they  had  been  called  out  to  de 
fend  their  own  State,  the  Governor,  for  political  and  other  reasons, 
did  not  wish  them  to  risk  an  attack  beyond  their  own  territory ;  and 
General  Reynolds  and  myself  were  opposed  to  the  movement  for 
reasons  stated. 

The  vote  was  a  tie,  but  as  the  Governor  was  very  uneasy,  it 
was  decided  to  order  the  retirement  of  the  militia.  The  movement 
commenced  at  1  A.  M.,  but  as  there  were  no  indications  of  an  at 
tack,  it  was  suspended  until  daylight.  Lee  was,  in  fact,  at  that 
time  too  busy  in  getting  his  retreating  army  safely  across  the  Poto 
mac  after  the  battle  of  Antietam  to  attempt  an  attack  on  Hagers 
town. 

The  next  day  I  rode  over  the  battlefield,  where  soldiers  were 
engaged  in  burying  the  dead  of  both  armies,  and  after  an  inter 
view  with  General  McClellan  at  his  Headquarters,  proceeded  via 
Boonsboro  to  Frederick,  and  thence,  by  rail,  to  Baltimore  and 
Washington. 

September  17,  a  dispatch  was  received  from  General  Heintzel- 
man  desiring  an  examination  of  track  and  bridges  as  far  as  Bull 
Run,  stating  that  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  was  reported 
to  be  at  Centreville,  and  that  the  2d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  had 
been  directed  to  go  as  far  as  Bull  Run  to  cover  my  reconnois- 
sance.  I  made  this  examination  personally  before  starting  for 
Hagerstown,  and  reported  road  in  good  condition. 

,  rr  ARLINGTON,  September  17, 1862. 

General  Haupt: 

You  will  please  communicate  with  General  Clough,  Military  Gov 
ernor  of  Alexandria,  who  has  been  directed  to  furnish  you  with  100  men. 

The  2d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  have  been  ordered  to  go  beyond  Fair 
fax  Court  House  as  far  as  Bull  Run  and,  if  practicable,  to  cover  your 
reconnoissance  on  the  railroad.  They  were  ordered  to  start  immediately ; 
the  order  must  have  reached  them  about  12  M. 

I  have  information  there  is  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  near 
Centreville. 

By  command  Major-General  Heintzelman. 

C.  McKENER, 
8  Lieutenant-Colonel,  A.  A.  (7. 


138  REMINISCENCES   OF 

On  September  19,  by  request  of  W.  P.  Smith,  Superintendent 
of  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  I  sent  a  force  of  carpenters,  under 
G.  W.  Nagle,  foreman,  to  assist  in  repairing  damages  on  that  road. 

September  23,  1862,  the  following  telegram  was  sent  from 
Headquarters  of  General  McClellan,  and  on  the  same  day  a  request 
from  President  Garrett  for  lumber  to  assist  in  the  reconstruction 
of  the  trestling  at  Harper's  Ferry : 

September  23,  1862. 

SIR:  The  Commanding  General  directs  me  to  inform  you  that 
Major-General  Heintzelman  has  been  directed  to  detach  two  regiments 
of  infantry,  with  (if  possible)  a  section  of  artillery,  to  accompany  the 
construction  party  you  propose  sending  to  Bristoe  Station  to-morrow. 

The  troops  will  meet  the  construction  party  at  Union  Mills.  Please 
acquaint  General  Heintzelman  by  telegraph  when  the  former  will  be  at 
the  rendezvous.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  B.  IRWIN, 
Captain  A.  D.  C.,  A.  A.  A.  G. 

Brigadier-General  Haupt. 

September  25, 1862,  W.  W.  Wright,  one  of  my  assistants,  was 
sent  to  Harrisburg  to  take  charge  of  the  transportation  on  the  Cum 
berland  Valley  Railroad,  with  instructions  as  follows : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  September  25,  1862. 
W.  W.  Wright,  Esq. 

SIR:  I  enclose  for  your  information  a  copy  of  "Special  Orders, 
No.  248,"  from  the  office  of  the  Adjutant-General ;  also  copies  of  previous 
instructions,  and  an  extract  from  a  letter  addressed  by  Captain  E.  C. 
Wilson,  Assistant  Quartermaster,  TJ.  S.  A.,  to  Quartermaster-General 
Meigs,  complaining  of  the  management  on  the  Cumberland  Valley  Rail 
road. 

You  will,  on  receipt  of  this  communication,  proceed  to  Harrisburg, 
see  Captain  Wilson,  ascertain  fully  the  character  and  magnitude  of  the 
evils  complained  of  and,  if  necessary,  assume  the  direction  of  train 
movements  on  the  Cumberland  Valley  Railroad. 

In  general,  it  is  desirable  that  roads  used  wholly  or  partially  for 
military  purposes  should  be  operated  by  and  through  the  regular  officers 
in  charge  of  such  roads;  but  when  the  management  is  characterized  by 
incompetency,  or  inefficiency,  it  becomes  necessary  to  assume  military 
possession  and  place  in  charge  agents  and  officers  who  will  promptly  for 
ward  troops  and  government  supplies.  When  the  amount  of  rolling  stock 
is  insufficient,  requisitions  must  be  made  upon  connecting  roads. 

I  found  it  necessary  last  week  to  take  possession  of  the  Franklin 
Railroad  between  Chambersburg  and  Hagerstown,  and  placed  in  charge 
J.  D.  Potts,  with  whom  you  will  consult  in  regard  to  train  arrangements. 

My  impression  was  that  very  little  business  for  the  United  States 
Government  would  be  required  to  be  done  over  the  line  between  Harris 
burg  and  Hagerstown,  as  troops  and  supplies  can  be  sent  with  much 
greater  facility  via  Sandy  Hook  or  Harper's  Ferry;  but  you  can  ascer 
tain  the  facts  from  Captain  Wilson  and,  if  necessary,  report  to  him  for 
additional  instructions. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  139 

In  the  management  of  Military  Kailroads  three  points  require 
special  attention.  They  are : 

1.  Not  to  allow  supplies  to  be  forwarded  to  the  advanced  terminus 
until  they  are  actually  required,  and  only  in  such  quantities  as  can  be 
promptly  removed. 

2.  To  insist  on  the  prompt  unloading  and  return  of  cars. 

3.  To  permit  no  delay  of  trains  beyond  the  time  fixed  for  starting, 
but  when  necessary  and  practicable,  to  furnish  extras,  if  the  proper 
accommodation  of  business  requires  them. 

H.  HAUPT, 

Brigadier-General, 

Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 
United  States  Military  Railroads. 

After  the  enemy  re-crossed  the  Potomac,  September  19,  no 
movement  was  made  for  some  time  in  pursuit.  The  enemy  re- 
occupied  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  the  line  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  and,  on  October  7,  information  was  received  that  they  had 
reconstructed  the  bridge  across  the  Rappahannock  on  the  line  of 
the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad,  and  were  running  trains  to 
Bristoe,  five  miles  south  of  Manassas,  carrying  off  the  disabled 
engines,  car  wheels  and  axles  left  at  that  point  after  Pope's  retreat. 

I  formed  a  plan  for  capturing  the  rebel  train,  and  sent  out  a 
force  to  proceed  beyond  Bristoe,  secrete  themselves  in  the  woods, 
obstruct  the  track  when  the  train  had  passed  so  that  it  could  not 
return  and  capture  it.  The  plan  failed  by  the  imprudence  of  one 
of  our  men  who  exposed  himself  and  was  seen  by  the  engineer,  who 
reversed  his  engine  and  returned  towards  the  Rappahannock. 

The  following  report  embraces  the  Military  Railroad  opera 
tions  from  September  13,  1862,  to  September  27: 

WASHINGTON,  September  27,  1862. 
Major-General  Halleck. 

SIR:  On  Thursday,  September  18,  I  was  authorized  and  directed 
by  Special  Order  No.  248  to  do  whatever  I  might  deem  expedient  to 
facilitate  the  transportation  of  troops  and  supplies  to  aid  the  armies  in 
the  field  in  Virginia  and  Maryland. 

I  immediately  proceeded  to  Baltimore,  where  a  conference  was  held 
with  General  Wood,  Quartermaster  Belger,  President  Garrett  and  Su 
perintendent  Smith  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad. 

This  conference  resulted  in  changing  the  route  of  several  regiments 
then  ordered  to  the  front,  and  in  establishing  the  following  rule  for 
future  operations : 

RULE.  All  troops  and  supplies  sent  from  Baltimore  and  points  south  thereof  to 
the  army  in  Maryland  shall  be  forwarded  by  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad ;  and  all  sent 
from  points  north  of  Baltimore,  by  the  York  &  Cumberland  Railroad. 

I  was  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  it  was  expedient  in  general  to 
operate  the  railroads  used  for  military  purposes  by  and  through  the  regu 
lar  officers  and  employes  of  such  roads,  using  military  authority  only 
when  necessary  to  render  assistance  to  them  in  procuring  rolling  stock,  or 
securing  regularity  in  train  movements. 


140  REMINISCENCES   OF 

The  efficiency  of  the  management  of  the  officers  of  the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  Railroad,  their  readiness  to  give  Government  supplies  the  prefer 
ence  over  all  other  transportation,  and  the  capacity  of  the  road,  which  is 
greater  than  any  ordinary,  or  even  extraordinary  demands  that  may  be 
made  upon  it,  left  nothing  more  to  be  desired  except  the  prompt  return 
of  cars  from  the  advanced  terminus.  Having  concluded  all  necessary 
arrangements,  I  proceeded  the  same  night  to  Harrisburg,  arriving  in  that 
city  on  Friday  morning,  September  19,  at  3 :30  A.  M. 

The  arrangement  of  sending  supplies  from  Baltimore  and  points 
south  thereof  over  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  relieving  the  Northern 
Central  of  its  transportation  of  Government  supplies  northward,  left  no 
question  as  to  the  ability  of  this  road  to  meet  any  anticipated  demands 
upon  it,  and  I  therefore  continued  my  journey  at  7:30  A.  M.  over  the 
York  &  Cumberland  Railroad  to  Chambersburg  where,  after  many  delays 
caused  by  passing  trains,  I  arrived  at  2 :30  p.  M. 

The  amount  of  business  on  the  York  &  Cumberland  Railroad  ex 
ceeded  its  capacity  for  prompt  accommodation.  About  18  regiments  of 
Pennsylvania  militia  had  been  sent  forward,  and  more  were  on  the  way, 
the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company  furnishing  cars  and  engines,  and 
assisting,  as  I  understand,  in  the  management  of  the  road.  Under  the 
circumstances,  the  only  action  at  that  point  which  I  considered  expedient 
was  to  order  that  all  private  sidings  should  be  vacated,  and  that  all  cars 
belonging  to  individuals,  and  all  others  not  required  for  military  pur 
poses,  should  be  either  run  off  the  tracks  or  sent  to  other  stations  where 
the  sidings  were  not  required  for  the  use  of  the  Government. 

I  found  a  very  efficient  officer  in  charge  of  the  depot  and  station  at 
Chambersburg,  J.  D.  Potts,  formerly  Assistant  Superintendent  on  the 
Western  Division  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  to  whom  I  gave  such 
instructions  as  appeared  to  be  necessary. 

At  Hagerstown  the  main  track  was  blocked  with  cars ;  there  was  no 
adequate  siding  or  warehouse  accommodation,  no  competent  person  in 
charge  and  much  confusion  existed.  I  found  it  necessary  to  assume 
military  possession  of  the  Franklin  Railroad  between  Chambersburg  and 
Hagerstown;  attended  personally  to  the  duty  of  raising  the  blockade; 
cleared  the  track  of  five  or  six  trains  that  had  accumulated  at  Hagers 
town;  placed  Mr.  Potts  in  charge  as  superintendent;  directed  him  to 
procure  a  substitute  in  the  Chambersburg  office ;  left  written  instructions 
as  to  the  future  management,  and  also  wrote  to  General  Kenly,  the  officer 
understood  to  be  in  command  at  Hagerstown,  informing  him  of  the  exist 
ing  arrangement  for  transportation,  and  giving  the  names  of  the  officers 
in  charge. 

On  Saturday,  September  20,  I  rode  from  Hagerstown  to  Sharps- 
burg,  where,  after  a  half  hour's  interview  with  General  McClellan,  I  re 
paired  to  Boonsboro  and  returned  via  Frederick  City  to  Baltimore. 

At  Monoccacy  I  found  about  200  loaded  cars  on  the  sidings,  some 
of  which  had  been  standing  nearly  a  week.  General  Wool,  at  my  request, 
sent  an  efficient  officer  of  his  staff  to  insist  upon  the  unloading  and  return 
of  cars. 

On  Monday,  September  22,  I  returned  to  Washington  and  made  a 
verbal  report  to  you  of  my  doings. 

^  On  Tuesday,  September  23,  having  received  information  that  the 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Company  were  embarrassed  in  their  opera 
tions  in  consequence  of  the  non-return  of  cars,  I  sent  two  of  our  most 
experienced  train  dispatchers  from  the  O.  &  A.  Railroad  over  the  North- 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  143 

ern  Central,  Pennsylvania  and  connecting  roads  to  search  for  and  return 
cars  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Company  and  of  the  United 
States  Military  Railroad. 

The  same  evening  I  started  for  Baltimore  and  Harper's  Ferry  to 
render  such  assistance  as  might  be  in  my  power  in  opening  communica 
tion  with  that  post. 

I  arrived  at  Harper's  Ferry  about  noon  on  Wednesday,  September 
24,  and  remained  until  Thursday  afternoon,  September  25.  The  supply 
of  material  being  insufficient  and  the  force  of  mechanics  for  the  railroad 
bridge  very  small,  I  telegraphed  for  the  Construction  Corps  of  the  O.  &  A. 
Railroad,  which  was  promptly  forwarded,  together  with  about  150,000 
feet  of  long  square  timber,  which  we  fortunately  had  on  hand  at  Alex 
andria. 

About  six  days  will  complete  the  railroad  trestle  bridge  and  secure 
connection  with  Harper's  Ferry,  but  a  much  longer  time  will  be  required 
to  replace  the  permanent  structure.  The  trestle  bridge  will  be  in  danger 
of  destruction  from  freshets;  the  most  certain  reliance  for  the  supplies, 
in  the  event  of  such  a  contingency,  will  be  the  pontoon  bridge,  which  has 
been  reconstructed.  With  proper  management  at  Harper's  Ferry  and 
Sandy  Hook,  the  supply  question  presents  no  difficulty,  even  in  case  the 
trestle  bridge  should  be  swept  away. 

The  embarrassments,  irregularities  and  blockades  on  the  United 
States  Military  Railroads,  which  are  so  frequent  and  so  annoying,  result 
from  three  causes,  which  can  be  and  should  be  avoided.  These  are : 

1.  Sending  supplies  to  the  advanced  terminus  before  they  are  re 
quired.     Such  supplies  are  not  unloaded;  they  block  the  track,  impede 
retreat,  and  are  in  danger  of  capture  or  destruction.    Nothing  should  be 
sent  to  the  extreme  front  until  it  is  actually  needed.    A  reasonable 
amount  can  be  kept  on  some  siding  a  few  miles  in  the  rear. 

2.  Lack  of  promptness  in  unloading  and  returning  cars.     Some 
times  a  single  car  will  be  unloaded  at  a  time  when  there  should  be  force 
sufficient  to  discharge  at  once  the  load  of  a  whole  train.     Cars  are  some 
times  kept  for  weeks  as  storehouses. 

3.  Detaining  trains  beyond  schedule  time.       Nothing  more  cer 
tainly  throws  the  business  of  a  line  into  confusion,  especially  if  there  be 
but  single  track.     Medical  directors  and  officers  should  conform  to  the 
schedule  time  of  trains,  or  if  extras  are  required  for  sick,  wounded,  or 
for  supplies,  they  should  always  be  furnished  when  practicable;  but 
when  the  hour  fixed  for  starting  has  arrived,  the  train  should  be  promptly 
dispatched. 

It  has  been  the  practice  on  most  roads  used  for  military  purposes, 
under  the  influence  of  a  pressure  of  business  and  the  impatience  of  mili 
tary  officers,  to  abandon  the  schedule  and  resort  to  the  use  of  the  tele 
graph  exclusively  for  running  trains.  This  practice  invariably  leads  to 
difficulty,  and  in  case  of  any  derangement  to  the  delicate  mechanism  of 
the  telegraph,  puts  an  end  to  all  business  and  blocks  everything  upon  the 
road.  I  believe  that  it  is  always  possible  with  good  management  to  run 
the  trains  by  schedule  and  the  telegraph,  although  valuable  as  an  auxil 
iary,  should  not  be  used  as  a  principal.  It  is  desirable  that  uniformity 
should  be  introduced  in  the  management  of  all  railroads  used  for  mili 
tary  purposes.  Very  respectfully  submitted, 

H.  HAUPT, 

Brigadier-  General, 

Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 
United  States  Military  Railroads. 


144  REMINISCENCES   OF 

October  9,  a  communication  was  sent  to  Colonel  D.  C.  Mc- 
Callum  in  reference  to  placing  bullet-proof  cabs  upon  the  engines, 
which  is  as  follows : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  October  9,  1862. 
Colonel  D.  C.  McCallum,  Director  of  Military  Railroads. 

DEAR  SIR:  I  have  been  thinking  over  the  subject  of  locomotives. 
It  is  one  which,  at  the  present  time  and  in  view  of  the  future  require 
ments  of  the  service,  demands  especial  attention.  Experience  has  shown 
that  on  engines  men  are  targets  for  the  enemy;  the  cabs  where  they  are 
usually  seated  have  been  riddled  by  bullets,  and  they  have  only  escaped 
by  lying  on  the  footboard.  It  will  be  necessary  to  inspire  confidence  in 
our  _  men  by  placing  iron  cabs  (bullet  proof)  upon  all  or  nearly  all  our 
engines,  and  the  necessity  will  increase  as  we  penetrate  further  into  the 
enemy's  country. 

Again,  it  is  desirable  that  the  smaller  and  more  delicate  portions 
of  the  apparatus  should  be  better  protected  than  at  present,  and  I  would 
be  pleased  if  you  could  give  to  the  plans,  of  which  I  spoke  to  you  re 
cently,  a  careful  consideration.  It  seems  to  me  that  they  are  peculiarly 
well  adapted  to  military  service.  I  hope  you  will  investigate  the  pro 
posed  improvements.* 

There  is  also  another  subject  to  which  I  wish  to  direct  your  atten 
tion.  Are  you  positively  sure  that  the  agents  you  have  sent  to  examine 
and  value  rolling  stock  are  perfectly  incorruptible?  Are  you  sure  that 
there  is  no  room  for  jobs  or  commissions?  It  seems  to  me  that  there  is 
only  one  way  of  making  sure  of  it,  and  that  is  by  direct  personal  exam 
ination  and  communication  with  the  parties  yourself. 

Can  you  not  leave  for  a  few  days  ?  There  is  but  little  to  do  in  the 
office.  Whiton  can  attend  to  the  business,  and  if  I  can  assist,  I  will  do 
it  cheerfully.  Yours  truly,  ^  HATJpT 

Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation. 

October  10,  1862,  I  was  requested  by  General  McClellan  to 
take  steps  to  reconstruct  the  railroad  to  Winchester.  As  I  consid 
ered  such  reconstruction  inexpedient,  the  following  communication 
was  sent  to  General  Halleck,  who  sustained  my  position,  and  the 
road  was  not  reconstructed : 

WASHINGTON,  October  11,  1862. 
Major-General  Halleck. 

SIR:  I  enclose  copies  of  telegrams  from  General  Rufus  Ingalls, 
Chief  Quartermaster  Army  of  Potomac,  and  from  W.  P.  Smith,  Esq., 
Superintendent  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad. 

On  the  receipt  of  the  telegram  from  General  Ingalls  asking  that 
the  Winchester  Railroad  be  reconstructed  with  T  rails,  I  requested  Mr. 
Smith  to  report  its  condition,  which  was  promptly  done. 

It  appears  that  the  road  is  in  very  bad  order ;  that  even  with  good 
ordinary  repair  and  good  management,  its  capacity  would  not  exceed 
about  sixty  cars  per  day.  To  reconstruct  this  road  under  favorable  cir 
cumstances  with  T  rails  will  require  two  months.  The  ties  must  be 
manufactured  and  the  rails  purchased. 

•Protected  locomotives  and  bullet-proof  cabs  were  soon  after  provided  as  recom 
mended. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  145 

If  the  object  of  our  military  operations  should  be  simply  to  expel 
the  enemy  from  Winchester  and  hold  it  ourselves  without  following  the 
enemy  further,  then  the  immediate  reconstruction  of  this  road  might  be 
a  military  necessity ;  but  I  cannot  suppose  that  our  armies,  if  successful 
in  obtaining  possession  of  Winchester,  would  stop  there;  and  if  the  pur 
suit  should  be  continued  further,  the  army  supplies  will  of  course  be  sent 
via  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad. 

Is  it  expedient,  under  the  circumstances,  to  reconstruct  the  Win 
chester  Eailroad  at  present? 

A  more  intimate  acquaintance  than  I  now  possess  with  the  plans 
of  operations  and  prospective  movements  would  be  required  before  I 
could  answer  this  question.  I  therefore  very  respectfully  refer  the  sub 
ject  to  you  and  ask  your  instructions.  -rmrn 

±1.  JtLAU-r  1, 

Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 

United  States  Military  Railroads. 

October  12,  General  Ingalls  informed  me  that  General  Mc- 
Clellan  approved  my  suggestions ;  that  it  would  be  best  to  supply 
the  army  via  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad  and  not  reconstruct  the 
road  to  Winchester. 

Received  orders  from  the  Secretary  of  War  as  follows,  which 
were  promptly  obeyed  : 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  D.  C.,  October  17, 1862. 
Brigadier-General   Haupt,   Superintendent    and   Military   Director    of 

Railroads. 

GENERAL:  You  will  proceed  immediately  to  inspect  the  Cumber 
land  Valley  Railroad  and  take  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to 
enforce  promptness  and  efficiency  in  the  transportation  and  delivery  of 
military  supplies  on  that  road  from  Harrisburg  to  Hagerstown. 

It  is  represented  that  the  service  is  inefficiently  performed  by  the 
agents  of  the  Company ;  that  private  and  express  freight  is  given  prefer 
ence  to  Government  supplies,  and  that  agents  are  not  present  to  dispatch 
cars. 

If  necessary,  you  will  take  possession  of  the  road  and  its  stock,  and 
employ  the  agents  needed  for  running  the  road  as  a  United  States 
Military  Eailroad  route.  ^^  M  gTANTON) 

Secretary  of  War. 

The  last  battle  at  Antietam  was  fought  September  17.  Lee 
crossed  the  Potomac  September  19.  November  1,  General  Mc- 
Clellan  telegraphed  the  President  that  all  his  Corps  had  crossed 
the  Potomac. 

In  reference  to  complaint  that  the  horses  were  fatigued  and 
their  tongues  sore,  the  President  telegraphed  to  General  McClel- 
lan:  "I  have  just  read  your  dispatch  about  sore  tongues  and 
fatigued  horses.  Will  you  pardon  me  for  asking  what  the  horses 
of  your  army  have  done  since  the  battle  of  Antietam  that  fatigues 
anything  ?" 


146  REMINISCENCES   OF 

October  26,  1862,  telegram  from  General  McClellan  in 
cipher : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

October  26,  1862,  10:45  A.  M. 
General  Herman  Haupt,  Superintendent  Railroads: 

I  have  the  honor  to  request  you  to  ascertain  how  far  the  Leesburg 
Railroad  is  practicable.  I  have  also  to  request  you  to  be  ready  to  supply 
this  army  via  Orange  &  Alexandria  and  Manassas  Gap  Railroads,  and 
to  take  steps  at  once  to  reestablish  the  wharves,  etc.,  at  Acquia,  and  to 
be  prepared  to  rebuild  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Rappahannock  at 
Fredericksburg  and  to  supply  that  road  with  rolling  stock. 

G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

The  following  reply  was  returned  the  same  day : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  October  26, 1862,  2  p.  M. 
Major-General  G.  B.  McClellan: 

Your  commands  will  receive  prompt  attention.  I  have  the  honor 
to  report  that  from  Alexandria  to  Difficult  Creek,  a  distance  of  18  miles, 
the  Leesburg  Road  is  in  running  order.  From  Difficult  Creek  to  Lees- 
burg  about  eighteen  miles  of  track  have  been  destroyed,  cross  ties  burned 
and  iron  scattered  through  the  woods.  Spans  of  bridges,  most  of  them 
150  feet  in  length,  in  six  different  localities,  require  to  be  constructed 
before  the  road  can  be  used.  The  reconstruction  of  this  road  beyond 
Difficult  Creek  in  time  for  any  immediate  advance  will  be  impracticable. 

Manassas  Gap  Railroad:  General  Siegel  reports  this  road  in  run 
ning  order  to  Front  Royal.  In  case  of  an  advance  the  enemy  will  no 
doubt  endeavor  to  destroy  the  Goose  Creek  bridges,  and  I  have  ordered 
material  to  be  prepared  for  their  reconstruction.  The  capacity  of  this 
road,  with  present  equipments,  is  about  700  to  900  tons  per  day,  if  cars 
are  promptly  returned  and  no  accident  occurs.  Please  report  the  prob 
able  demands  upon  this  line,  and  how  soon. 

Acquia  Creek  &  Fredericksburg  Railroad:  The  destruction  of  this 
road  was  an  unfortunate  piece  of  vandalism  on  the  part  of  our  troops.  I 
reported  to  General  Halleck  that  the  destruction  of  this  road  was  un 
necessary,  and  highly  censurable.  The  Potomac  Creek  bridge  was  nearly 
80  feet  high  and  400  feet  long.  Nearly  all  the  available  timber  within 
reach  was  used  in  its  construction.  This  bridge  was  blown  down,  then 
burned. 

The  reconstruction  of  the  Rappahannock  bridge  at  this  season  will 
be  difficult,  and  the  structure,  if  rebuilt,  precarious.  Timber  at  this 
time  is  very  scarce.  Would  it  not  be  best  to  rely  on  boat  and  pontoon 
bridges  at  Fredericksburg  ? 

The  wharf  at  Acquia  Creek  was  a  very  complete  affair,  covering 
an  area  of  nearly  an  acre  and  a  half,  with  double  tracks,  and  commodious 
buildings.  It  cannot  be  reconstructed  as  it  was  in  four  months.  The 
material  cannot  be  procured  in  any  reasonable  time. 

The  cars  on  this  road,  some  60  in  number,  were  all  destroyed  at  the 
time  of  the  evacuation. 

If  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  use  this  road,  extraordinary  efforts 
will  be  required  to  reconstruct  it  in  time  to  be  available,  and  I  respect- 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  147 

fully  request  instructions  as  to  the  relative  military  importance  of  these 
roads  and  the  order  of  priority  in  which  they  should  be  prepared  for 
service.  H  HAUPT. 

Reference  is  here  made  to  the  destruction  of  the  wharves  and 
property  at  Acquia  Creek  on  the  evacuation  by  Burnside's  Corps. 
I  reported  at  the  time  that  I  considered  the  destruction  of  stores, 
cars  and  improvements  entirely  unnecessary.  On  short  notice 
every  pound  could  have  been  removed.  The  landing  was  at  a  con 
siderable  distance  from  the  shore,  the  approach  by  a  narrow  em 
bankment  easily  defended,  with  impassable  swamps  on  both  sides. 

When  the  order  to  burn  was  given,  some  of  the  subordinate 
officers,  it  is  said,  threw  up  their  caps,  and  expressed  much  gratifi 
cation,  then  adjourned  to  divide  a  bottle  of  whisky. 

Why  they  were  pleased  is  easily  explained.  The  destruction 
of  stores  on  the  evacuation  of  a  post  settles  accounts  for  all  defi 
ciencies. 

I  was  once  present  in  a  company  of  officers  when  a  young 
Quartermaster  remarked  that  the  sinking  of  a  steamer  on  the  Mis 
sissippi  had  settled  more  shortages  than  twenty  steamers  could 
have  carried. 

Upon  reporting  the  fact  of  the  unnecessary  destruction  of  so 
much  valuable  property  to  General  Halleck,  he  promised  to  in 
vestigate  the  matter,  ascertain  by  whose  orders  the  buildings  had 
been  fired  and  have  the  party  punished;  but  it  was  found  that 
General  Burnside  had  given  the  orders,  no  doubt  on  the  representa 
tions  of  subordinates,  and  no  action  was  taken.  As  Lee's  army 
was  away  fighting  Pope,  and  no  large  body  of  the  enemy  near,  pro 
tection  during  the  removal  of  the  property  would  have  presented 
no  difficulty. 

At  the  next  evacuation  after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
with  Lee's  army  near  at  hand  on  the  Rappahannoek,  the  men  of 
my  Corps  loaded  and  removed  everything  of  value,  even  to  the 
sashes  of  the  buildings. 

October  27,  the  following  in  cipher  was  received  from  Gen 
eral  McClellan : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

October  27,  11  A.  M.,  1862. 
Brigadier- General  Haupt: 

Please  take  immediate  steps  to  enable  you  to  forward  supplies  via 
Orange  &  Alexandria  and  Manassas  Gap  Railroads  for  this  army,  at 
rate  of  seven  hundred  tons  per  day.  Also,  be  prepared  to  repair  the 
Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad  beyond  Manassas  Junction  wherever 
it  may  be  damaged.  Please  communicate  to  the  General-in-Chief  the 
information  you  gave  me  yesterday  in  regard  to  the  Fredericksburg  Rail 
road,  and  consult  with  him  as  to  the  possibility  of  repairing  that  road 
in  season  to  use  it  for  purpose  of  this  campaign. 

G.  B.  McCLELLAK 


148  REMINISCENCES   OF 

The  enemy  had  crossed  the  Potomac  after  the  battle  of  An- 
tietam  on  September  19,  but  six  weeks  later  the  main  body  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  had  not  yet  reached  the  line  of  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad.  About  this  time  General  Ingalls  came  to  my  office 
and  requested  transportation  to  Headquarters,  which,  he  said,  had 
been  established  at  Rectortown. 

I  expressed  my  doubts  of  the  fact,  but  he  was  positive  that 
General  McClellan  had  reached  that  point.  I  then  said  that  if  he 
was  determined  to  go,  I  would  risk  it  and  go  with  him. 

An  engine  was  ordered  to  which  two  platform  cars  were  at 
tached  to  hold  a  guard  which  was  taken  on,  I  think,  at  Fairfax 
Station.  We  proceeded  without  interruption  to  Manassas,  and 
there  started  on  the  Gap  Road.  The  road  had  not  been  used  since 
spring.  It  was  overgrown  with  grass,, which,  when  crushed  under 
the  wheels,  caused  the  drivers  to  slip  badly,  and  in  a  short  time 
the  sand  became  exhausted.  It  then  became  necessary  to  dismount 
a  part  of  the  force  and  walk  ahead  of  the  engine,  placing  pebbles 
on  the  track,  the  crushing  of  which  would  help  the  adhesion. 

Several  miles  were  passed  in  this  way  when  the  water  gave 
out.  We  had  fortunately  two  buckets,  and  dipped  water  from 
streams  and  puddles  whenever  it  could  be  found.  It  soon  became 
necessary  to  cut  off  one  of  the  cars  and  leave  part  of  the  guard; 
then  the  other  car  was  soon  after  left,  and  a  few  soldiers  were  taken 
on  the  tender  of  the  engine. 

Night  overtook  us,  and  Rectortown  was  not  reached  until  after 
midnight,  but  no  information  could  be  had  of  General  McClellan, 
and  we  were  compelled  to  return  in  the  same  manner. 

There  was  a  single  cavalryman  of  Gregg's  command  at  Man 
assas,  but  none  beyond,  and  at  several  points  we  heard  of  the  pres 
ence  of  Mosby's  men  the  day  before.  How  it  happened  that  we 
were  not  captured  has  always  been  a  matter  of  surprise,  for  the 
puffing  of  steam  and  the  slipping  of  the  wheels  made  a  noise  that 
could  have  been  heard  for  more  than  a  mile,  giving  notice  to  any 
enemy  in  the  vicinity. 

After  passing  Fairfax  on  our  return,  I  met  a  train,  the  con 
ductor  of  which  informed  me  that  he  had  just  been  fired  into  at  the 
last  bridge  he  crossed.  I  therefore  returned  to  Fairfax,  procured 
a  guard  and  proceeded  to  the  bridge,  which  had  not  been  injured. 
I  then  sent  out  the  soldiers  to  search  the  woods,  but  no  enemy 
could  be  found ;  there  were,  however,  numerous  fresh  horse  tracks  > 
showing  that  the  assailants  had  been  mounted. 

HOW  TO  DESTROY  LOCOMOTIVES  AtfD  BRIDGES. 

I  made  the  following  report  on  how  to  destroy  bridges  and 
locomotive  engines  expeditiously : 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  149 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  November  1, 1862. 

A  simple  and  expeditious  mode  of  destroying  bridges,  and  rendering 
locomotive  engines  useless  to  an  enemy,  is  often  a  desideratum.  Cavalry 
may  penetrate  far  into  an  enemy's  country,  may  reach  bridges  forming 
viaducts  on  important  lines  of  communication,  which  it  may  be  desirable 
to  break  effectually;  or,  in  retreat,  the  destruction  of  a  bridge  may  be 
essential  to  the  safety  of  an  army,  and  yet  time  may  not  be  sufficient 
to  gather  combustibles,  or  they  may  not  be  accessible,  or  the  fire  may  be 
extinguished,  or  the  damage  may  be  so  slight  as  to  be  easily  repaired. 

What  is  required  is  the  means  of  certainly  and  effectually  throwing 
down  a  bridge  in  a  period  of  time  not  exceeding  five  minutes,  and  with 
apparatus  so  simple  and  portable  that  it  can  be  carried  in  the  pocket  or  a 
saddle-bag. 

These  requirements  are  fulfilled  by  a  torpedo  (see  page  101),  which 
consists  simply  of  a  short  bolt  of  seven-eighths  inch  iron,  eight  inches 
long,  with  head  and  nut — the  head  to  be  two  inches  in  diameter,  and 
about  one  inch  thick.  A  washer  of  same  size  as  the  head  must  be  placed 
under  the  nut  at  the  other  end,  with  a  fuse-hole  in  it.  Between  the 
washer  and  the  head  is  a  tin  cylinder  one  and  three-quarters  inches  in 
diameter,  open  at  both  ends,  which  is  filled  with  powder,  and,  when  the 
washer  and  nut  are  put  on,  forms  a  case  which  encloses  it. 

In  using  this  torpedo,  a  hole  is  bored  in  a  timber ;  the  torpedo  (head 
downwards)  is  driven  in  by  a  stone  or  billet  of  wood,  and  the  fuse 
ignited.  The  explosion  blows  the  timber  in  pieces,  and,  if  a  main  sup 
port,  brings  down  the  whole  structure. 

The  time  required  is  only  that  which  is  necessary  to  bore  a  hole 
with  an  auger.  Ordinary  cigar  lighters,  which  burn  without  flame,  and 
cannot  be  blown  out,  are  best  for  igniting  the  fuse,  which  should  be 
about  two  feet  long. 

For  portability,  the  auger  should  be  short,  say  thirteen  inches,  and 
the  handle  movable  and  of  same  length. 

The  proper  place  at  which  to  insert  the  torpedo  is  of  much  conse 
quence.  Most  of  the  Virginia  bridges  are  Howe  trusses  without  arches. 
In  this  kind  of  bridge,  the  destruction  of  the  main  braces  at  one  end,  and 
on  only  one  side  of  a  span,  will  be  sufficient  to  bring  down  the  whole 
structure.  There  are  usually  but  two  main  braces  in  each  panel,  and 
two  torpedoes  will  suffice  to  throw  down  a  span.  Two  men  can  bore  the 
two  holes  at  the  same  time  without  interfering  with  each  other.  (See 
illustration  on  page  191.) 

Cartridges  containing  a  fulminate  would  be  more  portable,  but 
they  are  not  always  conveniently  procurable,  and  their  use  is  attended 
with  risk  of  explosion. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  operate  at  one  side  and  on  one  end  of  a 
bridge.  If  one  side  falls,  the  other  side  is  pulled  down  with  it. 

If  the  structure  contains  an  arch,  two  additional  torpedoes  will  be 
required;  but  in  this  case  it  may  be  equally  advantageous  to  operate 
upon  the  lower  chord. 

Experiments  made  at  Alexandria  proved  that  a  timber  placed  in 
the  position  of  a  main  brace,  and  similarly  loaded,  was  shattered  into 
many  pieces,  some  of  which  were  projected  by  the  force  of  explosion  more 
than  a  hundred  feet. 

To  Render  Locomotives  Unfit  for  Service:  The  most  expeditious 
mode  is  to  fire  a  cannon  ball  through  the  boiler.  This  damage  cannot  be 
repaired  without  taking  out  all  the  flues. 

The  usual  mode  of  disabling  engines  consists  in  burning  the  flues 


150  REMINISCENCES   OF 

by  letting  out  the  water  and  making  a  fire  in  the  fire-box ;  but  this  is  gen 
erally  done  so  imperfectly  that  the  enemy  soon  gets  them  in  running 
order. 

Cars  are  Readily  Destroyed  by  Burning:  On  this  subject  no 
instructions  are  necessary.  The  destruction  of  more  than  four  hundred 
cars  by  our  own  troops  within  the  last  six  months  proves  that  in  the  work 
of  destroying  such  property  perfection  has  been  attained,  and  no  room 
left  for  winning  fresh  laurels  in  this  field. 

The  Superintendent  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Military  Rail 
road  has  instructions  to  furnish  sample  torpedoes  to  officers  who  may 
order  them. 

Address  "J.  H.  DEVEREUX,  Superintendent  of  Orange  &  Alexan 
dria  Railroad,  Alexandria,  Va."  TT  TJAUPT 

Brigadier-  General, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

On  November  5,  the  following  telegram  was  received  from 
Superintendent  J.  H.  Devereux,  and  also  one  from  General  Mc- 
Olellan,  informing  me  that  the  Headquarters  would  that  night  be 
near  Rectortown: 

HEADQUARTERS  NEAR  RECTORTOWN, 

November  5,  1862. 
Brigadier-General  H.  Haupt: 

General  McClellan  directs  me  to  inform  you  that  his  Headquarters 
are  to-night  at  this  place.  So  far  as  we  can  learn,  railroad  is  in  good 
condition  as  far  as  Piedmont,  and  arrangements  should  be  made  to  for 
ward  supplies  to  that  and  other  points  as  soon  as  possible.  Can  you  not 
send  an  engine  to  this  point  at  once  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the 
exact  condition  of  road  and  to  enable  the  General  to  communicate  with 
you? 

Our  troops  are  on  the  line  of  the  road  from  Piedmont  to  Salem, 
and  we  will  have  troops  at  White  Plains  to-morrow.  Our  cavalry  is  in 
the  vicinity  of  Chester  Gap.  The  General  is  desirous  to  see  you  as  soon 
as  you  can  conveniently  come  up.  A.  V.  COLBURN, 

Assistant  Adjutant- General. 

ALEXANDRIA,  November  5,  1862. 
H.  Haupt,  Brigadier-General: 

At  6:40  this  morning  Moore  got  back  to  Manassas  from  the  Gap 
Road.  He  reports  the  road  is  not  guarded  at  any  point,  although  a  large 
force  was  at  Gainesville  and  one  at  Thoroughfare  Gap.  He  did  not  see  a 
soldier  between  Gainesville  and  Manassas,  and  your  outer  pickets  were  at 
Broad  Run.  He  understood  troops  were  at  Rectortown.  We  have  an 
engine  ready  to  go  if  you  say  so.  We  may  get  through,  and  may  not. 

J.  H.  D. 

On  the  same  day,  November  5,  1862,  the  following  General 
Orders  was  placed  on  record: 

GENERAL  ORDERS,  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

No.  182.  November  5,  1862. 

By  direction  of  the  President  it  is  ordered  that  Major-General 
McClellan  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  that  Major-General  Burnside  take  command  of  that  Army. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  153 

November  7,  1862,  the  following  were  received  from  General 
McClellan7  s  Headquarters : 

RECTORTOWN,  November  6,  1862. 
Brigadier-General  Haupt: 

General  McClellan  desires  me  to  say  that  we  are  in  possession  of 
Warrenton.  General  Sickles  has  been  directed  to  push  troops  forward  to 
Warrenton  Junction  and  to  cover  any  working  party  that  you  may  have 
on  the  railroad.  The  road  should  be  put  in  running  order  as  soon  as 
possible  in  order  that  the  movements  of  the  troops  need  not  be  delayed. 

A.  V.  COLBURN, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

CAMP  RECTORTOWN,  November  6,  1862. 
General  Meigs : 

Supplies  of  subsistence  and  forage  should  be  forwarded  to  this 
army  at  convenient  points.  The  supplies  should  be  held  in  readiness  in 
cars  on  sidings  at  Manassas  so  that  the  trains  can  be  started  to  any  point 
required  at  a  moment's  notice.  We  require  at  least  one  large  train  of 
supplies  at  Salem  immediately.  It  is  expected  that  the  amount  ordered 
by  General  McClellan  some  days  since  is  now  near  here.  We  shall 
require  an  equal  amount  on  the  8th  at  Warrenton  or  at  the  Junction. 

I  request  that  you  will  order  all  the  cars  that  can  be  obtained  shall 
be  loaded  with  subsistence  and  grain  and  be  held  in  readiness  at  Man 
assas  subject  to  move  on  orders  from  these  Headquarters.  General 
Haupt  reported  to  General  McClellan  that  the  road  can  transport  seven 
hundred  tons  daily.  If  such  is  the  fact,  we  will  not  suffer,  but  the  road 
must  not  fail  us.  Please  have  the  road  put  in  repair  from  Acquia  Creek 
to  Richmond  via  Fredericksburg.  RUFUS  INGALLS 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  A.  D.  C. 
Chief  Quartermaster  Army  of  Potomac,  etc. 

November  8,  1862,  in  consequence  of  interruption  to  trains 
by  guards  under  pretense  of  examining  passes,  the  following  note 
was  sent  to  the  officer  in  command,  which  produced  the  desired 
effect : 

ALEXANDRIA,  November  8, 1862. 
Colonel  Wendell,  of  New  Jersey  Volunteers. 

SIR  :  Last  night,  in  returning  to  Alexandria  from  General  McClel- 
lan's  Headquarters  in  special  train,  I  was  stopped  by  guards  near  Edsall's 
under  command  of  Captain  Plunt,  who  informed  me  that  he  had  instruc 
tions  from  you  to  stop  all  trains  and  examine  passes  of  all  persons 
thereon. 

As  this  action  is  in  violation  of  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  I  suppose  it  results  from  ignorance  of  those  orders,  and  I  there 
fore  send  you  the  following,  addressed  to  myself : 

"No  military  officer  will  give  any  orders  to  your  subordinates, 
except  through  you;  nor  will  any  of  them  attempt  to  interfere  with  the 
running  of  the  trains.  H  w  HALLECK." 

• 

It  remains  for  me  to  say  that  the  stoppage  of  trains  when  under 
full  headway  on  the  main  track  for  the  purpose  of  examining  passes,  or 
for  any  other  purpose,  cannot  be  permitted.  Passes  should  be  examined 


154  REMINISCENCES   OF 

at  stations,  and  I  will  afford  every  facility  in  my  power  to  enforce  proper 
regulations  in  this  regard. 

If,  notwithstanding  this  communication,  you  intend  to  persist  in 
stopping  trains,  please  send  me  copy  of  the  orders  under  which  you  are 
acting,  that  I  may  bring  the  subject  to  the  notice  of  the  General-in-Chief. 
An  immediate  answer  is  requested,  which  please  return  by  bearer. 

Very  respectfully  yours, 

H.  HAUPT, 

Brigadier-  General, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

In  the  attempt  to  re-establish  transportation  on  the  line  of  the 
railroad,  more  trouble  was  often  given  by  our  own  soldiers  than  by 
the  enemy.  Camps  had  been  established  near  the  road  and  near 
the  stations.  Soldiers  would  tear  up  sidings,  break  switch-stands, 
burn  the  wood  provided  for  the  engines,  wash  clothes  and  persons 
with  soap  in  the  springs  and  streams  which  supplied  the  water  sta 
tions,  and  many  engines  were  stopped  on  the  road  by  foaming 
boilers  caused  by  soapy  water.  In  consequence  of  these  annoy 
ances  and  the  delays  consequent  thereon,  a  stringent  special  order 
was  issued  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

ALEXANDRIA,  November  9,  1862,  9 :15  p.  M. 
General  Haupt : 

The  sidings  at  Camp  Upton,  on  Loudon  &  Hampshire  Railroad, 
have  been  destroyed  by  our  own  soldiers  so  as  to  render  them  unfit  for 
use  until  repaired.  Other  acts  of  vandalism  occur  daily  along  the  line 
of  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad,  such  as  wasting  water  and  burning 
all  the  wood  distributed  at  stations.  I  sent  to  Manassas  yesterday  wood 
sufficient  to  last  until  Tuesday ;  it  was  all  consumed  this  evening. 

Broad  Run  bridge  was  finished  this  evening  and  trains  will  leave 
Manassas  to-morrow  morning  at  6  o'clock  to  run  through  to  Warrenton 
Junction,  repairing  track,  etc.,  on  the  way  up.  I  go  to  Manassas  to-night. 

J.  J.  MOORE. 

WASHINGTON,  November  4, 1862. 
Major-General  Heintzelman. 

SIR  :  I  reported  to  Major-General  McClellan,-  in  reply  to  a  call  for 
-'  information,  that  the  capacity  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad, 
with  the  equipments  at  our  command,  without  accident  or  detention,  was 
from  700  to  900  tons  per  day.  The  demands,  I  find,  will  exceed  1,500 
tons  per  day.  We  have  taken  200  cars  from  other  roads  and  must  pro 
cure  350  cars  in  addition.  We  have  lost  402  cars  captured,  or  destroyed, 
and  we  have  now  less  than  300,  only  part  of  which  are  available. 
Demands  are  made  daily  for  troop  transportation  which  I  have  directed 
the  Superintendent  to  refuse  if  it  will  interfere  with  the  transportation 
of  supplies.  As  the  road  is  in  bad  order  and  detention  and  blockades 
may  occur,  I  recommend  the  establishment  of  a  depot  at  Manassas  suffi 
cient  for  three  days,  if  we  occupy  it  in  such  strength  that  we  cannot  be 
driven  out. 

I  learn  that  there  is  not  a  guard  on  the  road  between  Fairfax  Sta 
tion  and  Union  Mills,  although  we  have  five  bridges  in  that  interval.  I 
do  not  know  that  the  line  of  the  Occoquan  is  watched,  and  you  may  con- 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  155 

sider  it  officious  if  I  inquire,  but  I  have  heretofore  considered  it  my  duty 
to.  look  after  everything  which  affected  the  safe  and  efficient  operation 
of  the  railroads  under  my  charge. 

General  McDowell,  when  in  command,  directed  the  officers  in  com 
mand  of  guards  to  confer  with  me  in  regard  to  details.  If  you  will 
inform  me  whose  duty  it  is  to  attend  to  these  details,  I  will  communicate 
directly  with  that  officer  and  relieve  you  of  any  further  annoyance. 

Efforts  should  be  made  to  prevent,  if  possible,  the  destruction  of 
the  bridges  between  Manassas  and  the  Rappahannock ;  also  the  bridges 
between  Rectortown  and  Markham  on  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad. 

I  may,  perhaps,  appear  to  you  officious  in  making  so  many  inquiries 
and  suggestions  in  regard  to  the  protection  of  the  road  and  bridges,  but, 
as  the  successor  of  General  Banks,  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  consult  with 
you  as  I  did  and  was  directed  to  do  with  him. 

Our  railroad  men,  although  unarmed  and  defenseless,  do  not  shirk 
any  duty,  however  hazardous,  if  I  direct  them  to  proceed.  They  have 
occupied  the  most  exposed  positions ;  some  of  them  have  been  killed  and 
some  captured,  but  we  cannot  afford  to  risk  them  unnecessarily.  Their 
places  cannot  readily  be  supplied,  and  I  have  therefore  presumed  to  in 
quire  as  to  the  arrangements  for  guarding  the  roads  and  the  numbers, 
positions  and  instructions  of  the  forces  detailed  for  this  duty,  in  order 
that  I  might  be  able  to  give  directions  and  assurances  to  our  men  based 
on  a  personal  knowledge  of  the  facts. 

Before  ordering  our  men  to  exposed  positions,  I  wished  to  feel 
satisfied  that  such  reasonable  and  proper  arrangements  had  been  planned 
for  their  protection  as  circumstances  would  permit,  and  that  instructions 
had  been  actually  carried  out,  guards  and  outposts  in  position,  before 
commencing  railroad  transportation  or  construction. 

At  our  last  interview  you  remarked  that  the  officers  sent  to  guard 
the  roads  would  no  doubt  attend  to  their  business,  and  that  you  could 
not  go  yourself,  from  which  I  inferred  that  my  frequent  calls  upon  you 
were  becoming  annoying;  but  excuse  me  for  saying  that  from  past  ex 
perience  I  have  but  little  confidence  that  the  lines  will  be  guarded  prop 
erly,  unless  specific  instructions  are  given  as  to  the  positions  to  be  occu 
pied  in  advance,  the  forces  required,  and  manner  in  which  the  duty  is 
to  be  performed.  It  is  also  desirable,  even  if  not  absolutely  necessary, 
that  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  construction  and  operation  of  the  roads 
should  know  what  the  arrangements  are.  If  you  think  it  not  improper 
that  I  should  have  this  information,  and  will  suggest  any  way  of  obtain 
ing  it,  other  than  by  calling  upon  yourself,  I  will  refrain  from  tres 
passing  upon  your  time.  Very  respectfully  submitted, 

H.  HAUPT, 

In  Charge  of  Construction  and  Operation 
United  States  Military  Railroads. 

November  6,  1862. 
P.  H.  Watson,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 

DEAR  SIR:  Mr.  Moore,  engineer  of  tracks,  telegraphs  that  he  has 
been  over  the  road  beyond  Piedmont,  over  the  Goose  Creek  bridges,  and 
found  everything  all  right. 

I  go  to  Rectortown  to  see  General  McClellan  to-morrow. 

We  will  have  tough  times  on  the  railroad.    You  recollect  the  diffi 
culty  of  supplying  General  McDowell's  army  and  the  confusion  that 
reigned  for  some  time.     That  was  in  June,  when  grass  could  be  obtained ;    / 
now  60,000  animals  must  be  fed  exclusively  by  rail,  and  General  McClel- 


156  REMINISCENCES   OF 

lan's  requirements  for  transportation  are  four  or  five  times  as  great  as 
McDowell's.  Never  before,  perhaps,  has  a  single-track  railroad,  of  such 
limited  capacity,  been  so  severely  taxed,  and  if  we  can  succeed  in  for 
warding  necessary  supplies,  it  will  only  be  by  most  extraordinary  good 
management  and  good  luck  combined.  Expect  plenty  of  grumbling, 
but  I  shall  go  ahead.  Yours  truly,  - 


ALEXANDRIA,  November  8,  1862. 
P.  H.  Watson,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR  :  I  have  just  returned  from  Headquarters  of  General  McClel- 
lan,  and  report  as  follows: 

Of  the  cars  sent  over  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad  but  few  had  been 
unloaded  and  returned.  Even  the  places  for  depots  had  not  been  deter 
mined  upon.  Of  course,  the  movements  of  the  line  were  blocked.  No 
more  cars  could  be  sent  until  those  in  advance  were  unloaded  and  re 
turned. 

At  a  conference  with  General  McClellan  and  Colonels  Ingalls  and 
Clark  last  night,  the  whole  subject  of  transportation  was  discussed,  ex 
plained  and,  I  think,  understood;  and  if  arrangements  then  and  there 
made  and  ordered  to  be  carried  out  are  conformed  to,  there  will  be  no 
trouble  about  supplies  in  future.  I  was  gratified  to  receive  the  assur 
ance  from  both  the  Chief  Quartermaster  and  the  Chief  Commissary  that 
there  had  been  no  suffering  or  inconvenience  from  deficiency  of  supplies 
up  to  the  present  time.  The  details  of  arrangements  it  is  unnecessary 
to  trouble  you  with.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  they  were  satisfactory 
to  all  parties. 

The  propriety  of  reconstructing  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad  was 
considered,  and  a  reconnoissance  ordered  to  ascertain  the  exact  present 
condition  of  the  bridges.  I  will  go  personally  to  see  what  can  be  done 
towards  reconstructing  the  wharf,  or  providing  a  substitute. 

By  obstructing  temporarily  the  passage  for  vessels,  we  have  been 
able  to  run  cars  and  engines  over  the  Long  Bridge  without  much  inter 
ruption.  Yesterday,  in  consequence  of  the  high  wind,  but  little  progress 
could  be  made  in  driving  piles,  but  I  am  informed  that  the  work  will  be 
advanced  so  far  as  to  permit  the  passage  of  boats  to-night. 

A  construction  party  was  sent  to  Broad  Run,  and  the  bridges  will 
be  reconstructed  to-day. 

Trains  are  daily  stopped  by  guards  about  five  miles  from  Alexan 
dria  under  the  pretense  of  examining  passes  ;  this  must  not  be  permitted. 
I  cannot  ascertain  what  general  officer,  if  any,  ordered  it.  I  have  sent  a 
communication  to  the  officer  in  command,  and  if  the  practice  is  not 
discontinued,  I  will  take  such  further  action  as  may  appear  to  be  neces 
sary.  Yours  very  respectfully,  TT  TjATJPT 

The  last  telegram  that  I  find  among  my  records  from  General 
McClellan  is  dated  November  7,  on  which  day  he  probably  re 
ceived  notice  that  he  had  been  relieved.  I  had  been  confidentially 
advised  of  the  change  of  commanders  by  Assistant  Secretary  Wat 
son,  and  had  brought  out  the  bearer  of  dispatches,  General  Wads- 
worth,  I  think,  in  a  special  train. 

I  took  supper  with  McClellan  that  evening  in  his  tent,  and  he 
seemed  to  be  entirely  ignorant  at  the  time  of  the  fact  that,  within 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  157 

one  hour,  he  would  be  relieved.  He  was  speaking  to  me  of  pro 
posed  operations,  which  I  knew  he  would  have  no  opportunity  to 
carry  into  effect. 

General  McClellan  always  treated  me  with  kindness  and  con 
sideration,  and  my  suggestions  in  regard  to  the  lines  of  communica 
tion,  by  which  his  army  could  be  best  supplied,  were  approved  and 
acted  upon.  I  felt  a  warm  sympathy  for  the  pain  he  must  experi 
ence  when  the  intelligence  of  his  removal  should  reach  him.  Per 
sonally,  I  esteemed  General  McClellan  highly,  but  as  a  commander 
he  was  too  slow  and  his  caution  excessive.  He  did  not  wish  to 
move  until  he  could  strike  with  positive  certainty.  When  all  the 
reinforcements  and  supplies  he  invariably  asked  for  had  been  fur 
nished,  he  would  continue  to  ask  for  something  more,  something 
else,  until  the  patience  of  the  President,  following  that  of  Secre 
tary  Stanton,  became  completely  exhausted. 

General  McClellan  has  been  severely  criticised  for  allowing 
Lee  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  escape  after  the  battle  of  Antietam, 
but  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that,  under  the  conditions  then  exist 
ing,  it  could  have  been  prevented. 

If  General  McClellan  had  been  aware  of  Lee's  intended  move 
ments  ;  if  he  had  himself  been  free  from  any  apprehension  of  at 
tack  and  could  have  detached  safely  a  considerable  portion  of  his 
force  to  occupy  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac  with  artillery  and 
destroy  the  bridges,  then  Lee  might  have  been  captured;  but  the 
retreat  was  made  so  promptly  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  before 
McClellan  was  aware  of  the  fact. 

Of  course,  it  was  natural  to  suppose  that,  after  his  defeat  at 
Antietam,  when  Lee  had  moved  south  to  the  Potomac,  he  would  re- 
cross  the  river.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  if  McClellan  had 
immediately  placed  the  main  body  of  his  army  in  a  defensible  posi 
tion  on  the  river  below  Lee,  and  thrown  a  part  of  his  force  on  the 
south  side,  he  might  have  prevented  the  escape ;  but  there  were  few 
Generals  who  were  capable  of  moving  with  the  celerity  that  this 
would  have  required,  for  in  two  days  after  the  battle  Lee's  extraor 
dinary  activity  had  landed  him  safely  on  the  soil  of  Virginia, 
while  McClellan  was  actually  expecting  a  renewal  of  the  battle  on 
the  north  side ! 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OPERATIONS  UNDER  MAJOR-GENERAL 
A.  E.  BURNSIDE. 

{ACCOMPANIED  General  Halleck,  at  his  request,  to  the  Head 
quarters  of  General  Burnside,  and  after  he  had  been  placed  in 
command  no  time  was  lost  by  me  in  informing  him  of  the  condition 
of  the  railroads,  upon  which  he  was  dependent  for  supplies,  and  the 
absolute  necessity  of  proper  order  and  system  in  their  operation. 
He  assented  to  the  propriety  of  the  positions  taken,  and  gave  assur 
ances  that  he  would  cooperate  in  all  measures  to  promote  safety 
and  efficiency,  yet  there  was  no  other  commander  of  any  of  the 
armies  with  which  I  was  connected,  who  so  frequently  forgot  his 
promises  and  caused  so  much  delay  and  embarrassment  by  giving 
orders  to  subordinates  in  conflict  with  instructions  from  the  head 
of  the  Department. 

On  the  next  day  the  following  communication  was  sent  to 
General  Burnside : 

WASHINGTON,  November  9, 1862. 
Major-General  Burnside: 

Arrangements  in  regard  to  transportation  were  fully  discussed, 
explanations  made,  and  a  program  determined  upon  between  General 
McClellan,  his  chief  Quartermaster  and  Commissary,  and  myself  pre 
vious  to  his  removal.  As  you  are  now  in  chief  command,  I  think  it 
proper  to  report  to  you  and  ask  instructions  in  regard  to  certain  points. 

The  road  by  which  your  army  is  to  be  supplied  is  a  single  track, 
without  sidings  sufficient  for  long  trains,  without  wood  and  with  insuffi 
cient  supply  of  water,  a  road  which  has  heretofore  failed  to  supply  an 
army  of  one-fourth  the  size  of  that  which  you  command,  a  road,  the 
ordinary  working  capacity  of  which  is  not  equal  to  the  half  of  your  re 
quirements,  but  which,  by  a  combination  of  good  management  and  good 
fortune,  may  be  able  to  furnish  your  supplies.  To  do  this,  it  is  abso 
lutely  necessary  that  at  each  and  every  depot  a  force  should  be  in  readi 
ness  to  unload  a  train  as  soon  as  it  arrives;  the  contents  of  cars  must 
be  unloaded  on  the  ground  and  afterwards  moved,  if  necessary,  to  more 
convenient  points.  The  force  should  be  sufficient  to  unload  all  the  cars 
of  a  train  at  once. 

Railway  employes  are  required  to  be  civil  and  accommodating,  and 
if  they  are  not,  they  will  be  promptly  dismissed;  but  the  convenience 
of  local  quartermasters  and  commissaries  must  give  way  before  the  re 
quirements  of  a  service  far  more  imperative  than  it  has  ever  been  before. 
Trains  have  been  frequently  detained  for  hours  to  move  supplies  for 

158 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  159 

very  short  distances  to  save  handling.  I  desire  respectfully  but  most 
urgently  to  impress  upon  you  the  importance  of  making  your  orders  so 
imperative  that  they  dare  not  be  disobeyed,  and  that  cars  shall,  on  their 
arrival  at  each  and  every  depot,  be  immediately  unloaded  and  returned. 
I  say  again,  that  without  this  the  supply  of  your  army  is  impossible. 
No  man  living  can  accomplish  it. 

A  second  point  to  which  I  wish  to  direct  your  attention  is  the  im 
portance  of  establishing  a  depot  of  reserve  supplies  at  Manassas  to  draw 
upon  in  case  of  any  break  in  the  road  between  Manassas  and  Alexandria, 
and  as  the  army  advances,  depots  at  intervals  of  30  or  40  miles  should  be 
made  to  guard  against  the  consequences  of  breaks  in  the  connection. 
If  you  advance  far,  the  operation  of  the  road  will  present  greater  diffi 
culty;  its  protection  against  raids  will  be  almost  impossible,  and  the 
breaks  of  connection  will  become  frequent  from  various  causes  not  de 
pendent  on  the  movement  of  the  enemy. 

The  difficulty  of  operating  a  long  line  of  railroad,  with  an  exposed 
flank,  satisfies  me  that  the  reconstruction  of  the  Fredericksburg  Rail 
road,  so  uselessly  destroyed,  is  a  military  necessity.  If  this  is  your 
opinion,  please  advise  me  of  the  fact,  that  no  time  may  be  lost  in  prepara 
tion.  The  last  time  I  spoke  to  General  Halleck  on  this  subject,  he  said 
that  the  question  of  reconstructing  this  road  was  not  settled;  when  it 
was,  he  would  advise  me.  Since  then  I  have  not  heard  from  him,  but  I 
am  sure  that  when  you  advance  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad  alone 
will  be  a  very  insecure  reliance. 

The  subject  of  guarding  the  railroad  is  a  very  important  one,  but 
no  detention  of  trains  by  guards  on  any  pretense  should  be  permitted. 
The  proper  protection  of  the  road  between  Alexandria  and  Manassas 
requires  that  the  line  of  the  Occoquan  should  be  well  watched. 

As  other  duties  will  prevent  me  from  seeing  you  for  some  days,  I 
hope  you  will  not  consider  these  suggestions  and  statements  as  out  of 
place.  H  HATjPT) 

Brigadier-  General, 

In  Charge  of  Construction  and  Operation  of 
United  States  Military  Railroads. 

November  10,  8  A.  M. 
General  Haupt: 

Your  dispatch  received  and  suggestions  approved,  for  which  I  am 
much  obliged.  I  send  to  General  Halleck  special  messenger  to-day  with 
plan  of  operations.  Please  get  from  General  Cullum  a  copy  of  my  sug 
gestions  as  to  the  Acquia  Creek  Road,  sent  some  days  ago  from  Pleasant 
Valley,  and  get  ready  for  the  work  on  that  road.  Don't  fail  to  send  me 
at  any  time  your  views.  ±  E  BURtfSIDE, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

In  order  to  make  my  plans  as  nearly  absolutely  effective  as 
possible,  Secretary  Stanton  issued  the  following : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
SPECIAL  ORDER.  WASHINGTON,  November  10,  1862. 

I.  Commanding  officers  of  troops  along  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
Railroad  will  give  all  facilities  to  the  officers  of  the  road  and  the  Quar 
termaster  for  loading  and  unloading  cars,  so  as  to  prevent  any  delay. 
On  arrival  at  depots,  whether  in  the  day  or  night,  the  cars  will  be  in- 


160  REMINISCENCES   OF 

stantly  unloaded,  and  working  parties  will  always  be  in  readiness  for 
that  duty,  and  sufficient  to  unload  the  whole  train  at  once.  Command 
ing  officers  will  be  charged  with  guarding  the  track,  sidings,  wood,  water 
tanks,  etc.,  within  their  several  commands,  and  will  be  held  responsible 
for  the  result.  Any  military  officer  who  shall  neglect  his  duty  in  this 
respect  will  be  reported  by  the  Quartermasters  and  officers  of  the  rail 
road,  and  his  name  will  be  stricken  from  the  rolls  of  the  army. 

II.  Depots  will  be  established  at  suitable  points  under  the  direc 
tion  of  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
properly  guarded. 

III.  No  officer,  whatever  may  be  his  rank,  will  interfere  with  the 
running  of  the  cars,  as  directed  by  the  Superintendent  of  the  road.    Any 
one  who  so  interferes  will  be  dismissed  from  the  service  for  disobedience 
of  orders. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

J.  C.  KELTON. 

Instructions  were  given  to  W.  W.  Wright  to  prepare  for  the 
reconstruction  of  the  wharves  at  Acquia  Creek  and  the  road  to 
Fredericksburg.  It  was  recommended  that  several  regiments  of 
infantry,  some  cavalry,  and  a  couple  of  gunboats  be  sent  to  protect 
the  working  parties,  and  that  canal  barges  be  collected  upon  which 
to  remove  loaded  cars  from  Alexandria  as  soon  as  General  Halleck 
gave  authority  for  the  commencement  of  the  work. 

On  November  11,  requisition  was  made  upon  the  Quarter 
master  for  a  large  number  of  Schuylkill  barges,  pile-drivers,  piles, 
scows,  boats  and  anchors. 

On  the  same  day  General  Halleck  notified  General  Burnside 
to  arrange  for  a  meeting  with  him  the  next  day,  and  that  General 
Meigs  and  General  Haupt  would  accompany  him,  asking  General 
Burnside  also  to  carefully  consider  the  views  of  the  President  as 
expressed  in  a  letter  of  September  13,  of  which  he  inclosed  a  copy, 
that  it  might  be  talked  over  understandingly  when  they  met. 

At  this  interview,  at  which  I  was  present  by  request  of  Gen 
eral  Halleck,  General  Burnside  expressed  a  strong  disinclination 
to  take  the  command.  He  said :  "I  am  not  fit  for  it.  There  are 
many  more  in  the  army  better  fitted  than  I  am ;  but  if  you  and  the 
President  insist,  I  will  take  it  and  do  the  best  I  can." 

After  other  matters  were  settled,  I  endeavored  to  impress 
upon  the  General  the  absolute  necessity  of  preventing  military 
interference  with  the  trains,  and  the  importance  of  prompt  unload 
ing  and  returning  of  cars. 

On  November  12,  1862,  an  order  was  received  from  the  Sec 
retary  of  War  to  give  receipt  for  property  delivered  to  railroads 
for  transportation. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  163 

WASHINGTON,  November  12,  1862. 
Brigadier-General  H.  Haupt,  United  States  Volunteers. 

SIR:  The  Secretary  of  War  directs  that  you  instruct  your  agents 
to  give  receipts  for  all  supplies  heretofore  turned  over  to  them  for  trans 
portation  to  the  staff  officers  accountable  for  such  supplies. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

Attempts  had  been  made  previously  by  officers,  both  of  the 
Quartermaster  and  Commissary  Department,  to  induce  our  agents 
to  give  receipts  for  Government  property.  Such  requests  were 
simply  absurd  and  unreasonable.  The  Railway  Department  was 
charged  simply  with  the  construction  and  operation  of  roads,  not 
with  the  custody  of  property. 

Had  the  Secretary  gone  outside  of  his  interested  army  officers, 
as  he  finally  did,  for  advice  on  this  point  he  would  not  have  com 
mitted  the  error  of  issuing  such  an  order.  On  receipt  of  it,  I  im 
mediately  sent  the  following  reply : 

WASHINGTON,  November  13,  1862. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Sianton,  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR:  A  communication  this  day  received,  signed  E.  D.  Townsend, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General,  informs  me  that  by  your  direction  I  am 
instructed  to  require  my  agents  to  receipt  for  all  supplies  heretofore 
turned  over  to  them  for  transportation  to  the  staff  officer  accountable 
for  such  supplies. 

It  affords  me  pleasure  at  all  times  to  comply  with  your  wishes  and 
carry  out  your  instructions,  but  if  impediments  exist,  or  if  I  am  cog 
nizant  of  material  facts  which  I  have  reason  to  believe  you  are  un 
acquainted  with,  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  suspend  action,  report  the 
facts,  and  ask  instructions. 

The  object  of  the  receipt  is,  of  course,  to  relieve  the  officers  of  the 
Commissary  and  Quartermaster  Department  of  all  responsibility  after 
the  cars  are  loaded,  and  it  is  perfectly  right  and  proper  that  they  should 
have  such  relief,  but  it  does  not  appear  to  be  right  to  throw  the  responsi 
bility  upon  a  railway  superintendent,  who  has  nothing  to  do  with  loading 
or  unloading  the  cars,  no  opportunity  of  examining  their  contents,  and 
no  power  to  protect  them  when  on  the  road. 

Even  guards  themselves,  I  am  informed,  have  broken  into  cars 
containing  hospital  stores  and  appropriated  stimulants. 

The  responsibilities  and  labors  of  the  superintendents  are  very 
great,  and  I  could  not  find  really  competent  men  who  would  be  willing 
to  accept  the  position  if  they  were  increased,  as  proposed. 

Very  respectfully  submitted,  jj  jjAUPT 

In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

This  communication  was  followed  by  a  personal  interview 
with  the  Secretary,  in  which  he  declined  to  recede  from  his  posi 
tion,  and  insisted  that  the  order  should  be  complied  with.  I  there 
fore  sent  the  following  next  morning : 


164  REMINISCENCES    OF 

WASHINGTON,  November  15, 1862. 
Eon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR:  Since  my  conversation  with  you  last  evening,  I  have  given 
the  subject  of  freight  receipts  further  consideration,  and  the  more  I  re 
flect  upon  it,  the  greater  do  the  difficulties  appear. 

The  cars  are  loaded  and  unloaded  by  the  Quartermaster,  and  the 
custody  of  the  contents  does  not,  as  I  have  understood  it,  pass  out  of 
that  Department.  The  cars  can  be  locked  by  the  Quartermaster ;  he  can 
seal  them  as  cars  of  through  freights  are  sealed  in  the  West ;  he  can  send 
his  own  special  agent  with  each  train  to  deliver  to  and  secure  receipts 
from  the  consignee  and  to  report  any  loss  by  robbery  or  otherwise  that 
may  occur  upon  the  route. 

The  duties  of  railway  employes  are,  or  ought  to  be,  confined  simply 
to  the  movements  of  the  trains,  not  to  the  custody  of  the  contents  of  the 
cars,  and  the  transfer  of  responsibility  to  them,  instead  of  increasing  the 
security  of  the  Government,  would,  on  the  contrary,  impair  it  greatly. 

Suppose  the  present  representatives  of  the  Quartermaster's  Depart 
ment  should  be  succeeded  by  gentlemen  whose  integrity  was  less  un 
questionable,  and  they  should  ask  for  and  receive  receipts  from  the  rail 
way  managers  for  a  greater  quantity  of  stores  than  had  been  loaded  in 
the  cars,  the  doors  would  be  open  to  fraud  to  an  unlimited  extent,  and 
the  temptation  might,  in  some  cases,  be  too  strong  for  human  weakness. 

Suppose  the  transfer  of  custody  should  take  place  and  a  deficiency 
be  discovered  upon  delivery,  the  value  of  that  deficiency  could  not  be 
recovered  from  the  railway  employes  or  agents,  and  if  you  should  proceed 
a  step  farther  and  require  them  to  give  bonds,  they  could  not  comply, 
for  no  responsible  party  with  a  knowledge  of  the  facts  would  ever  enter 
into  bonds. 

If  security  is  required  of  railway  agents,  they  could  only  protect 
themselves  by  placing  a  careful  and  incorruptible  representative  at  each 
and  every  car  that  is  loaded  by  day  or  night,  but  even  this  would  not  be 
sufficient;  it  would  afford  a  check  only  on  the  number  of  packages,  none 
whatever  upon  the  contents  and  weights.  It  would  be  further  necessary 
to  weigh  every  package  and  examine  contents  before  the  check  could 
be  complete.  Such  an  arrangement  would  require  a  large  addition  to  the 
force  of  employes,  would  be  expensive,  would  cause  great  inconvenience 
and  delay,  and  there  would  still  be  an  opening  for  fraud  by  collusion 
between  the  two  classes  of  employes. 

I  think  the  enclosed  order  would  simply,  effectually,  and  econom 
ically  dispose  of  the  whole  difficulty. 

One  remark  more  appears  to  be  proper.  If  the  railroad  were  man 
aged  by  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  as  was  at  one  time  proposed, 
it  would  have  been  necessary,  either  to  send  supplies  over  the  road 
without  receipts,  or  send  an  officer  in  charge  to  give  and  receive  them. 
This  is  precisely  what  I  now  propose,  and  have  several  times  previously 
proposed  should  be  done,  and  which  the  consignors  have  had  the  privi 
lege  of  doing  at  any  and  all  times.  The  mere  fact  that  the  trains  are 
moved  by  a  set  of  employes,  trained  and  skilled  in  that  particular 
service,  should  not  affect  in  any  way  the  responsibilities  of  the  shippers 
and  receivers.  The  movement  of  a  car  does  not  necessarily  involve  re 
sponsibility  for  its  contents. 

The  above  remarks  and  suggestions  are  very  respectfully  submitted. 

H.  HAUPT, 

In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  165 

"Ordered:  That  the  agents  and  employes  of  the  United  States 
Military  Railroads  shall  have  no  control  or  responsibility  for  the  con 
tents  of  cars  containing  supplies,  such  supplies  shall  not  pass  out  of  the 
custody  of  the  consignor  until  delivered  to  and  receipted  for  by  the  con 
signee. 

"The  consignor  shall  be  permitted,  at  his  discretion,  to  seal  or  lock 
any  cars  containing  stores  that  might  be  stolen,  and  to  send  a  special 
agent  with  each  train,  who  will  report  any  robbery  to  the  proper  officer." 

Mr.  Stanton  sent  for  Assistant  Secretary  Watson  to  come  and 
read  my  communication  and  give  his  opinion.  Watson  said  I  was 
right.  This  did  not  seem  to  satisfy  the  Secretary,  who  replied: 
"Take  it  to  Meigs  and  see  what  he  thinks  of  it."  This  was  done 
and,  after  a  perusal  of  the  papers,  they  were  returned  with  the  re 
mark  :  "I  think  General  Haupt  is  entirely  correct." 

When  this  was  repeated  to  the  Secretary  he  jumped  from  his 
seat,  as  Watson  told  me,  paced  the  room  for  some  time,  and  then 
stopping  in  front  of  him  said :  "To  rescind  this  order  will  make 
me  ridiculous.  I  issued  a  peremptory  order,  and  will  not  take  it 
back;  but  if  you  and  Meigs  say  that  it  cannot  be  enforced,  go  to 
Haupt  and  tell  him  to  consider  it  a  dead  letter." 

The  scheme  was  a  nice  one  for  those  who  had  charge  of  Gov 
ernment  property  to  throw  the  responsibility  upon  the  Railroad 
Bureau,  and  hold  its  officers  accountable  for  shortages.  It  would 
have  been  easier  to  settle  accounts  in  this  way  than  by  burning 
depots,  a  plan  resorted  to  occasionally. 

No  further  efforts  were  made  to  extort  receipts  from  the  Mili 
tary  Railroad  Department. 

The  reconstruction  of  the  wharves  and  track  from  Acquia 
Creek  to  Fredericksburg  was  prosecuted  with  unprecedented  ex 
pedition.  It  was  on  November  10  that  I  directed  W.  W.  Wright 
to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  commence  work  so  soon  as  General 
Halleck  should  decide  upon  its  necessity.  It  was  November  11 
when  a  telegram  was  sent  to  Colonel  Belger  at  Baltimore  to  pro 
vide  canal  boats,  and  five  days  later,  November  17,  considerable 
progress  had  already  been  made  in  the  work  of  reconstruction. 
The  Superintendent  reported  that,  in  five  days  after  commence 
ment,  a  section  of  the  wharf  1,000  feet  long  was  completed,  and  a 
locomotive  and  cars  landed  and  trains  commenced  running  to  Poto 
mac  Creek.  In  five  days  more  trains  were  running  to  the  Rappa- 
hannock. 

The  Schuylkill  barges  answered  admirably,  and  thus  was 
formed  a  new  era  in  Military  Railroad  transportation.  Two  of 
these  barges  were  placed  parallel  to  each  other  and  long  timbers 
bolted  transversely.  The  length  of  the  barges  was  sufficient  for 
eight  tracks  carrying  eight  cars,  and  two  such  floats  would  carry  the 
sixteen  cars  which  constituted  a  train. 


166  REMINISCENCES   OF 

In  this  way  hundreds  of  loaded  cars  were  transferred  from 
the  advanced  position  of  the  Army,  on  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
Railroad,  loaded  on  the  floats,  towed  sixty  miles  to  Acquia  Creek, 
transferred  from  river  to  rail,  and  sent  to  Falmouth  without  break 
of  bulk,  in  about  the  same  time  required  to  march  the  army  across 
the  country  by  land.  Supplies  were  at  Falmouth  as  soon  as  there 
were  forces  there  for  their  protection. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  November  17,  1862. 
Major-General  Burnside: 

I  have  just  returned  from  Acquia  Creek.  Some  stores  were  on 
transports  yesterday  afternoon  ready  to  be  landed  at  Belle  Plain.  Sev 
eral  companies  of  the  Engineer  brigade  on  transports  are  probably  now 
ashore.  The  wharf  at  Acquia  is  not  entirely  burned,  but  is  worst  where 
the  track  was  located.  I  have  ordered  the  track  to  be  moved  over  and 
reconstructed  on  the  side  least  damaged.  Cars  and  engines  will  be 
loaded  immediately  and  sent  to  Acquia  to  be  unloaded  as  soon  as  the 
track  will  bear  their  weight. 

Eight  small  cars  will  be  sent  to-day,  landed  by  lighters,  loaded  with 
tents,  tools  and  rations,  pushed  by  hand  to  the  broken  bridges,  and 
accompanied  by  carpenters  with  escort  of  Engineer  troops  to  have 
bridges  repaired,  if  possible,  by  the  time  cars  and  engines  are  landed 
and  put  on  track.  As  soon  as  bridges  are  repaired  and  even  five  or  six 
cars  landed,  we  will  begin  to  run  in  supplies  to  Falmouth  to  relieve 
wagons  to  that  extent,  and  increase  daily. 

The  construction  of  a  floating  wharf  or  new  pile  wharf  at  Acquia 
is  not  a  question  for  present  consideration  while  time  is  so  much  of  an 
object.  New  construction  could  not  be  made  in  double  the  time  re 
quired  for  repairs  of  former  structure.  A  machine  shop  will  be  extem 
porized  at  Acquia  by  sending  lathe,  planer,  portable  engine,  small  tools 
and  shafting.  Army  forges  will  be  furnished  to  smithshops. 

H.  HAUPT. 

A  very  costly  irregularity  in  military  detail  is  treated  in  the 
following  communication : 

WASHINGTON,  November  18,  1862. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR:  The  Superintendent  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Kailroad, 
in  his  daily  report  of  operations,  states  that  142  cars  were  yesterday  and 
last  night  returned  loaded  from  Warrenton  and  other  stations. 

I  call  your  attention  to  this  fact  as  indicating  the  probable  exist 
ence  of  an  evil  which  requires  a  corrective.  While  the  Railway  Depart 
ment  has  been  making  the  most  extraordinary  efforts,  day  and  night,  to 
forward  supplies  represented  as  necessary,  to  enable  the  army  to  move 
forward,  requisitions  have  been  made  and  filled  for  articles  which  ap 
pear  to  be  entirely  unnecessary,  and  which,  when  the  army  moves,  must 
be  reloaded  and  sent  back,  or,  as  has  been  frequently  the  case  in  exposed 
positions,  destroyed  by  the  application  of  the  torch.  The  142  cars  re 
turned  loaded  in  the  recent  movement  have  a  capacity  of  2,800,000 
pounds — equivalent  to  six  days'  rations  of  three  pounds  each  of  150,000 
men,  or  its  equal  in  weight  in  other  supplies. 

The  fact  of  returning  so  large  an  amount  unused,  would  seem  to 
indicate  an  excessive  supply  for  the  army  at  a  time  when  it  was  only 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  167 

awaiting  a  sufficient  supply  to  enable  it  to  advance,  but  owing  to  in 
equalities  of  distribution,  this  excess  had  probably  not  been  general, 
and  has  not  been  a  consequence  of  necessary  depot  requirements.  Some 
regiments  or  brigades  may  have  had,  and  I  understand  have  had,  an 
excess,  and  others  a  deficiency. 

The  irregularity  of  distribution  appears  to  be  an  evil  vitally 
affecting  the  efficiency  of  the  army,  and  results  apparently  from  the  fact 
that  the  authority  to  make  requisitions  is  not  sufficiently  centralized. 
Each  Quartermaster  acts  independently,  and  with  the  approval  of  his 
immediate  superior;  sends  orders  which  are  filled,  without  regard  to  any 
rules  of  priority.  Hence,  it  may  follow  that  Quartermasters  who  are 
most  frequent  and  most  importunate  in  their  applications  may  receive 
an  excess  beyond  their  power  properly  and  economically  to  use,  while 
others  may  not  procure  that  which  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  troops 
which  it  is  their  duty  to  supply. 

The  avoidance  of  these  very  serious  evils  may  be  difficult,  and  I 
may  not  comprehend  all  that  is  in  the  way ;  but  with  my  present  informa 
tion  the  remedy  would  appear  to  be  both  simple  and  practical.  It  con 
sists  in  requiring  all  Quartermasters  and  Commissaries  in  an  Army 
Corps  to  make  their  requisitions  through  one  staff  officer,  who  should 
keep  a  record  of  such  requisitions  and  be  able  to  ascertain  at  a  glance 
the  supplies  that  have  been  delivered  to  each  regiment  and  their  com 
parative  necessities. 

At  the  principal  depots  the  requisitions  of  the  different  Army  Corps 
could  in  like  manner  be  equalized,  and  the  deliveries  proportioned  to 
the  numerical  strength  and  actual  requirements  of  each  Corps. 

As  the  armies  in  the  field  are  mainly  supplied  by  rail,  and  as  the 
responsibilities  of  rail  transportation  devolve  chiefly  upon  myself,  these 
suggestions,  designed  to  promote  the  efficiency  of  the  service  in  this  De 
partment,  will  not,  I  trust,  be  deemed  officious  or  impertinent. 
Yours  very  respectfully,  -g-  jjAFPT 

In  Charge  of  Construction  and  Operation 
United  States  Military  Railroads. 

WASHINGTON,  November   17,  1862. 
Wm.  W.  Wright,  Esq.,  Superintendent  R.  F.  &  P.  R.  R.: 

In  resuming  operations  on  the  Kichmond,  Fredericksburg  &  Poto-  •* 
mac  Railroad  you  will  conform  to  the  following  instructions : 

Your  position  will  be  that  of  Superintendent  of  the  Richmond, 
Fredericksburg  &  Potomac  Railroad,  and,  until  otherwise  ordered,  you 
will  also  perform  the  duties  of  engineer. 

You  will  nominate  and,  with  my  approval,  appoint,  assistants  and 
employes,  and  fix  their  compensations,  which  shall  not  exceed  the  rates 
heretofore  paid  on  other  Military  Railroads. 

Employes  now  in  service  of  Military  Railway  Department,  who 
can  be  transferred,  to  have  preference  over  new  appointees. 

Requisitions  for  material  or  supplies  to  be  made  through  the 
Quartermaster,  unless  the  amount  is  small  or  the  necessities  urgent. 
Such  requisitions  should  be  submitted  to  Colonel  D.  C.  McCallum  for 
approval. 

Time  of  employes,  certified  by  you,  to  be  returned  to  the  paymaster. 

Trains  to  be  run  on  former  schedule  and  in  convoys  in  preference 
to  extras.  Force  to  be  sufficient  to  unload  a  whole  train  at  once ;  if  not, 
the  fact  and  names  of  officers  to  be  reported.  See  Special  Order  337  and 
circular,  the  instructions  in  which  are  to  be  conformed  to. 


168  '  REMINISCENCES   OF 

Transportation  to  be  commenced  as  soon  as  an  engine  and  a  few 
cars  can  be  landed.  The  train,  so  long  as  there  is  but  a  single  one,  will 
run  without  regard  to  schedule,  as  rapidly  as  cars  can  be  loaded  and  un 
loaded.  There  must  be  no  intermission  day  or  night.  When  a  second 
engine  is  landed,  one  can  run  by  day  and  one  at  night.  Until  fifty  or 
sixty  cars  are  delivered,  you  will  not  require  a  third  engine. 

The  details  of  construction  and  the  order  of  priority  have  been  dis 
cussed,  and  you  have  my  views.  I  will  only  say,  work  all  the  force  upon 
the  wharf  that  is  possible.  If  boats  cannot  be  procured,  make  floats. 
Put  up  no  buildings  until  the  wharf  is  finished.  Let  the  forwarding  of 
supplies  be  the  first  consideration,  and  personal  convenience  the  last. 
Yours  respectfully,  H.  HAUPT, 

In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

November  18, 1862. 
Major-General  Burnside: 

In  resuming  transportation  southward  from  Acquia  Creek,  certain 
matters  will  require  your  attention,  which  I  think  should  be  regulated 
by  orders  from  Headquarters. 

Passes — I  forbid  the  Superintendent  of  the  Military  Railroads  to 
give  any  passes  except  to  employes.  All  other  passes  must  be  given  by 
the  military  authorities.  The  ordinary  practice  has  been  for  the  Provost 
Marshal  of  Washington  or  Alexandria  to  give  passes  to  Acquia  Creek. 
The  commandant  at  the  post  gives  passes  to  Fredericksburg,  which  are 
examined  by  a  guard  at  the  depot.  This  system  is  perhaps  as  good  as 
any,  if  officers  acting  as  aides  to  Provost  Marshals  will  cease  to  scatter 
these  passes  broadcast,  as  has  been  too  often  the  case. 

Newspapers — Newspaper  boys  traveling  daily  on  trains  are  an  un 
necessary  nuisance.  The  proper  plan  is  for  the  Superintendent  to  for 
ward  the  bundles  of  papers  properly  directed  to  a  local  agent,  by  whom 
they  can  be  distributed. 

Smuggling — Large  quantities  of  contraband  goods  have  no  doubt 
been  sent  over  the  road  by  Jews,  sutlers  and  others,  marked  with  the 
names  of  officers.  Just  before  General  Pope's  retreat  I  procured  the 
issuing  of  an  order  that  all  such  packages  should  be  delivered  by  the 
railway  agents  to  the  Provost  Marshal,  who  would  deliver  to  the  party 
named  thereon  only  upon  a  written  declaration  that  the  package  con 
tained  the  private  property  of  the  individual,  and  nothing  else,  such 
declaration  not  to  interfere  with  the  right  of  examination,  and  when  the 
amounts  were  excessive,  the  facts  were  to  be  reported  to  the  General  in 
command. 

These  are  some  of  the  abuses  which  only  stringent  orders,  faith 
fully  executed  by  Provost  Marshals,  can  prevent.  I  respectfully  report 
them  for  your  consideration  and  action. 

H.  HAUPT, 

In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

On  November  17,  a  telegram  from  General  Burnside  ex 
pressed  gratification  at  progress  at  Acquia  Creek,  and  informed  me 
that  General  Sumner  would  occupy  Falmouth  that  night. 

At  this  time  the  advanced  positions  on  the  line  of  the  Orange 
&  Alexandria  Railroad  had  been  abandoned,  and  the  officer  in  com 
mand  of  the  rear  guard  applied  for  a  train  to  remove  his  men  and 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  169 

material.  General  Burnside,  having  decided  that  the  road  was  no 
longer  safe,  the  officer  was  directed  to  use  his  wagons,  horses  and 
legs. 

On  November  22,  I  sent  a  telegram  in  cipher  to  General 
Burnside,  making  certain  suggestions  which  I  thought  worthy  of 
consideration :  To  cross  the  river  and  occupy  Fredericksburg  and 
the  strong  position  on  the  height  before  the  enemy  could  concen 
trate. 

There  may  have  been  good  reasons  for  not  taking  this  course, 
and  General  Burnside  was  in  a  far  better  position  to  know  the 
whole  situation  than  myself.  The  movement  may  have  been  im 
practicable  or  inexpedient  at  that  time,  and  I  knew  that  General 
Burnside  would  not  act  on  any  suggestion  from  me,  unless  his  own 
judgment  approved,  and  if  there  might  be  assurance,  there  would 
at  least  be  no  harm  in  making  suggestions. 

If  this  movement  could  have  been  made  at  the  time  indicated 
instead  of  waiting  until  the  enemy  had  concentrated  and  occupied 
a  position  which  the  natural  topography  made  almost  impregnable, 
the  result  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  if  fought  at  all,  might 
have  been  very  different. 

November  22, 1862. 
Major-General  Burnside: 

Several  days  must  elapse  before  the  railroad  to  Fredericksburg 
can  be  reconstructed,  several  days  more  before,  in  addition  to  daily  sup 
plies,  ten  or  twelve  days'  rations  can  be  accumulated  in  advance.  Cars 
and  engines  must  be  transported  from  Alexandria  and  unloaded  singly. 
This  takes  time. 

Suppose  your  whole  army  should  be  thrown  on  the  south  side  of 
the  Rappahannock,  communicating  by  boat  and  pontoon  bridges,  would 
it  not  cover  and  protect  the  navigation  of  the  stream?  Could  not  sup 
plies  of  all  kinds  be  sent  by  water  to  Fredericksburg  in  greater  quantities 
and  in  shorter  time  than  in  any  other  way  ? 

Could  you  not  be  prepared  to  advance  much  sooner  than  if  de 
pendent  upon  supplies  exclusively  by  rail?  If  unsuccessful,  could  you 
not  retire  behind  the  Rappahannock,  by  which  time  a  full  depot  would 
be  formed  at  Falmouth?  If  successful,  could  you  not  draw  supplies 
from  White  House  or  James  River  while  we  reconstruct  the  road  to 
Richmond  for  the  purpose  of  daily  communication  with  Washington  ? 

I  make  these  suggestions  reluctantly.  You  have  no  doubt  con 
sidered  them  already.  If  you  have  or  have  not,  they  can  do  no  harm. 

H.  HAUPT. 

November  29,  1862,  a  communication  was  sent  to  Quarter 
master-General  Meigs  giving  an  estimate  of  the  saving  to  be  effect 
ed  by  the  plan  of  transportation  adopted  by  the  Military  Railroad 
Department  in  the  substitution  of  barges  for  steamboats  at  the 
price  then  paid,  which  saving  was  at  the  rate  of  $1,352,000  per 
annum,  between  Alexandria  and  Acquia  Creek. 


170  REMINISCENCES   OF 

On  December  2,  an  officer  sent  to  inquire  into  the  condition  of 
the  Army  Corps  as  regards  supplies,  reported  to  General  Burnside 
that  all  the  Corps  were  supplied  liberally,  and  one  of  them  had 
rations  for  seventeen  days  in  advance. 

Telegram  to  General  Burnside : 

December  5, 1862. 
Major-General  Burnside: 

General  Ingalls  telegraphs  this  morning  in  regard  to  railroad  iron, 
and  says  it  is  your  wish  to  have  some  afloat  to  be  taken  up  the  Rappa- 
hannock. 

Is  this  the  best  practical  arrangement  ?  If  rails  are  taken  by  water 
to  Fredericksburg,  they  cannot  be  loaded  and  transported  on  the  rail 
road  without  cars  and  engines,  and  cars  and  engines  cannot  be  procured 
until  the  bridge  is  finished.  If  we  wait  for  the  bridge,  we  can  send  the 
iron  ready  loaded  to  where  we  may  wish  to  use  it,  without  a  tranship 
ment  at  Fredericksburg,  which  would  be  very  troublesome.  If  the  idea 
is  to  haul  by  wagons  from  Fredericksburg,  in  case  the  track  is  torn  up 
near  that  place,  it  will  be  almost  as  convenient  to  haul  from  Falmouth 
over  the  wagon  bridge,  which  must  necessarily  be  built  in  the  event  of 
our  getting  possession  of  the  city.  In  any  event,  I  do  not  perceive 
that  the  sending  of  rails  by  water  to  Fredericksburg  is  necessary,  but  it 
shall  be  done  if  you  desire  it. 

My  latest  information  is  that  the  rebels  were  still  running  trains 
to  Fredericksburg;  if  so,  the  track  is  not  yet  torn  up,  and  if  you  turn 
their  position,  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  will  probably  be  too  precipitate 
to  permit  them  to  do  much  damage. 

Although  we  have  probably  iron  enough,  I  will  order  ten  miles 
more  immediately  to  make  sure.  Please  show  this  telegram  to  General 
Ingalls  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  repeating  it  to  him. 

H.  HAUPT. 

WASHINGTON,  December  19,  1862. 
To  Agents  and  other  Employes  of  the  United  States  Military  Railroad 

Department : 

Complaints  have  been  made  that  employes  of  the  United  States 
Military  Railroads  do  not  treat  officers  with  respect;  that  they  are  un 
civil,  offensive  in  their  language,  and  unaccommodating. 

•  While  I  appreciate  the  difficult  position  in  which  officers  of  the 
Military  Railroad  Department  are  placed  during  a  period  of  active 
operations,  their  incessant  labors  night  and  day,  and  the  innumerable 
sources  of  difficulty  and  annoyance  from  which  ordinary  railroads  are 
exempt,  I  wish  it  distinctly  to  be  understood,  that  no  profanity,  incivil 
ity,  or  indisposition  to  accommodate  will  be  permitted;  but  if  com 
plaints  are  made  by  officers,  which,  on  investigation,  shall  be  proven  to  be 
well  founded,  the  offender  will  be  removed  as  soon  as  a  properly  quali 
fied  substitute  can  be  found  to  perform  his  duties. 

While  conscious  of  no  disposition  to  shield  the  employes  or  agents 
•of  the  Military  Railroads  from  any  censure  or  punishment  that  is  really 
merited,  justice  to  them  requires  me  to  state  that,  so  far,  examination 
has  shown  that  complaints  against  them  have  been  generally  without 
proper  f  oimdation ;  and  when  demands  were  not  promptly  complied  with, 
the  cause  has  been  inability,  arising  from  want  of  proper  notice,  and 
not  indisposition. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  173 

Officers  at  posts  entrusted  with  the  performance  of  certain  local 
duties,  and  anxious,  as  they  generally  are,  to  discharge  them  efficiently, 
are  not  always  able,  or  disposed,  to  look  beyond  their  own  particular 
spheres ;  they  expect  demands  on  railway  agents  to  be  promptly  complied 
with,  without  considering  that  similar  demands  at  the  same  time,  in 
addition  to  the  regular  train  service  and  routine  duties,  may  come  from 
Quartermasters,  Commissaries,  Medical  Directors,  Surgeons,  Ordnance 
Officers,  the  Commanding  General,  the  War  Department,  and  from  other 
sources.  The  Military  Railroads  have  utterly  failed  to  furnish  trans 
portation  to  even  one-fifth  of  their  capacity,  when  managed  without  a 
strict  conformity  to  schedule  and  established  rules.  Punctuality  and 
discipline  are  even  more  important  to  the  operation  of  a  railroad,  than 
to  the  movements  of  an  army,  and  they  are  vital  in  both. 

If  all  cars,  on  their  arrival  at  a  depot,  are  immediately  loaded  or 
unloaded  and  returned,  and  trains  are  run  to  schedule,  a  single  track 
road,  in  good  order  and  properly  equipped,  may  supply  an  army  of  200,- 
000  men,  when,  if  these  conditions  are  not  complied  with,  the  same  road 
will  not  supply  30,000. 

Let  it  be  understood  that  requisitions  for  cars  should  always  be 
made  with  sufficient  notice  through  the  Quartermaster,  and  to  the  Su 
perintendent  or  his  representatives,  the  agents  at  stations.  In  time  of 
action,  it  is  sometimes  necessary  to  suspend  the  use  of  the  road  for 
supply  trains,  and  hold  it  for  the  exclusive  use  of  ammunition.  Orders 
to  this  effect  must  come  from  the  Chief  Quartermaster  of  the  Army,  or 
the  Commanding  General,  to  the  Superintendent;  no  other  orders  will 
be  respected  by  him  which  conflict  with  the  regular  operation  of  the  road. 

Attention  is  directed  to  the  following  extracts  from  orders  of 
Major-General  Halleck,  addressed  to  myself: 

"No  military  officer  will  give  any  orders  to  your  subordinates  except 
through  you,  nor  will  any  of  them  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  running 
of  the  trains. 

"In  case  of  an  attack  upon  the  road,  you  will  consult  the  com 
mander  of  the  nearest  forces. 

"The  railroad  is  entirely  under  your  control.  No  military  officer 
has  any  right  to  interfere  with  it.  Your  orders  are  supreme." 

While  no  officer  has  any  right  to  interfere  with  or  interrupt  the 
regular  business  of  the  road,  by  detaining  trains  or  otherwise,  employes 
will  be  expected  to  comply  with  every  reasonable  request  of  officers,  when 
not  incompatible  with  prescribed  duty,  and  answer  questions  with  civ 
ility. 

To  avoid  unnecessary  interruption  to  answer  questions  in  regard  to 
the  time  of  starting  trains,  a  clock  should  be  conspicuously  placed  at 
each  station,  and  several  notices  posted  giving  the  necessary  information. 

The  aides  of  the  Commanding  General  and  the  train  dispatcher 
can  be  admitted  to  the  telegraph  offices;  all  others  must  be  excluded. 
As  messages  are  read  by  sound,  no  loud  conversation  can  be  permitted. 
Officers  and  soldiers  crowding  into  telegraph  offices  have  been  a  source 
of  serious  annoyance.  In  all  such  cases,  operators  will  seek  the  protec 
tion  of  the  Provost  Marshal  and  ask  for  a  guard. 

H.  HAUPT, 

Brigadier-General, 

Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation, 
United  States  Military  Railroads. 


174  REMINISCENCES   OF 

A  few  days  before  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  a  gentleman 
called  at  my  office  and  announced  his  name  as  Rev.  Alexander 
Reed,  General  Agent  of  the  Christian  Commission.  He  stated 
that  some  carloads  of  hospital  supplies  had  been  sent  to  the  front, 
and  that  it  was  a  matter  of  the  greatest  importance  that  he  should 
attend  to  the  distribution,  or  all  would  be  lost ;  that  he  had  applied 
for  a  pass  to  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  General  Hal- 
leek  and  to  the  Military  Governor  of  Washington,  but  he  had  been 
refused,  as  all  passes  had  been  prohibited,  and  no  exception  would 
be  made,  however  urgent  the  necessity.  He  wished  to  know  if  I 
could  not  give  him  a  pass. 

I  asked  him  how  he  expected  to  get  a  pass  from  me  when  my 
superiors  had  positively  refused  him.  He  did  not  know,  but  hoped 
that  some  way  could  be  discovered,  as  the  stores  were  very  valuable, 
and  if  lost,  the  Christian  Commission  would  be  discouraged  from 
future  efforts.  I  appreciated  the  situation,  and  turning  to  my 
desk  wrote  a  few  lines : 

"Alexander  Reed  is  hereby  appointed  brakeman  in  the  service  of 
the  Military  Railroad  Department,  and  will  enter  upon  his  duties  forth 
with.  He  is  directed  to  report  without  delay  at  Falmouth.  He  will  be 
furnished  transportation  by  boat  and  rail,  and  this  order  will  be  recog 
nized  as  a  pass  by  all  guards." 

I  handed  the  note  to  the  reverend  gentleman,  who  seemed 
puzzled,  and  asked  what  it  meant,  saying  that  he  did  not  under 
stand  the  duties  of  brakeman.  I  replied:  "It  means  that  in 
no  other  capacity  can  I  send  you  to  the  front.  When  you  get  to 
Falmouth,  if  you  do  not  like  the  service  you  can  resign." 

Some  years  after  the  war  I  attended  evening  service  at  the 
First  Presbyterian  Church  at  Pittsburg.  The  pastor,  Rev.  Will 
iam  Paxton,  D.D.,  was  .an  old  acquaintance.  The  pulpit  was  filled 
that  evening  by  Rev.  Alexander  Reed.  After  service  I  remained 
to  have  some  conversation  with  the  pastor,  who  introduced  his 
friend,  Dr.  Reed. 

I  remarked  that  I  had  met  the  gentleman  before.  Dr.  Reed 
looked  at  me  with  some  surprise  and  said  that  he  was  not  aware 
that  he  had  ever  had  the  pleasure  of  meeting  me  previously. 

I  replied:  "Perhaps  you  are  ashamed  to  acknowledge  that 
you  once  held  the  position  of  brakeman  on  a  Military  Railroad." 
This  recalled  the  incident,  which  was  related,  much  to  the  amuse 
ment  of  my  friend. 

This  recalls  another  incident,  which  illustrates  the  annoy 
ances  caused  by  ladies  who  would  sometimes  get  passes  to  meet 
their  husbands  before  an  expected  engagement.  During  McDow 
ell's  forced  march  to  Front  Royal,  I  had  ordered  several  trains  of 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  175 

supplies,  expected  to  arrive  during  the  night  at  Rectortown,  to 
move  forward  four  miles  to  Piedmont  by  daylight.  I  was  waiting 
at  Piedmont  for  them,  but  as  they  did  not  arrive,  I  walked  towards 
Rectortown  to  meet  them.  I  did  not  find  them  until  that  station 
was  reached,  where  they  were  still  standing  on  the  track. 

I  asked  the  conductor  why  he  had  not  obeyed  orders,  and  was 
told  that  the  wife  of  a  prominent  officer  had  been  a  passenger  on 
the  train  and  had  gone  to  a  farmhouse  to  seek  accommodations  for 
the  night.  I  ordered  him  to  start  at  once,  but  just  then  an  elegant 
ly  dressed  lady  came  tripping  across  the  field  to  take  her  place  in 
one  of  the  cars.  I  did  not  display  extra  gallantry  on  the  occasion, 
nor  even  offer  the  lady  assistance.  She  had  detained  four  trains 
for  three  hours  during  a  period  of  urgency,  and  I  was  not  in  an 
amiable  mood. 


CHAPTEK  VIII. 

BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 

O^T  December  11,  I  received  a  telegram  at  Washington  from 
General  J.  G.  Parke,  Chief  of  Staff:     "Our  troops  now 
occupy  Fredericksburg.     The  bridge  material  can  now  be  forward 
ed  as  rapidly  as  possible."     I  sent  the  following  at  once : 

WASHINGTON,  December  11,  1862. 
W.  W.  Wright,  Acquia  Greek: 

I  leave  here  to-morrow  morning  for  Acquia  Creek.  Make  all  pos 
sible  preparations  for  the  immediate  construction  of  the  bridge  on  the 
Rappahannock.  TT  TTATJPT 

Wright  was  also  instructed  to  load  the  cars  and  send  them  up 
that  night  and  have  E.  C.  Smeed  in  readiness  to  commence  the 
bridge  at  daylight. 

I  reached  Falmouth  on  the  12th,  and  secured  from  General 
/  Burnside  a  detail  of  200  men  to  assist  in  building  the  railroad 
bridge  across  the  Rappahannock  on  the  morning  of  December  13, 
but  as  soon  as  the  fight  commenced  the  soldiers  all  deserted  and 
went  to  a  neighboring  hill  overlooking  the  city,  from  which  they 
could  make  observations. 

Leaving  Smeed  and  his  civilians  at  work,  I  repaired  to  the 
Headquarters  of  General  Burnside  to  report  the  situation  and  ask 
for  more  men  to  replace  the  deserters,  but  he  replied  that  no  more 
could  be  spared. 

I  then  returned  to  the  bridge  and  found  it  deserted.  ~Not  a 
human  being  was  in  sight  in  that  vicinity. 

I  walked  out  to  the  end  of  the  bridge,  but  could  see  no  one.  I 
returned  to  the  cut  at  the  end  of  the  embankment,  where  I  found 
my  foreman  behind  a  tree  watching  the  fight  across  the  river. 

He  explained  that  the  ropes  had  been  cut  and  the  pulleys 
broken  by  the  shells  and  that,  as  no  work  could  be  done,  he  and  his 
men  had  followed  the  example  of  the  soldiers,  and  skedaddled  to 
the  woods. 

I  told  him  it  was  all  right;  that  civilians  should  not  be  ex 
pected  to  work  under  fire  when  nothing  could  be  accomplished  by 
it,  and»I  then  returned  to  Burnside's  Headquarters,  where  I  re- 

176 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  Ill 

mained  in  the  room  with  him  all  day,  looking  from  a  window  over 
the  battlefield  and  listening  to  reports  as  they  came  in. 

The  next  day  I  returned  to  Washington,  where  I  met  Hon. 
John  Covode,  of  Pennsylvania,  and  he  went  with  me  to  see  the 
President  at  about  9  P.  M.  The  President  was  much  interested  in 
the  report,  and  asked  me  to  walk  with  him  to  General  Halleck7  s 
quarters,  then  on  I  street,  between  15th  and  16th  streets.  When 
we  arrived  he  requested  Covode  and  others  present  to  step  into  the 
next  room,  as  he  desired  a  private  conference,  and  then  asked  me 
to  repeat  the  substance  of  my  report  to  him,  which  I  did. 

On  its  conclusion,  the  President  asked  General  Halleck  to 
telegraph  orders  to  General  Burnside  to  withdraw  his  army  to  the 
north  side  of  the  river.  General  Halleck  rose  and  paced  the  room 
for  some  time,  and  then  stopped,  facing  the  President,  and  said  de 
cidedly  :  "I  will  do  no  such  thing.  If  we  were  personally  present 
and  knew  the  exact  situation,  we  might  assume  such  responsibility. 
If  such  orders  are  issued,  you  must  issue  them  yourself.  I  hold 
that  a  General  in  command  of  an  army  in  the  field  is  the  best  judge 
of  existing  conditions." 

The  President  made  no  reply,  but  seemed  much  troubled.  I 
then  remarked  that  I  did  not  consider  the  situation  as  critical  as 
the  President  imagined  it  to  be,  and  proceeded  to  describe  more  in 
detail  the  topographical  configuration.  There  was  a  low  flat,  or 
plateau,  near  the  river  on  which  our  troops  were  massed.  Above 
this  was  a  second  more  extensive  plateau,  on  which  the  city  was 
built,  which  completely  masked  the  position  of  our  army.  Beyond 
this  the  ground  rose  gradually  to  Marye's  Heights,  where  the 
enemy's  batteries  were  posted.  Our  bridges  could  not  be  enfiladed 
by  the  batteries,  and  no  attempt  could  be  made  to  fire  upon  our 
troops  without  destroying  the  town,  filled  as  it  was  with  citizens, 
which  the  enemy  would  not  attempt  to  do.  I  expressed  a  confident 
opinion  that  Burnside  would  withdraw  his  forces  during  the  night, 
and  that  he  could  do  it  without  loss  or  interference,  and  he  did. 

When  I  finished,  the  President  sighed  and  said :  "What  you 
say  gives  me  a  great  many  grains  of  comfort." 

The  position  General  Halleck  took  on  this  occasion  is  one 
which,  so  far  as  my  knowledge  extends,  he  always  maintained.  He 
has  been  charged  repeatedly  with  interference.  It  is  an  error.  He 
would  indicate  to  the  commander  of  an  army  the  objects  to  be 
accomplished,  but  would  leave  him  untrammelled  as  far  as  details 
were  concerned. 

After  the  interview  with  the  President  and  General  Halleck, 
I  made  arrangements  to  return  to  Burnside's  Headquarters.     It 
was  expected  that  another  forward  movement  would  soon  be  at 
tempted,  and,  if  successful,  that  a  very  rapid  advance  towards 
10 


178  REMINISCENCES   OF 

Richmond  would  be  made,  requiring  an  expeditious  reconstruction 
of  the  railroad  and  bridges,  if  the  enemy  in  their  retreat  should 
destroy  them.  I  had  a  profile  of  the  line  and  knew  the  dimensions 
of  all  the  bridges,  so  that  I  had  a  clear  idea  of  the  work  to  be  ac 
complished.  On  the  14th  the  following  dispatch  was  sent  to  Gen 
eral  Burnside  : 

WASHINGTON,  December  14,  1862. 
Major-General  Burnside: 

I  am  using  my  best  exertions  to  procure  civilians  to  work  on 
wharves  and  bridges,  but  they  are  gathered  slowly. 

General  Halleck  does  not  much  favor  my  idea  of  forming  a  Con 
struction  and  Transportation  Corps  of,  say  500  civilians,  for  our  work. 
He  thinks  that  the  Engineer  troops,  who  have  been  enlisted  and  receive 
double  pay  for  this  particular  duty,  should  attend  to  it. 

If  one  of  the  Engineer  regiments  were  placed  under  my  orders,  as 
a  permanent  detail,  I  could  get  them  in  time  organized,  drilled,  and 
made  efficient  for  bridge  purposes,  provided  I  could  pick  them  and  get 
rid  of  the  drones  ;  but  civilians  would  be  preferable. 

If  we  get  possession  of  the  line  beyond  Fredericksburg,  all  the 
bridges  should  be  started  at  once.  They  should  be  reconstructed  of 
sticks  cut  in  the  woods  and  hauled  by  oxen.  No  dependence  should  be 
placed  in  the  railroad  for  the  transportation  of  material  for  them.  I 
have  ordered  200  oxen  with  yokes  to  be  in  readiness.  Colonel  Ingalls 
should  provide  ox  chains  and  wheels,  say  30  pairs,  and  2,000  men  can  b*» 
employed  and  should  be  ready.  The  Engineer  brigades  can  alone  furnish 
this  force  in  time.  I  leave  to  return  to-night.  - 


^Notwithstanding  the  assurances  of  General  Burnside  that  the 
regular  transportation  should  not  be  interfered  with,  he  would  fre 
quently  telegraph  the  Superintendent  to  hold  a  train  for  his  accom 
modation,  and  then  compel  it  to  wait  for  several  hours  until  he 
made  his  appearance.  This  caused  an  abandonment  of  the  sched 
ule,  and  threw  all  the  trains  into  confusion. 

As  a  remedy  I  ordered  that  an  engine,  under  steam,  should  be 
kept  constantly  at  Falmouth  subject  to  the  General's  orders.  On 
one  occasion  a  train  had  become  derailed,  and  the  special  engine 
had  been  sent  to  render  assistance.  While  absent  on  this  service 
and,  impatient  of  delay,  General  Burnside  walked  down  the  road 
to  meet  it.  As  it  was  night,  the  engineer  did  not  recognize  him 
and  passed  him  on  the  way,  then  returned,  took  him  up  and  carried 
him  to  Acquia  Creek. 

Upon  entering  the  office  in  an  irate  mood,  he  demanded  of  the 
Superintendent  why  he  had  disobeyed  his  orders.  Wright  handed 
him  my  telegram,  saying  :  "Here  are  my  instructions,"  upon  read 
ing  which  the  General  turned  on  his  heel  with  the  remark  :  "This 
is  a  nice  condition  of  things  if  the  General  in  command  of  an  army 
can  be  snubbed  by  a  brigadier."  The  General  knew  that  the  action 
was  proper,  and  did  not  allude  to  it  in  any  of  our  subsequent  inter 
views. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  179 

On  receiving  the  report  of  the  Superintendent  concerning  this 
incident,  the  following  answer  was  returned : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  January  24,  1863. 
Wm.  W.  Wright,  Superintendent  R.,  F.  &  P.  R.  R. 

DEAR  SIR:  Your  communication  of  yesterday,  enclosing  fourteen 
telegrams  on  the  subject  of  the  delay  of  a  special  train  ordered  for  the 
accommodation  of  General  Burnside,  was  received  by  messenger  to-day. 
You  report  the  fact  that  when  a  special  train  is  required  at  a  particular 
hour,  the  party  is  not  always,  and  not  even  generally,  ready  to  use  it  at 
that  hour ;  that  in  the  case  referred  to  the  train  was  ordered  at  9 :30  p.  M., 
and  the  General  did  not  arrive  until  11:10  P.  M.  at  the  Falmouth  depot; 
that  an  accident  having  occurred  which  blocked  the  road  at  Stoneman's, 
the  engine  of  the  special  train  was  sent  to  clear  it,  and  being  away  when 
General  Burnside  arrived,  was  the  cause  of  much  dissatisfaction. 

You  ask  for  instructions  to  govern  your  action  in  future  cases  that 
may  occur,  and  desire  to  be  informed  whether  the  track  is  to  be  kept 
clear  for  a  special  train  and  all  other  business  suspended  until  it  has 
passed. 

I  answer  unhesitatingly,  no.  The  regular  and  most  important 
duty  of  the  railroads  is  to  forward  supplies  to  the  army.  To  accomplish 
this,  the  most  indispensable  requisite  is  exact  punctuality  in  running 
schedule  trains.  Every  Superintendent  knows  this,  but  no  one  but  the 
Superintendent  of  a  Military  Railroad  can  appreciate  it  to  its  full  ex 
tent,  or  realize  the  difficulties  which  do  not  exist  elsewhere. 

General  Burnside  is  one  of  the  most  reasonable  and  practical 
men  I  have  ever  met,  and  he  will  not  expect  impossibilities.  He  does 
not,  with  the  multiplicity  of  his  own  duties,  understand  yours.  All  you 
have  to  do  is  to  conform  to  the  established  rules,  furnish  extras  when 
ever  General  Burnside  orders  them,  if  it  is  in  your  power  to  do  so,  but 
extras  must  keep  out  of  the  way  of  schedule  trains,  unless  the  Command 
ing  General  expressly  orders  all  other  business  which  conflicts  with  the 
special  to  be  stopped.  If  this  is  done,  obey  the  order  and  straighten  out 
the  confusion  which  will  ensue  as  soon  as  you  can.  The  responsibility 
of  failure  elsewhere  in  consequence  of  it  will  not  rest  with  you;  you  will 
have  your  record  straight. 

Your  action,  as  exhibited  by  the  communication  forwarded  and 
accompanying  telegrams,  is  approved. 

Yours  respectfully,  H.  HAUPT, 

Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation. 

The  forward  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under 
General  Burnside  was  not  made.  Nothing  more  of  importance 
occurred  in  connection  with  Military  Railroad  operations  while  he 
continued  in  command.  The  army  had  been  at  all  times  well  sup 
plied,  and  the  plan  of  transferring  loaded  cars  from  Alexandria  to 
Acquia  Creek  by  water  had  been  a  great  success.  It  required  but 
about  an  hour  to  transfer  trains  of  cars  from  the  track  to  floats,  and 
the  same  from  floats  to  track,  and  no  accident  ever  occurred  in  the 
transfer. 

The  time  for  towage  between  landings  was  about  six  hours. 
To  have  transported  the  contents  of  a  train  from  the  Alexandria 


180  REMINISCENCES   OF 

Railroad  to  Falmouth  would  have  required  nearly  200  wagons 
from  four  to  six  days,  dependent  upon  the  condition  of  the  roads, 
and  the  saving  in  expense  as  compared  with  water  transportation 
by  means  of  transports  was  nearly  $3,000  per  day  on  the  supplies 
transferred. 

The  plans  of  General  Burnside  did  not  meet  the  cordial  ap 
proval  of  the  President  and  General  Halleck,  and  their  assent  was 
given  with  reluctance.  In  the  letter  of  the  President  to  General 
McClellan,  of  October  13,  1862,  a  copy  of  which  was  sent  to  Gen 
eral  Burnside  with  request  for  careful  consideration  preparatory 
to  the  visit  of  Generals  Halleck,  Meigs  and  myself,  on  November 
12,  the  program  that  was  considered  most  satisfactory  was  clearly 
defined. 

It  was  stated  that  the  army  could  march  on  interior  lines  cov 
ering  Washington  and  the  line  of  communication,  while  the  enemy 
must  take  a  more  circuitous  and  longer  route  to  reach  either 
Fredericksburg  or  Eichmond ;  that,  of  the  several  routes  presented, 
he  was  recommended  to  take  that  which  was  nearest  to  the  enemy, 
so  as  to  operate  on  his  communications,  keep  fully  advised  of  his 
movements,  and  strike  whenever  opportunity  offered. 

This  plan,  if  followed,  would  have  taken  the  army  to  Freder 
icksburg  on  the  south  side  of  the  Rappahannock  instead  of  to  Fal 
mouth  on  the  north  side,  and,  with  a  few  bridges,  the  communica 
tion  with  Acquia  Creek  would  have  been  the  same. 

Had  the  movement  been  made,  Lee  could  not  have  occupied 
Fredericksburg,  and  the  battle  would  have  been  fought  at  some 
point  between  Fredericksburg  and  Richmond. 

What  General  Burnside's  reasons  were  for  departing  from 
this  plan  of  operation,  I  never  knew.  Perhaps  he  thought  it  safer 
to  move  with  the  river  between  his  forces  and  those  of  the  enemy ; 
but  even  then,  if  he  had  moved  quickly  and  occupied  Fredericks 
burg  before  Lee,  the  reverses  at  that  point  would  not  have  been  ex 
perienced. 

The  assault  upon  Marye's  Heights  in  the  center  was  a  mis 
take,  and  inexcusable  on  the  supposition  that  General  Burnside 
had  any  idea  of  the  strength  of  the  position. 

I  had  an  opportunity  of  examining  the  ground  afterwards, 
and  never  saw  a  stronger  natural  position.  It  was  almost  as  im 
pregnable  as  a  permanent  fortification  on  the  most  approved  plans 
of  Vaubon.  A  road  ran  in  front  of  Marye's  house,  parallel  to  the 
river.  On  the  river  side  was  a  stone  wall,  the  top  of  which  was 
level  with  the  ground  in  front  of  it,  which  sloped  gently  towards 
the  town  and  river  like  the  glacis  of  a  permanent  fortification. 
Immediately  in  rear  were  high  hills,  with  projecting  salients 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  183 

like  bastions,  on  which  batteries  were  placed  commanding  the 
whole  plain  in  front,  with  cross  fire  in  all  directions.  The  road 
was  filled  with  rebel  troops  perfectly  protected;  they  could  stoop 
to  load,  then  rise  and  fire  without  exposure.  An  assaulting  column 
had  no  chance.  It  was  as  hopeless  as  the  Balaklava  charge  in  the 
Crimea. 

From  the  window  in  Burnside's  room  I  could,  with  a  field 
glass,  see  our  columns  move  to  the  attack,  then  the  smoke  of  battle 
would  obscure  everything.  When  it  cleared  away,  our  forces  were 
found  driven  back  and  the  ground  strewn  with  dead  and  wounded. 


CHAPTEK  IX. 

OPENING  OPERATIONS  UNDER  GENERAL 
HOOKER. 

THE  following  characteristic  letter  from  the  President  to  Gen 
eral  Joseph  Hooker  was  sent  on  the  day  upon  which  he  was 
placed  in  command  to  succeed  General  Burnside : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  January  26,  1863. 
Major-General  Hooker. 

GENERAL:  I  have  placed  you  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  Of  course,  I  have  done  this  upon  what  appears  to  me  to  be 
sufficient  reasons,  and  yet  I  think  it  best  for  you  to  know  that  there  are 
some  things  in  regard  to  which  I  am  not  quite  satisfied  with  you.  I  be 
lieve  you  to  be  a  brave  and  skilful  soldier,  which,  of  course,  I  like.  I 
also  believe  you  do  not  mix  politics  with  your  profession,  in  which  you 
are  right.  You  have  confidence  in  yourself,  which  is  a  valuable,  if  not 
an  indispensable  quality.  You  are  ambitious,  which,  with  reasonable 
bounds,  does  good  rather  than  harm;  but  I  think  that  during  General 
Burnside's  command  of  the  army  you  have  taken  counsel  of  your  ambi 
tion  and  thwarted  him  as  much  as  you  could,  in  which  you  did  a  great 
wrong  to  the  country  and  to  a  most  meritorious  and  honorable  brother 
officer. 

I  have  heard  in  such  a  way  as  I  believe  it,  of  your  recently  saying 
that  both  the  army  and  the  Government  needed  a  dictator.  Of  course, 
it  was  not  for  this,  but  in  spite  of  it,  that  I  have  given  you  the  command. 
Only  those  Generals  who  gain  success  can  set  up  dictators.  What  I  now 
ask  of  you  is  military  success,  and  I  will  risk  the  dictatorship. 

The  Government  will  support  you  to  the  extent  of  its  ability,  which 
is  neither  more  nor  less  than  it  has  done  and  will  do  to  all  commanders. 

I  much  fear  that  the  spirit  which  you  have  aided  to  infuse  into- 
the  army,  of  criticising  their  commanders  and  withholding  confidence 
from  them,  will  now  turn  upon  you.  I  shall  assist  you,  as  far  as  I  can, 
to  put  it  down.  Neither  you,  nor  Napoleon,  if  he  was  alive  again,  could 
get  any  good  out  of  an  army  while  such  a  spirit  prevails  in  it.  And 
now  beware  of  rashness.  Beware  of  rashness,  but  with  energy  and  sleep 
less  vigilance  go  forward  and  give  us  victories. 

Yours  very  truly,  A.  LINCOLN. 

On  his  assuming  command  of  the  army,  I  addressed  the  fol 
lowing  letter  to  General  Hooker : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  January  27,  1863. 
Major-General  Hooker,  Commander  of  the  Army  of  Potomac. 

GENERAL:  Allow  me  to  offer  my  sincere  congratulations  on  your 
elevation  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  to  express 

184 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  185 

the  hope  that  your  administration  of  affairs  will  secure  for  our  arms  the 
success  to  which  the  justice  of  the  cause  entitles  them. 

It  will  be  my  effort,  so  far  as  the  Department  of  Military  Railroads 
is  concerned,  to  cooperate  efficiently  in  your  movements,  and  I  am  well 
aware  that  the  success  or  failure  of  a  movement  is  often  a  question  of 
prompt  supply. 

In  assuming  the  duties  of  Commander-in-Chief,  it  is  proper  that 
you  should  know  the  conditions  essential  to  the  efficient  operation  of  the 
Military  Railroads. 

The  difficulties  connected  with  the  operation  of  Military  Railroads 
are  innumerable;  yet  with  the  cordial  support  which  I  have  always  re 
ceived  from  General  Halleck  and  from  McDowell,  McClellan,  Pope  and 
Burnside,  the  army,  since  my  connection  with  it,  I  believe,  never  suffered 
from  a  deficiency  of  any  supplies  dependent  upon  the  transportation 
which  they  could  furnish. 

To  insure  regularity  in  supplies,  regularity  in  running  trains  and 
prompt  loading  and  unloading  of  cars  are  indispensable.  As  far  as  prac 
ticable,  all  business  should  be  done  by  regular  schedule  trains,  and  no 
regular  schedule  train  should,  from  any  cause,  be  detained  a  minute,  un 
less  from  accident.  The  Superintendent  has  orders  to  furnish  an  extra  to 
the  Commanding  General  whenever  it  is  in  his  power  to  do  so,  but  extras 
must  keep  out  of  the  way  of  schedule  trains,  and  extras  should  only  be 
called  for  when  an  urgent  necessity  requires  them. 

The  existing  organization  and  arrangements  work  very  satisfac 
torily.  J.  H.  Devereux  is  Superintendent  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
Railroad;  William  W.  Wright,  Superintendent  of  the  Fredericksburg 
Railroad ;  Adna  Anderson,  engineer  of  construction  on  both  roads.  I  have 
directed  Mr.  Anderson,  who  is  a  very  efficient  and  experienced  civil  engi 
neer,  to  report  to  you  and  keep  you  advised  of  his  whereabouts,  so  that, 
in  the  event  of  any  movement,  you  can  communicate  with  him.  Colonel 
McCallum  attends  to  the  routine  and  red-tape  business  of  the  Depart 
ment. 

For  myself,  I  am  generally  present  when  active  operations  are  in 
progress,  organizing  and  directing  where  my  presence  seems  essential. 

I  may  be  absent  for  some  weeks  during  the  present  session  of  the 
Massachusetts  Legislature,  but  my  arrangements  are  such  that  nothing 
will  suffer  in  my  absence.  In  everything  pertaining  to  railroad  trans 
portation  consult  with  or  direct  Mr.  Wright,  and  in  all  that  pertains  to 
construction,  Mr.  Anderson. 

Assured  that  in  all  my  efforts  to  continue  or  increase  the  efficiency 
of  the  Railway  Department  I  will  receive  your  cordial  cooperation,  I  re 
main,  •  Yours  very  respectfully, 

H.  HAUPT, 
Chief  of  Construction  and  Transportation. 

The  long  interval  from  January  26,  1863,  when  General 
Hooker  took  command,  until  May,  1863,  was  a  period  of  compar 
ative  inactivity  in  military  operations.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  v' 
was  encamped  on  the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock  opposite 
Fredericksburg,  and  supplies  were  forwarded  by  river  and  rail 
via  Acquia  Creek.  We  were  not  troubled  by  guerrilla  raids  or  mil 
itary  interference.  The  trains  were  run  with  regularity  by  sched 
ule,  and  the  telegraph  was  left  for  the  almost  exclusive  use  of  the 
military  authorities. 


REMINISCENCES    OF 

The  Construction  Corps,  during  this  period,  was  not  idle, 
/    but  performed  services  of  great  value  in  perfecting  organization, 
procuring  material,  and  preparing  for  rapid  advance  movements 
whenever  they  should  be  ordered. 

A  large  number  of  bridge  trusses  were  prepared  in  spans  of 
60  feet  to  be  transported  on  flat  cars,  hauled  by  oxen  to  the  sites 
of  the  bridges,  and  hoisted  bodily  into  position  by  suitable  portable 
machinery.  These  trusses  were  cal]ed  "shadbellies"  by  the  work 
men  from  their  peculiar  shape. 

A  plan  was  also  designed  for  a  military  truss  bridge,  the  parts 
of  which  were  interchangeable,  and  which  could  be  put  together 
without  previous  fitting,  and  with  so  much  rapidity  that,  as  my 
foreman,  E.  C.  Smeed,  expressed  it,  he  could  put  the  bridge  to 
gether  about  as  fast  as  a  dog  could  trot. 

Torpedoes  were  also  prepared  for  blowing  down  bridges  in 
operating  on  the  communications  of  the  enemy.  These  torpedoes 
consisted  simply  of  an  iron  bolt  with  a  head  and  washer  of  such 
diameter  that  they  could  be  driven  easily  into  a  two-inch  auger- 
hole.  Between  the  head  and  the  washer  was  a  tin  case  8  inches 
long,  open  at  both  ends,  filled  with  powder.  Experiments  were 
made  in  blowing  up  trunks  of  trees  which  proved  their  efficiency, 
and  by  means  of  them  any  ordinary  wooden  bridge  could  be  thrown 
down  in  five  minutes. 

Other  experiments  were  made  on  old  sidings  near  Alexandria 
to  determine  the  best  mode  of  rapidly  destroying  tracks.  The 
usual  mode  adopted  by  the  enemy  had  been  to  tear  up  the  rails, 
pile  the  cross  ties,  place  the  rails  upon  them,  set  the  pile  on 
fire,  and  bend  the  rails  when  heated.  I  found  this  mode  en 
tirely  too  slow,  as  several  hours  were  required  to  heat  the  rails 
sufficiently  and,  when  bent,  we  could  generally  straighten  them  for 
use  in  a  few  minutes,  in  fact,  in  less  than  one-tenth  of  the  time 
required  to  heat  and  bend  them. 

We  had  been  experimenting  for  some  time  with  no  results 
that  I  considered  satisfactory,  when  one  day  Smeed  came  into  my 
office  with  a  couple  of  U-shaped  irons  in  his  hands  (see  illustration 
on  page  111)  and  exclaimed:  "I've  got  it!"  "Got  what?"  I 
asked.  "Got  the  thing  that  will  tear  up  track  as  quickly  as  you 
can  say  'Jack  Robinson/  and  spoil  the  rails  so  that  nothing  but 
a  rolling  mill  can  ever  repair  them." 

"That  is  just  what  I  want,"  was  my  reply;  "but  how  are 
you  to  do  it  with  that  pair  of  horseshoes  ?" 

He  explained  his  plan.  The  irons  were  turned  up  and  over 
at  the  ends  so  as  firmly  to  embrace  the  base  of  the  rail.  Into  the 
icavity  of  the  U  a  stout  lever  of  wood  was  to  be  inserted.  A 
rope  at  the  end  of  the  lever  would  allow  half  a  dozen  men  to  pull 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  187 

upon  it  and  twist  the  rail.  When  the  lever  was  pulled  down  to 
the  ground  and  held  there,  another  iron  was  to  be  placed  beside  it, 
and  another  twist  given,  then  the  first  iron  removed  and  the  process 
repeated  four  or  five  times  until  a  corkscrew  twist  was  given  to  the 
rail.  After  hearing  the  explanation,  I  said :  "I  think  it  will  do ; 
let  us  go  at  once  and  try  it."  Smeed's  plan  was  found  to  answer 
perfectly,  and  the  problem  of  the  simplest  and  quickest  mode 
of  destroying  track  was  satisfactorily  solved. 

The  photographic  department  in  connection  with  the  opera 
tions  of  the  Construction  Corps  was  of  great  value.  All  the 
more  important  operations  in  connection  with  the  construction  of 
bridges,  the  expedients  for  rapidly  crossing  streams,  the  de 
struction  of  track,  etc..  were  photographed  and  with  printed  ex 
planations  were  sent  to  heads  of  departments  and  to  Corps  com 
manders  wherever  our  armies  were  in  the  field.  Many  hundreds 
of  torpedoes  and  instruments  for  destroying  track  were  ordered 
and  prepared  at  the  Alexandria  shops,  but  we  had  more  work 
to  do  to  protect  and  restore  our  own  communications  than  in  oper 
ating  on  those  of  the  enemy. 

General  Burnside  told  me  that  he  once  paid  $3,000  to  have 
a  bridge  destroyed,  and  that  the  work  had  not  been  done  effect 
ually.  A  couple  of  the  bridge  torpedoes  would  have  saved  that 
expenditure. 

On  February  Y,  1863,  I  sent  a  letter  to  General  Hooker 
with  explanation  of  a  system  of  ferriage  by  means  of  blanket  boats,     \ 
accompanied  by  a  diagram  showing  mode  of  operation.     These 
boats  are  fairly  illustrated  by  the  photographs  reproduced  in  this 
volume. 


J 


CHAPTEK  X. 
IRREGULARITIES  IN  THE  WEST. 

DURING  the  late  winter  and  spring  lull  I  spent  some  time 
in  Massachusetts  attending  to  private  affairs. 

On  March  20,  at  Cambridge,  I  received  a  message  from  the 
Secretary  of  War  stating  that  he  wished  to  see  me  at  my  earliest 
'convenience.  I  returned  to  Washington,  and  on  the  24th  called 
upon  the  Secretary,  who  wished  to  know  the  condition  of  the  rail 
roads  used  for  Government  transportation  in  the  West  and  South 
west. 

I  replied  that  I  knew  nothing  about  them,  although  nominally 
in  charge  of  the  Military  Railroads  of  the  United  States. 

He  remarked  that  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  these  roads 
were  used  for  the  benefit  of  Jew  peddlers,  speculators,  contractors 
and  sutlers;  in  fact,  for  anything  and  everything  except  the 
legitimate  business  of  Government  transportation,  and  directed 
me  to  go  at  once  and  straighten  things  out. 

I  answered :  "I  will  do  so  cheerfully  if  I  have  the  requisite 
authority,  but  I  must  go  to  Headquarters,  see  General  Hooker 
and  leave  things  in  proper  shape  in  case  his  forward  movement 
should  be  made  before  my  return." 

On  returning  to  my  office,  I  drew  up  a  form  of  orders  defining 
the  duties  to  be  performed  and  giving  the  necessary  authority. 

The  Secretary  read  the  paper,  and  remarked  that  I  had  made 
it  pretty  strong.  I  replied  that  it  was  necessary;  there  was  no  use 
in  going  without  full  authority  to  act.  He  then  said:  "Leave 
it  with  me ;  I  will  think  it  over  for  a  day  or  two." 

I  then  went  to  Falmouth  to  see  General  Hooker,  and  in 
formed  him  that  the  Secretary  of  War  proposed  to  send  me  to 
the  West  to  straighten  out  the  Military  Railroads.  The  Gen 
eral  was  decidedly  opposed  to  any  such  movement ;  said  that  when 
he  made  his  advance  my  personal  presence  was  indispensable ;  he 
would  move  rapidly  and  trust  to  me  to  reconstruct  the  railroads 
and  bridges  and  keep  his  army  in  supplies,  and  my  absence 
would  possibly  render  his  campaign  a  failure. 

On  my  return  to  Washington,  the  Secretary  said  that  General 
Hooker  had  telegraphed  that  it  would  not  do  for  me  to  leave, 

188 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  189 

and  that  some  other  plan  must  be  adopted.     Then  the  following 
order  was  issued : 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  March  25,  1863. 

Ordered:  That  Brigadier-General  H.  Haupt,  Superintendent  of 
Railroads,  cause  an  inspection  to  be  made  of  the  condition  of  the  rail 
road  transportation  service  where  the  armies  of  the  United  States  are 
operating  in  the  Western  States,  and  make  a  report  to  this  Department 
upon  all  points  relating  thereto,  material  to  the  service,  with  such  recom 
mendations  as  may  be  necessary  to  promote  the  efficiency  and  economy 
of  the  transporting  service.  He  may  designate  to  this  Department,  for 
approval,  the  names  of  the  persons  to  whom  he  proposes  to  commit  this 
inspection. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

In  compliance  with  these  instructions,  I  appointed  F.  H. 
Forbes,  of  Massachusetts,  a  gentleman  whose  long  training  as  a 
newspaper  reporter  admirably  fitted  him  to  act  as  a  detective 
and  find  out  things,  and  I  knew  that  his  personal  relations  to 
me  were  such  that  I  could  depend  upon  him. 

I  wrote  out  full  detailed  instructions  for  the  Special  Agent, 
had  them  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  orders  given  to 
all  officers  to  furnish  any  information  called  for. 

An  order  was  also  issued  by  Quartermaster-General  M.  C. 
Meigs,  as  follows : 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  April  23,  1863. 

Officers  and  agents  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department  will  furnish 
information  called  for  by  F.  H.  Forbes,  Special  Agent  in  the  Department 
of  United  States  Military  Railroads,  under  the  instructions  of  Briga 
dier-General  Haupt  of  21st  April,  1863,  approved  by  the  Secretary  of 
War. 

Necessary  transportation  will  be  furnished  to  enable  Mr.  Forbes 
to  visit  the  several  roads  in  charge  of  the  War  Department,  and  every 
facility  will  be  afforded  to  him  for  accomplishing  the  object  of  his  mis 
sion — a  general  inspection  of  the  Military  Railroads. 

M.  C.  MEIGS, 
Quartermaster  General. 

Reports  were  made  by  the  Special  Agent,  as  directed,  at  short 
intervals.  These  reports  indicated  the  existence  of  as  widespread 
corruption  as  the  Secretary  had  intimated.  Steamboats  were  de 
tained  at  landings  under  pretense  that  they  were  required  for  I/ 
Government  use,  and  then  released  upon  payment  of  a  liberal 
sum  of  money.  Property  was  sold  and  the  proceeds  appropriated 
by  the  sutlers;  forage  and  hardtack  were  exposed  to  the  weather 
without  protection,  and,  when  condemned,  new  supplies  ordered 
for  the  benefit  of  contractors. 

Some  large  game  was  hit  in  these  reports,  and  I  had  letters 
of  remonstrance  from  parties  who  wished  me  to  suppress  the 


190  REMINISCENCES    OF 

reports.  I  replied  that  the  reports  must  go  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  but  if  they  wished  to  make  any  denials  or  explanations  I 
would  forward  them.  Some  weeks  thereafter  the  Secretary  took 
a  trip  West,  and  on  his  return  removed  the  Special  Agent  and 
sent  him  home.  I  never  heard  in  what  manner  the  abuses  were 
corrected. 

Tt  was  a  frequent  remark  of  Confederates  that  our  army 
wasted  more  than  their  army  consumed,  and  there  appeared  to  be 
some  reason  for  the  assertion. 

On  one  occasion  two  contractors  were  captured  by  General 
Stuart.  Upon  interrogating  them  he  learned  that  they  had  made 
and  delivered  a  large  number  of  wagons  for  the  Government.  He 
offered  to  release  them  if  they  would  pledge  their  honor  to  do 
honest  work,  saying  that  the  United  States  Government  con 
tractors  were  relied  upon  to  supply  the  Confederate  army,  but  that 
most  of  the  wagons  were  so  badly  constructed  that  they  were  con 
stantly  breaking  down  and  making  trouble. 

The  exposed  condition  of  the  depot  grounds  at  Alexandria 
induced  me  to  ask  and  obtain  permission  from  General  Halleck 
to  construct  a  substantial  stockade,  enclosing  sixteen  squares. 

A  raid  by  two  or  three  hundred  cavalry  could  have  made 
an  attack  at  night  and  destroyed  the  buildings,  shops,  cars,  engines 
and  stores,  and  retired  without  damage  to  themselves. 

The  forts  were  so  distant  that  before  notice  could  be  given 
and  a  force  collected  the  damage  could  be  done,  and  the  eucmy 
escape. 

Our  men  took  much  pride  in  building  this  stockade  as  a  model 
to  show  the  engineer  troops,  as  they  said,  how  such  work  should 
be  done.  Straight  trees  were  selected,  nicely  pointed  on  top,  set 
three  or  four  feet  in  the  ground,  with  loop-holes  provided  at  short 
intervals.  In  the  middle  of  the  sides  and  at  the  corners  were 
projecting  bastions,  so  as  to  afford  a  flanking  fire  along  the  sides ; 
and  at  the  south  end,  commanding  the  road  by  which  the  enemy 
would  approach,  were  placed  pieces  of  artillery.  The  men  were 
provided  with  repeating  rifles,  and  so  divided  and  organized  as 
to  be  capable  of  very  efficient  defense. 

These  arrangements  did  not  appear  satisfactory  to  the  Gov 
ernment  engineers,  who  made  complaint  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  General  Haupt  had  constructed  a  line  of  interior  defenses 
that  was  an  interference  with  their  general  plans  for  the  defense 
of  the  capital.  (See  illustration,  page  299.) 

When  this  complaint  reached  me  through  the  circumlocu 
tion  office  with  a  number  of  indorsements,  I  added  one  more  in 
dorsement  to  the  effect  that  I  was  not  able  to  comprehend  how 
the  construction  of  a  fence  around  the  depot-grounds  of  Alex- 


POCKET  AUGKR  FOR  MAKING  MORTICES  AND  TENONS  FOR  BLANKET  BOATS. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  193 

andria  could  interfere  with  the  defenses  of  Washington,     ^"o  ac 
tion  was  taken  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

As  the  time  was  approaching  for  the  resumption  of  active 
operations,  I  gave  directions  to  Chief  Engineer  Anderson  to  have 
everything  in  readiness  for  rapid  reconstruction  of  roads  and 
bridges. 

"One  day  I  received  a  telegram  from  General  Hooker,  who 
wished  to  see  me  immediately.  I  started  at  once  in  a  little 
steamer,  reached  Acquia  at  daylight,  breakfasted  with  Wright  and 
then  ran  to  Ealmouth  on  an  engine,  reporting  to  General  Hooker 
as  he  was  going  to  breakfast.  He  asked  me  to  accompany  him, 
which  I  declined,  as  I  had  already  taken  my  morning  meal. 

He  then  handed  me  a  paper  to  read  over,  saying  that  it  con 
tained  his  plan  of  operations,  but  I  must  not  on  any  consideration 
open  my  lips  to  any  living  soul ;  that  even  the  members  of  his  staff 
did  not  know  what  his  plans  were,  and  would  not  know  until  the 
time  arrived  for  putting  them  in  execution;  he  had  left  them 
under  the  impression  that  a  very  different  movement  was  contem 
plated.  He  added  that  when  he  did  move  he  expected  to  ad 
vance  very  rapidly,  and  as  he  would  depend  upon  me  for  his  sup 
plies  I  had  a  very  important  duty  to  perform;  that  upon  its 
performance  success  or  failure  might  depend,  and  he  had  con 
cluded  to  advise  me  fully  so  that  I  might  make  the  necessary  prep 
arations. 

When  the  General  returned  from  breakfast  I  had  read  the 
papers,  and  told  him  we  would  be  ready.  ^ 

After  leaving  General  Hooker  I  determined  at  once  to  build 
a  new  bridge  across  the  Potomac  run.  One  of  the  Corps  com 
manders  had,  very  unwisely,  as  I  thought,  cut  down  all  the  timber 
in  the  valley  above  the  bridge,  which,  in  case  of  a  freshet,  would 
be  carried  against  the  bridge  and  sweep  away  the  trestle-work. 
I  therefore  gave  orders  to  E.  C.  Smeed  to  proceed  at  once  to  erect 
a  new  military  truss-bridge  in  spans  of  120  feet  resting  on  the 
stone  piers,  and  remove  the  old  bridge. 

As  soon  as  the  work  was  commenced  I  was  summoned  again 
by  General  Hooker,  who  wished  to  see  me  immediately. 

I  reported  at  Headquarters,  when  he  said  rather  excitedly: 
""I  understand  you  are  going  to  take  down  that  large  bridge  at 
Potomac  Creek  and  build  another." 

"Yes,  sir." 

"Well !  I  cannot  permit  it.  I  am  now  loading  my  wagons, 
and  cannot  allow  any  interruption  to  the  trains." 

I  rejoined:   "I  do  not  propose  to  interrupt  the  trains." 

"Why,  how  can  you  take  down  that  bridge  and  build  another 
without  stopping  transportation  for  some  days  at  least  ?" 


194  REMINISCENCES   OF 

I  said:  "General,  it  is  your  place  to  indicate  to  me  what 
you  wish  to  have  done,  and  mine  to  carry  out  your  wishes  in  such 
manner  as  will  best  secure  the  results  desired.  If  you  wish  a 
detailed  explanation,  I  will  make  it ;  but  I  say  to  you  noAV  that  the 
bridge  will,  before  you  are  ready  to  move,  be  replaced  by  a  more 
safe  and  substantial  structure,  and  not  a  single  train  will  be 
detained  for  a  single  hour." 

"Well !"  replied  the  General,  "if  you  say  so,  go  ahead ;  but 
I  don't  see  how  you  can  do  it."  His  chief  of  staff,  General  Butter- 
field,  echoed :  "And  I  don't  see  how  you  can  do  it.  either." 

The  new  bridge  was  erected  and  was  in  use  for  some  weeks 
before  the  forward  movement  commenced,  and  no  train  was  de 
layed  during  its  construction.  I  cannot  find  the  report  of  the 
time  required  in  its  erection,  but  my  impression  is  that  it  did  not 
exceed  three  or  four  days. 

On  April  11,  1863,  General  Hooker  informed  the  President 
that  he  proposed  to  turn  the  enemy's  position  to  his  (Hooker's) 
right,  and  sever  his  connections  with  Richmond  by  a  dragoon 
force. 

On  May  1,  1862,  General  Eutterfield  telegraphed  to  Hooker: 
"Sedgwick's  troops  are  now  advancing.  Haupt  is  ready  to  spring 
with  the  bridge." 

Lowe  reports,  from  balloon  observations,  "Long  trains  of 
enemy's  wagons  moving  to  the  right." 

On  May  2,  Sedgwick  was  directed  to  cross  the  river  as  soon 
as  indications  would  permit,  capture  Predericksburg,  and  pursue 
the  enemy. 

On  May  3,  Hooker  engaged  the  enemy  at  Chancellors ville 
and  was  wounded. 

Butterfield  telegraphed  to  Hooker  regrets  that  he  is  wounded, 
also,  "Haupt  is  at  Pal  mouth  with  his  force  ready  to  spring  with 
the  railroad  bridge  when  ordered.  Affairs  seem  to  justify  it  now 
here." 

On  May  3,  12:30  p.  M.,  Sedgwick  had  carried  the  heights; 
5  p.  M.,  Sedgwick's  advance  was  three  and  one-half  miles  from 
'Frederieksburg,  near  Guest's  house. 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  while  waiting  for  orders  to  com 
mence  the  bridge,  I  walked  over  the  battle-ground,  and  examined 
the  heights  beyond  Marye's  house.  I  then  realized  the  great 
strength  of  the  position  and  the  impossibility  of  taking  it,  if  prop 
erly  defended,  by  a  direct  assault  in  front,  as  had  been  attempted 
by  Burnside  with  disastrous  results.  My  photographic  artist, 
Captain  Russell,  was  with  me  and  secured  several  large  photo 
graphic  negatives — one  very  good  one  of  the  stone  wall,  with  the 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  195 

rebel  dead  lying  behind  it.     The  position  seemed  to  have  been 
taken  by  a  flank  movement.     (See  illustration,  page  307.) 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  the  enemy,  15,000  strong, 
re-entered  the  earthworks  south  of  Fredericksburg,  Gibbon  still 
holding  the  city. 

About  the  same  time,  in  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy 
had  resumed  possession  of  the  heights,  I  walked  out  with  Superin 
tendent  Wright  to  examine  a  pile  of  lumber  some  distance  beyond 
the  depot,  to  see  if  it  could  be  utilized  in  building  the  bridge.  A 
short  distance  beyond  was  a  fence  and  ditch,  lined  with  trees, 
behind  which  some  riflemen  were  firing  at  short  intervals,  but  I 
could  not  imagine  what  they  were  firing  at,  as  I  supposed  they  were 
our  own  men,  and  I  could  see  no  enemy  beyond.  On  returning 
leisurely  to  the  depot,  looking  at  the  dead  bodies  along  the  track 
and  wondering  why  they  had  not  been  buried,  I  asked  one  of  the 
soldiers,  sheltered  behind  a  building,  what  those  men  were  firing 
at. 

"Popping  at  us  when  we  shows  ourselves.     Them's  the  rebs." 

Wright  and  I  had  walked  into  a  trap  without  knowing  it,  but 
the  apparent  boldness  of  the  move  no  doubt  saved  us.     As  we  were 
not  in  uniform  it  was  probably  supposed  that  none  but  loyal  citi 
zens  of  Eredericksburg  would  approach  so  near  the  Confederate  ' 
lines. 

On  the  morning  of  May  5  the  President  was  notified  that 
Hooker  considered  it  expedient  to  retire  across  the  river,  so  that  I 
was  not  called  upon  to  build  the  bridge,  and  all  my  extensive  prep 
arations  for  a  forward  movement  were  rendered  useless. 

On  the  evening  of  May  4  I  was  notified  from  Hooker's  Head 
quarters  not  to  send  any  more  supplies  until  further  orders  and  to 
ask  protection  at  Acquia  in  case  of  necessity,  "though  we  trust  to 
fight  it  out  in  excellent  style  yet." 

May  4  I  received  a  communication  from  the  depot  Quarter 
master  at  Acquia,  notifying  me  that  the  first-class  steamer  John 
Brooks  had  been  specially  assigned  to  the  use  of  the  Railroad  and 
Construction  Department  for  the  purpose  of  removing  em 
ployes,  etc. 

I  was  much  surprised  at  this  courtesy,  as  I  had  just  indulged 
in  a  little  amusement  at  that"  officer's  expense.  Like  many  others 
who  had  been  appointed  from  civil  life,  he  seemed  to  have  a  high 
idea  of  the  importance  of  his  position  and  was  inclined  to  make 
others  recognize  it  by  issuing  orders.  He  had  made  complaint 
to  the  Department  at  Washington  that,  although  he  had  issued 
orders  that  all  steamers  landing  at  Acquia  should  come  to  his  office 
to  report,  yet  in  defiance  of  such  orders  and  in  violation  of  the 
courtesv  due  to  his  position,  the  steamers  detailed  in  the  service  of 


196  REMINISCENCES. 

the  Military  Railroad  Department  had  neglected  or  refused  to 
obey  such  orders. 

In  reply  I  stated  that  I  had  not  seen  the  orders  referred  to ; 
that  no  want  of  courtesy  to  the  distinguished  representative  of  the 
Quartermaster's  Department  was  intended;  that  without  raising 
any  question  as  to  his  rights,  or  my  duties,  I  would  cheerfully 
teoinply  with  any  reasonable  and  proper  regulations;  but  that, 
inasmuch  as  we  had  no  marine  railway  or  other  equivalent  facili 
ties  ;  as  the  office  was  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  landing, 
and  steamboats  were  not  furnished  with  organs  of  speech,  I  could 
not  comprehend  how  it  was  possible  for  said  steamers  to  go  to  the 
office  to  report.  The  captains  might  do  it,  and  if  it  was  the  wish 
of  the  Quartermaster,  I  would  °;ive  orders  accordingly. 

As  there  was  considerable  merriment  at  the  gentleman's 
expense,  I  was  not  prepared  to  expect  so  much  consideration  for 
our  safety  and  comfort  as  was  exhibited  in  placing  one  of  the 
largest  steamers  at  my  disposal.  I  did  not,  however,  consider  that 
there  was  the  slightest  danger.  The  landing,  as  previously  stated, 
was  a  long  distance  from  the  shore,  connected  by  a  straight  and 
narrow  railroad  track,  on  each  side  of  which  were  marshes  im 
passable  by  horse  or  foot.  There  were  two  gunboats  anchored  in 
the  stream,  and  the  track  could  easily  have  been  barricaded  if  any 
attack  had  been  apprehended.  The  tender  of  the  steamer  was  re 
spectfully  declined,  and  the  Quartermaster  requested  to  use  it  for 
other  more  necessary  purposes.  I  remained  on  shore  with  all  my 
force,  and  our  sleep  that  night  was  not  disturbed  by  apprehensions 
of  capture.  All  the  rest,  officers  and  men,  of  the  other  depart 
ments,  took  refuge  on  steamers. 

We  retained  the  position  at  Acquia  Creek  without  any  annoy 
ance  from  an  enemy  until  June  14,  when  orders  were  received 
to  abandon  the  post. 

In  three  days  from  the  receipt  of  these  orders  all  the  stores 
and  other  property  left  by  the  army,  together  with  all  railroad 
property  and  about  ten  or  twelve  thousand  sick  and  wounded  men 
V  from  the  hospitals,  amounting  in  all  to  over  500  car-loads,  were 
moved  to  the  landing  and  safely  loaded  on  vessels.  ISTo  railroad 
property  was  left  behind  or  destroyed.  Even  the  window  sashes 
were  taken  from  the  houses  and  brought  away. 

An  equally  successful  removal  of  supplies  could  have  been 
effected  on  the  occasion  of  the  former  evacuation  under  Burnside, 
if  an  opportunity  had  been  given  us,  but  there  seemed  to  be  no  de 
sire  at  that  time  to  save  property. 


CHAPTER  XL 
PORTABLE  TRACK-WRECKING  APPARATUS. 

IN"  order  that  the  entire  Union  army  might  have  the  benefit  dur 
ing  the  summer  and  future  campaigns  of  my  investigations,  I 
submitted  the  following  report  on  experiments  made  to  determine 
the  most  expeditious  mode  of  destroying  track  by  portable  appara 
tus,  with  a  view  to  operations  against  the  communications  of  the 
enemy : 

WASHINGTON,  May  16,  1863. 
Major-General  H.   W.  HallecTc,  General-in-Chief  of  the  Army  of  the 

United  States. 

GENERAL:  The  attempts  made  by  the  forces  of  the  United  States 
to  break  the  communications  of  the  enemy,  and  destroy  his  roads  and 
bridges,  have  not  been  as  numerous  as  the  interests  of  the  service  would  , 
seem  to  require ;  and,  when  made,  they  have  rarely  resulted  satisfactorily. 
The  communications  ineffectually  broken  have  been  restored  in  a  few 
hours,  and  no  serious  or  permanent  damage  has  been  inflicted. 

To  tear  up  the  track  of  a  railroad  is  a  very  difficult  operation  with 
any  implements  heretofore  known  or  used  which  cavalry  can  carry  with 
them  in  an  expedition.  The  claw  and  clevis  bars,  used  by  track  repairers 
for  drawing  spikes,  are  very  heavy;  they  could  not  be  carried  with  an 
expedition,  except  in  wagons,  and  no  portable  substitutes  have  ever  yet 
been  proposed. 

Even  when  track  is  torn  up,  if  the  cross-ties  are  not  burned  and 
the  rails  destroyed,  the  time  required  to  repair  is  less  than  is  necessary 
to  inflict  the  damage. 

The  enemy  have  been  more  successful  in  the  destruction  of  track 
than  our  own  troops,  but  their  success  has  been  the  work  of  time,  operat 
ing  on  their  own  territory,  without  fear  of  interruption.  On  the  Lou- 
doun  &  Hampshire  Railroad  the  ties  were  burned,  the  rails  heated  and 
bent  around  trees,  forming  sometimes  complete  circles ;  rails  so  damaged 
have  never  been  again  used. 

On  the  Richmond,  Fredericksburg  &  Potomac  Railroad  three  miles 
of  track  were  torn  up  in  April,  1862,  near  Acquia  Creek.  The  rails 
were  carried  south  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  the  ties  burned;  yet  it  re 
quired  but  three  days  for  the  Construction  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Rappahannock  to  cut  new  ties  and  reconstruct  the  track  with  new  iron 
brought  from  Alexandria. 

The  writer  has  been  engaged  during  the  last  week  in  prosecuting  a 
series  of  experiments,  with  a  view  to  determine  the  most  expeditious 
and  effectual  mode  of  destroying  a  railway  communication  by  the  use 
of  means  and  appliances  which  fulfill  the  essentially  important  condition 
of  portability. 

Rails  which  are  simply  bent  can,  with  the  use  of  levers  and  sledges,  y 
or,  still  better,  with  jack  screws,  be  straightened  so  as  to  permit  their 
11  197 


198  REMINISCENCES   OF 

use.  If  the  rails  are  twisted  spirally,  like  a  corkscrew  or  auger,  the  diffi 
culty  of  straightening  is  greatly  enhanced,  and  if  bent,  in  addition  to  the 
spiral  twist,  it  is  not  probable  that  any  attempt  would  ever  be  made  to  re 
pair  or  use  them. 

The  experiments  have  been  completely  successful,  and  have  resulted 
in  the  construction  of  apparatus  which  is  simple,  portable,  and  effica 
cious;  which  tears  up  track'in  one-sixth  of  the  time  required  to  construct 
it;  twists  and  bends  the  rails  so  as  to  render  them  entirely  unfit  for  use, 
and  does  it  all  in  a  cold  state,  without  the  delay  caused  by  heating. 

The  accompanying  series  of  photographs  will  illustrate  the  experi 
ments. 

The  illustrations  on  pages  111  and  121  represent  various  small  in 
struments  for  loosening  rails.  They  consist  of  steel  hooks,  provided  with 
sockets,  into  which  wooden  handles  are  inserted;  the  handles  may  be 
pieces  of  round  poles,  four  feet  long  and  three  inches  in  diameter  at 
the  larger  end.  These  hooks  are  designed  simply  to  force  back  the 
heads  of  the  spikes  without  extracting  them.  They  perform  the  work 
very  expeditiously;  about  four  spikes  in  a  minute  can  be  bent  back,  so 
as  to  unclasp  the  rail  and  permit  its  removal. 

The  chair  presents  the  greatest  difficulty  to  the  removal  of  the 
rail ;  the  spikes  which  pass  through  the  chairs  can  neither  be  forced  back 
nor  drawn  out  with  implements  which  are  effectual  when  applied  to  the 
intermediate  spikes. 

After  repeated  trials,  the  only  portable  contrivance  which  gave 
satisfactory  results  in  the  removal  of  the  chair,  consisted  of  two  socket 
wedges  of  iron,  with  wood  inserted  in  the  back.  These  wedges  should  be 
2%  inches  broad ;  they  are  driven  under  the  chair,  and  between  it  and  the 
tie,  by  means  of  axes.  The  time  required  to  remove  a  chair  from  a  hard, 
firm  tie,  if  the  intermediate  spikes  have  been  forced  back,  is  only  three 
minutes.  As  the  intermediate  spikes  can  be  unclasped  in  the  same  time 
by  other  hands,  four  men  can  remove  a  rail  in  three  minutes,  and  the  im 
plements  required  for  the  purpose  are  two  steel  hooks,  two  wedges  and 
two  axes. 

This  mode  of  removing  rails,  although  far  superior  to  any  known 
previous  to  the  commencement  of  the  experiments,  is  completely  eclipsed 
by  a  simple  and  portable  contrivance,  suggested  by  E.  C.  Srneed,  one  of 
the  most  efficient  officers  of  the  Construction  Corps.  The  contrivance 
consists  of  two  pieces  of  iron,  of  the  form  represented  in  illustration 
on  page  111.  They  are  placed  under  the  two  ends  of  the  rail,  as  in 
illustration  on  page  121;  le\ers,  11  or  12  feet  long  and  4^/2  or  5  inches 
diameter  at  the  larger  end,  are  inserted  in  the  irons,  when,  by  pulling 
on  the  levers,  the  whole  rail  is  ripped  from  its  fastening  in  less  than 
half  a  minute,  and  the  chair  is  broken. 

These  irons  weigh  about  6]/2  pounds ;  in  using  them  fence  rails  will 
answer  for  levers.  They  not  only  furnish  the  most  expeditious  mode  yet 
devised  of  tearing  up  track,  but  they  can  be  used  to  twist  the  rails 
spirally  in  a  cold  state.  To  accomplish  this  object  the  levers  should  be 
applied  at  one  end  of  the  rail,  the  other  end  remaining  in  the  chair ;  one 
lever  having  been  applied  and  bent  down  to  the  ground,  the  second  should 
be  attached  and  a  further  twist  given  as  far  as  the  lever  can  be  moved; 
then  a  fresh  hold  can  be  taken  with  the  first,  and  the  operation  continued 
until  the  twist  is  sufficient.  The  rail  can  then  be  bent  by  pulling  on  a 
rope  attached  to  the  loose  end,  and  afterwards  thrown  out  by  applying 
one  of  the  levers  to  the  end  which  had  remained  fastened. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  199 

If  the  rail  is  loose,  it  can  be  twisted  in  the  manner  represented  in 
illustration  on  page  131.  Illustration  on  page  121  shows  a  short  piece 
of  T  rail  that  has  been  twisted  cold  by  the  levers,  and  illustration  on 
page  131  a  short  U  rail,  which  is  more  difficult  to  twist  than  the  T 
pattern.* 

Experiments  were  made  to  determine  the  time  required  to  destroy 
rails  in  the  manner  which  has  usually  been  adopted  by  the  enemy,  which 
consists  in  heating  arid  bending.  Two  piles  of  ties  were  made,  one  of 
thirty-two  ties,  across  which  eight  rails  were  placed,  and  another  of  six 
teen  ties,  with  four  rails  laid  thereon.  The  fire  was  started  by  splitting 
two  of  the  ties  into  kindling  wood,  and  pouring  half  a  gallon  of  coal  oil 
on  each  of  the  piles.  (See  illustration  on  page  161.) 

Although  the  ties  were  not  wet,  the  fires  burned  so  slowly  that  in 
three  hours  the  rails  had  not  become  heated  to  any  considerable  extent. 
The  piles  were  then  left  until  the  next  morning,  when  they  were  found 
to  be  entirely  consumed,  but  the  rails  were  lying  on  the  ground  unin 
jured;  the  weight  of  the  projecting  ends  had  not  bent  the  rails. 

This  experiment  proves  that  burning  is  too  slow  a  process  to  be 
relied  upon  for  destroying  rails,  where  time  is  any  object;  and  that  in 
any  expedition  to  operate  on  the  communications  of  an  enemy,  such 
plans  must  be  adopted  as  will  permit  the  rails  to  be  destroyed  without 
heating. 

A  successful  attempt  to  bend  and  break  rails  was  made  by  plac 
ing  a  rail  parallel  to,  and  in  contact  with,  one  of  the  rails  of  the 
track;  three  spikes  were  then  driven  about  three  feet  from  the  end  to 
serve  as  a  fulcrum;  ten  men  carried  the  rail  around,  bending  it  at  the 
place  where  it  is  spiked,  and  finally  breaking  it  at  that  point. 

A  similar  experiment  is  represented  in  illustration  on  page  141. 
In  this  case,  instead  of  the  spikes,  a  chain  was  passed  around  the  rails 
at  about  .three  feet  from  the  end  of  the  loose  rail  experimented  upon.  A 
horse  was  attached  to  the  other  end,  who  doubled  the  rail  into  the  shape 
of  the  letter  U  without  difficulty. 

On  the  opposite  side  of  the  track  (see  illustration  on  page  141), 
a  joint  is  shown,  raised  from  the  tie  by  driving  wedges  under  the  chair. 

Another  plan,  which  was  used  successfully  for  bending  and  break 
ing  rails  cold,  is  represented  in  illustration  on  page  151.  It  consisted 
in  boring  a  hole  in  a  tree,  inserting  a  stout  iron  pin  nearly  two  inches 
diameter,  passing  a  log  chain  over  the  pin,  placing  the  end  of  the  rail 
in  a  loop  of  the  chain,  and  pulling  on  the  other  end.  In  this  case  the 
rail  was  of  the  U  pattern,  short  and  stiff,  and  required  two  horses  to 
break  it. 

A  rail  was  also  bent  readily  by  the  plan  which  follows:  A 
hole  was  bored  in  a  tie,  in  which  was  inserted  a  two-inch  pin  for  a  ful 
crum  ;  the  short  end  of  the  rail  to  be  bent  rested  against  the  end  of  a  rail 
in  the  track  that  had  not  yet  been  taken  up.  The  horse,  hitched  to  the 
long  end  of  the  rail,  walked  around  and  doubled  it  without  difficulty. 

The  results  given  by  these  experiments  are  all  of  much  practical 
value,  and  prove  that  there  is  no  serious  difficulty  in  bending  rails  with 
out  heating  them,  so  as  to  render  them  useless.  But  the  most  satisfac 
tory  results  are  secured  by  the  U-shaped  iron  represented  in  illustra- 


*  NOTE.— Wiggins  and  other  writers  have  given  the  credit  of  this  invention  to  Col 
onel  Poe,  of  General  Sheridan's  staff.  This  is  a  mistake.  E.  C.  Smeed  is  entitled  to  the  credit 
of  the  invention,  the  knowledge  of  which  was  communicated  to  the  commanders  of  armies 
"by  the  photograph  and  accompanying  descriptions  which  were  sent  to  them. 


200  REMINISCENCES   OF 

tion  on  page  121.  With  them  a  rail  can  be  torn  from  its  fastenings  in 
?ess  than  a  minute,  without  previously  drawing  the  spikes;  and  with 
the  same  apparatus  rails  can  be  twisted  and  afterwards  bent. 

A  thousand  cavalry  marching  two  abreast,  and  following  each  other 
closely,  will  occup  a  space  of  one  mile.  At  least  one-half  should  be  re 
served  for  protection,  leaving  the  other  half  for  work.  Suppose  the 
working  parties  to  be  divided  into  squads  of  ten  men,  and  that  to  each 
squad  be  assigned  the  duty  of  removing  and  destroying  twelve  rails,  sup 
posed  to  be  each  20  feet  long.  The  number  of  squads  in  one  mile  will 
be  44,  requiring  440  men,  and  leaving  560  for  defense  out  of  the  thou 
sand.  Each  squad  should  be  supplied  with  the  following  implements: 
2  U-shaped  irons ;  2  stout  wooden  levers,  12  feet  long  and  4^  inches  di 
ameter;  2  pieces  of  rope,  each  6  yards  long,  to  tie  to  the  levers;  2  axes 
and  2  wooden  wedges  to  place  between  levers  and  rails. 

The  levers  can  be  cut  from  the  woods,  or  stout  fence  rails  can  be 
used;  the  axes,  ropes,  and  U  irons  must  be  carried.  The  whole  weight 
to  be  carried  for  a  squad  of  ten  men  would  be  but  twenty-five  pounds; 
one  pack-horse  or  one  mule  would  carry  the  implements  for  six  or  eight 
squads. 

Five  minutes  is  sufficient  time  to  twist,  bend,  and  remove  a  rail; 
in  one  hour  the  twelve  rails,  which  form  the  task  of  a  squad,  could  be 
destroyed.  440  men  in  the  same  time  (one  hour)  will  destroy  a  mile. 
2,200  men  in  the  same  time  can  destroy  five  miles.  5,000  cavalry  sent 
on  an  expedition  to  break  communications,  could  detail  2,200  men  for 
the  work,  2,800  for  protection,  and  in  one  hour  could  effectually  destroy 
five  miles  of  track;  they  could  then  ride  for  two  hours  and  destroy  five 
miles  more. 

In  destroying  track  it  is  best  to  pile  and  burn  the  cross  ties.  Each 
squad  will  have  forty-eight  ties  to  burn.  To  pile  these  ties,  split  two  of 
them  for  kindling,  pour  over  two  canteens  of  coal  oil,  and  set  fire  to  the 
heap,  will  consume  but  fifteen  minutes.  A  small  detachment  may  be  left 
to  prevent  residents  in  the  vicinity  from  extinguishing  the  fires. 

Heretofore  it  has  been  possible  to  operate  effectually  against  the 
communications  of  an  enemy  only  where  there  were  important  bridges 
that  could  be  destroyed.  The  plans  herein  described  for  destroying 
track  will  permit  communications  to  be  broken  wherever  they  can  be 
reached,  and  in  so  effectual  a  manner  that  repairs  will  be  impossible 
without  new  material,  which,  without  tearing  up  some  other  road,  it  may 
be  impossible  for  the  enemy  to  procure. 

A  cavalry  expedition,  led  by  intelligent  and  dashing  officers,  pro 
vided  with  the  appliances  herein  described,  and  with  the  bridge  torpedoes 
for  the  destruction  of  bridges,  could  traverse  the  whole  South  and  inflict 
irreparable  damage  upon  the  communications  of  the  enemy.  If  a  work 
s'  ing  force  of  2,200  men  can  destroy  five  miles  of  track  in  one  hour,  and 
two  or  three  men  to  a  span,  with  the  use  of  the  torpedoes,  throw  down  the 
largest  bridges  in  five  minutes,  the  movement  of  the  forces  can  be  too 
rapid  to  admit  of  pursuit,  except  by  cavalry,  to  prevent  which  the 
numerical  strength  should  be  great  enough  to  oppose  any  possible  force 
of  cavalry  that  the  enemy  can  bring  against  it.  Eresh  horses  should 
be  seized,  wherever  practicable,  and  abandoned  ones  shot. 

The  telegraph  should  be  cut  frequently;  but  instead  of  leaving  the 
ends  loose,  the  break  should  be  at  a  pole,  and  the  ends  connected  by 
small  pieces  of  insulated  wire,  concealed  by  the  insulators,  so  that  the 
point  of  break  would  not  be  discernible. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  203 

On  an  expedition  of  this  kind  a  few  men,  expert  in  repairs  of  track, 
bridges,  and  telegraph  lines,  would  prove  of  great  value.  Still  more  im 
portant  is  it  that  the  officers,  and  at  least  a  portion  of  the  force,  say  one 
or  two  men  in  each  squad,  should  be  actually  drilled  in  laying  track  and 
in  tearing  it  up,  and  in  bending  and  twisting  old  and  useless  rails,  if  any 
can  be  found. 

In  the  hope  that  the  results  of  these  experiments  will  prove  benefi 
cial  for  the  service,  they  are  respectfully  submitted  by 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 


CHAPTEK  XII. 
HOOKER  FLUNKS  AND  IS  RELIEVED. 

A  FTER  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  General  Hooker  marched 
l\  towards  the  line  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad,  which 
once  more  became  a  base  of  supplies,  and  we  were  again  subjected 
to  the  usual  annoyances  inflicted  by  guerrilla  parties,  such  as 
burning  bridges,  obstructing  track,  and  firing  upon  trains.  It  be 
came  necessary  to  run  all  trains  with  30  to  50  men  as  a  guard. 
On  one  occasion  a  bridge  was  found  burning  in  the  middle  and  at 
both  ends,  and  five  men  made  their  escape  on  horseback  when  the 
train  approached. 

General  Hooker  to  the  President,  June  10,  1863,  refers  to 
contemplated  raid  by  Lee  into  Maryland,  and  remarks : 

If  it  should  be  the  intention  to  send  a  heavy  column  of  infantry 
to  accompany  the  cavalry  on  the  proposed  raid,  he  can  leave  nothing  be 
hind  to  interpose  any  serious  obstacle  to  my  rapid  advance  on  Richmond. 
If  it  should  be  found  to  be  the  case,  would  it  not  promote  the  true  inter 
ests  of  the  cause  for  me  to  march  to  Richmond  at  once? 

If  left  to  operate  from  my  own  judgment,  with  my  present  informa 
tion,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  I  should  adopt  this  course  as  being  the 
most  speedy  and  certain  mode  of  giving  the  rebellion  a  mortal  blow. 

From  information  which  I  deem  reliable,  the  only  troops  remain 
ing  in  Richmond  is  the  provost  guard,  1,500,  and  all  the  troops  between 
here  and  there  are  brought  well  to  the  front. 

To  this  the  President  replied : 

June  10,  1863,  6:40  P.  M. 
Major-General  Hooker: 

Your  long  dispatch  of  to-day  is  just  received.  If  left  to  me  I 
would  not  go  south  of  Rappahannock  upon  Lee's  moving  north  of  it. 
If  you  had  Richmond  invested  to-day,  you  would  not  be  able  to  take  it 
in  twenty  days;  while  your  communications,  and  with  them  your  army, 
would  be  ruined.  I  think  Lee's  army  and  not  Richmond  is  your  object 
ive  point.  If  he  comes  toward  the  upper  Potomac,  follow  in  his  flank 
and  on  his  inside  track,  shortening  your  lines  while  he  lengthens  his. 
Fight  him,  too,  when  opportunity  offer?.  If  he  stays  where  he  is,  fret 
him  and  fret  him. 

A.  LINCOLN. 

June  11  General  Halleck  telegraphs  that  he  fully  agrees  with 
the  President. 

204 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  205 

On  June  14.  1863,  Mr.  Lincoln  telegraphed  to  General 
Hooker : 

If  the  head  of  Lee's  army  is  at  Martinsburg  and  the  tail  of  it  on 
the  plank  road  between  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville,  the  animal 
must  be  slim  somewhere.  Could  you  not  break  him? 

On  June  15,  10:20  A.  M.,  General  Hooker's  Headquarters 
were  at  Dumfries.  On  same  day,  6 :30  p.  M.,  he  had  moved  to 
Fairfax  Station.  At  8  :30  he  received  a  telegram  from  the  Presi 
dent,  to  which  he  replied :  "It  seems  to  disclose  the  intention  of 
the  enemy  to  make  an  invasion,  and  if  so,  it  is  not  in  my  power  to 
prevent  it." 

On  June  16  General  Hooker  had  established  his  Headquarters 
near  Fairfax  Station.  The  Blue  Ridge  divided  the  opposing  , 
forces.  Lee  was  moving  towards  the  Potomac  with  the  evident 
design  of  another  invasion  of  Maryland.  I  supposed,  of  course, 
that  Hooker  would  oppose  this  movement  and  throw  his  forces 
forward  to  the  Potomac,  in  which  case  our  railroad  operations 
would  be  transferred  to  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Eailroad. 

It  was  important  for  me  to  know  what  moves  General  Hooker 
designed  to  make,  so  that  I  could  prepare  for  them.  I  went  to 
see  him  at  Fairfax  to  make  inquiries,  and  found  him  in  a  decidedly 
bad  humor.  He  said  that  he  did  not  intend  to  move  at  all  until 
he  got  orders,  and  would  then  obey  them  literally  and  let  the  re 
sponsibility  rest  where  it  belonged ;  that  he  had  made  various  sug 
gestions  which  had  not  been  approved  by  the  powers  that  be  in 
Washington,  and  if  he  could  not  carry  out  his  own  plans,  others 
must  give  orders,  and  if  disaster  ensued  his  skirts  would  be  clear, 
or  words  to  that  effect. 

I  was  greatly  surprised  at  the  spirit  exhibited,  and  at  the 
close  of  the  interview  returned  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Washing 
ton  and  reported  the  situation  to  General  Halleck,  stating  that 
General  Hooker  would  not  move  until  he  got  orders,  and  that 
action  ought  to  be  taken  immediately. 

General  Halleck  replied  that  some  of  the  statements  of  Gen 
eral  Hooker  were  not  in  accordance  with  the  facts,  and  then,  open 
ing  his  desk,  took  out  a  bundle  of  papers  and  read  to  me,  from 
copies  in  his  possession,  part  of  the  correspondence  between  Gen 
eral  Hooker  and  the  President,  from  which  it  appeared  that  Hook 
er's  plan  was  to  take  advantage  of  the  absence  of  Lee's  army  to 
capture  Richmond. 

To  this  the  President  had  replied  in  his  characteristic  style, 
as  nearly  as  I  can  recollect  it:  "General,  you  may  be  right,  but 
I  think  you  are  wrong.  It  seems  to- me  that  it  would  be  a  very 
poor  exchange  to  give  Washington  for  Richmond.  If  the  enemv 


206  REMINISCENCES    OF 

is  scattered,  as  you  report,  in  a  long  thin  line,  with  one  flank  at 
Frederieksburg  and  the  other  on  the  Potomac,  why  can  you  not 
keep  your  shoulder  well  up  to  him,  break  through  somewhere  in  the 
middle  and  beat  him  in  detail  ?" 

This  is  the  substance  of  the  letter,  as  I  recollect  it,  and  it 
made  a  decided  impression  upon  my  memory.  I  do  not  find  a 
letter  in  these  exact  words  amongst  the  records ;  but  there  are  oth 
ers  expressive  of  the  same  ideas. 

After  reading  the  letters  to  me,  General  Ilalleck  put  on  his 
cap  and  left  the  office.  I  remained  in  conversation  with  his  chief 
of  staff,  General  Cullom,  for  more  than  half  an  hour,  when  General 
Halleck  returned,  threw  his  cap  on  the  table  and  remarked: 
''Hooker  will  get  his  orders." 

On  June  16,  at  11  A.  M.,  General  Hooker  telegraphed  to  the 
President  from  Fairfax  Station: 

You  have  long  been  aware,  Mr.  President,  that  I  have  not  enjoyed 
the  confidence  of  the  Major- General  commanding  the  army,  and  I  can 
assure  you  so  long  as  this  continues  we  may  look  in  vain  for  success, 
especially  as  future  operations  will  require  our  relations  to  be  more  de 
pendent  upon  each  other  than  heretofore. 

At  11 :30  A.  M.  of  the  same  day,  General  Halleck  telegraphed 
General  Hooker  that  there  was  no  reliable  information  that  the 
enemy  had  crossed  the  Potomac  in  any  force,  and  advised  him  to 
keep  his  army  near  enough  to  the  enemy  to  ascertain  his  move 
ments. 

Several  other  telegrams  about  the  same  time  indicate  a  desire 
on  the  part  of  General  Hooker  to  avoid  the  exercise  of  any  dis 
cretion  in  regard  to  the  movements  of  his  army  and  secure  explicit 
and  detailed  instruction  from  the  Commander-in-Chief.  At  7 :30 
p.  M.  he  telegraphed  General  Halleck:  "In  compliance  with 
your  instructions,  I  shall  march  to  the  relief  of  Harper's  Ferry," 
to  which  General  Halleck  replied,  10 :15  p.  M.  : 

I  have  given  no  directions  for  your  army  to  move  to  Harper's 
Ferry;  I  have  advised  the  movement  of  a  force  sufficiently  strong  to 
ascertain  where  the  enemy  is,  and  then  move  to  the  relief  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  or  elsewhere,  as  circumstances  may  require.  You  are  in  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  will  make  the  particular  dispositions  as 
you  deem  proper.  I  shall  only  indicate  the  objects  to  be  arrived  at.  We 
have  no  positive  information  of  any  large  force  against  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  it  cannot  be  known  whether  it  will  be  necessary  to  go  there  until  you 
can  feel  the  enemy  and  ascertain  his  whereabouts. 

At  10  P.  M.  the  President  telegraphed  General  Hooker : 

To  remove  all  misunderstanding,  I  now  place  you  in  the  strict 
military  relation  to  General  Halleck  of  a  commander  of  one  of  the 
armies  to  the  General-in-Chief  of  all  the  armies.  I  have  not  intended 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  207 

differently,  but  it  seems  to  be  differently  understood.     I  shall  direct  him 
to  give  you  orders  and  you  to  obey  them. 

On  June  27,  1  P.  M.,  General  Hooker  telegraphed  from  Sandy 
Hook,  a  station  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  on  the  Potomac 
near  Harper's  Ferry : 

My  original  instructions  require  me  to  cover  Harper's  Ferry  and 
Washington.  I  have  now  imposed  upon  me,  in  addition,  an  enemy  in 
my  front  of  more  than  my  number.  I  beg  to  be  understood,  respectfully 
but  firmly,  that  I  am  unable  to  comply  with  this  condition  with  the 
means  at  my  disposal,  and  earnestly  request  that  I  may  at  once  be  re 
lieved  from  the  position  I  occupy. 

The  request  of  General  Hooker  to  be  relieved  from  the  com 
mand  was  immediately  complied  with,  and  on  the  same  afternoon 
the  President  issued  orders  placing  General  Meade  in  command  of 
the  army. 

The  report  of  General-in-Chief  Henry  W.  Halleck  is  charac 
teristic  : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  November  15,  1863. 

SIR  :  In  compliance  with  your  orders  I  submit  the  following  sum 
mary  of  military  operations  since  my  last  annual  report : 

General  Hooker  relieved  General  Burnside  from  his  command  on 
January  26,  but  no  advance  movement  was  attempted  until  near  the  end 
of  April,  when  a  large  cavalry  force,  under  General  Stoneman,  was  sent 
across  the  upper  Rappahannock  towards  Richmond  to  destroy  the  enemy's 
communications,  while  General  Hooker,  with  his  main  army,  crossed  the 
Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan  above  their  junction  and  took  position 
at  Ohancellorsville.  At  the  same  time  General  Sedgwick  crossed  near 
Fredericksburg  and  stormed  and  carried  the  heights. 

A  severe  battle  took  place  on  May  2  and  3 ;  and  on  May  5  our  army 
was  again  withdrawn  to  the  south  side  of  the  river. 

From  want  of  official  data,  I  am  unable  to  give  any  detailed  ac 
counts  of  their  operations,  or  of  our  losses. 

It  is  also  proper  to  remark  in  this  place,  that  from  the  time  he  was 
placed  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  till  he  reached  Fairfax 
Station,  on  June  16,  a  few  days  before  he  was  relieved  from  the  com 
mand,  General  Hooker  reported  directly  to  the  President,  and  received 
instructions  directly  from  him.  I  received  no  official  information  of  his 
plans,  or  of  their  execution.  * 

Very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

General-in-Chief. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 
BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG. 

WHE!^"  the  order  was  issued  relieving  General  Hooker  and 
placing  General  Meade  in  command,  the  army  of  General 
Lee  occupied  the  Cumberland  Valley  in  Maryland  and  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  on  or  near  the  line  of  the 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad. 

I  proposed,  as  soon  as  practicable,  to  join  General  Meade  in 
the  field  and  ascertain  his  requirements,  acting  under  the  following 
special  order : 

WASHINGTON,  June  27,  1863. 
SPECIAL  ORDER 
No.  286. 

Brigadier-General  H.  Haupt,  U.  S.  Volunteers,  is  hereby  authorized 
and  directed  to  do  whatever  he  may  deem  expedient  to  facilitate  the 
transportation  of  troops  and  supplies  to  aid  the  armies  in  the  field  in 
Virginia,  Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania. 

By  command  of  Major-General  HallecTc. 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

On  June  28,  1863,  General  Meade  telegraphed  General  Hal- 
leek,  acknowledging  receipt  of  order  placing  him  in  command  of 
the  army,  and  stated  that  he  was  in  ignorance  of  the  exact  condi 
tion  of  the  troops  and  position  of  the  enemy. 

Having  called  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  and  communicated 
my  intentions,  he  directed  me  to  remain  in  Washington,  as  he  had 
some  other  service  for  me  to  perform. 

After  waiting  two  or  three  days  very  impatiently,  during 
which  time  I  had  no  orders  from  the  Secretary,  I  reported  the 
situation  to  General  Halleck,  who  agreed  with  me  that  I  should  be 
in  the  field,  and  advised  me  to  go  again  to  the  Secretary  and  say 
to  him  that,  unless  he  had  more  important  duties  for  me  to  attend 
to  elsewhere,  General  Halleck  desired  me  to  leave  at  once.  The 
Secretary  replied,  "I  do  not  know  that  I  have  anything  for  you 
to  attend  to ;  you  had  better  go." 

By  this  time  General  Meade  had  moved  northward.  The  Bal 
timore  &  Ohio  Railroad  had  been  cut  by  the  enemy,  and  I  con 
cluded  that  the  most  efficient  service  that  I  could  render  would  be 
to  go  to  Harrisburg,  ascertain  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Pennsyl- 

208 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  211 

vania — especially  the  numbers  and  position  of  the  forces  that  had 
been  raised — and  then  make  my  way  across  the  country  on  foot, 
or  horseback,  and  give  General  Meade  all  the  information  I  could 
gather. 

With  this  object  in  view,  I  started  for  ITarrisburg,  but  as  the 
Northern  Central  Railroad  had  been  badly  injured,  I  was  com-1 
pelled  to  travel  via  Philadelphia  and  Beading.  I  reached  Harris- 
burg  late  in  the  evening  of  June  30,  and  repaired  at  once  to  the 
capitol.  where  I  found  Governor  Ourtin  and  his  staff.  The 
room  was  filled  with  aides  and  other  officers.  M'uch  confusion 
and  excitement  prevailed.  I  could  get  very  little  information, 
and  asked  where  I  could  find  Colonel  Thomas  A.  Scott. 

Having  been  informed  that  he  was  at  the  station  engaged  in 
dispatching  troops  to  protect  the  bridges  on  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad  that  had  been  threatened  by  a  cavalry  raid,  I  repaired  to 
the  station,  and,  when  the  trains  had  been  started,  requested  him, 
after  showing  my  instructions,  to  give  me  a  full  and  detailed 
report  of  the  situation. 

The  request  was  complied  with,  from  which  I  learned  that, 
until  the  morning  of  that  day,  the  enemy  had  occupied  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river  in  large  force;  that  at  an  early  hour  they  had 
commenced  to  retreat,  and  with  so  much  precipitancy  that  in  some 
cases  provisions  had  been  lej:t  uncooked;  that  the  artillery  had 
gone  through  Mechanicsburg  at  a  fast  trot.  Numerous  other  de 
tails  were  also  given. 

I  then  asked  what  explanation  could  be  given  as  to  the  cause 
of  these  movements,  and  the  answer  was,  that  the  enemy  had  been 
deceived  by  the  representation  that  we  had  60,000  men  on  the  east 
side  of  the  river,  when,  in  fact,  there  were  but  15,000  raw  recruits, 
and  that,  unwilling  to  risk  the  passage  of  the  river  in  the  face  of 
so  large  a  force,  Lee  had  concluded  to  retreat. 

I  replied  to  Colonel  Scott :  "You  are  entirely  in  error.  These 
movements  do  not  mean  retreat;  they  mean  concentration.  Re 
treat  would  not  be  made  hastily  with  no  enemy  pushing ;  it  would 
be  done  deliberately,  foraging  on  the  country  on  the  route.  My 
explanation  is  this:  Lee  has  just  received  the  intelligence  that 
Hooker  has  been  relieved  and  Meade  put  in  command.  He  knows 
that  our  Army  Corps  are  scattered,  and  that  Meade  cannot  get  the 
reins  in  hand  for  some  days  at  least,  and  he  has  formed  the  design 
to  concentrate  with  all  possible  expedition  and  fall,  with  a  largely 
superior  force,  upon  our  isolated  Army  Corps  and  overwhelm  them 
successively.  We  are  in  the  most  critical  condition  we  have  been 
in  since  the  war  commenced,  and  nothing  but  the  interposition  of 
Providence  can  save  us.  If  the  army  is  destroyed,  no  new  force 
can  be  collected  in  time  to  make  effectual  resistance.  Washington, 


212  REMINISCENCES   OF 

Baltimore,  Philadelphia  and  New  York  will  fall,  and  the  enemy 
can  then,  as  masters  of  the  situation,  dictate  their  own  terms."* 

Scott  replied,  "I  think  you  are  right."  I  answered,  "I  am 
sure  I  am/7  and  immediately  wrote  and  forwarded  this  telegram 
at  10 :30  p.  M.  : 

HARRISBURG,  PA.,  June  30,  1863. 
Major-General  HallecTc,  General-in-Chief: 

Lee  is  falling  back  suddenly  from  the  vicinity  of  Harrisburg,  and 
concentrating  all  his  forces.  York  has  been  evacuated.  Carlisle  is  be 
ing  evacuated.  The  concentration  appears  to  be  at  or  near  Chambers- 
burg.  The  object,  apparently,  a  sudden  movement  against  Meade,  of 
which  he  should  be  advised  by  courier  immediately.  A  courier  might 
reach  Frederick  by  way  of  Western  Maryland  Railroad  to  Westminster. 
This  information  comes  from  T.  A.  Scott,  and  I  think  it  reliable. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-General. 

Further  information  continued  to  be  received,  and  at  12  :45 
A.  M.  I  sent  a  second  telegram,  stating  that  information  just  re 
ceived  indicated  that  the  point  of  concentration  of  Lee's  forces 
was  at  Gettysburg,  and  not  at  Chambersburg.  General  Meade 
received  this  information  at  3  A.  M.  by  special  courier  from  West 
minster,  as  he  subsequently  informed  me. 

HARRISBURG,  July  1,  1863,  6  A.  M. 
Major-General  Halleclc,  General-in-Chief  U.  S.  Army. 

GENERAL:  I  sent  two  telegrams  last  night  and  sent  the  same  to 
General  Schenck. 

Finding  the  communications  cut  with  Meade's  army,  I  concluded 
to  run  to  Harrisburg,  ascertain  the  position  of  affairs,  then  return  to 
Baltimore,  and  try  to  work  my  way  through  to  Frederick. 

I  found  that  there  had  been  some  skirmishing  near  Harrisburg 
yesterday;  that  the  forces  gathered  for  the  protection  of  the  place 
amounted  to  16,000  men,  and  that  the  information  in  regard  to  the  move 
ments,  position,  and  numbers  of  the  enemy  and  arrangements  for  keep 
ing  advised  of  the  same,  were  apparently  reliable. 

It  appears  to  have  been  the  intention  of  the  enemy  to  attack  Harris- 
burg  yesterday.  Our  forces,  supposed  to  be  Pleasanton's,  were  resisting 
their  movements  and  T.  A.  Scott  said,  had  actually  succeeded  in  retard 
ing  their  advance  upon  Harrisburg  and  compelled  a  retreat.  I  thought 
I  saw  a  much  more  decisive  and  important  move  on  the  tapis.  Lee  had 
received  information  of  the  removal  of  Hooker  and  the  situation  of 
Meade.  He  knew,  also,  that  Meade's  communications  had  been  cut  off 
by  Stuart;  that  some  confusion  must  exist  from  the  change  of  com 
manders  ;  that  Meade  could  not  at  once  get  his  forces  in  hand,  and  that, 
by  suddenly  concentrating  and  falling  upon  Meade,  he  could  be  crushed, 
when  Washington,  Baltimore,  and  Philadelphia  would  all  be  at  the  mercy 
of  the  enemy.  I  mentioned  to  Scott  my  opinion,  in  which  he  at  once 


*  NOTE. — After  the  war  I  happened  to  travel  in  the  same  car  with  General 
Longstreet  between  New  Orleans  and  Richmond,  and  he  fully  confirmed  the  opinion 
here  expressed  as  to  the  design  of  Lee  in  the  movement  towards  Gettysburg. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  213 

concurred,  and  I  immediately  sent  the  telegram  to  you  and  to  General 
Schenck  last  night. 

The  most  reliable  information  as  to  the  number  of  the  enemy,  as 
given  by  Scott,  is  as  follows: 

Ewell  23,000  men,  48  pieces;  Longstreet  30,000  men,  122  pieces; 
Hill  24,000  men,  pieces  not  known;  Early  15,000  men,  26  pieces;  total 
92,000  men  and  236  pieces,  exclusive  of  Hill's.  Forces  of  Ewell  were 
counted  in  Carlisle  Friday  P.  M.,  June  26,  as  they  passed.  They  left 
Carlisle  by  the  Balitmore  pike,  Tuesday,  June  30,  5  A.  M. 

Longstreet's  Corps  passed  through  Chambersburg  on  Friday  and 
Saturday  (27th)  in  the  direction  of  Carlisle.  In  Carlisle  Sunday 
evening;  left  on  Monday  afternoon;  went  through  Newville  with  artil 
lery  in  full  trot,  in  the  direction  of  Shippensburg,  probably  to  take  the 
Gettysburg  road  from  this  point. 

Lee  was  in  the  square  at  Chambersburg  at  9  A.  M.,  Saturday,  with 
8,000  men  and  40  pieces  (part  of  Hill's).  Left  after  conference  with 
Hill  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg.  Hill's  Corps  commenced  leaving 
Chambersburg  at  12  M.  Saturday,  three  hours  after  Lee,  in  the  same  di 
rection. 

Early  left  Gettysburg  for  York  Saturday,  entered  York  Sunday; 
left  York  2  p.  M.  Tuesday. 

Firing  Tuesday  for  several  hours  about  Dillsburg  and  Petersburg, 
on  the  line  between  York  and  Gettysburg. 

I  am  leaving  for  Baltimore. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

H.  HAUPT. 

I  left  Harrisburg  on  the  morning  of  July  1,  reached  Balti 
more  in  the  evening,  and  at  once  proceeded  to  organize  transporta 
tion  on  the  Western  Maryland  Railroad.  On  reaching  West 
minster,  I  found  everything  in  great  confusion,  hundreds  of 
wagons  waiting,  and  the  officers  clamoring  for  supplies. 

I  asked  them  to  give  me  a  few  minutes  to  think,  and  to  escape 
the  crowd  I  crept  into  a  covered  wagon  and  hid  myself.  In  a 
short  time  I  emerged,  having  organized  a  plan  of  operations,  and, 
as  soon  as  I  could  reach  the  wires,  commenced  to  put  it  in  opera 
tion. 

J.  1ST.  Du  Barry,  the  Superintendent  of  the  Northern  Central 
Railroad,  was  relieved  at  his  own  request.  Adna  Anderson  was 
ordered  from  Alexandria,  with  a  force  of  400  railroad  men,  a  train 
of  split  wood,  lanterns,  buckets,  etc.,  and  under  his  efficient  man 
agement  thirty  trains  per  day  were  passed  over  the  Westminster 
Railroad,  29  miles^  on  which  there  were  no  sidings  sufficient  to 
pass  trains,  and  which  had  previously  accommodated  only  three  or 
four  per  day.  Water  was  dipped  in  buckets  from  the  streams,  and 
the  wood  was  brought  from  Alexandria,  ready  cut  and  split.  The 
operation  of  this  road,  under  the  circumstances,  was  a  very  credit 
able  performance,  and  was  so  successful  that,  as  General  Ingalls 
stated,  the  army  at  no  time  had  less  than  three  days'  rations  ahead. 


214  REMINISCENCES    OF 

The  following  telegrams  will  furnish  further  information  in 
regard  to  the  Military  Railroad  operations  during  the  battle  on 
the  second,  third  and  fourth  days  of  July : 

HARRISKURG,  PA.,  July  1,  1863,  12 :45  A.  M. 
Major-General  H.  W.  Halleck.  General-in-Chief:* 

Information  just  received,  12:45  A.  M.,  leads  to  the  belief  that  the 
concentration  of  the  forces  of  the  enemy  will  be  at  Gettysburg  rather 
than  at  Chambersburg.  The  movement  on  their  part  is  very  rapid  and 
hurried.  They  returned  from  Carlisle  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg  by 
way  of  the  Petersburg  pike.  Firing  about  Petersburg  and  Dillstown 
this  P.  M.  continued  some  hours.  Meade  should,  by  all  means,  be  in 
formed,  and  be  prepared  for  a  sudden  attack  from  Lee's  whole  army. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

General  Meade  subsequently  informed  me  that  he  received 
both  of  my  former  dispatches  by  courier  in  his  tent  at  3  A.  M. 

At  Harrisburg  I  received  a  copy  of  General  Jubal  A.  Early's 
proclamation  to  the  citizens  of  York,  Pa.?  as  follows : 

YORK,  PA.,  June  30,  1863. 
To  the  Citizens  of  York: 

I  have  abstained  from  burning  the  railroad  buildings  and  car  shops 
in  your  town  because,  after  examination,  I  am  satisfied  the  safety  of  the 
town  would  be  endangered,  and  acting  in  the  spirit  of  humanity,  which 
has  ever  characterized  my  government  and  its  military  authorities,  I  do 
not  desire  to  involve  the  innocent  in  the  same  punishment  with  the  guilty. 
Had  I  applied  the  torch,  without  regard  to  consequences,  I  would  have 
pursued  a  course  that  would  have  been  fully  vindicated  as  an  act  of  just 
retaliation  for  the  authorized  acts  of  barbarity  perpetrated  by  your  own 
army  on  our  soil;  but  we  do  not  war  upon  women  and  children,  and  I 
trust  that  the  treatment  you  have  met  with  at  the  hands  of  my  soldiers 
will  open  your  eyes  to  the  monstrous  iniquity  of  the  war  waged  by  your 
Government  upon  the  people  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  that  you  will 
make  an  effort  to  shake  off  the  revolting  tyranny  under  which  it  is  ap 
parent  to  all  you  are  yourselves  groaning. 

J.  A.  EARLY, 
Major-General  C.  S.  Army. 

ETJTAW  HOUSE, 
BALTIMORE,  July  1,  1863. 
General  R.  Ingalls: 

The  Western  Maryland  Railroad  is  in  running  order,  but  there  are 
numerous  small  bridges  in  danger  of  destruction  from  rebel  sympa 
thizers.  As  guards  cannot  be  provided,  it  will  be  necessary  to  run  trains 
with  escorts.  The  road  is  not  in  good  condition;  it  has  but  a  single 
track,  no  adequate  sidings,  and  the  time  consumed  in  running  the  ordi 
nary  trains  has  been  five  hours  for  twenty-nine  miles.  There  is  no  tele 
graph  line  on  the  road. 


*  NOTE. — And  to  General  Meade  and  General  Schenck. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  215 

To  forward  supplies  by  this  line,  the  following  arrangements  will 
be  required : 

1.  Trains  must  be  run  in  convoys  of  five  or  six  with  guards  suffi 
cient  for  protection. 

2.  Half  a  dozen  men  should  be  placed  at  each  bridge  to  keep  off 
individuals  mischievously  inclined. 

3.  No  schedule  can  be  used,  but  when  a  convoy  is  dispatched  from 
Junction  no  others  can  be  sent  until  they  have  returned,  so  long  as  there 
are  no  telegraph  lines. 

4.  It  will  be  all-important,  on  the  arrival  of  a  convey,  to  unload 
each  and  every  car  on  the  mainv  track  and  send  back  immediately.     This 
duty  will  require  the  most  efficient  officer  of  your  staff.     The  rapidity 
with  which  cars  can  be  unloaded  will  measure  the  capacity  of  this  road 
to  supply  the  army. 

5.  No  extras  or  specials  should  be  run  over  the  road  until  a  tele 
graph  line  is  established,  as  great  risk  and  delay  will  resurt  from  it. 

I  have  ordered  iron,  cars  and  engines  from  Alexandria,  and  will 
increase  the  business  facilities  at  the  depot  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

Please  communicate  with  me  at  the  Eutaw  House  and  let  me  know 
your  wishes.  It  is  not  necessary  to  say  that  no  time  will  be  lost  in  carry 
ing  them  into  effect. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

July  1,  1863. 
General  M.  C.  Meigs,  Quartermaster  General: 

I  find  that  the  communication  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  by 
rail  to  Westminster  will  be  very  slow  and  uncertain,  besides  interfering 
most  seriously  with  the  supply  trains.     It  has,  therefore,  been  arranged 
to  start  immediately  horse  expresses  at  intervals  of  three  hours,  with      , 
relays  every  seven  miles,  to  run  day  and  night.     The  distance  from  Bal-  -' 
timore  to  Westminster  is  only  twenty-eight  miles,  the  road  a  good  turn 
pike.     The  distance  by  rail  is  much  longer.     The  time  usually  required 
by  rail  has  been  five  hours  from  junction.     The  time  by  express  from 
Baltimore  will  be  three  hours. 

I  send  copy  of  note  to  General  Ingalls  to  be  forwarded  by  first  ex 
press.  Please  communicate  contents  to  General  Halleck  and  Secretary 
of  War,  that  the  arrangement  may  be  understood. 

Adams'  Express  Company  will  run  the  horse  express.  S.  M.  Shoe 
maker,  Esq.,  has  made  the  necessary  arangements  with  aid  of  General 
Schenck. 

II.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-General, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

WASHINGTON,  July  1,  1863. 
For  Brigadier-General  H.  Haupt,  U.  S.  A.: 

General  Meade  desires  that  you  be  prepared  to  push  on  the  repairs 
of  the  Northern  Central  Road  to  open  connection  with  him  from  Balti-  • 
more  as  soon  as  he  reaches  the  line  of  the  road.  I  have  ordered  Con 
struction  Corps  and  train  to  Western  Maryland  Road,  now  open,  to 
prepare  siding  and  turnouts  and  be  ready  to  transfer  to  the  Northern 
Central.  As  soon  as  that  is  safe,  you  will  proceed  via  Baltimore  to  these 
two  lines  to  take  charge  of  operations.  These  roads  have  sent  away 


216  REMINISCENCES    OF 

much  of  their  equipments.     Some  of  the  military  stock  will  be  sent  for 
ward;  it  is  lighter  than  the  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  engines. 

M.  C.  MEIGS, 
Quartermaster  General. 

July  2,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

Anderson  and  Construction  Corps  of  400  men  left  here  yesterday 
p.  M.  The  force  has  undoubtedly  gone  up  the  Northern  Central  to  West 
minster  Branch  to  build  turnouts.  I  requested  Mr.  Anderson  to  find 
you  if  he  could;  if  not,  to  proceed  up  the  line.  Four  car-loads  of  iron 
have  been  forwarded;  more  will  be  sent  to-day.  Have  telegraphed  you 
fully,  addressed  to  Eutaw  House,  Baltimore. 

D.  C.  McCALLUM. 

July  2,  1863,  3  o'clock. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War: 

I  have,  after  careful  inspection  of  condition  and  estimate  of  ca 
pacity  of  the  Western  Maryland  Road,  arranged  for  fifteen  trains  per  day 
each  way,  in  convoys  of  five  trains  each,  at  intervals  of  eight  hours. 
Trains  cannot  pass  at  any  point  on  this  road  from  want  of  sidings,  and 
there  is  no  telegraph  line.  Still,  if  cars  are  promptly  unloaded,  and  no 
accident  occurs,  I  hope  to  pass  150  cars  per  day  each  way,  capable  of 
carrying  from  2,000  to  4,000  wounded  in  return  cars.  The  rapidity  of 
loading  and  unloading  will  measure  the  capacity  of  the  road.  My  men 
have  passed  over  the  Northern  Central  Railroad  to  Hanover  Junction, 
and  over  Hanover  and  Gettysburg.  A  branch  is  marked  on  the  map 
from  Hanover  to  Littlestown,  but  my  information  is  that  the  track  is 
actually  laid  only  a  few  hundred  yards  from  Hanover.  I  have  informed 
General  Ingalls  by  courier  of  all  these  facts,  and  it  rests  with  him  to 
designate  the  route.  I  have  no  very  recent  information  from  Gettysburg, 
but  at  last  account,  the  position  of  the  enemy  would  not  permit  the  re 
construction  and  operation  of  the  Gettysburg  Branch  of  that  line.  I 
can  soon  open  the  branch  road  to  Gettysburg  after  we  have  full  and  un 
disturbed  possession. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

RELAY  STATION,  N.  C.  R.  R.,  July  2,  1863. 
Brigadier-General  Haupt,  Eutaw  House: 

Just  returned  from  New  Oxford  and  Hanover  Junction.  There  are 
nineteen  bridges  destroyed.  Between  York  Haven  and  Hanover  Junc 
tion  and  Gettysburg  there  are  two  small  ones  gone  and  one  partly.  I 
think  these  three  bridges  can  be  put  up  in  from  one  to  two  days. 

J.  B.  CLOUGH, 
12  midnight.  Engineer  of  Construction. 

July  2,  1863. 
Colonel  D.  C.  McCallum,  Washington: 

Trainmen  have  reported.  I  expect  to  see  Du  Barry  to-day  and 
make  arrangements.  The  Western  Maryland  Railroad  to  Westminster, 
the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  to  Frederick,  and  the  Northern  Cen 
tral  to  Hanover  Junction  are  in  order. 

H.  HAUPT. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  219 

BUEHLER  HOUSE, 

HARRISBURG,  July  2,  1863. 
General  : 

Your  telegram  directing  me  to  report  to  Mr.  Du  Barry  is  received, 
but  before  it  arrived  General  Couch,  in  consequence  of  some  trouble 
with  railroads  here,  had  issued  an  order  appointing  me  "Superintend 
ent  of  Railroad  Transportation"  in  his  Department,  and  in  accordance 
with  permit  "To  make  myself  useful  in  any  way"  I  had  accepted  the 
position  subject  to  your  orders,  and  have  taken  measures  to  remove  the 
difficulties  complained  of.  I  think  this  a  much  better  arrangement  than 
taking  military  possession  of  the  railroad,  as  suggested  by  Colonel 
Thomson. 

Below  please  find  copy  of  General  Couch's  Special  Order  No.  22 : 

2.  Colonel  W.  W.  Wright,  Superintendent  U.  S.  Military  Railroads,  is  hereby  ap 
pointed  Superintendent  of  Railroad  Transportation  in  this  Department. 

I  have  seen  Mr.  Cameron,  President  Northern  Central  Railroad, 
and  have  consulted  with  General  Couch,  and  he  does  not  think  it  ad 
visable  to  commence  the  reconstruction  of  the  Northern  Central  at  this 
end  at  present.  Mr.  Cameron  informs  me  that  Mr.  Anderson's  Con 
struction  Corps  are  at  work  on  the  Baltimore  end  of  the  road,  and  that 
Mr.  Du  Barry  is  at  Baltimore. 

I  will,  therefore,  hold  on  until  I  can  hear  from  you  as  to  whether 
you  wish  me  to  remain  here  or  not. 

W.  W.  WRIGHT, 

Superintendent  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 
Brigadier-General  H.  Haupt, 

Chief  Construction   and   Transportation. 

July  2,  1863. 
Colonel  Ambrose  Thomson,  Assistant  Quartermaster: 

If  Mr.  Wright's  services  to  you  are  invaluable,  I  will  allow  him 
to  remain  with  you.  I  cannot,  however,  delegate  to  any  one  the  power, 
at  his  discretion,  to  take  military  possession  of  any  or  all  railroads.  It 
is  best  to  operate  roads  by  and  through  the  regular  officers  and  agents. 
If  a  necessity  should  arise  for  taking  possession  of  the  Chambersburg 
and  of  the  Hanover  branch  roads  for  a  short  time,  the  proper  orders  will 
issue  when  the  necessity  arises,  but  I  would  not  consent  to  any  seizure 
of,  or  interference  with,  the  Pennsylvania  or  the  Northern  Central  Rail 
roads. 

There  should  be  no  confusion.  No  orders  should  be  given  except 
by  or  through  you  as  Quartermaster,  and  your  orders  should  be  given 
only  to  the  Superintendent  of  each  road,  or  some  one  designated  by  him. 

The  Pennsylvania  Central,  Northern  Central  and  Lebanon  \7alley 
Railroads  are  managed  by  experienced  officers,  and  preference  will 
always  be  given  by  them  to  Government  transportation.  To  assert  or 
exercise  authority  will  not  be  necessary  or  proper. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 


12 


220  REMINISCENCES   OF 

July  2,  1863. 

We  drove  the  rebels  on  our  left  this  afternoon  some  distance.  Our 
line  formed  an  arc,  but  our  left  is  now  tangent. 

Prospect  of  heavy  work  to-morrow.  Rebels  having  been  foiled  in 
four  attempts  to  carry  our  right  and  left  wings,  I  think  will  next  try 
to  get  in  our  rear. 

URIAH  H.  PAINTER. 

BALTIMORE,  July  3,  1863. 
General  D,  H.  Ruclcer,  Washington: 

I  am  just  informed  that  supplies  have  been  ordered  by  you  to 
Union  Bridge.  They  have  heretofore  been  manifested  to  Westminster. 
The  arrangements  for  running  the  road  have  been  completed  under  the 
impression  that  Westminster  was  to  be  the  depot.  The  amount  of  sup 
plies  that  can  be  forwarded  to  Union  Bridge  will  be  much  less  than  can 
be  handled  at  Westminster,  and  will  involve  an  entire  change  of  our 
arrangements. 

The  distance  of  Union  Bridge  from  the  headquarters  of  the  army 
is  about  the  same  as  from  Westminster  and  the  road  from  Westminster 
much  better.  Can  you  not  telegraph  orders  immediately  to  have  the 
supplies  unloaded  at  Westminster  instead  of  Union  Bridge? 

H.  HAUPT. 

WASHINGTON,  July  3,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

Your  dispatch  received.  You  have  full  authority  to  do  whatever 
you  think  proper  in  respect  to  transportation.  You  will  please  give  to 
J.  N.  Du  Barry,  Superintendent  Northern  Central  Road,  the  thanks  of 
the  Department  for  his  energetic  cooperation. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

July  3,  1863,  12  M. 
General  H.  Haupt,  Baltimore: 

Spare  no  efforts  to  send  trains  to  bring  in  the  wounded.     It  is  said 
/that  the  road  from  Baltimore  to  Littlestown,  only  seven  (7)  miles  from 
the  field,  is  in  working  order  and  protected.     If  transportation  by  rail 
cannot  be  had,  provide  it  in  any  other  practicable  mode. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

HANOVER  JUNCTION,  July  4,  1863. 
Major-General  Halleclc,  General-in-Chief: 

All  the  supplies  offered  for  transportation  on  Westminster  branch 
have  been  sent  forward,  and  sidings  at  Relay  are  clear.  Our  arrange 
ments  work  well.  Transportation  of  the  wounded  should  be  via  West 
minster,  to  fill  return  cars.  I  have  so  requested. 

Our  men  rebuilt  entirely  the  bridge  at  this  junction,  three  spans 
about  forty  feet,  this  morning.  They  expect  to  reach  York  to-morrow 
night.  The  reconstruction  of  the  Northern  Central  entire  at  this  time 
may  not  be  an  imperative  military  necessity,  but  as  my  Corps  would  not 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  221 

be  otherwise  employed,  it  is  best  to  do  it.  I  will  endeavor  to  secure  for 
you,  when  I  reach  Hanover,  more  rapid  communication  by  telegraph 
with  Gettysburg 

H.  HAUPT. 

HANOVER,  PA.,  July  4,  1863. 
Major-General  HallecTcf  General-in-Chief: 

I  am  now  at  Hanover  Station.  A  bridge  is  broken  between  this 
place  and  Littlestown.  I  will  proceed  at  once  to  repair  it,  and  commence 
to  send  off  wounded;  then  return  and  take  the  Gettysburg  Railroad  and 
commence  repairing  it.  It  will  be  well  to  make  a  good  hospital  in  York, 
with  which  place  I  expect  in  two  days  to  be  in  communication  by  rail.  \s 
Until  then,  temporary  arrangements  can  be  made  for  wounded.  I  learn 
that  the  wire  is  intact  for  nine  miles  towards  Gettysburg.  I  will  have 
it  repaired,  and  communicate  any  information  of  importance  that  I  can 
obtain. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

HANOVER,  PA.,  July  4,  1S63,  4  p.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck,  General-in-Chief: 

I  have  just  returned  from  Littlestown.  Bridge  repaired;  trains 
with  wounded  following.  Saw  Captain  Fry,  of  General  Sickles'  staff.  v" 
Have  arranged  to  bring  General  Sickles  by  special  train  to  Washington. 
General  Meade's  Headquarters  said  to  be  nine  miles  from  Littlestown, 
on  Taneytown  road.  I  am  now  starting  towards  Gettysburg  to  repair 
road  and  telegraph.  Captain  Fry  reports  that  Pleasanton  sent  a  note 
to  General  Sickles  last  evening,  saying  he  had  routed  and  driven  the 
enemy;  reported  that  Longstreet  and  Hill  are  both  wounded  and  pris 
oners;  that  3,000  prisoners  passed  through  Littlestown  this  morning; 
that  we  are  in  possession  of  Gettysburg,  and  that  Lee  is  retreating  by 
Chambersburg  road.  I  give  these  reports  as  I  get  them  from  Captain 
Fry.  They  may  not  be  correct.  No  firing  heard  to-day.  Telegram 
from  General  Meade  received  by  courier  says  enemy  retreated  from 
Gettysburg  at  3  A.  M.  He  will  follow  when  rations  are  received  for  men 
and  horses. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-General. 

OXFORD,  PA.,  July  4,  1863, 11  p.  M. 
Major-General  HallecTc,  General-in-Chief: 

Night  has  overtaken  me  at  Oxford,  seven  miles  east  of  Gettysburg. 
We  have  been  at  work  on  a  large  bridge  near  this  town,  which  is  con-r- 
siderably  damaged.  It  will  require  two  hours  to-morrow  to  finish  it, 
when  we  will  proceed  to  Gettysburg.  A  portion  of  track  is  torn  up.  I 
have  found  the  foreman  of  repairs,  and  he  will  commence  to  repair  the 
track  at  daylight.  About  a  mile  of  the  telegraph  wire  is  down  and  wire 
carried  off.  I  have  sent  my  engine  to  junction  for  men  and  material 
to  repair  it.  When  an  office  is  ready  and  line  in  order  to  Gettysburg, 
the  operator  will  report  to  General  Meade's  Headquarters. 

Persons  just  in  from  Gettysburg  report  the  position  of  affairs.  I 
fear  that  while  Meade  rests  to  refresh  his  men  and  collect  supplies,  Lee 
will  be  off  so  far  that  he  cannot  intercept  him.  A  good  force  on  the  line 
of  the  Potomac  to  prevent  Lee  from  crossing  would,  I  think,  insure  his 
destruction. 


222  REMINISCENCES. 

By  11  o'clock  to-night  about  two  thousand  tons  of  supplies  should 
have  been  forwarded  since  yesterday  morning  to  Meade's  army  if  so 
much  has  been  offered  for  transportation.  I  had  arranged  for  1,500  tons 
per  day  on  Western  Maryland  Railroad.  The  reopening  of  the  Northern 
Central  Railroad  from  Hanover  Junction  to  York  will  permit  the  rapid 
and  convenient  removal  of  wounded  to  that  city,  which  is  an  excellent 
location  for  hospitals.  I  expect  to  have  this  completed  by  to-morrow 
(Sunday)  night. 

H.  HAUPT. 

Saturday  night,  July  4,  the  Construction  Corps  reached  the 
last  bridge  on  the  road  to  Gettysburg.  It  was  dark  and  rainy, 
and  the  men  were  required  to  do  their  work  by  the  aid  of  lanterns, 
but  at  such  a  time  personal  convenience  was  not  consulted.  After 
getting  the  work  properly  started,  I  walked  to  Oxford,  10  miles 
from  Gettysburg,  and  passed  the  night  at  the  house  of  a  friend. 


CHAPTEK  XIY. 
MEADE  URGED  IN  VAIN  TO  FIGHT. 

THE  next  morning,  Sunday,  July  5,  and  the  day  after  Lee's 
retreat,  my  friend  drove  me  in  his  buggy  to  Gettysburg.  I 
found  General  Patrick  in  the  square,  and  was  directed  by  him  to 
Ueade's  Headquarters  on  the  Baltimore  pike,  near  Kock  Creek, 
two  and  a  half  miles  from  town.  Here  I  found  Generals  Meade 
and  Pleasanton.  I  informed  them  that  by  noon  that  day  they 
would  be  in  communication  with  Washington,  both  by  rail  and 
telegraph,  at  which  much  surprise  and  gratification  were  expressed, 
as  it  had  been  understood  that  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  had 
been  so  complete  that  two  or  three  weeks  would  be  required  for 
their  renewal. 

As  this  interview  was  an  important  one,  I  propose  to  describe 
it  as  accurately  as  possible.  General  Meade  was  seated  at  a  small 
table  in  a  farm  house;  General  Pleasanton  on  his  left.  I  was 
facing  them  on  the  opposite  side.  They  gave  me  a  brief  history 
of  the  engagement,  during  which  General  Pleasanton  made  the 
remark  that  if  Longstreet  had  concentrated  his  fire  more  in  the 
center  instead  of  scattering  it  over  the  whole  of  our  left  flank  and 
held  on  a  little  longer,  we  would  have  been  beaten.  General 
Meade  made  no  reply.  He  did  not  dissent,  and  I  concluded  from 
this  fact  that  he  acquiesced  to  this  opinion. 

During  the  conversation  General  Barksdales'  sword  was 
brought,  and  a  number  of  relics  of  the  battlefield,  some  of  which 
were  given  to  me. 

After  an  hour  or  more  spent  in  general  conversation,  I  asked 
General  Meade  in  reference  to  his  future  movements,  so  that  I 
could  arrange  for  his  supplies,  and  observed  that  I  supposed  he 
would  march  at  once  to  the  Potomac  and  cut  off  Lee's  retreat.  He 
replied  that  he  could  not  start  immediately.  The  men  required 
rest. 

I  ventured  to  remark  that  the  men  had  been  well  supplied 
with  rations ;  that  they  had  been  stationary  behind  the  stone  walls 
during  the  battle ;  that  they  could  not  be  footsore ;  that  the  enemy 
before  and  after  the  battle  had  been  in  motion  more  than  our 
army;  that  it  was  but  little  more  than  a  day's  march  to  the  river, 

223 


224  REMINISCENCES   OF 

and  that  if  advantage  were  not  taken  of  Lee's  present  condition, 
lie  would  escape. 

To  this  General  Meade  answered  that  Lee  had  no  pontoon 
train  and  that  the  river  was  swollen  by  rains  and  was  not  fordable. 

I  replied:  "Do  not  place  confidence  in  that.  I  have  men 
in  my  Construction  Corps  who  could  construct  bridges  in  forty- 
eight  hours  sufficient  to  pass  that  army,  if  they  have  no  other  mate 
rial  than  such  as  they  could  gather  from  old  buildings  or  from  the 
woods,  and  it  is  not  safe  to  assume  that  the  enemy  cannot  do  what 


we  can." 


There  was  more  conversation  on  the  subject.  As  a  class-mate 
of  General  Meade  at  West  Point,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  express  my 
opinions  freely  without  fear  of  offense.  I  could  not,  however,  re 
move  the  idea  from  General  Meade  that  a  period  of  rest  was  nec 
essary. 

I  left  much  discouraged,  and  as  soon  as  practicable,  com 
municated  the  situation  to  General  Halleck  at  Washington,  in 
hopes  that  something  could  be  done  to  urge  General  Meade  to  more 
prompt  action  than  he  appeared  to  contemplate.  I  took  an  engine 
the  same  night  after  the  interview  with  General  Meade  and  went 
to  Washington  to  make  a  report  to  General  Halleck  in  person  early 
on  Monday  morning,  July  6. 

General  Meade  informed  me  that  he  proposed  to  move  his 
Headquarters  towards  Creagerstown,  but  there  was  nothing  to  in 
dicate  any  disposition  to  move  rapidly  with  any  considerable  por 
tion  of  his  force  to  cut  off  Lee's  retreat,  and  I  left  him  with  the 
impression  upon  my  mind  that  there  would  be  no  advance  of  any 
considerable  portion  of  the  army  for  some  days,  and  that  Lee 
would  be  sure  to  escape  and  the  fruits  of  the  victory  be  lost.  These 
fears  were  realized,  although  Lee  did  not  cross  the  river  until 
July  14. 

At  the  opening  of  the  "Northern  Pacific  Railroad  in  1884,  of 
which  I  was  General  Manager,  President  Arthur  and  Secretary  of 
War  Eobert  T.  Lincoln  were  invited  guests.  Lincoln  sent  word 
that  he  wished  to  see  me,  and  when  I  presented  myself  he  inquired 
about  information  given  by  me  immediately  after  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  He  said  that  upon  entering  his  father's  room  one 
day  he  found  him  in  great  trouble,  and  upon  inquiring  the  cause 
the  President  said  that  information  had  been  received  from  Gen 
eral  Haupt  which  led  to  the  belief  that  Meade  did  not  intend  im 
mediately  to  follow  up  his  victory  and  that  Lee  would  escape.  He 
asked  for  my  exact  recollection  of  the  facts,  which  I  gave  him  as 
here  stated. 

My  telegram  to  General  Halleck  of  Sunday,  July  5,  after  the 
interview  with  General  Meade,  shows  very  clearly  that  I  had  little 


11 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  227 

hope  that  Lee  would  be  intercepted  and  prevented  from  crossing 
the  river,  and  my  hope  then  was,  by  a  very  prompt  movement  to 
head  him  off,  intercept  his  supplies  and  reinforcements  and  starve 
him  out,  or  compel  him  to  fight  again  under  unfavorable  conditions. 

BALTIMORE,  MDV  July  5,  1863. 
Major-General  Halleck,  General-in-Chief: 

I  have  just  returned  from  Headquarters  of  General  Meade.    I  left 
him  about  1  P.  M.,  about  moving  for  Creagerstown.    The  main  body  of  the 
enemy  appears  to  have  taken  the  Hagerstown  road.    They  will  reach  the 
Potomac  before  Meade  can  possibly  overtake  them.     Would  it  not  be  well  ,  ,,. 
to  send  immediately  forces  to  occupy  all  the  gaps  on  the  side  of  Shenan-  " 
doah  Valley;  ascertain  condition  of  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  and,  by 
a  very  prompt  movement,  throw  a  large  force  on  Front  Royal  to  inter 
cept  them  ?    I  will  see  you  to-morrow. 

H.  HAUPT. 

On  Monday  morning  I  had  a  personal  interview  with  General 
Halleck,  and  explained  verbally  the  situation,  then  I  called  upon 
the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  President  separately.  After  the 
interview  with  General  Halleck  I  returned  to  my  office  and  wrote 
the  following  letter,  in  which  I  assumed,  from  the  position  taken 
by  General  Meade,  that  he  would  certainly  permit  Lee  to  escape, 
and  suggested  the  course  that  should  be  pursued  to  minimize  to 
some  extent  the  evil  effects : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  0.,  July  6, 1863. 
Major-General  Halleck,  General-in-Chief  U.  8.  Army. 

GENERAL:  I  fear  that  in  my  brief  statement  this  morning  I  did 
not  express  clearly  the  idea  I  intended  to  convey.  I  did  not  mean  to 
suggest  that  the  principle  of  concentration  should  be  violated,  for  in  this 
I  am  well  aware,  has  heretofore  consisted  the  enemy's  strength  and  our 
weakness.  My  idea  is  this: 

Lee  left  Gettysburg  Saturday  morning  in  retreat,  Meade  more  than 
one  day  behind. 

Lee  would  nearly  have  reached  Hagerstown  when  Meade  started 
from  Gettysburg. 

From  Hagerstown  to  South  Mountain  Gap  or  from  Frederick  to 
same  point  the  distance  is  about  thirteen  miles.  Lee  could  reach  the 
Gap  of  South  Mountain  one  day  ahead  of  Meade,  unless  the  Gap  was 
occupied  by  French,  and  I  was  not  aware  of  the  fact  until  to-day  that 
he  had  such  orders. 

By  holding  Meade  in  check  at  the  Gap  of  South  Mountain  for  a 
few  days,  the  fords  would  become  passable  and  Lee  could  cross  the  Po 
tomac. 

Once  across,  he  could  move  more  rapidly  than  we  could  follow  and 
instead  of  attempting  it,  Meade  would  probably  move  on  the  inside  track 
east  of  the  Blue  Ridge. 

In  this  condition  of  affairs,  the  railroad  would  be  indispensable, 
and  as  the  country  must  now  be  nearly  clear  of  the  enemy,  a  very  small 
force  could  occupy  the  Gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  make  descents  into  the 
valley  to  cut  off  any  trains  of  supplies  sent  to  relieve  Lee  and  put  the 
Manassas  Gap  and  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroads  in  condition  for  use, 
if  sudden  demand  should  be  made  upon  them. 


228  REMINISCENCES   OF 

Even  if  Lee's  army  should  be  captured  or  dispersed  north  of  the 
Potomac,  I  suppose  the  railroad  will  be  required  for  a  movement  south 
to  strike  rapidly  and  follow  up  our  advantages  until  every  strong  place 
has  fallen  and  the  rebellion  be  completely  crushed. 

If  the  enemy  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Potomac,  then  a  large  num 
ber  of  troops  could  be  sent  by  rail  to  Front  Royal  or  Gordonsville,  in 
stead  of  following  the  enemy  by  marches. 

McDowell  used  to  say  that  I  was  always  seeking  to  anticipate  posi 
tions  for  a  year  ahead  and  provide  for  them,  but  if  this  be  a  fault,  I 
think  it  is  on  the  safe  side;  better  look  too  far  ahead  than  not  be  ready. 

Excuse  my  suggestions ;  they  may  be  and  probably  are  of  no  value 
whatever.  I  have  neither  your  judgment,  experience,  nor  sources  of 
information,  but  anxious  to  do  something  to  finish  up  the  war.  I  feel 
better  satisfied  with  myself  if  I  make  them  than  if  I  do  nothing. 

I  am  again  off  for  Frederick  to-day. 

Very  respectfully  submitted, 

H.  HAUPT. 

The  foregoing  letter,  which  I  find  in  my  old  letter-book,  is 
important  as  throwing  light  upon  a  point  on  which  I  had  some 
doubts. 

I  had  been  with  Meade  until  noon  Sunday,  July  5.  I  then 
spent  two  or  three  hours  in  walking  over  the  battlefield,  and  on 
Monday,  July  6,  I  was  in  Washington  and  wrote  the  above  letter. 
It  shows  that  at  that  early  date  (Monday,  July  6),  I  anticipated 
the  escape  of  Lee,  which  was  not  accomplished  until  July  14,  and 
that  I  sought  to  repair  the  error  in  part  by  rapid  movements  to  in 
tercept  his  supplies  and  embarrass  his  retreat. 

It  is  ungenerous  to  criticise  faults,  and  it  is  always  easy,  after 
an  event,  to  say  what  might  have  been ;  but  so  far  as  my  opinions 
are  concerned,  they  were  matters  of  record  before,  and  not  after 
the  event.  I  clearly  predicted  what  would  probably  occur,  and 
what  did  actually  occur,  and  I  am  probably  largely  responsible 
for  what  has  been  denounced  as  an  act  of  great  injustice  to  Gen 
eral  Meade  in  the  correspondence  between  himself  and  the  Presi 
dent  and  General  Halleck,  which  caused  him  to  ask  to  be  relieved 
from  the  command. 

My  ideas  of  the  situation  then,  and  I  have  seen  no  reason  to 
change  them  since,  can  be  briefly  stated. 

Lee's  army  had  been  badly  beaten ;  it  was  fatigued,  much  more 
than  ours,  from  forced  marches  and  charges ;  it  had  suffered  great 
losses :  it  must  have  been,  to  a  great  extent,  dispirited  and  demor 
alized,  and,  it  was  reasonable  to  suppose,  very  short  of  artillery 
ammunition  which  could  not  be  supplied  north  of  the  Potomac. 

In  this  condition  retreat  was  interrupted  by  an  impassable 
river.  The  army  was  in  a  trap.  It  must  either  find  means  to  get 
across  that  river,  fight  another  battle,  or  surrender. 

Meade's  army  could  have  reached  the  Potomac  certainly  in 
less  than  two  days ;  it  was  less  fatigued  than  its  enemy ;  it  would 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  229 

be  marching  towards  its  base  of  supplies  via  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad ;  no  large  supply  of  rations  was  required  and,  as  General 
Ingalls  reported,  they  had  an  abundance ;  they  had,  I  understood, 
two  pontoon  trains  for  bridges,  and  there  was  no  large,  if  any, 
force  of  the  enemy  on  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac,  for  Lee  had 
carried  with  him  into  Pennsylvania  all  his  available  forces. 

NOAV,  it  is  possible  that  if  Meade  had  attacked  Lee  in  a  strong- 
defensive  position,  the  enemy  would  have  fought  desperately  so 
long  as  their  scant  supply  of  ammunition  lasted,  and  our  losses 
might  have  been  heavy,  although  I  cannot  believe  that  the  result 
would  have  been  disastrous  even  then. 

But  this  was  not  necessary.  Meade  could  have  taken  position 
below  Lee  on  the  river,  covering  Washington  and  his  base  of  sup 
plies  at  the  same  time.  He  could  have  chosen  a  spot  readily  de 
fensible  against  attack,  and  thrown  a  part  of  his  force,  by  means 
of  his  bridges,  across  the  river,  keeping  them  within  supporting 
distance.  This  force  could  safely  have  been  spared  and,  if  neces 
sary  in  case  of  attack,  could  have  been  recalled.  A  force  on  the 
south  side  with  a  small  amount  of  artillery  would  have  effectually 
cut  off  all  reinforcements  and  supplies,  and  the  construction  of 
bridges  under  fire  would  never  have  been  attempted.  Lee  would 
never  have  renewed  the  attack  if  Meade  had  occupied  a  defensible 
position ;  he  would  have  sent  in  a  flag  of  truce  and  capitulated  then 
and  there. 

This  result  I  anticipated  until  after  the  conference  with 
Meade  on  Sunday  morning.  After  that,  I  had  but  little  doubt  that 
Lee  would  escape,  and  directed  my  attention  to  the  best  means  of 
repairing  the  damage  that  would  be  caused  by  such  disaster. 

To  build  a  bridge  across  the  Potomac  I  knew  to  be  a  very  / 
simple  matter,  if  unmolested  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  The  photo 
graphs  and  accompanying  printed  explanations  that  had  been  sent 
to  nearly  all  the  Corps  commanders  would  have  enabled  any  intel 
ligent  engineer  officer  to  construct  bridges  from  timbers  cut  in  the 
woods  and  from  material  from  old  buildings ;  and  the  fact  is  that 
the  enemy  did  build  their  bridges  precisely  as  I  had  predicted  that 
they  would. 

Assuming  that  the  enemy  would  succeed  in  crossing  the  Poto 
mac,  and  continue  their  retreat  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley  towards 
Front  Royal  and  Staunton,  the  question  then  was,  what  move 
ments  should  be  made  by  the  Federal  army  ? 

To  follow  after  the  enemy  would  be  folly.  It  would  be  like 
a  tortoise  attempting  to  catch  a  greyhound.  Lee  would  be  moving 
towards  his  base  and  growing  stronger  daily,  while  Meade  would 
be  leaving  his  base  behind  with  an  increasing  line  of  communica- 


230  REMINISCENCES    OF 

tion,  subject  to  constant  interruption  by  guerrillas  and  cavalry 
raids. 

The  Shenandoah  Valley  is  bounded  on  the  east  by  the  high 
range  of  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains,  extending  through  the  State ; 
and  near  the  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge  runs  the  line  of  the  Orange  & 
Alexandria  Railroad  from  Alexandria  through  Fairfax,  Manassas, 
Charlottesville  and  Lynchburg. 

Two  railroads  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge — the  Chesapeake  & 

Ohio  through  Charlottesville,  crossing  at  Rockfish  Gap;  and  the 

road  from  Norfolk  to  Bristol  through  Lynchburg,  crossing  at  Blue 

-'  Ridge  Station.     These  two  railroads  would  be  the  main  sources  of 

supply  for  Lee's  army. 

With  the  bridge  torpedoes  and  the  implements  for  destroying 
track,  described  elsewhere,  a  force  of  cavalry  could  quickly  wreck 
these  roads  and  bridges,  and,  by  occupying  the  gaps  of  the  mount 
ain  through  which  the  common  roads  passed  and  obstructing  them 
with  fallen  trees,  could  prevent  wagons  from  the  east  from  reach 
ing  the  rebel  army. 

This  would  have  cut  off  communication  with  Richmond  and 
the  ammunition  supplies  of  which  they  were  in  need,  and  com 
pelled  them  to  scatter  to  subsist  upon  the  country. 

Then  would  have  been  the  time  to  watch  the  movements  from 
the  mountains  and  strike  blows  when  opportunity  offered,  risking 
a  general  engagement  only  when  the  conditions  were  favorable  for 
success. 

My  letter  to  General  Halleck  outlined  such  a  plan  as  this. 
In  f act,  after  the  escape  of  Lee,  the  line  of  the  Orange  &  Alexan 
dria  Railroad  was  reoccupied  after  some  weeks  of  delay,  and  be 
came  once  more  the  base  of  supplies;  but  the  movements  of  the 
military  were  too  slow,  and  the  advantages  they  might  have  gained 
by  celerity  were  lost. 

With  30,000  men,  the  great  Napoleon  could  beat  100,000. 
He  manoeuvred  until  his  enemy  was  separated,  then  struck  like  a 
thunderbolt,  and  repeated  the  blows  until  his  enemy  was  van 
quished.  After  victory  he  did  not  stop  to  rest  and  let  his  enemy 
recuperate. 

We  had  no  Napoleons  in  the  armies  of  the  East  on  either  side. 
Stonewall  Jackson  was  the  nearest  approach  to  one,  and  if  he  had 
lived  possibly  the  fate  of  the  rebellion  might  have  been  different. 

A  feather's  weight  would  have  turned  the  scale  at  Gettysburg ! 

The  opinion  has  been  expressed  by  some  that  if  Meade  had 

moved  as  I  have  indicated  and  occupied  a  defensive  position  on  the 

-    Potomac  below  Lee's  army,  the  enemy  could  have  reoccupied  the 

Cumberland  Valley  and  drawn  supplies  of  forage  and  rations  from 

this  rich  country.     Lee  certainly,  in  the  condition  of  his  army, 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  231 

would  not  have  attempted  a  retrograde  movement,  and  as  the  Corps 
of  General  Couch,  which  had  not  been  in  action,  occupied  the  Val 
ley,  any  foraging  parties  would  have  been  cut  off*. 

Subsistence  could  have  been  obtained  only  for  a  very  short 
time,  and  ammunition,  of  which  he  was  greatly  in  need,  could  not 
have  been  secured  north  of  the  Potomac.  While  he  might  have 
successfully  resisted  an  attack  from  Meade,  a  renewal  of  the  of 
fensive  in  the  condition  of  his  army  would  have  been  a  desperate 
movement  with  no  prospect  of  success,  and  there  is  no  reason  to 
believe  that  it  would  have  been  attempted.  Lee  was  in  a  trap, 
and  if  he  had  been  prevented  from  crossing  the  river,  he  must 
have  surrendered. 

General  Hunt,  in  the  Century  of  January,  1887,  gives  the 
relative  strength  of  the  contending  armies — Federal  77,208  in 
fantry,  Confederates  59,484;  but  remarks  that  "neither  return  is 
worth  much  except  as  a  basis  for  guessing." 

At  my  last  interview  with  General  Hooker  just  before  he  was 
relieved,  he  informed  me  that  the  total  of  his  effective  men  did  not 
exceed  GOjOOO,  My  report  to  General  Halleck  of  July  1,  from 
information  obtained  from  Colonel  Thomas  A.  Scott,  from  actual 
count  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  Chambersburg  and  Carlisle, 
gave  92,000  men  and  230  pieces  of  artillery,  exclusive  of  Hill's. 

I  have  never  doubted  that  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg  were  largely  in  excess  of  our  own. 

In  an  article  in  the  Century,  General  Longstreet  states  that 
he  objected  to  the  attack  on  the  Cemetery  Ridge  on  the  second  day, 
and  advisd  Lee  to  turn  Meade's  position  by  the  right  flank,  which 
would  have  compelled  a  precipitate  evacuation  by  Meade  of  his 
strong  position  and  compelled  him  to  give  battle  when  the  advan 
tage  of  position  would  have  been  on  the  side  of  the  enemy. 

I  can  see  no  reason  why  such  a  movement  would  not  have  been 
successful.  The  movement  could  readily  have  been  concealed  for 
some  time  by  the  character  of  the  country,  and  before  Meade  could 
have  discovered  it  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  army  could  have 
been  interposed  between  him  and  Washington. 

Another  critic  defends  Lee  and  lays  the  blame  on  Longstreet, 
charging  him  with  dilatory  movements.  It  is  stated  that  Long- 
street  wras  ordered  to  make  an  attack  early  in  the  day,  and  that, 
had  he  done  so,  the  Union  forces  holding  Cemetery  Ridge  would 
have  been  overwhelmed  before  the  arrival  of  reinforcements.  This 
may  be  true  also,  and  shows  how  little  would  have  turned  the  scale 
and  how  narrowly  the  Union  army  escaped  a  disastrous  defeat  and 
gained  a  glorious  victory.  That  the  fruits  of  victory  were  not 
harvested  when  the  opportunity  was  presented  must  ever  remain  a 
source  of  profound  regret. 


CHAPTER  XV. 
OFFICIAL  RECORDS  OF  GETTYSBURG. 

HARRISBURG,  July  6,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

Message  received.  ISTo  U.  S.  M.  cars  on  our  line.  Your  construc 
tion  cars,  eight  in  number,  are  on  Northern  Central,  but  cannot  be 
spared  from  your  operating  force.  The  roads  centering  at  Philadelphia 
can  give  you  only  number  of  cars  that  may  be  needed  if  your  own  and  B. 
&  O.  and  Feltons  are  not  sufficient.  Please  advise  fully.  Lee's  army  is 
flying  for  Potomac;  the  Cumberland  Valley  from  Greenvillage  south  is 
full  of  them.  General  Conch  is  harassing  them.  Captured  500  pris 
oners,  100  wagons  and  three  pieces  artillery  near  Greencastle  last  night. 

If  good  forces  are  thrown  forward  from  Frederick  to  Boonsboro 
and  Hagerstown,  most  of  Lee's  army  will  be  captured. 

THOMAS  A.  SCOTT. 

July  6,  1863,  the  President  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck: 

I  left  the  telegraph  office  a  good  deal  dissatisfied.  I  see  a  dispatch 
from  General  French  saying  the  enemy  is  crossing  his  wounded  over 
th»  river  in  flats;  still  later,  another  dispatch  from  General  Pleasanton, 
by  direction  of  General  Meade,  to  General  French,  stating  that  the  main 
army  is  halted,  because  it  is  believed  the  rebels  are  concentrating,  and 
is  not  to  move  until  it  is  ascertained  that  the  rebels  intend  to  evacuate 
Cumberland  Valley. 

These  things  all  appear  to  me  to  be  connected  with  a  purpose  to 
cover  Baltimore  and  Washington  and  get  the  enemy  across  the  river 
again  without  a  further  collision,  and  they  do  not  appear  to  be  con 
nected  with  a  purpose  to  prevent  his  crossing  and  to  destroy  him.  I  do 
fear  the  former  purpose  is  acted  upon,  and  the  latter  rejected. 

Although,  perhaps,  it  was  more  the  concern  of  some  other 
officer  to  do  so,  I  addressed  to  the  presidents  of  the  Boston  & 
Worcester;  ^"ew  Haven,  Hartford  &  Springfield;  Camden  & 
Amboy;  Philadelphia,  Wilmington  &  Baltimore;  Cleveland  & 
Toledo;  Pitteburg,  Columbus  &  Cincinnati;  Pennsylvania 
Central ;  Indiana  Central ;  Cleveland  &  Pittsburg ;  New  Jersey 
Railroad  &  Transportation  Co.;  New  York  &  New  Haven;  and 
Michigan  Southern  Eailroads  this  telegram : 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  July  6, 1863. 

I  am  informed  by  the  Quartermaster  General  that,  in  order  to 
reap  the  fruits  of  victory,  a  large  number  of  fresh  horses  are  most 
urgently  required.  They  are  needed  to  recruit  the  cavalry  and  restore 
the  batteries  to  a  condition  of  efficiency.  Extraordinary  efforts  should 

232 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  235 

be  made  by  the  officers  of  all  railroads  over  which  horses  are  transported 
to  push  them  forward  without  delay,  day  and  night. 

Please  give  this  subject  prompt  personal  attention.  In  no  other 
way  can  more  efficient  service  be  rendered  at  this  time  to  the  country. 
The  enemy  must  not  escape  if  in  our  own  power  to  prevent  it. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-General, 
Chief    of  Construction   and    Transportation 

United    States    Military  Railroads. 

General  Halleck  to  General  Meade  July  7,  1363 : 

You  have  given  the  enemy  a  stunning  blow  at  Gettysburg.  Fol 
low  it  up  and  give  him  another  before  he  can  reach  the  Potomac.  When 
he  crosses,  circumstances  will  determine  whether  it  will  not  be  best  to 
pursue  him  by  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  or  on  this  side  of  the  Blue 
Ridge.  There  is  strong  evidence  that  he  is  short  of  artillery  ammuni 
tion,  and  if  vigorously  pressed,  he  must  suffer. 

My  operations  during  the  week  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg 
are  summarized  in  the  following  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  7,  1863. 

SIR:  I  herewith  submit  a  brief  report  of  operations  in  the  Mili 
tary  Railway  Department  for  the  last  week. 

On  Monday,  June  29,  acting  under  Special  Orders  286,  a  copy  of 
which  is  inclosed,  I  repaired  to  Baltimore  intending  to  join  General 
Meade  at  Frederick  and  ascertain  the  condition  and  requirements  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Finding  the  communications  broken  both  by  rail  and  telegraph, 
and  the  road  near  Sykesville  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  I  concluded 
to  proceed  to  Harrisburg,  ascertain  the  precise  condition  of  affairs,  then 
work  my  way  by  some  means  to  General  Meade  and  inform  him  what  de- 
jrree  of  assistance  and  cooperation  he  might  expect  from  the  Pennsyl 
vania  forces. 

Owing  to  the  interruptions  of  travel,  I  proceeded  to  Harrisburg 
via  Reading,  arrived  in  that  city  Tuesday  morning,  spent  several  hours 
with  Governor  Curtin  and  Thomas  A.  Scott,  and  learned  the  position 
of  affairs. 

I  had  written  to  the  Governor  from  Falmouth  soon  after  the  battle 
of  Chancellorsville,  informing  him  that  the  enemy  would  soon  be  in 
Pennsylvania,  and  made  suggestions  of  means  proper  to  be  resorted  to 
to  impede  his  progress  and  protect  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad. 

I  found  that  Colonel  Scott  had  been  very  active  and  efficient,  and 
that  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  had  been  as  well  protected  as  the  short 
time  would  permit. 

Very  extensive  arrangements  had  been  made  to  procure  informa 
tion  from  scouts,  and  I  saw  clearly  that  instead  of  attacking  Harrisburg, 
an  exceedingly  rapid  concentration  of  the  enemy's  forces  had  been  go 
ing  on  that  day  tending  towards  Gettysburg,  evidently  designed  to  fall 
upon  and  crush  in  detail  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  before  it  could  fully 
concentrate  or  its  new  commander  get  it  well  in  hand. 

I  at  once  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck  and  to  General  Schenck 
and  suggested  that  an  engine  be  run  from  Baltimore  to  Westminster 
with  express,  and  a  mounted  courier  be  dispatched  to  General  Meade. 


236  REMINISCENCES    OF 

The  dispatch  was  received  and  it  helped  to  confirm  the  correctness 
of  information  derived  from  other  sources.  It  came  from  the  rear  of 
the  enemy,  while  other  information  could  only  be  derived  from  the  front. 

Wednesday  I  returned  to  Baltimore  and  proceeded  to  the  Relay 
House  on  the  Northern  Central  Railroad.  I  found  the  Western  Mary 
land  Railroad  entirely  without  equipment  or  facilities  for  the  business 
to  be  thrown  immediately  upon  it.  It  had  no  experienced  officers,  no 
water  stations,  sidings  or  turntables,  or  wood  for  a  business  exceeding 
three  or  four  trains  per  day,  while  the  necessities  of  the  service  required 
thirty  trains  per  day  to  be  passed  over  it.  I  had  engines  and  cars  sent 
from  Alexandria  with  full  sets  of  hands.  A  train  of  sawed  and  split 
wood  and  a  supply  of  buckets  was  also  forwarded.  Tanks  were  filled 
by  dipping  water  from  the  streams,  and  with  other  arrangements  re 
quired  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case  we  were  enabled  to  provide  for 
a  transportation  of  1,500  tons  per  day  each  way.  In  two  days  the  army 
was  supplied  not  only  with  everything  required,  but  with  an  excess  which 
has  been  left  for  the  use  of  the  hospitals. 

The  Chief  Quartermaster  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  informed 
me  that  their  supplies  had  at  no  time  become  so  low  that  they  could  not 
have  been  stretched  over  three  days,  and  on  Sunday,  when  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  commenced,  they  had  more  than  they  wished  to  carry 
with  them. 

After  organizing  the  transportation  on  the  Western  Maryland 
Railroad  and  leaving  it  in  charge  of  Adna  Anderson,  Esq.,  the  efficient 
Chief  Engineer  of  Construction,  I  proceeded  to  Hanover  with  a  construc 
tion  train,  passed  over  the  Littlestown  branch;  reconstructed  a  bridge 
that  had  been  broken  down;  found  General  Sickles  [who  was  wounded] 
without  means  of  transportation;  arranged  to  have  him  sent  immedi 
ately  to  Washington;  returned  to  Hanover  and  switched  off  on  Gettys 
burg  Branch;  proceeded  to  Oxford,  where  a  large  bridge  across  the 
Conewago  had  been  burned;  decided  on  mode  of  repair;  set  the  gangs 
at  work,  returned  to  Oxford  and  dispatched  train  to  junction  for  more 
men  and  materials. 

The  next  morning  I  left  instructions  with  foreman  after  finishing 
the  Conewago  bridge,  to  proceed  to  next  bridge,  repair  it,  and  work  on 
to  Gettysburg,  unless  he  received  word  from  me  that  the  enemy,  who 
were  on  the  road  near  Gettysburg  the  previous  afternoon,  were  still 
there.  I  then  procured  a  buggy  and  proceeded  over  the  turnpike  to 
Gettysburg,  finding  no  enemy  except  wounded  at  the  farmhouses,  the 
last  having  retreated  the  previous  evening. 

After  about  three  hours  with  General  Meade  and  other  officers  at 
Headquarters,  I  returned  to  Oxford,  and  after  completing  the  railroad 
to  Gettysburg,  returned  to  Baltimore  Sunday  night  after  a  very  active 
week,  in  which  my  Corps,  both  in  construction  and  transportation,  per 
formed  services  of  very  great  importance.  I  am  particularly  indebted 
to  A.  Anderson,  Esq.,  Chief  Engineer,  for  his  sound  judgment  and  effi 
ciency;  also  to  J.  N.  Du  Barry,  Superintendent  of  Northern  Central 
Railroad,  for  his  active  cooperation.  I  have  presented  to  him,  as  you 
directed,  the  thanks  of  your  Department. 

The  Construction  Corps  is  still  at  work  on  the  bridges  of  the  North 
ern  Central  Railroad,  of  which  nineteen  were  destroyed,  and  in  two 
days  more  I  expect  that  communication  with  Harrisburg  will  be  re 
established. 

I  cannot  speak  in  terms  of  too  strong  commendation  of  the  Corps 
for  Reconstruction  and  Transportation.  No  department  of  the  military 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  237 

service  is  of  more  importance  than  that  which  is  charged  with  con 
structing,  reopening  and  maintaining  communications  and  forwarding 
supplies.  Volunteers  have  always  been  ready  for  any  service,  however 
dangerous.  At  the  second  battle  of  Manassas  General  Kearney  desired 
me  to  run  a  pilot  engine  over  the  road,  in  advance  of  his  troop  trains, 
after  a  train  had  been  fired  upon  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  and  men 
were  found  to  perform  the  service  without  hesitation. 

Employes  of  the  Transportation  Department  have  remained  at 
stations  long  after  they  had  been  evacuated  by  the  military  in  retreat, 
and  have  brought  away  stores  to  save  them  from  the  enemy.  At  the 
battle  of  Fredericksburg  a  small  force  of  carpenters,  under  E.  C.  Smeed 
and  G.  W.  Nagle,  superintendents  of  bridge  construction,  worked  for 
nearly  half  a  day  under  fire,  until  their  ropes  were  cut,  the  pulleys 
smashed,  and  the  timbers  knocked  about  with  shells.  A  military  force 
of  200  men,  which  had  been  detailed  to  assist,  straggled  off  soon  after 
the  action  commenced,  not  leaving  a  single  man. 

These  men  are  not  in  a  position  to  acquire  military  distinction 
or  rewards,  but  I  would  fail  in  my  duty  if  I  omitted  to  signify  to  you  my 
high  appreciation  of  the  labors,  services,  courage  and  fidelity  of  the 
Corps  for  Construction  and  Transportation  in  the  Department  of  II.  S. 
Military  Eailroads,  and  suggest  that  some  recognition  of  their  services 
would  be  a  great  encouragement  to  men  who  so  richly  deserve  it. 
Very  respectfully  submitted, 

H.  HAUPT, 

In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton, 

Secretary  of  War. 

July  7,  1863,  General  Halleck  to  General  Meade: 

I  have  seen  your  dispatch  to  General  Couch  of  4:40  p.  M.  You 
are  perfectly  right.  Push  forward  and  fight  Lee  before  he  can  cross 
the  Potomac. 

July  8, 1863,  General  Halleck  to  General  Meade : 

There  is  reliable  information  that  the  enemy  is  crossing  at  Will- 
iamsport.  The  opportunity  to  attack  his  divided  forces  should  not  be 
lost.  The  President  is  urgent  and  anxious  that  your  army  should  move 
against  him  by  forced  marches. 

July  8,  1863,  General  Meade  to  General  Halleck,  3  p.  M.  : 

My  army  is  and  has  been  making  forced  marches  short  of  rations 
and  barefooted.  One  Corps  marched  yesterday  and  last  night  over 
thirty  miles. 

July  8,  1863,  General  Halleck  to  General  Meade: 

You  will  have  sufficient  forces  to  render  your  victory  certain.  My 
only  fear  now  is  that  the  enemy  may  escape  by  crossing  the  river. 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  July  7,  1863. 
Brigadier-General  Haupi,  in  Charge  of  Railroads. 

GENERAL:  The  following  is  a  copy  of  telegram  sent  you  on  the 
4th  inst.,  viz. : 

Adams  Express,  by  Mr.  Shoemaker,  Superintendent,  proposes  to  organize  and  send 
forward  a  hospital  corps  to  assist  in  caring  for  and  removing  the  wounded  with  stores, 


238  REMINISCENCES   OF 

supplies,  men,  vehicles  and  spring  wagons.  They  ask  transportation  to  Westminster  by 
Summit  Railway  for  men  and  material.  The  Secretary  of  War  has  consented,  and  referred 
them  to  you  for  such  transportation  as  can  be  furnished  by  rail  without  interfering  with 
forwarding  of  supplies  which  the  army  needs  to  enable  it  to  pursue  the  enemy — advising 
them  at  the  same  time  that  probably  the  best  and  speediest  route  will  be  with  their  spring 
wagons  over  the  turnpike  roads  from  Baltimore  to  Westminster.  Also,  that  latest  reports 
show  eleven  hundred  (1100)  ambulances  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Let  nothing  interfere  with  the  supply  of  rations  to  the  men  and  grain  for  the  horses. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

(Signed)  M.  C.  MEIGS, 

Quartermaster  General. 
By  order  of  Quartermaster  General. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

CHAS.  THOMAS, 
Colonel  and  Assistant  Quartermaster  General. 

PLANE  No.  4,  MD.,  July  8,  1863. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton: 

The  blockade  at  Frederick  is  raised.  Everything  now  works 
smoothly.  I  am  on  my  way  to  Harrisburg  to  open  the  Cumberland  Val 
ley  Railroad,  which  is  now  very  necessary  for  army  operations. 

H.  HAUPT. 

A  telegram  to  M.  0.  Meigs,  Quartermaster-General,  dated 
Frederick,  July  8,  1863,  announced  that  a  train  blockade  at  that 
point  had  been  relieved ;  that  fifteen  trains  had  been  returned,  "and 
I  am  needed  here  no  longer."  Also  this  : 

I  will  return  immediately  to  Harrisburg  and  pass  through  the  line 
to  Hagerstown  as  fast  as  we  can  get  possession.  We  should  be  able  to 
capture  many  prisoners  and  take  wagons  and  ambulances  and  perhaps 
artillery  before  the  enemy  can  cross  the  river.  The  late  rains  and  bad 
roads  will  help  us,  but  I  do  not  believe  we  can  prevent  Lee's  army  from 
crossing.  I  could  build  trestle-bridges  of  round  sticks  and  floor  with 
fence  rails.  It  is  too  much  to  assume  the  rebels  cannot  do  the  same.* 

Other  suggestions  were  made  with  the  request  that  if  General 
Meigs  concurred  in  their  expediency,  he  should  talk  the  matter 
over  with  General  Halleck.  I  did  not  wish  to  appear  officious  by 
too  frequent  suggestions  to  my  superior  officers. 

Under  date  July  8,  1863,  3  P.  M.,  General  Meade  telegraphed 
General  Halleck : 

My  information  as  to  the  crossing  of  the  enemy  does  not  agree 
with  that  just  received  in  your  dispatch.  His  whole  force  is  in  position 
between  Funkstown  and  Williamsport. 

My  army  is  and  has  been  making  forced  marches,  short  of  rations 
and  barefooted.  One  Corps  marched  yesterday  and  last  night  thirty 
miles. 

This  statement  that  the  army  was  short  of  rations  and  bare 
foot  is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  report  of  the  Chief  Quartermaster 
that  their  supplies  had  at  no  time  become  so  low  that  they  could 
not  have  been  stretched  over  three  days,  and,  on  Sunday,  July  5, 

*  NOTE. — This  refers  to  a  remark  made  to  me  by  General  Meade  on  Sunday 
morning,  July  5,  that  the  enemy  had  no  pontoon  trains,  that  the  river  was  up  and 
he  could  not  cross.  He  did  not  cross  until  the  14th,  during  which  time  he  had  ample 
time  to  construct  bridges,  in  fact,  double  the  time  required. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  239 

when  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  commenced,  they  had  more  than 
they  wished  to  carry  with  them. 

As  the  Chief  Quartermaster  was  the  officer  whose  duty  it  was 
to  know  the  condition  of  the  supplies,  and  as  the  amount  was  so 
large  on  the  5th  that  it  was  necessary  to  leave  a  surplus  for  the 
use  of  the  hospitals,  and  as  the  reconstruction  of  the  railroad  to 
Gettysburg  was  completed  by  noon  Sunday,  July  5,  and  trains  run 
ning  constantly  to  Baltimore  and  Washington,  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  the  army  could  be  barefoot  and  out  of  rations  on 
the  8th.  * 

If  some  Corps  or  Brigade  happened  to  be  short,  it  must  have 
resulted  from  inequalities  of  distribution,  which  could  have  been 
remedied  quickly  and  easily.  Besides,  in  moving  towards  the  line 
of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  Meade  would  have  been  moving 
towards  and  not  from  his  proper  base  of  supplies. 

HANOVER,  July  9, 1863, 1 :20  p.  M. 
General  M.  0.  Meigs: 

I  am  on  my  way  to  Gettysburg  again.  Find  things  in  great  con 
fusion.  Eoad  blocked ;  cars  not  unloaded ;  stores  ordered  to  Gettysburg, 
where  they  stand  for  a  long  time,  completely  preventing  all  movement 
there ;  ordered  back  without  unloading ;  wounded  lying  for  hours  without 
ability  to  carry  them  off;  all  because  the  simple  rule  of  promptly  un 
loading  and  returning  cars  is  violated. 

I  have  ordered  my  track  gangs  from  Alexandria  to  Gettysburg, 
to  be  sent  to  Chambersburg  by  wagon,  to  repair  Hagerstown  road. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

SOUTH  MOUNTAIN,  July  10,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

The  enemy  is  in  force  at  Hagerstown.  We  move  towards  that 
place  to-day.  General  Meade  wishes  you  to  refer  to  General  Couch 
for  information  as  to  affairs  north  of  that  place;  we  only  know  that 
the  enemy  is  there.  I  hope  Generals  Couch  and  Smith  will  push  up 
rapidly  and  vigorously;  now  is  the  time. 

KUFUS  INGALLS, 

Brigadier-General. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  8  p.  M.,  July  11,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

It  is  now  reasonably  certain  that  the  railroad  must  be  put  in  order 
to  Hagerstown  as  quickly  as  possible.  Send  your  best  forces.  The 
enemy  evacuated  Hagerstown  last  night  and  our  forces  will  certainly 
move  to  Hagerstown  or  beyond. 

THOS.  A.  SCOTT. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  11,  1863. 
General  R.  Ingalls,  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac: 

The  Northern  Central  Railroad  through  to  Harrisburg  will  not     J 
be  opened  before  Tuesday.     With  great  exertion  I  have  impressed  four 
teams,  and  my  force  of  180  trackmen  is  now  started  to  march  to  Cham 
bersburg.     The  report  of  damages  leads  me  to  expect  great  difficulty 

13 


240  REMINISCENCES   OF 

in  procuring  materials  to  reconstruct  the  Hagerstown  road.  I  go  to 
Chambersburg  to-morrow,  and  will  spare  no  efforts  to  open  the  com 
munication. 

H.  HAUPT. 

July  13,  1863,  General  Halleck  to  General  Meade,  9:  30  P.  M.: 

Yours  of  5  P,  M.  received.  You  are  strong  enough  to  attack  and 
defeat  the  enemy  before  he  can  effect  a  crossing.  Act  upon  your  own 
judgment  and  make  your  Generals  execute  your  orders.  Call  no  coun 
cil  of  war.  It  is  proverbial  that  councils  of  war  never  fight.  Rein 
forcements  are  pushed  on  "as  rapidly  as  possible.  Do  not  let  the  enemy 
escape. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  13,  1863. 
General  M.  C.  Meigs,  Quartermaster-General,  Washington: 

I  am  engaged  with  a  part  of  my  Construction  Corps  in  reconstruct 
ing  the  Hagerstown  Railroad.  Ten  miles  have  been  destroyed  and  ties 
burned.  While  engaged  on  Northern  Central,  Western  Maryland  and 
Gettysburg  roads.  I  requested  T.  A.  Scott  to  send  forces  from  Pennsyl 
vania  Railroad  to  reconstruct  road  to  Hagerstown,  and  get  iron  wherever 
Jhe  could  find  it.  We  could  not  send  it  from  Alexandria  in  time.  400 
tons  of  rails  have  been  procured  from  Cambria.  An  account  will  be 
kept  of  work  and  materials  on  each  road,  to  be  charged  against  trans 
portation  bills.  Any  iron  not  used  can  be  returned. 

H.  HAUPT. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  13,  1863. 
D.  J.  Morrell,  Johnstown,  Pa.: 

The  Government  must  have  the  iron.  Please  send  it  on  without 
delay.  The  reopening  of  the  Hagerstown  Railroad  in  the  shortest  time 
possible  is  an  imperative  military  necessity. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

July  13,  1863. 
A.  Anderson,  Hanover;  J.  H.  Devereux,  Alexandria: 

Send  immediately  twenty-five  yoke  of  our  oxen  with  yokes,  chains, 
drivers,  and  attendants.  Put  them  in  cars  on  receipt  of  this  and  for 
ward  them  by  special  train  to  Chambersburg,  by  most  expeditious  route. 
Ten  miles  of  track  on  Hagerstown  road  have  been  destroyed.  We  must 
cut  and  haul  ties,  and  no  transportation  to  be  had  in  the  country. 
Show  this  telegram  to  railroad  superintendents,  and  ask  them  to  hurry 
the  oxen  along, 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-General. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  14,  1863. 
General  R.  Ingalls,  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac: 

We  have  a  sweet  time  reconstructing  Hagerstown  road.  Rain  or 
drizzle  all  the  time ;  men  work  but  accomplish  little ;  several  bridges  on 
Northern  Central  Railroad  twice  carried  away  since  we  commenced 
to  reconstruct  them.  We  started  a  steam  saw-mill  yesterday;  run  it 
day  and  night;  make  cross-ties  of  slabs,  planks — anything  we  can  get. 
Telegraph  poles  between  this  place  and  Hagerstown  cut  down  and 
burned;  no  poles  or  teams  to  be  had.  Line  must  be  reconstructed  from 
Hagerstown  end.  To-day  I  suppose  the  Northern  Central  Railroad  will 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  243 

be  finished,  when  the  balance  of  my  force,  with  tools  and  material,  will 
be  able  to  get  here ;  the  work  will  then  progress  very  rapidly.  I  marched 
my  track  force  of  180  men  across  mountain;  they  are  doing  good  ser 
vice,  but  want  tools  and  transportation.  Send  me  a  telegram  every 
afternoon  giving  position  of  affairs. 

xi.  jLJ-AU-lr  -L , 

Brigadier-  General. 

On  July  14,  1863,  General  Meade  reported  to  General  Hal- 
leek  that  upon  advancing  his  lines  he  found  the  enemy's  position 
evacuated. 

On  July  14,  1863,  General  Halleck  to  General  Meade,  1 
p.  M.  : 

The  enemy  should  be  pursued  and  cut  up  wherever  he  may  have 
gone.  This  pursuit  may  or  may  not  be  upon  the  rear  or  flank,  as  circum 
stances  may  require.  The  inner  flank  towards  Washington  presents 
the  greatest  advantages.  Supply  yourself  from  the  country  as  far  as 
possible.  I  cannot  advise  details,  as  I  do  not  know  where  Lee's  army 
is,  nor  where  your  pontoon  bridges  are.  I  need  hardly  say  to  you  that 
the  escape  of  Lee's  army  without  another  battle  has  created  great  dis 
satisfaction  in  the  mind  of  the  President,  and  it  will  require  an  active 
and  energetic  pursuit  on  your  part  to  remove  the  impression  that  it  has 
not  been  sufficiently  active  heretofore.* 

[Translated  cipher.] 

WASHINGTON,  July  14,  1863,  3  p.  M. 
Brigadier-General  Haupt: 

Withdraw  all  your  Construction  Corps  from  Northern  Central  Bail- 
road  and  bring  them  as  quickly  as  possible  to  Alexandria.  Lee  has 
crossed  the  Potomac.  M_  ft  ^^ 

Quartermaster  General. 

July  14,  1863. 
General  M.  C.  Meigs:  Quartermaster-General,  Washington: 

Construction  Corps  will  be  ordered  immediately  back  to  Alex 
andria.  This  movement  is  precisely  as  I  expected  and  predicted.  I 
did  not  see  how  we  could  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing.  It  is  now 
of  the  greatest  importance  to  occupy  the  gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and 
push  forces  ahead  to  secure  any  bridges  on  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
Railroad  that  may  still  remain  from  destruction. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-General. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  14,  1863. 
D.  J,  Morrellj  Johnstown: 

No  iron  will  be  required;  the  movement  of  the  army  renders  the 
reconstruction  of  Hagerstown  road  unnecessary.  I  have  requested  T. 
A.  Scott  to  return  all  that  you  have  delivered. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-General, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

*  NOTE. — This  was  the  dispatch  that  induced  Meade  to  ask  to  be  relieved. 
The  word  "disappointment"  was  substituted  for  "dissatisfaction"  in  subsequent  cor 
respondence. 


244  REMINISCENCES   OF 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  14,  1863. 
General  R.  Ingalls: 

The  Winchester  Eoad  cannot  be  relied  upon  for  any  transportation 
whatever.  The  rail  is  strap  iron,  the  supports  rotten.  The  lighter  en 
gines  run  off  the  track  continually.  I  am  moving  my  whole  force  to 
Alexandria.  You  cannot  catch  Lee  by  following  in  his  rear.  The  bridges 
on  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad  which  are  not  burned  should 
be  saved  if  possible;  also  on  Manassas  Gap  Eailroad. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  14, 1863. 
J.  N.  Bu  Barry,  Harrisburg: 

Send  the  construction  forces,  tools  and  material,  back  to  Alexandria 
with  all  possible  expedition. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  14,  1863. 
A.  Anderson,  Esq.,  Hanover: 

Turn  over  your  charge  to  W.  W.  Wright  and  return  to  Alexandria 
with  your  whole  force  with  all  possible  expedition. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  14,  1863. 
E.  C.  Smeed,  G.  W.  Nevin,  Bridgeport: 

Return  to  Alexandria  with  all  your  men,  tools  and  material  with 
out  delay.  Apply  for  transportation  immediately. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  14,  1863. 
Colonel  D.  C.  McCallum,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Construction  Corps,  tools  and  material  ordered  to  repair  to  Alex 
andria.  Assist  in  providing  transportation  by  special  trains.  Order 
back  oxen  if  they  have  been  forwarded. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-  General. 

CHAMBERSBURG,  July  14,  1863. 
A.  Anderson,  Hanover: 

I  would  like  to  leave  Gettysburg  to-morrow  about  noon  and  run 
through  to  Baltimore  the  same  evening.  Can  it  be  arranged  without 
inconvenience? 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier-General. 

On  July  14,  1863,  General  O.  O.  Howard  reports  that  the 
rebels  crossed,  infantry  and  cavalry,  at  a  ford  just  above  Williams- 
port.  The  ford  was  reported  to  be  from  four  to  four  and  a  half 
feet ;  also  that  they  constructed  pontoons  at  a  point  where  there  was 
lumber  and  floated  the  bridge  to  Falling  Waters,  where  the  great 
est  portion  of  the  army  crossed  over. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  245 

On  July  14,  General  Ingalls,  Chief  Quartermaster,  tele 
graphed  General  Meigs  to  ask  me  to  put  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
Railroad  in  order,  adding:  "It  will  be  utterly  fruitless  to  move 
this  army  down  the  Winchester  Valley."  A  similar  telegram  was 
sent  direct  to  me. 


o 


CHAPTER  XVI. 
LEE'S  ESCAPE  UNINTERRUPTED. 

July  15,  1863,  9  A.  M.,  President  Lincoln,  in  reply  to  a  tele 
gram  from  General  Simon  Cameron,  said  : 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  received.  Lee  was  already  across  the 
river  when  you  sent  it. 

I  would  give  much  to  be  relieved  of  the  impression  that  Meade, 
Couch,  Smith  and  all,  since  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  have  striven  only 
to  get  Lee  over  the  river  without  another  fight.  Please  tell  me  if  you 
know  who  was  the  one  Corps  commander  who  was  for  fighting  in  the 
council  of  war. 

On  July  14,  1863,  General  Meade  to  General  Halleck,  2:30 
p.  M.  : 

Having  performed  my  duty  conscientiously  and  to  the  best  of  my 
ability,  the  censure  of  the  President,  conveyed  in-  your  dispatch  of 
1  P.  M.  this  day  is,  in  my  judgment,  so  undeserved  that  I  feel  compelled 
most  respectfully  to  ask  to  be  immediately  relieved  from  the  command 
of  this  army. 

July  16,  1863. 
General  H.  Haupt,  Superintendent  Military  Railroads: 

Your  dispatch  to  General  Ingalls  received.  General  Meade  says 
that  as  soon  as  this  army  crosses  the  Potomac  his  cavalry  will  be  sent 
to  guard  the  gaps  in  the  Blue  Eidge.  General  Ingalls  has  gone  to 
Washington  to-day. 

C.  G.  SAWTELLE, 
Chief  Quartermaster. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

July  16,  1863. 
Brigadier-General  H.  Haupt,  Superintendent  Military  Railroads: 

Your  dispatch  is  received.  I  am  directed  by  the  Major-General 
Commanding  to  say  that  his  bridges  are  not  yet  completed,  but  that 
when  finished,  he  will  pass  over  his  cavalry  and  whole  army,  and  give 
protection  to  the  bridges  your  dispatch  refers  to. 

A.  A.  HUMPHEEYS, 

Chief  of  Staff. 


from  President  Lincoln  to  General  Halleck.  July  20, 
1863: 

Seeing  General  Meade's  dispatch  of  yesterday  to  yourself,  causes 
me  to  fear  that  he  supposes  the  Government  here  is  demanding  of  him  to 
bring  on  a  general  engagement  with  Lee  as  soon  as  possible.  I  am  claim 
ing  no  such  thing  of  him.  In  fact,  my  judgment  is  against  it;  which 

246 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  247 

judgment,  of  course,  I  will  yield  if  yours  and  his  are  contrary.  If  he 
could  not  safely  engage  Lee  at  Williamsport,  it  seems  absurd  to  suppose 
he  can  safely  engage  him  now  when  he  has  scarcely  more  than  two-thirds 
the  force  he  had  at  Williamsport,  while  it  must  be  that  Lee  has  been 
reinforced.  True,  I  advised  General  Meade  to  pursue  Lee  across  the 
Potomac,  hoping,  as  has  proved  true,  that  he  would  thereby  clear  the  , 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  and  get  some  advantages  by  harassing  him 
on  his  retreat.  Those  being  past,  I  am  unwilling  he  should  now  get  into 
a  general  engagement  on  the  impression  that  we  here  are  pressing  him, 
and  I  would  be  glad  for  you  to  so  inform  him,  unless  your  own  judg 
ment  is  against  it. 

A.  LINCOLN. 

ALEXANDRIA,  July  20,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

Following  just  received  from  General  King: 

FAIBFAX  STATION,  July  20,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

Yours  just  received.  My  Headquarters  are  now  at  Fairfax  Court  House,  and  my 
main  force  is  there.  I  will  furnish  any  guard  you  wish  if  you  will  let  me  know  when  and 
where  they  are  wanted.  How  far  is  the  road  now  in  running  order?  Have  you  sufficient 
guards  now  for  your  trains  and  working  parties? 

BUFUS  KING, 
Brigadier-  General. 

So  far  the  guard  furnished  is  sufficient.  If  more  soldiers  are 
needed  to-morrow,  we  will  ask  for  them.  The  General  knows  we  are 
pushing  ahead,  I  suppose,  and  whether  we  should  meet  our  troops  at 
Manassas.  If  not,  would  it  not  be  well  to  have  a  force  advanced  there 
from  Fairfax?  The  third  bridge  is  completed  over  Pope's  head,  and 
workmen  are  on  the  fourth. 

J.  H.  DEVEREUX. 

FAIRFAX  COURT  HOUSE, 

July  21,  1863,  11:30  A.  M. 
General  Haupt,  Chief  of  Construction,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Colonel  Lowell  started  at  daylight  from  Centreville,  to  reconnoiter 
in  the  direction  of  Manassas  and  also  towards  Thoroughfare  Gap.  He 
took  all  our  spare  cavalry  with  him.  You  may  hear  from  him  on  your 
way.  I  can  furnish  you  an  infantry  guard,  one  or  two  companies,  if  you 
desire  it,  from  the  regiment  now  at  Fairfax  Station.  I  will  direct  the 
Colonel  to  follow  your  instructions  in  this  respect. 

RUFUS  KING, 
Brigadier-General. 

July  22, 1863. 
General  Haupt: 

Shall  I  send  construction  force  towards  Warrenton  Junction,  fol 
lowing  General  Gregg,  or  wait  at  Manassas  for  the  present? 

A.  ANDERSON. 


My  answer  was  that  "the  construction  can  follow  General 

Gregg." 

WASHINGTON,  July  23, 1863. 
Brigadier-General  Gregg: 

Your  dispatch  is  received.  I  will  communicate  with  General  Hal- 
leek  and  arrange  to  have  the  railroad  bridge  guarded  by  infantry.  The 
protection  of  the  railroad  requires  that  the  gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and 


248  REMINISCENCES    OF 

fords  of  the  Occoquaii  be  carefully  guarded.  If  your  force  is  insuffi 
cient  for  this  service,  it  should  be  performed  by  others.  If  you  make  a 
reconnoissance  to  Culpepper,  please  inform  me  as  early  as  practicable 
of  the  condition  of  the  road  and  bridges.  If  any  bridges  are  destroyed, 
we  will  at  once,  on  being  advised,  take  measures  to  reconstruct  them. 

H.  HAUPT, 
Brigadier- General. 

ALEXANDRIA  DEPOT,  July  26,  1863. 
General  Herman  Haupt: 

No.  1  train  this  A.  M.  found,  when  a  mile  and  a  half  east  of  Burkes, 
a  rail  taken  out  of  the  track  and  horseshoes  on  rail.  Engine  was  re 
versed  and  brakes  put  hard  down.  Engine  jumped  the  break  and,  with 
two  cars,  passed  on.  Had  it  been  rail  on  opposite  side,  the  whole  train 
would  have  run  off  the  track  down  a  twelve-foot  bank.  Before  train 
was  checked  twelve  rebels  in  grey  and  blue  coats  and  pants,  and  all  with 
guns,  pushed  out  of  bushes,  whilst  the  guard  of  the  Fourth  Delaware 
then  took  a  hand  and,  after  a  few  shots,  jumped  off  the  train  and  had 
a  foot-race  through  the  woods  after  the  rebels.  One  fat  rebel  par 
ticularly  distinguished  himself  in  getting  out  of  sight.  The  guard  saved 
the  train  and  its  convoy,  and  Providence  saved  a  smash-up  which,  for 
some  time,  would  have  prevented  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  receiv 
ing  supplies. 

It  is  pitiful  that  a  handful  of  rebels  can  be  allowed  the  chance  of 
so  retarding  the  progress  of  our  army  in  such  measure  as  an  accident 
like  this  might  cause.  I  earnestly  ask  that  200  men  be  at  once  sta 
tioned  from  Accotink  to  Burkes.  General  Meade  has  ordered  the  road 
repaired  at  once  to  the  river,  and  the  Rappahannock  bridge  rebuilt. 
All  stores  and  material  have  been  forwarded  to-day  on  regular  time. 

J.  H.  DEVEREUX. 

WASHINGTON,  July  27,  1863. 

Received  10:20  A.  M. 
General  R.  Ingalls,  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac: 

Another  attempt  was  made  to  throw  off  and  capture  our  trains  near 
Burkes  yesterday.  Rails  were  taken  out  and  horseshoes  placed  upon 
the  track.  Fortunately  the  rails  were  taken  up  on  the  inside  and  not 
on  the  outside  of  the  curve,  and  the  train  was  not  thrown  off.  Twelve 
rebels  in  grey  and  blue  costumes,  armed  with  guns,  made  their  appear 
ance  and  were  chased  by  the  train  guard,  but  none  were  captured. 

These  attempts  to  throw  off  trains  are  made  daily,  and  unless  the 
practice  can  be  broken  up,  there  is  no  security  in  your  communications. 
To  operate  the  road  with  reasonable  security,  we  must  have  the  gaps  of 
the  Blue  Ridge  so  occupied  that  Lee's  cavalry  cannot  get  through,  the 
fords  of  the  Occoquan  guarded,  the  country  patrolled  by  cavalry,  and 
notice  given  to  the  inhabitants  that  in  case  of  any  further  attempts  to 
disturb  track  or  telegraph,  all  able-bodied  residents  within  ten  miles 
will  be  arrested  and  placed  under  guard. 

Please  communicate  with  General  Meade  and  have  an  order  issued, 
giving  notice  to  the  inhabitants,  something  to  this  effect : 

"Notice  is  hereby  given  that  if  any  attempt  shall  be  made  to 
destroy  the  track,  bridges,  or  telegraph,  or  any  of  the  lines  of  railroad 
used  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  residents  in  the  vicinity  for  a 
distance  of  ten  miles  will  be  held  responsible  in  person  and  property, 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  251 

and  all  the  able-bodied  citizens  arrested.     If  the  offenders  can  be  dis 
covered,  their  punishment  will  be  death." 

I  will  endeavor  to  see  you  to-morrow.  Would  it  be  well  to  search 
houses  and  seize  arms?  This,  I  know,  is  an  extreme  measure,  but  I 
am  confident  that  those  who  appear  to  be  farmers  during  the  day  are  the 
parties  who  injure  us  at  night. 

H.  HAUPT. 

ALEXANDRIA,  July  23,  1863,  11:20  A.  M. 
General  Rufus  King,  Cenireville : 

Yesterday  morning,  on  returning  from  a  reconnoissance  to  White 
Plains,  I  passed  the  western-bound  train  at  Burkes'  about  5  A.  M.  Con 
ductor  reported  that  his  train  had  been  fired  into  at  Accotink,  eight 
miles  from  Alexandria.  As  I  had  no  train  guard  with  me,  I  returned 
to  Fairfax,  procured  two  companies,  and  scoured  the  woods  about  Acco 
tink,  but  found  no  enemy.  Fresh  horse-tracks,  however,  were  numer 
ous.  I  learn  this  morning  that  before  the  train  passed  rails  had  been 
taken  out  and  obstructions  placed  upon  the  track  by  these  guerrillas, 
but  some  of  the  track  men  had  seen  and  repaired  the  damage. 

These  men  are  supposed  to  be  part  of  Mosby's  gang.  I  heard  of 
them  the  evening  on  which  I  was  over  the  Gap  road  as  being  at  Wolf 
Run  Shoals,  and  I  also  heard  of  the  proximity  of  Mosby's  men  at  Thor 
oughfare  and  other  points. 

To  enable  us  to  operate  the  road  with  any  security,  we  must  have 
cavalry  pickets  along  the  Occoquan  and  at  the  Gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge ; 
also  patrols  through  the  country.  Every  citizen  of  suitable  age  for 
draft,  who  is  not  in  the  army,  should  be  regarded  with  suspicion  and 
closely  watched,  for  I  am  told  that  many  of  them  have  been  exempted 
from  draft  on  condition  of  joining  Mosby's  band,  who  are  guerrillas  by 
night  and  farmers  by  day.  Our  trains  will  be  run  as  much  as  possible 
by  daylight  and  with  train  guards,  but  with  a  heavy  business  we  cannot 
avoid  running  at  night,  and  train  guards  afford  but  little  protection. 

Please  send  copy  of  this  to  General  Gregg.    I  wish  to  examine  the 
line  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad  as  far  as  protection  can  be  y 
afforded  to  our  railroad  forces.     Can  you,  or  can  General  Gregg  ascer-  ' 
tain,  by  a  cavalry  reconnoissance,  the  condition  of  the  railroad  and 
bridges  between  Culpepper  and  Manassas? 

H.  HAUPT, 
In  Charge  of  Military  Railroads. 

The  following  reply  was  received  from  General  King: 

CENTREVILLE,  July  23,  1863,  5:30  p.  M. 
Brigadier-General  Herman  Haupt,  Washington: 

Your  dispatch  is  received.  I  will  employ  my  cavalry  as  far  as 
possible  in  scouting  along  the  line  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Rail- 
road  as  far  as  Bull  Run,  and  also  through  the  country  between  this  •" 
point  and  the  ridge.  They  will  be  instructed  to  watch  narrowly  all 
suspected  persons,  and  to  look  out  especially  for  the  guerrillas  who  make 
up  Mosby's  gang.  I  have  not  force  enough  at  my  command  to  make 
the  reconnoissance  you  wish  towards  Culpepper,  but  I  have  sent  a  copy 
of  your  message  to  General  Gregg,  who  is  at  Briscoe  with  a  brigade  of 
cavalry,  and  requested  him  to  do  it. 

RUFUS  KING, 
Brigadier-  General. 


252  REMINISCENCES   OF 

FAIRFAX  STATION,  July  23,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

I  will  go  out  again  to  White  Plains,  if  your  road  there  is  in  work 
ing  condition.  I  would  like  to  leave  early  in  the  morning  from  foot  of 
14th  street,  end  of  Long  Bridge.  Will  you  please  inform  me  if  I  can 
be  sent  through  quickly  on  a  special,  and  at  what  hour  I  must  start?  It 
7  is  very  probable  now  that  we  will  wish  to  begin  using  the  O.  &  A.  R.  R. 
as  well  as  the  Manassas  Gap.  I  wish  to  send  grain  now  to  Gainesville. 

RUFUS  INGALLS, 
Brigadier- General, 

Chief  Quartermaster. 

ALEXANDRIA  DEPOT,  July  27,  1863. 
Colonel  D.  C.  McCallum: 

To  post  you  I  would  report:  In  addition  to  reconstructing  road 
from  Alexandria  to  Warrenton  and  from  Manassas  to  White  Plains,  we 
have  forwarded  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  this  last  opening  five  hun 
dred  and  thirty  loaded  cars,  sending  to  Warrenton  Junction,  forty  miles, 
yesterday,  one  hundred  and  twenty-seven  loaded  cars,  and  to-day  one 
hundred  and  fifty-nine  loaded  cars.  Part  of  these  have  been  sent  from 
Warrenton  Junction  to  Warrenton,  but  the  branch  track  is  still  bad  and 
greasy. 

Last  night  two  engines  were  three  hours  getting  ten  cars  up  the 
branch.  The  army  reached  Warrenton  before  the  road  was  opened  be 
yond  Manassas,  short  and  out  of  everything.  One  hundred  thousand 
men  and  eight  thousand  animals  are  to  be  fed  daily,  but  they  desire 
V  ten  days'  rations  to  be  sent  at  once,  at  eight  tons  to  the  car,  and  most 
of  them  had  ten  tons.  We  sent  to-day  twelve  hundred  and  seventy-two 
tons  with  the  last  train  this  P.  M.  We  cleared  every  loaded  car  from  the 
yard  and  they  have  reached  Warrenton  Junction,  but  the  branch  track 
detains  part  of  them  there,  and  with  all  other  demands,  that  of  press 
ing  the  road  forward  and  reconstructing  Rappahannock  bridge  is  not 
the  least  in  importance. 

J.  H.  D. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

July  27, 1863,  1  p.  M. 
General  Haupt: 

Your  dispatch  was  read  to  General  Meade,  who  said  he  had  com 
municated  with  General  Heintzelman  to  know  at  what  points  his  troops 
would  guard  the  roads;  soon  as  informed,  he  will  cause  them  to  be 
properly  protected  within  his  lines.  It  would  certainly  seem  to  be  the 
province  of  General  Heintzelman  to  guard  them  as  far  as  Fairfax. 
Your  suggestion  for  protection  ought  to  be  acted  upon.  It  is  too  late  to 
act  after  an  accident,  and  yet  that  is  our  usual  practice.  I  think  this 
army  will  protect  the  roads  without  failure  this  side  of  Centreville  and 
Manassas.  General  Meade  wishes  to  have  the  bridges  repaired  over  the 
Rappahannock  as  soon  as  possible. 

RUFUS  INGALLS, 
Brigadier-  General. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

July  27,  1863. 
General  Haupt: 

Arrangements  have  already  been  made  to  take  possession  of  the 
south  bank  at  the  Rappahannock  Station  as  soon  as  the  river  is  fordable 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  253 

or  the  pontoons  arrive,  which  have  been  ordered  up  by  rail.    Meantime, 
the  bridge  has  been  secured  from  any  further  interference  by  the  enemy. 
As  soon  as  we  are  on  the  south  bank,  A.  Anderson,  Chief  Engineer  of 
Construction,  and  yourself  will  be  informed. 
By  order  of  General  Meade. 

WARREN, 

Chief  Engineer. 

July  287  1863,  General  Halleck  wrote  a  conciliatory  letter  to 
General  Meade  commending  his  action  in  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg,  and  stated  that  he  should  not  have  been  surprised  or  vexed 
at  the  President's  disappointment  at  the  escape  of  Lee's  army. 
He  thought  that  Lee's  defeat  was  so  certain  that  he  felt  no  little 
impatience  at  his  unexpected  escape.  He  assures  General  Meade 
that  he  had  lost  none  of  the  confidence  which  he  felt  when  he 
recommended  him  for  the  command. 


CHAPTEK  XVII. 

RESTORING  WRECKED  RAILROADS  EXPE- 
DITIOUSLY. 

THE  subsequent  operations  during     my  connection  with  the 
service  were  of  the  usual  character,  and  are  not  of  sufficient 
v      interest  or  importance  to  be  reported  in  detail.     Bridges  were 
destroyed  and  reconstructed,  that  over  Bull  Run  for  the  seventh 
time ;  trains  troubled  by  guerrillas ;  contraband  articles  smuggled 
into  camps  by  sutlers  and  others,  etc.     The  following  served  to 
check  guerrilla  operations: 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

July  30, 1863. 
PROCLAMATION. 

The  numerous  depredations  committed  by  citizens,  or  rebel  soldiers 
in  disguise,  harbored  and  concealed  by  citizens,  along  the  Orange  & 
Alexandria  Railroad  and  within  our  lines,  call  for  prompt  and  ex 
emplary  punishment.  Under  the  instructions  of  the  Government,  there 
fore,  every  citizen  against  whom  there  is  sufficient  evidence  of  his  hav 
ing  engaged  in  these  practices,  will  be  arrested  and  confined  for  pun 
ishment,  or  put  beyond  the  lines. 

The  people  within  ten  miles  of  the  railroad  are  notified  that  they 
will  be  held  responsible  in  their  persons  and  property,  for  any  injury 
done  to  the  road,  trains,  depots,  or  stations  by  citizens,  guerrillas,  or 
persons  in  disguise;  and  in  case  of  such  injury  they  will  be  impressed 
as  laborers  to  repair  all  damages. 

If  these  measures  should  not  stop  such  depredations,  it  will  become 
the  unpleasant  duty  of  the  undersigned,  in  the  execution  of  his  instruc 
tions,  to  direct  that  the  entire  inhabitants  of  the  district  of  country 
along  the  railroad  be  put  across  the  lines,  and  their  property  taken  for 
Government  uses.  GEQ.  G.  MEADE, 

Major- General  Commanding. 

I  applied  for  and  received  authority  to  arm,  drill  and  make 
the  Military  Railroad  organization,  to  some  extent,  self -protective, 
and  procured  action  regulating  passes,  transportation  of  supplies 
and  newsboys. 

GERMANTOWN,  August  1,  1863,  3 :10  p.  M. 
Brigadier-General  Haupt: 

I  am  instructed  by  the  Major-General  Commanding  to  inform  you 
that  we  hold  both  banks  of  the  Rappahannock  near  the  railroad  bridge, 
and  that  its  repair  may  now  be  commenced. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

Major-General, 
254  Chief  of  Staff. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  255 

"We  had  to  be  masters  of  construction  as  well  as  destruction, 
so,  for  the  benefit  of  the  army,  I  submitted  a  report  on  experi 
ments  I  had  made  to  determine  the  most  expeditious  mode  of 
straightening  rails  and  destroying  communications  that  had  been 
broken  by  the  enemy,  as  follows : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  0.,  August  4,  1863. 

To   Major-General   H.    W.   Halteck,    General-in-Chief    United   States 
Army. 

GENERAL:  In  obedience  to  the  instructions  contained  in  Special 
Order,  No.  286,  I  commenced  the  reconstruction  of  the  Cumberland 
Valley  and  Franklin  Railroads,  near  Chambersburg,  Pa.,  for  the  purpose 
of  forwarding  troops  and  supplies  to  Hagerstown,  to  aid  the  armies 
operating  in  that  vicinity. 

I  found  about  ten  miles  of  these  roads  destroyed  in  the  manner 
usually  adopted  by  the  enemy;  the  cross-ties  had  been  piled,  the  fence- 
rails  from  both  sides  of  the  road  mixed  with  them  and  fired;  the  rails 
placed  on  top  of  these  piles,  and  when  heated,  bent  at  various  angles, 
and  left  in  that  condition. 

After  experimenting  for  a  few  hours,  I  found  that  about  three- 
fourths  of  all  the  damaged  rails  could  be  straightened  without  heating, 
and  in  less  than  one-tenth  of  the  time  required  to  injure  them  by  the 
means  which  the  enemy  had  adopted.  The  remaining  fourth  part  could 
also  be  straightened  and  made  fit  for  use,  but  not  without  heating. 

As  a  general  rule,  I  found  that  all  rails  that  had  been  bent  with  a 
curve  of  one  foot  or  more  radius  could  be  straightened  cold  in  from  two 
to  four  minutes  to  each  rail;  while  those  which  had  been  heated  to  a 
high  degree,  and  bent  at  a  sharp  angle,  could  not  be  restored  without 
heating  and  hammering. 

As  the  results  of  these  experiments  may  be  of  much  value  to  the 
public  service,  and  avoid  the  delay  and  expense  of  procuring  new  iron, 
as  has  been  the  usual  practice  heretofore  in  the  reconstruction  of  roads 
that  have  been  injured  by  the  enemy,  I  have  caused  the  operations  to  be 
repeated  and  photographed,  forming  a  series  illustrative  of  the  operation 
of  reconstruction,  as  a  sequel  to  the  series  showing  the  most  expeditious 
and  effectual  modes  of  destruction,  which  formed  the  subject  of  a  former 
report. 

A  very  rapid,  effective  and  portable  contrivance  for  straightening 
rails,  which  I  used  on  the  Hagerstown  Road,  consists  of  five  blocks  of 
wood,  each  about  ten  inches  square  and  five  feet  long.  The  top  block 
was  notched  slightly,  to  receive  the  base  of  the  rail  and  cause  it  to  lie 
with  the  plane  of  the  base  vertical.  The  pieces  of  scantling  three  by 
four  or  four  by  four,  were  placed  across  the  ends.  Twelve  or  sixteen 
men  at  each  end  would  press  down  or  relieve  the  pressure  at  the  words 
of  command,  "down,"  "up."  The  rail  was  moved  forward  or  back  at  the 
word  of  command,  or  turned.  After  a  very  short  drill  the  intelligent 
contrabands,  who  furnished  the  motive  power,  were  able  to  straighten  a 
rail  in  an  average  of  from  two  to  three  minutes  sufficiently  near  to  a 
straight  line  to  permit  it  to  be  laid  in  the  track,  and  so  nearly  straight 
that  a  continuance  of  the  operation  would  not  generally  result  in  any 
improvement.  The  rail,  after  this  operation,  could  be  laid  in  the  track 
and  spiked ;  it  would  be  so  nearly  straight  that  trains  could  be  run  over 
it  safely;  but  a  short  bend  would  always  remain,  wrhich  could  be 
removed  by  the  jack-screw  apparatus  after  it  was  in  the  track. 


256  REMINISCENCES   OF 

After  finishing  the  rails  within  a  convenient  distance,  the  blocks 
were  carried  forward  to  the  next  pile. 

By  distributing  the  gangs,  several  miles  of  rails  could  be  straight 
ened  in  a  day. 

Sometimes  the  rails  would  be  bent  in  the  direction  of  the  plane  of 
the  vertical  rib,  and  be  too  stiff  to  straighten  by  simple  pressure.  In  this 
case  the  rail  was  raised  to  the  height  of  the  head  and  allowed  to  fall  on 
a  cross- tie  at  the  words  of  command,  "ready,"  "drop ;"  once  or  twice  drop 
ping  did  not  fail  to  take  out  the  vertical  bend.  (See  illustration  on 
page  181). 

Another  mode  was  used  very  successfully  in  straightening  a  large 
amount  of  bent  iron  at  the  depot  in  Chambersburg.  In  this  case  the 
power  was  applied  by  means  of  a  rope  attached  to  the  end  of  the  rail, 
forming  a  fulcrum.  Two  posts  firmly  planted  in  the  ground,  about  two 
and  one-half  feet  apart,  would  be  very  convenient  for  straightening 
rails  on  this  plan.  The  rail  must  be  supported  beyond  the  fulcrum,  or  a 
bend  will  be  formed  at  this  point. 

When  the  rail  is  so  much  bent  that  it  cannot  be  straightened  cold, 
it  should  be  thrown  out,  and  no  time  lost  in  attempting  to  improve  it. 
When  the  track  is  laid,  these  rails  should  be  carried  to  a  convenient  place 
where  a  furnace  can  be  prepared  for  heating  them.  Two  parallel  walls 
of  brick,  stone  or  even  of  clay,  with  bars  laid  across  to  hold  the  wood  or 
coal,  will  answer  for  a  furnace.  When  heated,  the  rails  are  laid  upon  a 
straightening  table  and  hammered  until  the  bends  are  removed,  after 
which  the  rail  is  cooled  before  removal  by  pouring  on  water. 

The  straightening  table  is  prepared  in  a  very  simple  manner,  by 
taking  a  piece  of  timber  twelve  inches  square,  and  as  long  as  a  rail, 
placing  two  rails  base  downwards  on  the  top  surface  of  the  timber,  and 
another  rail  base  upwards  between  the  first  two;  the  whole  being  firmly 
spiked,  the  base  of  the  top  rail  forms  the  plane  surface  on  which  the 
rails  are  straightened. 

The  short  bends  or  kinks  in  the  rails,  whether  in  the  track  or  out 
of  it,  are  readily  removed  by  the  apparatus  represented  in  illustration  on 
page  171.  The  pile  of  iron  shown  in  the  picture  is  a  portion  of  that 
destroyed  by  the  rebels  on  the  Loudoun  &  Hampshire  Railroad,  and 
brought  into  Alexandria,  where  it  now  lies.  A  portion  of  this  iron  was 
heated  and  bent  around  trees,  from  which  it  could  be  removed  only  by 
cutting  the  trees  down. 

This  report,  with  the  accompanying  photographs,*  is  very  respect 
fully  submitted  by 

H.  HATJPT, 
Brigadier-  General, 
In  Charge,  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

One  of  the  most  effective  features  of  my  plan  of  organization 
was  approved  as  follows: 

WASHINGTON,  August  7,  1863. 
Major-General  HallecTc,  General-in-Chief  United  States  Army. 

GENERAL  :  The  difficulty  of  procuring  guards  for  the  protection  of 
the  employes  of  the  Military  Railroad  Department  and  for  the  security 


*  NOTE. — The  Photographic  Department  was  under  the  charge  of  Captain 
A.  J.  Russell,  141st  Regiment,  N.  Y.  Volunteers,  a  photographer  and  an  artist  who 
was  specially  detailed  for  the  service  at  my  request.  After  the  war  Captain  Russell 
was  for  many  years  on  the  staff  of  artists  for  Leslie's  Magazine. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  259 

of  the  public  property  entrusted  to  their  care,  induces  me  to  recommend 
that  the  organization  be  made  self -protective. 

I  propose  to  have  the  men  formed  into  companies,  drilled  and 
armed  and  will  proceed  to  carry  this  recommendation  into  effect  if 
approved  by  you,  so  soon  as  the  necessary  orders  are  given  for  arms  and 
ammunition. 

Very  respectfully  submitted, 

H.  HAIJPT, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 

Approved.  Requisitions  for  arms,  etc.,  signed  by  General  Haupt 
will  be  filled. 

August  8,  1863.  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

General-in-Chief. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

August  20,  1863. 
GENERAL  ORDERS, 
No.  78. 

1.  Passes  from  Headquarters  to  be  given  by  the  Provost  Marshal 
General,  or  by  his  authority.    Said  passes  will  authorize  the  return  of  the 
parties,  but  will  not  include  the  transportation  for  property  beyond 
necessary  personal  baggage. 

2.  All  orders  for  transportation  of  property  must  be  given  by  the 
Quartermaster's  Department. 

3.  Supplies  for  officers  may  be  procured  by  sending  an  agent  with 
a  list  of  the  articles  to  be  obtained,  signed  by  a  General  Officer  and 
approved  by  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  or  by  his  authority. 

4.  Sutlers  and  their  property  to  be  entirely  excluded  from  trans 
portation  by  rail  for  the  present. 

5.  Newsboys  will  not  be  permitted  to  travel  on  trains,  but  pack 
ages  of  papers  may  be  sent  to  local  agents,  under  charge  of  a  baggage- 
master,  for  sale  or  distribution. 

6.  No  passes  to  civilians  to  visit  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  shall  be 
given,  except  by  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  and  the  General  in 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

7.  The  principal  depot  quartermasters  at  Washington,  Alexandria 
and  at  other  depots  upon  the  line  of  the  road  can  pass  officers  and  agents 
of  their  departments,  and  also  officers  and  agents  of  other  departments 
traveling  on  necessary  public  business,  who  can  procure  orders  for 
transportation  from  them. 

8.  All  orders  for  cars  must  be  sent  to  the  Superintendent  of  the 
Military  Railroad,  through  the  proper  officers  of  the  Quartermaster's 
Department  in  charge  of  depots. 

^  9.  No  officers,  other  than  those  herein  specified,  will  be  permitted 
to  give  passes  beyond  the  limits  of  their  commands. 

10.  All  boxes  or  packages  sent  to,  or  marked  with  the  name  of  any 
officer  shall  be  accompanied  with  an  accurate  list  of  contents,  and  shall 
be  placed  in  custody  of  the  Provost  Marshal  at  the  place  of  destination, 
to  be  delivered  to  the  consignee  upon  satisfactory  evidence  that  the 
package  contains  necessary  supplies  for  his  individual  use  and  contains 
nothing  else. 

11.  All   persons   seeking   transportation    on    any    railroad    shall 
present  their  passes  for  examination  at  the  office  of  the  Superintendent 
in  that  city. 


260  REMINISCENCES. 

12.  Provost  guards  at  Washington,  Alexandria  and  other  stations 
will  see  that  the  foregoing  orders  are  executed. 

13.  Train  guards  for  the  protection  of  each  train  and  to  preserve 
order  and  keep  off  stragglers  will  be  furnished  by  commander  of  troops 
nearest  the  points  of  departure,  on  requisition  of  Superintendent  of 
Eoad. 

By  command  of  Major- General  Meade. 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 
Approved  as  amended. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

JAMES  A.  HAEDIE, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 
Official: 

RUFUS  INGALLS, 

Brigadier-General, 
And  Chief  Quartermaster  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

GERMAN-TOWN;  August  20,  1863. 

GENERAL:    The  enclosed  is  a  copy  of  the  order  as  amended  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  which,  of  course,  governs  us  in  future. 
I  am,  very  respectfully  yours,  etc., 

KUFUS  INGALLS, 

Brigadier-  General, 
And  Chief  Quartermaster  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Brigadier-General  Haupt, 

Superintendent  United  States  Military  Railroads, 
Washington,  D.  0. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

RUPTURE  OF  OFFICIAL  RELATIONS  CAUSED  BY 
GOVERNOR  ANDREW,  OF  MASSACHUSETTS. 

IK"  the  latter  part  of  August  G  overnor  John  A.  Andrew,  of  Massa 
chusetts,  visited  Washington  and  was  in  daily  conference 
with  the  Secretary  of  War.  I  had  many  friends  in  his  office, 
and  one  of  the  assistant  secretaries  informed  me  that  I  was  a  fre 
quent  topic  of  conversation,  and  that  it  had  been  arranged  that 
the  Secretary  should  compel  me  to  accept  my  commission  uncondi 
tionally,  and  then  assign  me  to  some  position  that  would  prevent 
me  from  going  to  Massachusetts  to  trouble  the  Legislature  with  my 
claims  for  compensation  for  expenditures  made  in  the  construction 
of  the  Hoosac  Tunnel. 

The  Governor,  notwithstanding  the  unanimous  endorsement 
of  investigating  committees  and  in  opposition  to  the  advice  of  his 
Executive  Council,  had  insisted  that  the  work  should  be  taken  out 
of  my  hands  and  placed  under  the  control  of  commissioners,  and 
not  a  single  dollar  had  been  repaid  for  the  expenditures  I  had 
made  upon  the  work.  I  was  willing  to  accept  expenditures  with 
simple  interest,  and  waive  all  claims  for  profits  or  for  damages, 
but  the  Governor  was  not  willing  that  I  should  receive  a  cent. 

My  presence  in  Boston  during  the  session  of  the  Legislature 
was  a  great  annoyance  to  him,  and  to  the  Chairman  of  the  Board 
of  Commissioners,  whose  plans  I  was  compelled,  in  self-defense, 
to  criticise,  and  his  ignorance  and  extravagance  to  expose;  but 
as  the  Governor  of  Massachusetts  was  active  and  powerful  in 
furnishing  men  and  other  support  to  the  war.  the  Secretary  of 
War  was  compelled  to  side  with  Andrew  and  sacrifice  me. 

Accordingly,  I  soon  after  received  the  following  notice: 

WASHINGTON,  September  1,  1863. 

GENERAL  :  I  do  not  observe  on  file  any  acceptance  of  your  appoint 
ment  as  Brigadier-General.  Inasmuch  as  the  Secretary  of  War  has 
ordered  that  all  appointments  the  acceptance  of  which  shall  not  have 
been  filed  by  September  5, 1863,  be  taken  as  vacated,  it  becomes  necessary 
to  file  your  acceptance  at  once. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JAMES  A.  HARDIE, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 
Brigadier-General  H.  Haupt, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
14  261 


262  REMINISCENCES    OF 

On  the  receipt  of  this  notice,  I  turned  to  my  files  and  found 
that  my  commission  as  Brigadier-General  had  been  dated  Sep 
tember  5,  1862,  just  one  year  before  the  date  named,  and  it 
seemed  evident  that  this  General  Order  had  been  made  to  fit  my 
particular  case,  I  waited  until  September  5,  and  then  sent  the 
following  letter  to  the  Secretary: 

WASHINGTON,  September  5,  1863. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Staiiion,  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR:  I  am  in  receipt  of  a  communication  from  Colonel  Hardie, 
Acting  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  informing  me  that  all  commissions 
that  are  not  formally  accepted  by  this  date  will  be  considered  as  vacated. 

I  have  uniformly  declined  to  accept  military  rank  unconditionally, 
and  have  given  you  my  reasons  for  it.  I  cannot  part  with  the  control 
of  my  time  and  of  my  freedom  of  action  to  so  great  an  extent  as  I  must 
do  if  I  accept  a  commission  unconditionally. 

Interests  involving  more  than  a  million  of  dollars ;  the  private  for 
tunes  of  my  associates  and  myself,  my  reputation  as  an  engineer  and  a 
man,  are  in  jeopardy  from  the  efforts  of  active  and  unscrupulous 
enemies.  They  can  only  be  saved  by  my  personal  exertions. 

But  not  even  to  save  them,  not  to  protect  private  interests  were 
they  tens  of  millions,  should  I  suffer  the  country  to  sustain  injury  from 
neglect  or  omission  of  anything  that  I  could  do,  or  had  engaged  to  do, 
to  save  it.  At  the  same  time,  when  I  know  that  the  public  interests  do 
not,  and  my  private  interests  do  require  my  attention  for  a  short  time, 
I  must  be  at  liberty  to  act  as  my  judgment  dictates. 

I  could  not,  if  my  presence  were  required  in  Boston,  resign  for  a 
week  and  be  reappointed.  I  might  not  obtain  a  leave  if  I  asked  for  it. 
I  must,  if  I  accept  unconditionally,  be  placed  in  the  same  category  as 
other  officers,  although  not  another  officer  in  the  service,  perhaps,  can  be 
found  whose  acceptance  has  not  been  a  benefit  to  him,  while  with  me  it 
would  involve  the  loss  of  everything.  Even  while  I  have  been  in 
Washington  parties  in  Massachusetts,  to  whom  I  have  not  been  legally 
or  equitably  indebted  a  single  dollar,  have  brought  suit  on  fictitious 
claims  of  which  I  had  no  notice,  and  from  my  non-appearance  have 
obtained  judgment,  taken  execution  and  seized  on  personal  property. 

The  conduct  of  the  State  authorities,  and  of  some  of  the  people 
of  Massachusetts  interested  in  the  Western  Railroad,  has  been  infamous, 
and  I  must  hold  myself  in  a  position  to  settle  accounts  with  my  enemies 
if  opportunity  offers.  It  is  probable  that  many  times  the  compensa 
tion  of  a  Brigadier-General  for  the  time  that  I  have  been  in  Washington 
would  not  compensate  me  for  the  losses  consequent  upon  my  being  here, 
if  I  cannot  secure  legislation  to  repair  the  damage. 

These  losses  do  not  disturb  me  greatly.  I  have  confidence  enough 
in  the  good  sense  and  justice  of  the  people  of  Massachusetts  to  believe 
that  when  I  have  time  and  opportunity  for  explanation,  the  wrongs  done 
through  misrepresentation  of  facts  will  be  set  right;  and,  if  I  can  be 
useful  to  the  country  in  no  other  way  than  by  accepting  a  commission, 
I  would  put  the  yoke  upon  my  neck  and  the  fetters  upon  my  wrists  and 
labor  to  save  the  Union.  But  is  this  necessary?  The  members  of  the 
Cabinet  are  civilians;  the  Assistant  Secretaries  of  the  War  and  Navy 
are  civilians;  the  chiefs  of  most  of  the  bureaus  are  civilians;  why 
cannot  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Military  Railroads  be  a  civilian  also, 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  263 

if  you  will  clothe  him  with  the  power  necessary  to  secure  efficiency  and 
prevent  military  interference  with  his  duties? 

You  refused  my  acceptance  unless  untrammeled  with  conditions, 
and  I  declined  to  accept  unconditionally.  My  name  is,  I  suppose,  or  will 
be,  dropped  from  the  rolls,  where  I  never  asked  that  it  should  be  entered, 
although  the  appointment  for  meritorious  services  was  a  source  of  much 
gratification,  and  I  am  not  ungrateful  for  your  expressions  of  confidence 
in  me  and  of  obligations  for  what  has  been  accomplished. 

During  the  whole  time  that  I  have  been  connected  with  the  public 
service,  now  a  year  and  a  half,  I  have  received  no  pay  except  for  personal 
expenses  for  a  portion  of  the  time.  After  my  last  interview  with  you  dn 
the  subject,  I  concluded  to  make  no  more  explanations  and  to  trouble 
you  no  further  about  my  account,  which  you  had  hesitated  to  allow,  but 
to  raise  money  from  other  sources,  by  loans  or  otherwise,  to  pay  my  way 
until  the  war  was  over,  and  then  if  the  account  was  not  paid,  I  would 
make  the  Government  a  present  of  the  amount  and  retire. 

The  condition  of  Military  Railroad  aifairs  in  the  West,  as  appears 
from  the  reports  of  the  Special  Agent,  is  becoming  worse  and  worse.  It 
is  almost  too  late  now  to  apply  a  remedy.  I  hope  that  I  will  not  be 
called  upon  at  so  late  an  hour  to  make  the  attempt.  The  labor  would  be 
excessive  and  the  result  problematical;  still,  I  will  endeavor  to  carry 
out  your  wishes,  and  I  am  willing,  if  you  desire  it,  to  continue  my 
supervision  over  operations  in  the  East  where  results  have  been  attained 
with  which  I  am  much  gratified.  There  are  no  longer  difficulties  about 
transportation,  deficiencies  of  supplies,  delays  of  army  movements  while 
waiting  for  stores,  accidents  and  blockades.  All  these  have  ceased  since 
my  efforts  have  been  sustained  by  the  orders  of  yourself  and  General 
Halleck,  and  roads  and  bridges  have  been  reconstructed  in  less  than 
half  the  time  ever  before  considered  practicable. 

I  repeat,  that  so  long  as  I  can  be  useful  to  your  Department,  or 
to  the  country  in  this  crisis,  I  am  willing  to  work,  cost  what  it  may  in 
labor  and  sacrifice,  but  when  my  usefulness  is  at  an  end  I  wish  to  leave. 
No  office  in  the  gift  of  the  President  would  tempt  me  to  accept  it  as  I 
am  now  situated,  unless  consideration  of  duty  should  imperatively 
require  it,  and  when  my  services  are  not  required,  my  time  and  the 
control  of  them  I  desire  to  use  for  other  purposes. 

If  you  desire  that  I  should  continue  the  ambiguity  that  exists  in 
regard  to  my  position  should  be  removed.  You  might  appoint  me  Chief 
of  a  Bureau  of  Military  Railroads.  I  have  not  had,  since  Pope's 
campaign,  any  official  position.  My  title  then  was  Chief  of  Construction 
and  Transportation  of  the  Army  of  Virginia.  Since  then  I  have 
appended  to  my  signature  in  official  communications  "In  charge  of 
United  States  Military  Railroads." 

Please  decide  whether,  in  your  opinion,  the  interests  of  the  service 
will  be  best  promoted  by  my  continuance  or  withdrawal;  and  if  you 
wish  me  to  continue,  prescribe  the  position  which  I  am  to  occupy,  the 
authority  to  exercise,  the  powers  to  remedy  defects  and  correct  abuses 
with  which  I  am  to  be  clothed,  and  the  geographical  limits  over  which 
these  powers  are  to  be  exercised. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

H.  HAUPT. 

A  few  days  after  the  receipt  of  this  letter  the  Secretary  sent 
for  me.  He  seemed  to  be  irritated  bcause  I  would  not  yield,  and  re- 


264  REMINISCENCES   OF 

marked  that  the  commission  had  been  given  to  me  for  meritorious 
services ;  that  my  name  had  been  sent  to  the  Senate  by  the  Presi 
dent  and  confirmed ;  that  I  should  consider  it  a  high  honor,  and  that 
my  refusal  to  accept  was  an  act  of  disrespect  to  the  President,  to 
himself  and  to  the  Government ;  and  further,  that  I  could  not  be 
paid  lawfully  unless  the  commission  was  accepted. 

I  replied  that  pay  was  no  consideration.  I  was  losing 
many  times  the  amount  of  pay  by  neglect  of  other  interests.  He 
could  pay  me  from  the  contingent  fund,  if  so  inclined.  If  not,  I 
could  do  without  it ;  that  I  did  appreciate  the  honor  conferred  and 
was  grateful  for  it.  If  he  did  not  wish  to  make  a  record  of  any 
conditions  as  establishing  a  precedent,  I  was  willing  to  rely  upon 
his  word. 

I  represented  that  in  the  winter  there  was  a  long  period  of 
suspension  of  military  operations  during  which  my  presence  was 
not  required.  I  referred  to  our  first  interview  when  he  asked  me 
to  undertake  the  reconstruction  of  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad, 
saying  that  my  services  would  only  be  required  for  a  few  weeks ; 
that  as  soon  as  McDowell  could  move  Richmond  would  fall  and  the 
war  be  ended;  and  added  that  while  I  was  willing  to  remain  so 
long  as  my  services  were  needed,  when  they  were  no  longer  needed 
he  had  it  in  his  power  to  relieve  me.  The  Secretary  exclaimed, 
"I  will  relieve  you  at  once,  sir !"  and  soon  after  the  following  order 
was  issued : 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  September  14,  1863. 

SIR:     You  are  hereby  relieved  from  further  duty  in  the  War 
V      Department. 

You  will  turn  over  your  office,  books,  papers  and  all  other  prop 
erty  under  your  control  belonging  to  the  United  States,  to  Colonel  D. 
C.  McCallum,  Superintendent  of  Military  Railroads. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 
To  Herman  Haupt,  Esq., 

In  Charge  of  Military  Railroads, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

The  action  of  the  Secretary  occasioned  much  surprise.  Hon. 
John  Covode  and  other  members  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War  went  to  the  Secretary  to  know  what  it  meant,  but  with 
out  results,  and  efforts  were  made  to  induce  the  President  to  insist 
upon  a  withdrawal  of  Stanton's  order.  The  President,  although 
apparently  regretting  the  action,  declined  to  take  any  steps  to 
reverse  it. 

My  retirement  called  forth  letters  of  regret  from  Assistant 
Secretary  Watson,  who  had  always  supported  me,  and  also  from 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  267 

officers  in  high  positions,  who  expressed  commendation  in  strong 
and  gratifying  terms.  There  is  a  letter  before  me  now,  dated  Sep 
tember  27,  1863,  in  which  I  was  informed  that  if  I  would  use  my 
pen  and  tell  what  I  knew,  there  was  a  party  in  Congress,  both  in  the 
Senate  and  House,  that  would  bring  such  a  pressure  as  to  compel 
Stanton's  resignation;  but  I  had  absolutely  no  inclination  to  en 
gage  in  such  a  contest,  even  had  I  believed  it  could  succeed. 


T 


CHAPTER  XIX. 
FINAL  REPORT. 

I  HE  following  report  to  the  Secretary  of    War  was  my  last 
official  act  in  connection  with  the  Bureau  of  United  States 
Military  Railroads : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  September  9,  1863. 
Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR  :    A  brief  review  of  operations  in  the  Bureau  of  United  States 
Military  Railroads  since  my  c^Rjiection  with  it  is  herewith  respectfully 
_  submitted: 

In  April,  1862,  Ixwas  summoned  to  Washington  by  a  telegram  from 
you,  and  requested  to  assist  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  railroad  from 
Acquia  Creek  to  Fredericksburg.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  at  that 
time  in  front  of  Yorktown ;  the  Army  of  the  Rappahannock  rested  near 
the  Potomac ;  neither  could  move,  as  was  supposed,  without  the  coopera 
tion  of  the  other,  and  such  cooperation  was  impossible  without  the  rail 
road  as  a  means  of  communication  with  the  depots  on  the  base  of  the 
Potomac. 

The  injury  of  the  railroad  consisted  of  the  wharves  and  buildings 
at  Acquia  Creek,  which  had  been  burned;  three  miles  of  track  torn  up, 
the  ties  consumed,  and  rails  carried  south  of  Fredericksburg.  The 
bridges  across  Potomac  and  Ackakeek  Creek  and  the  Rappahannock 
River  destroyed;  and  two  miles  of  strap  rail  in  a  very  unsafe  condition, 
i  which  required  to  be  relaid. 

Although  engaged  at  the  time  in  a  professional  enterprise  which 
was  entirely  dependent  on  my  personal  efforts  for  success,  and  although 
the  protection  of  property  and  reputation,  which  were  jeopardized  by  the 
hostile  and  unjust  action  of  the  State  administration  in  Massachusetts, 
required  ceaseless  vigilance  and  effort,  I  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  allow 
personal  interests  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  success  of  the  military 
operations  of  the  army,  and  believing  that  I  could  be  useful,  and  that 
my  services  would  not  be  required  for  a  longer  time  than  three  or  four 
weeks,  I  consented  to  undertake  the  work  of  reconstructing  the  road  to 
^Fredericksburg. 

The  only  laborers  to  be  procured  consisted  of  soldiers  detailed  from 
the  ranks,  many  of  them  entirely  unaccustomed  to  labor,  others  unwill- 
\  ing;  and  what  was  worst  of  all,  the  details  would  be  changed  daily,  so 
that  after  spending  a  great  part  of  the  day  in  organizing  the  forces,  the 
next  day  new  details  would  be  sent  out  and  the  process  would  have  to  be 
repeated. 

My  remonstrances  led  to  a  change  in  this  organization;  a  per 
manent  detail  was  made,  forming  the  members  of  a  Construction  Corps, 
but  the  men  were  without  experience  or  skill,  and  much  effort  was 
required  to  infuse  into  them  a  proper  emulation  and  induce  efforts  to 
hasten  the  completion  of  the  work.  The  difficulties  were  much  increased 
by  the  state  of  the  weather;  the  rain  fell  almost  daily,  and  the  track 

268 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  269 

was  laid  in  a  lake  'of  mud ;  but  with  all  these  disadvantages,  the  work 
was  carried  on  day  and  night,  light  being  furnished  at  night  by  means 
of  lanterns,  and  the  supply  very  limited  at  that. 

One  day  was  lost  in  waiting  for  iron,  which  was  supplied  from 
Alexandria,  but  in  three  working  days  the  three  miles  of  track  were 
relaid,  during  which  time  most  of  the  ties  were  manufactured  in  the 
woods.  In  forwarding  this  work,  as  also  on  various  occasions  subse 
quently,  very  important  aid  was  rendered  by  Major  Barstow,  of  General 
McDowell's  staff,  now  Assistant  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

Ackakeek  bridge  was  commenced  on  Saturday,  at  2  p.  M.,  and  on 
the  next  day,  at  about  the  same  hour,  a  train  passed  over  it.  This 
bridge,  120  feet  long  and  about  30  feet  high,  was  erected  in  fifteen 
hours. 

In  reference  to  the  Potomac  Creek  bridge,  General  McDowell,  in 
his  remarks  before  the  Court  of  Inquiry,  uses  the  following  language: 

"The  Potomac  Run  bridge  is  a  most  remarkable  structure.  When 
it  is  considered  that  in  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon  the  trestle-bridges 
of  more  than  one  story,  even  of  moderate  height,  were  regarded  as 
impracticable,  and  that,  too,  for  common  military  roads,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  understand  why  distinguished  Europeans  should  express 
surprise  at  so  bold  a  specimen  of  American  military  engineering.  It 
is  a  structure  which  ignores  all  the  rules  and  precedents  of  military 
science  as  laid  down  in  books.  It  is  constructed  chiefly  of  round  sticks 
cut  from  the  woods,  and  not  even  divested  of  its  bark;  the  legs  of  the 
trestles  are  braced  with  round  poles.  It  is  in  four  stories,  three  of 
trestles  and  one  of  crib-work.  The  total  height  from  the  deepest  part 
of  the  stream  to  the  rails  is  nearly  80  feet.  It  carries  daily  from  ten 
to  twenty  heavy  trains  in  both  directions,  and  has  withstood  several 
severe  freshets  and  storms  without  injury. 

"The  bridge  was  built  in  May,  1862,  in  nine  working  days,  during 
which  time  the  greater  part  of  the  material  was  cut  and  hauled.  It 
contains  more  than  two  million  feet  of  lumber.  The  original  structure 
which  it  replaced  required  as  many  months  as  this  did  days." 

The  bridge  across  the  Rappahannock  was  under  the  immediate 
supervision  of  Daniel  Stone,  Esq.,  the  experienced  bridge  architect  of 
Philadelphia.  It  was  longer  than  the  Potomac  Creek  bridge,  but  not 
so  high. 

These  structures  were  all  completed  and  the  road  opened  for  use 
in  about  three  weeks,  when  I  expected  to  return  to  Massachusetts  to 
protect  my  interests  in  that  State,  but  General  McDowell  remon 
strated  so  earnestly  against  this  course,  and  represented  that  my  con 
tinuance  with  the  army  was  essential  to  the  success  of  his  movements, 
that  I  felt  it  my  duty  to  remain  until  after  the  opening  of  the  Manassas 
Gap  Road  to  Front  Royal,  to  which  place  the  Army  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock  had  been  ordered  for  the  purpose  of  intercepting  the  retreat  of 
General  Jackson. 

By  this  time  the  efficiency  of  the  Construction  Corps  was  so  much""'" 
increased  that  in  June,  1862,  they  reconstructed  five  bridges  of  from 
60  to  120  feet  span  in  one  day,  and  in  three  days  opened  the  Manassas,   * 
Gap  Railroad  to  Front  Royal,  reaching  that  place  with  a  continuous"    ** 
track  and  reinforcements  of  5,000  men  only  one  day  after  the  advance 
of  the  army  had  arrived  there  by  forced  marches. 

Soon  after  General  McDowell  was  relieved,  and  General  Pope 
placed  in  command.  This  officer  did  not  seem  to  place  so  high  a  value 


270  REMINISCENCES   OF 

on  my  labors  as  his  predecessor.  He  gave  me  no  instructions,  and 
having  declined  to  accept  a  commission,  I  returned  to  Massachusetts, 
after  leaving  my  address  at  the  War  Department,  with  the  informa 
tion  that  if  my  services  were  again  required  for  any  temporary  duty  I 
could  be  sent  for,  but  that  the  condition  of  my  affairs  would  not  permit 
me  to  connect  myself  permanently  with  the  army,  or  be  absent  for  long 
periods  of  time  from  Massachusetts. 

I  was  not  long  permitted  to  be  absent.  General  Pope  tried  the  ex 
periment  of  operating  a  Military  Railroad,  and  the  results  were  unsat 
isfactory.  In  about  ten  days  from  my  departure  I  received  a  telegram 
from  the  War  Department  requesting  my  immediate  return,  with  a 
declaration  that  without  my  aid  to  organize  and  manage  the  operations 
of  the  Military  Railroads  it  was  impossible  to  keep  the  army  supplied. 

I  again  dropped  all  professional  and  business  engagements, 
reported  at  the  War  Department,  and  proceeded  to  the  Headquarters  of 
General  Pope,  near  Cedar  Mountain.  The  road  was  in  a  state  of 
blockade,  very  few  trains  moving,  everything  in  great  confusion;  the 
primary  cause  being  military  interference.  General  Pope  issued  a 
stringent  order,  in  terms  which  I  suggested,  forbidding  officers  of  any 
rank  to  interfere  with  the  management  of  the  roads.  Rules  were  made 
and  enforced,  punctuality  insisted  upon,  and  in  two  or  three  days 
regularity  was  again  restored./  Since  this  time,  with  a  single  exception, 
'  when  an  officer  of  high  rank  undertook  to  place  me  in  arrest  for 
respectfully  declining  to  obey  orders  which  he  had  no  right  to  give, 
the  operations  of  the  Military  Railroads  in  Virginia  have  been  con- 

5  ducted  with  extraordinary  regularity  and  exemption  from  accidents; 
and  no  army  movements  have  ever  been  delayed  a  single  hour  for  want 
of  any  supplies  or  transportation  which  it  was  the  province  of  the 
railroads  to  furnish. 

While  the  Army  of  Virginia  was  in  position  behind  the  Rappa- 
hannock  the  enemy,  in  superior  numbers,  succeeded  in  turning  its  right 
flank.  The  first  information  of  this  movement  was  conveyed  by  an 
attack  of  Stuart's  cavalry  at  Catlett's,  August  22,  1862,  followed  soon 
nfter  by  an  attempt  to  capture  several  of  our  trains  at  Bri stow. ^Unfor 
tunately,  General  Pope  had  ordered  a  large  portion  of  the  rolling  stock 
to  the  front,  from  which  exposed  position  it  could  not  be  withdrawn 
after  the  break  in  the  communications  in  the  rear,  and  as  a  conse 
quence  seven  first-class  locomotives  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy 
and  277  freigbt  cars  were  destroyed. 

During  the  battle  which  followed  great  exertions  were  made  to 
preserve  and  maintain  intact  the  communications  with  the  army. 
Troops  were  sent  by  rail  to  hold  bridges  across  Bull  Run,  supplies  were 
forwarded,  and  General  Pope  notified  at  what  station  his  wagons  could 
receive  them;  telegraph  operators  and  scouts  were  sent  out  to  make  and 
report  observations,  which  were  promptly  communicated  to  Headquar 
ters  at  Washington.  Services  of  great  value  were  rendered  by  the 
officers  and  employes  of  the  Military  Railway  Bureau,  both  in  trans 
portation  and  construction.  They  remained  at  stations  loading  cars 
and  carrying  away  stores  long  after  the  retreat  of  our  forces  and  the 
departure  of  the  guards  had  left  them  without  any  military  protection 
whatever,  and  when  the  enemy  on  the  common  roads  was  in  advance 
of  the  positions  so  occupied.  They  volunteered  for  the  service  and 
succeeded  in  reconstructing  a  bridge  and  bringing  off  General  Taylor 
and  the  wounded  men  of  his  command  at  Bull  Run  after  the  General 
in  command,  with  whom  I  was  directed  to  consult,  had  declined  to  send 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  271 

a  military  force  for  this  purpose  in  consequence  of  the  risk.  Night  and 
day,  during  this  period  of  intense  excitement,  the  railway  employes 
remained  at  their  posts,  performing  uncomplainingly  the  most  dangerous 
duties  without  rest  or  regular  food.  From  the  Superintendent  to  the 
lowest  grade  of  operatives,  they  are  all  entitled  to  much  credit  for  the 
important  services  rendered  on  that  occasion. 

The  retreat  of  General  Pope  was  followed  by  the  invasion  of 
Maryland  and  raids  into  Pennsylvania;  operations  on  the  railroads  of 
Virginia  were  suspended,  but  some  employment  was  found  for  the 
Construction  Corps  in  assisting  in  rebuilding  the  bridge  across  the 
Potomac  at  Harper's  Ferry,  for  which  we  were  fortunately  in  a  condi 
tion  to  aid  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Company  by  furnishing 
material. 

The  battles  of  South  Mountain  and  Antietam  were  followed  by  the 
retreat  of  the  enemy  and  the  reoccupatioii  of  the  country  north  of  the 
Rappahannock  by  our  forces.  The  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad  was 
soon  repaired  and  put  in  running  order.  Great  doubts  existed  as  to  the 
ability  of  this  road  to  supply  the  army,  which  then  consisted  of  the  two 
Armies  of  Virginia  and  the  Potomac  united;  but  with  the  efficient  and 
cordial  cooperation  of  the  Chief  Quartermaster,  General  Ingalls,  so  large 
an  amount  of  stores  was  forwarded  that  during  the  brief  sojourn  at 
Warrenton  nearly  four  thousand  tons  were  accumulated  in  excess  of 
requirements,  which  were  afterwards  brought  back  and  sent  to  Acquia 
Creek.  About  two  thousand  tons  were  forwarded  daily  while  the  army 
remained  in  the  vicinity  of  Warrenton,  and  this  business  was  accom 
modated  without  accident  or  delay.  This  result  is  most  extraordinary, 
when  the  difficulties  of  operating  a  Military  Railroad  are  considered, 
but  it  is  due  chiefly  to  the  fact  that  the  stringent  orders  of  General 
Halleck  prevented  any  military  interference  with  the  running  of  the 
trains,  and  the  excellent  arrangements  of  General  Ingalls  secured  the 
prompt  return  of  cars. 

Anticipating  the  necessity  of  a  change  in  the  line  of  operations 
to  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad,  I  had,  with  the  approval  of  General 
Halleck,  ordered  a  million  feet  of  lumber,  which  very  opportunely  com 
menced  to  arrive  on  the  very  day  when  work  was  resumed  at  Acquia 
Creek.  The  reconstruction  and  opening  of  the  railriad  between  Acquia 
Creek  and  Falmouth  was  accomplished  in  a  very  brief  period  of  time, 
under  the  direction  of  William  W.  Wright,  Esq.,  as  engineer  and  super 
intendent,  and  the  road  was  operated  with  great  regularity  and  success 
during  the  whole  period  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  remained  at 
Falmouth. 

After  the  occupation  of  Falmouth  by  the  forces  under  General 
Burnside,  in  the  fall  of  1862,  the  high  bridge  across  Potomac  Creek  was 
repaired.  The  damage  done  by  the  enemy  consisted  in  the  destruction 
of  parts  of  two  spans,  which  were  promptly  restored.  No  opportunity 
was  offered  of  attempting  the  reconstruction  of  the  railroad  bridge 
across  the  Rappahannock  until  the  day  of  the  first  battle  of  Fredericks  - 
burg,  when  our  forces  having  possession  of  the  city,  I  commenced  work 
on  the  bridge. 

At  this  time  the  construction  party  consisted  of  only  thirty 
carpenters  under  the  supervision  of  E.  C.  Smeed.  The  Construction 
Corps  which  I  had  organized  under  General  McDowell  had  been  dis 
banded  by  General  Pope  and,  owing  to  the  diversity  of  opinion  which 
existed  as  to  the  propriety  of  employing  soldiers  or  civilians,  no  reorgan 
ization  on  a  scale  sufficient  for  efficiency  had  been  made.  General 


272  REMINISCENCES   OF 

Burnside  had,  at  my  solicitation,  given  peremptory  orders  that  200 
soldiers  should  report  for  duty  to  me  at  daylight,  and  I  went  personally 
to  the  commanding  officer  to  see  that  the  detail  was  made  and  the  men 
notified.  The  soldiers  made  their  appearance  next  morning,  but  as 
soon  as  the  battle  became  exciting,  it  was  found  impossible  to  keep 
them  at  work;  they  scattered  over  the  hills  and  behind  trees,  leaving 
only  the  bridge  carpenters.  These  men  worked  for  several  hours  under 
a  warm  fire,  until  the  pulley  block  of  the  hoisting  apparatus  was  broken, 
the  timber  on  which  the  men  were  at  work  struck  several  times  by  shells 
and  the  ropes  cut.  As  they  were  too  few  in  number  to  accomplish  any 
important  results,  and  as  the  bridge  could-  be  finished  after  the  battle 
as  soon  as  it  would  be  required  for  use,  I  permitted  the  men  to  seek 
shelter  and  wait  until  the  next  day  before  resuming  operations. 

Next  day  operations  were  resumed,  and  a  span  on  each  side  well 
advanced  towards  completion;  but  the  following  night  Fredericksburg 
was  evacuated,  and  no  opportunity  has  ever  been  offered  since  that 
time  of  reconstructing  the  bridge. 

General  Burnside  was  succeeded  by  General  Hooker  in  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  who,  if  successful  in  his  movement  against 
the  enemy  on  the  Rappahannock,  expected  to  advance  towards  Richmond 
with  great  rapidity.  General  Hooker  sent  for  me  before  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville.  informed  me  of  his  plans  and  requested  me  to  have 
everything  in  readiness  for  very  active  operations.  I  was  prepared  to 
reconstruct  the  road  and  bridges  with  a  rapidity  exceeding  anything 
that  the  Construction  Corps  had  previously  accomplished.  About  1,600 
lineal  feet  of  bridging  had  been  prepared,  1,000  feet  of  which  was  in 
spans  of  60  feet,  the  trusses  comprising  which  were  to  be  transported  on 
cars  to  the  end  of  the  track,  then*  hauled  by  oxen  to  the  sites  of  the 
bridges  and  hoisted  into  place  as  a  whole  by  means  of  apparatus  prepared 
for  this  purpose.  About  seventy  car-loads  of  material  were  in  readiness 
for  the  "On  to  Richmond"  movement  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville,  but  the  enemy  was  so  unaccommodating  as  not  to  give 
us  an  opportunity  of  using  them. 

While  waiting  for  the  onward  movement,  the  opportunity  was 
improved  for  replacing  the  trestle-bridge  across  Potomac  Creek  by  a 
substantial  truss-bridge.  The  new  bridge  was  erected  and  the  old  one 
removed  without  delaying  a  single  one  of  the  numerous  trains  running 
on  the  road  for  a  single  minute,  a  performance  which  the  officers  at 
Headquarters  supposed  to  be  impossible.  Objections  had  been  made 
to  the  reconstruction  of  the  bridge,  under  the  impression  that  it  must 
necessarily,  for  some  days  at  least,  interfere  with  army  transportation. 

The  new  bridge  was  a  very  beautiful  and  substantial  structure.  It 
was  built  on  a  new  plan  designed  as  a  general  one  for  military  truss- 
bridges.  Its  peculiarities  were  that  it  was  adapted  to  any  span  or 
location;  could  be  used  either  for  deck  or  through  bridges;  could  be 
constructed  to  any  extent  in  advance,  and  kept  on  hand  ready  for  an 
emergency.  It  required  no  skilled  labor  to  frame  and  raise  it,  the  auger 
and  the  saw  being  almost  the  only  tools  required  to  put  it  together.  All 
the  parts  were  alike  and  interchangeable;  any  timber  could  be  turned 
or  reversed  end  for  end,  and  it  would  fit  equally  well.  It  was  not 
necessary  to  put  any  part  of  the  bridge  together  until  it  was  erected  on 
the  spot  which  it  was  intended  to  occupy,  and  it  could  be  raised  in  one- 
half  or  one-third  the  time  of  any  other  bridge.  The  trusses  of  the 
Potomac  Creek  bridge,  four  hundred  feet  long  in  three  spans,  were 
raised  in  about  a  day  and  a  half,  and  this  was  the  first  bridge  of  the 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  275 

kind  ever  constructed.  I  have  but  little  doubt  that  with  a  proper  drill 
and  more  perfect  organization  600  lineal  feet  of  this  military  truss- 
bridge  might  be  set  up  in  a  single  day. 

After  the  reconstruction  of  the  Potomac  Creek  bridge  nothing  of 
special  interest  occurred  until  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville. 
Regularity,  order  and  absence  of  all  complaints  distinguished  the  opera 
tions  of  the  railroads  in  Virginia  so  far  as  they  were  under  our  charge. 
This  continued  until  the  movement  of  the  enemy  towards  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania  compelled  the  abandonment  of  the  Fredericksburg  line, 
and  Acquia  Creek,  with  its  expensive  wharves  and  warehouses,  was 
again  evacuated  and  subsequently  destroyed  by  the  enemy. 

The  evacuation  was  effected  without  any  loss  of  movable  property; 
everything  was  carried  away,  even  to  the  sashes  of  the  buildings.  The 
cars,  loaded  with  stores  at  Falmouth,  were  put  on  barges  at  Acquia 
Crook,  towed  to  Alexandria,  landed  without  break  of  "bulk,  and  sent  to 
the  front  over  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad. 

The  success  of  this  movement  convinced  all  who  had  previously 
been  skeptical  in  regard  to  the  advantages  of  sending  loaded  cars  on 
barges,  and  if  it  should  ever  again  become  necessary  to  reoccupy  the 
Fredericksburg  line,  I  am  most  decided  in  the  opinion  that  the  wharves, 
warehouses  and  buildings  at  Acquia  Creek  should  never  again  be  recon 
structed  on  a  scale  approaching  to  its  former  magnitude,  but  that  the 
distribution  should  be  made  from  cars  loaded  at  Alexandria  and  Wash 
ington,  and  sent  without  break  of  bulk  to  Falmouth,  Fredericksburg,  or 
other  more  advanced  stations  on  this  line,  as  fast  as  they  came  into  our 
possession. 

The  duties  which  the  Railway  Bureau  was  called  upon  to  perform 
subsequent  to  the  successful  evacuation  of  Acquia  Creek  were  connected 
with  the  second  invasion  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  in  June  of  the 
present  year.  A  few  days  sufficed  to  replenish  the  supplies  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  by  way  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad,  so  that 
the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  in  the  direction  of  Frederick  was  resumed. 
While  at  and  near  Frederick,  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  formed 
the  line  of  supply,  but  some  embarrassment  was  caused  by  that  prolific 
source  of  Military  Railway  troubles — the  detention  or  appropriation  of 
trains  by  military  authority,  exercised  independently  of  the  Superin 
tendent  of  the  line.  Having  relieved  the  blockade  which  the  inter 
ference  had  occasioned,  I  proceeded  to  take  military  possession  of  the 
Western  Maryland  Railroad,  extending  from  the  Relay  House,  on  the 
Northern  Central  Railroad,  to  Westminster.  The  operation  of  this 
road  under  the  circumstances  was  a  remarkable  success,  and  showed 
how  much  could  be  accomplished  by  expedients.  The  road  was  crooked, 
the  grades  unfavorable,  there  were  neither  water-stations,  sidings,  turn 
tables,  nor  other  conveniences  for  more  than  two  or  three  trains  per  day, 
and  no  fuel.  The  supply  of  the  army  required  about  thirty  trains  per 
day  in  both  directions. 

To  meet  these  difficulties,  cars,  engines,  and  full  sets  of  train 
hands,  also  coal  and  split  wood  were  brought  from  Alexandria;  water 
wns  dipped  from  a  dam  by  buckets,  an  old  turn-table  was  put  in  order 
to  turn  the  engines,  sidings  were  dispensed  with  by  the  prompt  unloading 
of  the  cars  on  the  main  track  under  the  efficient  supervision  of  Major 
Painter,  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  and,  with  the  presence  and 
personal  exertions  of  Adna  Anderson,  Esq.,  Chief  Engineer  of  Con 
struction  on  the  Military  Railroads,  the  extraordinary  service  so 
suddenly  required  of  the  road  was  satisfactorily  performed. 


276  REMINISCENCES    OF 

After  organizing  the  transportation  on  the  Western  Maryland 
Railroad,  and  placing  it  in  competent  hands,  my  attention  was  next 
directed  to  the  reopening  of  the  communication  with  Harrisburg  by 
means  of  the  Northern  Central  Railroad.  On  this  road  nineteen 
bridges,  some  of  them  of  considerable  magnitude,  had  been  completely 
destroyed.  I  divided  the  Construction  Corps  into  two  divisions,  and 
each  of  them  into  subdivisions.  One  division,  under  E.  C.  Smeed,  as 
superintendent,  I  sent  to  Harrisburg  via  Philadelphia,  with  a  train  of 
tools  and  materials,  with  instructions  to  commence  at  Harrisburg  and 
work  south.  The  second  division,  under  George  W.  Nagle,  as  superin 
tendent,  was  instructed  to  work  north  until  it  met  the  first.  One  of  the 
subdivisions  of  the  second  party  I  took  with  me,  and  personally  attended 
to  the  reopening  of  the  communication  with  Littlestown  and  Gettys 
burg.  Littlestown  was  reached  on  Saturday,  July  4,  the  very  day  of 
Lee's  retreat,  where  I  found  General  Sickles,  and  made  immediate 
arrangements  for  his  removal.  The  next  morning  I  reported  to  General 
Meade  at  Headquarters  near  Gettysburg  that  in  a  few  hours  he  would  be 
again  in  communication  with  the  capital,  and  with  his  depots,  both  by 
rail  and  telegraph. 

While  engaged  in  this  work,  earnest  solicitations  were  made  for 
the  reconstruction  of  the  railroad  between  Harrisburg  and  Chambers- 
burg,  but  as  the  Construction  Corps  had  more  on  hand  than  could 
possibly  be  managed,  I  requested  Colonel  Thomas  A.  Scott,  Vice-Presi 
dent  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company,  to  assist  in  the  recon 
struction  of  the  Cumberland  Valley  Railroad,  and  take  men  from  the 
shops  under  his  control,  until  I  could  relieve  a  portion  of  my  own  forces 
from  other  duties.  Colonel  Scott  promptly  responded  to  this  request 
and,  for  several  days,  superintended  the  work  in  person. 

As  soon  as  the  road  to  Gettysburg  was  opened,  I  marched  200  men 
over  the  mountain  to  Chambersburg  under  charge  of  J.  B.  Clough, 
Principal  Assistant  Engineer  of  Construction,  carrying  tools  and 
rations  in  wagons,  which  it  was  necessary  to  impress  for  that  purpose, 
and  set  them  to  work  to  reconstruct  the  Chambersburg  and  Franklin 
Railroads.  The  remainder  of  the  Construction  Corps,  after  completing 
the  bridges  on  the  Northern  Central  Railroad,  were  directed  to  proceed 
with  their  trains  via  Harrisburg  and  report  at  Chambersburg.  While 
the  Corps  was  on  the  way,  and  had  nearly  reached  Chambersburg,  a 
telegram  was  received  from  Washington  informing  me  of  the  escape  of 
Lee.  I  immediately  turned  back  the  trains  and  directed  them  to  be  for 
warded  with  all  possible  dispatch  to  Alexandria,  stopped  work  on  the 
Franklin  Road,  and  with  the  remainder  of  the  men  returned  with  all 
haste  to  Alexandria  to  resume  operations  on  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
line. 

Telegrams  were  sent  to  Superintendents  of  other  roads  requesting 
the  prompt  return  of  all  cars  and  engines  belonging  to  the  Government, 
and  a  sufficient  number  were  collected  to  forward  all  necessary  supplies 
before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  reached  the  line  of  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad. 

It  affords  much  gratification  to  be  able  to  state  that  the  Armies  of 
the  Rappahannock,  of  Virginia  and  of  the  Potomac,  while  dependent 
for  supplies  on  the  railroads  in  my  charge,  have  never  suffered  incon 
venience  or  been  delayed  in  their  movements  from  any  deficiency;  in 
fact,  it  is  a  question  whether  rapid  movement  was  not  retarded  by  the 
very  superabundance  of  supplies.  No  movement  ever  took  place  without 
involving  the  necessity  of  reloading  and  transporting  by  rail  hundreds, 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  277 

and  sometimes  thousands  of  tons  which  had  been  sent  forward  in  excess 
of  the  consumption  and  of  the  ability  of  the  wagons  to  remove.  These 
results  are  due  chiefly  to  two  causes:  the  great  efficiency  of  the  Super- 
intendents,  J.  H.  Devereux  and  William  W.  Wright,  and  their  subor 
dinates,  and  the  stringent  orders  of  Major-General  Halleck,  which 
prevented  that  interference  by  officers  with  train  movements  which, 
previous  to  my  connection  with  Military  Railroad  operations,  had  been 
the  cause  of  constant  and  vexatious  blockades. 

I  have  now  presented  a  brief  report,  in  the  form  of  a  personal 
narrative,  of  such  operations  of  the  Military  Railroads  Bureau  as  came 
under  my  personal  observation.  This  has  properly  been  made  in  very 
general  terms,  as  T  preferred  to  refer  for  details  to  the  reports  of  the 
officers  to  whom  they  were  more  particularly  entrusted,  which  reports 
are  appended  hereto. 

Information  in  regard  to  disbursements  and  accounts  has  been 
furnished  by  Colonel  D.  C.  McCallum,  Military  Director  and  General 
Superintendent  of  United  States  Railroads. 

The  report  of  Adna  Anderson,  Chief  Engineer  of  Construction, 
will  exhibit  the  operations  of  the  Construction  Corps. 

The  report  of  J.  H.  Devereux,  Esq.,  Superintendent  of  Orange  & 
Alexandria,  Loudoui*.  &  Hampshire,  Manassas  Gap  &  Washington  and 
Alexandria  Railroads,  will  exhibit  the  doings  on  those  roads. 

The  report  of  W.  W.  Wright,  Superintendent  and  Engineer  of  the 
Richmond,  Fredericksburg  &  Potomac  Railroad,  and  for  a  time  also 
Military  Superintendent  of  the  Cumberland  Valley  and  Franklin  Rail 
roads,  will  exhibit  the  operations  on  those  lines. 

The  Petersburg  &  Suffolk  and  Seaboard  &  Roanoke  Railroads  have 
been  under  the  charge  of  E.  L.  Wentz,  Esq.,  as  Superintendent  and  ' 
Engineer,  who  will  also  report  the  doings  in  construction  and  transpor 
tation  on  those  lines. 

These  are  all  the  Military  Railroads  that  have  been  directly  under 
my  charge;  for  the  management  of  others  I  have  not  been  in  any  way 
responsible.  Although  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  cause  an 
inspection  to  be  made  of  the  various  Military  Railroads  in  the  West, 
and  to  report  such  suggestions  and  recommendations  as  would  promote 
their  efficiency  and  economy,  1  never  received  authority  to  correct  abuses 
or  remedy  defects,  and  my  recommendations  have  not  been  acted  upon. 

The  report  of  F.  H.  Forbes,  Esq.,  Special  Agent,  is  submitted,  and 
the  attention  of  the  Department  particularly  directed  thereto. 

While  the  report  of  Mr.  Forbes  gives  evidence  of  a  commendable 
fidelity  and  attention  to  duty  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  officers  connected 
with  the  railway  organization  in  the  West,  the  general  impression  pro 
duced  by  the  report  is  that  of  inefficiency,  want  of  system  and  order, 
inexperience  and,  too  often,  utter  disregard  of  economy  and  great  waste 
of  public  property.  Sometimes,  too,  there  are  strong  reasons  to  suspect 
collusion  between  Government  officers  and  contractors.  The  most  pro 
lific  source  of  irregularity  in  operations,  resulting  in  detention  of  trains, 
embarrassment  of  operations  and  waste  of  property  has  been  caused 
in  the  West,  as  it  formerly  was  in  the  East,  by  interference  of  officers 
with  the  duties  of  the  Superintendent.  It  might  be  supposed  that  mil 
itary  men,  recognizing  the  importance  of  subordination,  would  be  the 
last  to  interfere  with  the  orders  of  a  Superintendent  or  require  a  viola 
tion  of  them  on  the  part  of  his  employes;  but,  unfortunately,  there 
has  existed  a  thorough  contempt  for  civilians,  particularly  on  the  part 
of  officers  of  low  grade,  and  very  few  are  willing  to  look  beyond  their 


278  REMINISCENCES    OF 

own  personal  gratification  or  convenience,  or  care  for  the  embarrass 
ments  to  other  Departments  that  a  determination  to  accommodate  them 
selves  may  cause.  The  only  remedy  for  this  evil  is  that  which  was 
applied  by  General  Ha] leek  to  the  railroads  under  my  charge,  when 
it  was  ordered  that  any  officer  who  interfered  with  the  movements  of  the 
trains  should  be  dismissed,  and  my  authority  over  the  railroad  was 
declared  to  be  supreme.  It  is  too  evident  to  require  argument  or  illus 
tration,  that  a  railroad  is  a  complicated  machine,  requiring  for  its 
successful  operation  a  Superintendent  possessed  of  qualifications  not 
often  found ;  it  must  have  one  head,  and  only  one,  and  through  that  head 
alone  should  orders  be  given  affecting  the  movement  of  trains.  Self- 
evident  as  appears  the  propriety  of  these  positions,  they  have  not  been 
generally  recognized  or  acted  upon,  but  have  been  continually  violated. 

What  is  needed  is  a  uniform  code  of  rules,  regulations  and  signals 
for  the  operation  of  all  Military  Railroads  of  the  United  States;  a 
central  bureau  at  Washington;  a  system  of  regular  periodical  reports, 
giving  the  names,  location,  condition,  amount  of  rolling  stock,  miles 
in  operation,  characteristics,  persons  in  charge,  doings  in  construction 
and  transportation,  salaries  of  employes,  and  other  particulars  on  all 
the  Military  Railroads;  but  even  with  this,  no  efforts  for  improvement 
or  reform  can  be  successful  without  the  approval  and  cordial  coopera 
tion  of  the  officer  in  command  of  the  Department,  who  must  have  a  real 
izing  sense  of  the  necessity  of  order  and  system,  and  who  will  not 
permit  his  own  temporary  convenience,  or  that  of  his  officers,  to  violate 
the  established  rules  of  operation,  and  throw  the  trains  into  confusion. 

Claims  by  railroad  corporations  will,  no  doubt,  be  presented  for 
damages  caused  by  the  raids  of  the  enemy,  or  for  suspension  of  ordinary 
business  during  the  occupancy  of  such  roads  for  military  purposes. 

In  all  such  cases  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  no  payment  should  be 
made  by  the  Government  except  for  actual  damages  that  can  be  proved 
to  have  been  sustained,  none  for  the  loss  of  prospective  profits  antici 
pated  by  corporations  from  taxing  Government  transportation.  The 
^business  and  receipts  of  a  road  during  its  ordinary  condition  can  be 
readily  ascertained  by  taking  the  average  of  several  years  before  the 
"war,  and  adding  the  indicated  annual  percentage  of  income;  or,  if  the 
occupation  has  been  only  for  a  short  time,  then  by  comparing  corre 
sponding  periods  before  the  war  at  the  same  seasons.  The  deficiency 
of  receipts  during  the  period  of  military  occupancy  should  be  made 
good,  as  also  any  damages  caused  by  such  occupancy.  If  allowances  be 
made  for  damages  caused  by  raids,  the  labor  and  material  expended  by 
Government  in  reconstruction  should  be  deducted  or  considered  in  the 
award. 

The  exposed  position  of  the  depot  grounds  at  Alexandria,  which 
invited  raids;  the  large  amount  of  rolling  stock  and  other  valuable 
property  accumulated  there,  and  the  fact  that  attempts  had  been  made 
•to  fire  the  buildings,  induced  me  to  ask  permission  of  General  Halleck 
•to  construct  some  artificial  protection.  The  permission  was  granted 
^without  hesitation,  and  after  a  careful  examination  of  the  ground,  I 
concluded  to  enclose  an  area  occupying  several  squares  with  a  substan 
tial  stockade.  The  stockade  will  not  only  exclude  persons  who  have  no 
right  to  enter  the  enclosure,  but  it  will  be  capable  of  a  very  efficient 
defense  in  case  of  attack.  The  straight  lines  which  form  the  sides  have 
been  broken  by  intermediate  bastions,  so  that  every  part  is  well  flanked; 
the  bastions  are  formed  by  heavier  logs  than  the  rest  of  the  stockade, 
and  have  two  tiers  of  loop-holes.  In  case  of  attack  they  will  be  defended 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  279 

by  practiced  riflemen  armed  with  magazine  rifles.  Two  positions  which 
command  the  exterior  approaches  have  been  prepared  for  artillery.  The 
work  was  done  by  the  Construction  Corps  at  a  time  when  they  had  no 
other  employment,  and  is  very  creditable  to  them. 

The  Construction  Corps  arid  a  portion  of  the  employes  in  the 
Transportation  Department  have  been  drilled  daily  under  the  direction 
of  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  Clark. 

The  Construction  Corps  consists  of  about  200  bridge  carpenters 
and  300  "contrabands."  They  are  not  often  suffered  to  remain  idle,  but 
when  not  actually  employed  in  advance  movements,  are  required  to  cut 
wood,  piles  and  cross-ties,  repair  track,  straighten  rails,  build  block 
houses  and  stockades,  frame  bridges  in  advance  of  requirements  in  con 
struction,  and  perform  various  other  services,  in  which  they  have 
attained  great  efficiency. 

Owing  to  the  frequent  exposure  of  these  men  in  positions  where 
they  are  liable  to  capture,  I  obtained  permission  from  General  Halleck 
to  organize,  arm,  and  drill  all  the  employes  of  the  Military  Railroads 
Bureau,  in  number  about  one  thousand  men,  with  a  view  to  self-defense. 
They  have  entered  into  the  plan  with  much  zeal  and  spirit.  In  case  of 
attack,  I  have  no  doubt  they  will  give  a  good  account  of  themselves. 

In  the  operations  of  the  Military  Railroads  which  have  been  under 
my  charge,  various  new  modes  of  facilitating  transportation,  of  recon 
structing  roads  and  bridges,  of  destroying  and  repairing  communi 
cations,  and  of  rapidly  throwing  troops  across  streams,  have  presented 
themselves  as  the  results  of  observation  and  experience,  the  introduction 
of  which  would  increase  the  efficiency  and  economy  of  the  service. 

For  the  purpose  of  giving  an  intelligible  explanation  of  these 
plans,  the  operations  were  photographed  and  reports  made  to  General 
Halleck,  accompanied  with  the  illustrations.  These  reports  were  printed, 
and  with  the  accompanying  photographs  sent  to  officers  in  command  of 
departments,  posts  and  expeditions,  where  the  introduction  might  lead 
to  valuable  results.  To  these  officers  the  information  should  be  confined 
during  the  continuance  of  the  war;  any  publication  of  details  previous 
to  its  termination  would  be  improper. 

The  artist  was  detailed  from  one  of  the  regiments  and  receives  no 
compensation  except  his  ordinary  pay.  The  expense  of  the  photographs 
is  inconsiderable. 

Some  of  the  operations  which  have  been  thus  illustrated  consist 
of  plans  of  transporting  loaded  cars  on  floats  so  as  to  connect  the  water 
termini  of  different  railroads,  and  transfer  cars  from  one  road  to 
another  without  break  of  bulk  or  lapse  of  time. 

Plans  for  constructing  floating  docks,  wharves,  warehouses  and 
bridges,  so  as  to  avoid  delay  in  establishing  landings  and  river  depots, 
or  loss  of  stores  or  improvements,  if  an  evacuation  becomes  necessary. 

Plans  for  destroying  bridges  with  apparatus  so  portable  that  it 
can  be  carried  in  the  pocket,  and  in  a  period  of  time  not  exceeding  five 
minutes. 

Plans  for  destroying  track  at  the  rate  of  five  miles  in  an  hour, 
with  apparatus  that  can  be  carried  in  saddle-bags,  and  which  twists  and 
bends  rails  so  effectually  that  they  cannot  be  again  used. 

Plans  for  straightening  rails  and  reconstructing  roads  that  have 
been  destroyed  by  the  enemy. 

Plans  for  various  new  kinds  of  trusses,  trestle  and  suspension 
bridges,  designed  to  permit  the  use  of  rough  sticks  and  other  material 
that  will  not  require  transportation. 


280  REMINISCENCES. 

Plans  and  expedients  for  crossing  streams  with  boats  that  two  men 
can  construct  of  rough  sticks  in  four  hours,  requiring  transportation  of 
only  about  eight  pounds  of  ropes,  cords,  and  material  to  each  man.  By 
means  of  these  boats,  rafts,  ferries  and  bridges  can  be  formed  capable 
of  crossing  infantry  at  the  rate  of  from  10,000  to  20,000  men  per  hour; 
also  artillery  and  wagon-trains.  They  will  render  possible  operations 
which  have  been  considered  impossible  by  the  best  military  engineers. 

All  these  operations  have  been  tested  experimentally  and  illus 
trated  by  photographs  exhibiting  actual  results.  The  Construction 
Corps  has  rendered  valuable  service  in  making  these  experiments  at 
times  when  they  would  have  been  otherwise  unemployed.  Instead  of 
allowing  the  men  to  remain  idle  in  camp,  they  have  been  constantly 
exercised  and  employed  in  some  way  by  which  they  could  be  made  to 
pay  expenses. 

This  report,  with  a  complete  set  of  photographs  illustrative  of 
operations  in  construction  and  transportation,  is  herewith  respectfully 
submitted. 

H.  HAUPT, 
In  Charge  of  United  States  Military  Railroads. 


CHAPTEE  XX. 

DESCRIPTION  OF  PHOTOGRAPHIC  ILLUS 
TRATIONS. 

ONLY  a  portion  of  the  photographs  of  the  achievements  and  ex 
periments  of  the  Military  Railroads  Construction  Corps  can 
be  presented  herein ;  but  a  description  of  certain  of  those  not  repro 
duced  may  be  quite  as  instructive  and  interesting,  especially  to 
military  men  and  engineers,  as  the  pictures  themselves. 

The  title-page  of  the  quarto  volume  containing  the  entire 
series  stated : 

Photographic  Illustrations  of  Operations  in  Construction  and 
Transportation,  as  used  to  facilitate  the  movements  of  the  Armies  of  the 
Rappahannock,  of  Virginia,  and  of  the  Potomac,  including  experiments 
to  determine  the  most  expeditious  and  practical  modes  to  be  resorted  to 
in  the  construction,  destruction,  and  reconstruction  of  roads  and  bridges. 
This  series  of  photographs  is  sent  to  officers  of  departments,  posts, 
and  expeditions,  with  a  view  to  increase  the  efficiency  and  economy  of 
the  public  service,  and  especially  to  suggest  expedients  whereby  our 
own  communications  can  be  most  readily  preserved  or  restored,  and  those 
of  the  enemy  most  rapidly  and  effectually  destroyed. 

No.  1.  Illustrates  a  mode  of  transportation  which  was  adopted 
with  great  advantage  on  the  Potomac  (see  page  291)  in  establishing  a 
communication  between  Alexandria  and  Aquia  Creek.  It  can  be  used 
to  connect  the  various  roads  which  have  their  termini  on  navigable 
rivers,  and  would  prove  of  great  advantage  on  the  Western  waters. 

The  floats  used  on  the  Potomac  consisted  of  two  large-sized  Schuyl- 
kill  barges,  across  which  long  timbers  were  placed  supporting  eight 
tracks.  On  these  tracks  loaded  cars  were  run  at  Alexandria,  towed  to 
Aquia  Creek,  landed  without  break  of  bulk,  and  sent  to  advanced  sta 
tions,  where  their  contents  were  distributed.  This  is  the  first  known 
attempt  to  transport  cars  by  water  with  their  cargoes  unbroken. 

At  the  time  of  the  abandonment  of  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad, 
in  June,  1863,  supplies  from  Falmouth  and  other  stations  in  the  front 
were  loaded  in  cars,  the  cars  run  on  floats  at  Aquia  Creek,  sent  to  Alex 
andria,  landed  without  break  of  bulk,  and  sent  forward  to  meet  the  army 
which  had  marched  overland  to  the  line  of  the  Orange  &  Alexandria 
Railroad.  All  the  cars  and  engines  were  safely  removed,  and  none  of 
the  stores  lost  or  destroyed.  Without  the  floats  this  would  have  been 
impossible. 

With  suitable  arrangements  trains  can  be  loaded  on  or  unloaded 
from  the  barges  in  a  very  few  minutes,  and  by  this  means  the  multiplica 
tion  of  depots,  the  break  of  bulk,  with  the  handling,  waste  and  expense 
which  it  involves,  the  steamers  and  transports,  and  the  risk  of  capture 
15  283 


284  REMINISCENCES    OF 

from  the  establishment  of  depots  in  exposed  positions,  would,  to  a  great 
extent,  be  avoided.  It  was  estimated  that  the  general  introduction  of 
this  system  on  the  Potomac  for  the  supply  of  the  Army  at  Fredericks- 
burg  would  have  saved  at  the  rate  of  a  million  and  a  half  of  dollars  per 
annum.  On  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers  there  may  also  be  oppor 
tunities  of  using  the  plan  with  great  advantage. 

No.  4.  "Represents  arks  60  feet  long,  20  feet  wide,  and  from  6  to  8 
feet  high.  The  sides  are  formed  of  round  sticks,  flatted  where  they  come 
together,  and  about  6  inches  in  diameter.  The  sticks  are  connected  by 
spikes  and  treenails.  Two-inch  planks  are  spiked  vertically  in  the  crib- 
work,  covered  with  two  thicknesses  of  canvas,  coated  on  both  sides  with 
pitch,  and  the  canvas  then  covered  with  boards.  (See  page  273.) 

These  arks  may  be  used  for  a  great  variety  of  purposes  connected 
with  army  transportation,  some  of  which  are  as  follows : 

a.  Transports  for  carrying  lumber,  commissary  or  quartermas 
ter's  stores. 

I.  Lashed  together  in  lots  of  four,  forming  a  float  120  feet  by  40 
feet,  they  will  carry  16  cars,  which  constitute  a  full  train  on  the  Virginia 
railroads,  and  all  the  cars  can  be  loaded  and  unloaded  without  changing 
the  position  of  the  float. 

c.  Five  arks,  placed  side  by  side    and  covered  by  a  canvas  roof, 
will  form  a  warehouse  100  feet  by  60  feet,  from  which  supplies  may  be 
issued;  and  when  empty,  the  warehouse  itself  may  be  towed  to  the  depot 
to  be  refilled. 

d.  Placed  together,  end  to  end,  they  form  a  wharf  sufficiently 
wide  for  two  railway  tracks,  upon  which,  when  anchored  by  piles,  trains 
can  be  safely  run ;  and  the  capacity  for  loading  or  unloading  vessels  may 
be  increased  to  any  desired  extent  by  increasing  the  number  of  floats  at 
the  end  of  the  wharf.     In  case  of  evacuation,  the  wharves  and  floating 
warehouses  may  be  towed  to  a  place  of  safety,  rendering  the  destruction 
of  buildings  and  stores  unnecessary. 

e.  Built  about  8  feet  high,  with  a  roof  of  logs,  they  may  be  used 
as  floating  block-houses,  for  the  transportation  of  troops  on  rivers,  where 
ordinary  transports  would  be  exposed  to  fire  from  the  banks;  or  for  the 
protection  of  warehouses  and  other  property  at  river  landings. 

f.  Filled  with  bunks,  they  may  form  floating  hospitals,  or  may  be 
used  for  the  accommodation  of  mechanics  and  laborers  employed  on  work 
near  streams. 

g.  The  weight  of  a  locomotive  engine  will  depress  an  ark  but  8 
inches;  they  may,  therefore,  be  used  to  support  railway  bridges  capable 
of  carrying  trains  across  wide  and  deep  streams.     The  spans  may  be 
built  in  advance  on  the  arks,  one  at  each  end,  towed  into  position,  fast 
ened  together,  anchored  in  any  suitable  way,  and  a  railway  communica 
tion  opened  in  a  very  short  time.     A  draw  in  such  a  bridge  can  be 
formed  by  making  a  span  movable. 

Provision  should  be  made  for  bailing  or  pumping  any  water  that 
may  run  or  leak  into  the  arks. 

No.  5.  Represents  the  platform  on  which  the  bottoms  of  the  arks 
are  constructed.  It  is  elevated  10  feet  above  the  launching  ways,  sup 
ported  by  stout  hinges  in  the  middle  so  as  to  afford  facilities  for  turning 
over  the  bottom  of  the  ark  when  it  has  been  finished  ready  to  receive  the 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  285 

sides.  The  inclined  braces  which  support  the  projecting  part  of  the 
platform  are  removed  when  the  bottom  is  to  be  turned,  and  the  maneuver 
is  effected  by  ropes  passing  round  the  windlasses  shown  on  the  back  part 
of  the  platform.  (See  page  281.) 

Near  the  water  is  seen  an  ark  on  the  ways,  nearly  finished. 

No.  14.  EXPERIMENTAL  SUSPENSION  TRUSSES  OF  BOARDS. — The  ex 
periments  on  this  truss  gave  very  important  results,  and  indicate  the 
possibility  of  applying  the  principles  even  to  railway  bridges.  The 
supports  of  the  bridge  consisted  of  two  catenaries,  each  of  six  1-inch 
boards,  12  inches  wide;  the  span  was  100  feet,  versed  sine  10  feet.  The 
boards  were  nailed  together  at  intervals  of  4  inches,  with  tenpenny 
nails;  and  after  the  catenary  was  formed,  cut  spikes  were  driven  through. 
The  anchorage,  which  was  not  very  secure,  gave  way  with  84,000  pounds, 
but  the  boards  were  not  pulled  apart.  The  experiment  will  be  repeated 
by  coating  the  surfaces  of  the  boards  with  pitch,  compressing  them  with 
half -inch  bolts  one  foot  apart,  and  driving  spikes  at  intervals  of  four 
inches.  It  is  believed  that  this  arrangement  will  possess  extraordinary 
powers  of  resistance,  and  the  combination  being  impervious  to  water,  will 
also  possess  great  durability. 

In  constructing  a  suspension  bridge  upon  this  principle,  to  replace 
a  bridge  of  one  or  more  spans  that  has  been  destroyed,  three  of  the  layers 
of  boards  which  form  the  catenaries  are  nailed  together  on  the  bank  at 
one  end  of  the  bridge,  supported,  if  necessary,  by  rollers,  and  drawn  into 
place  across  the  opening  by  a  cable  and  capstan  on  the  opposite  side. 
When  the  catenary  of  three  boards  is  placed,  it  will  form  a  runway  across 
the  opening;  other  boards  are  then  added,  taking  care  to  break  joints  at 
equal  distances.  Holes  are  then  bored,  bolts  inserted  and  tightly  screwed, 
and  lastly  the  spikes  are  driven.  The  anchorage  is  secured  by  spreading 
the  boards  at  the  ends  by  means  of  wedges,  in  the  shape  of  a  fan,  to  pre 
vent  it  from  pulling  through  the  timbers  which  embrace  it;  or  in  several 
other  ways  secure  anchorage  may  be  obtained. 

As  boards  can  be  carried  by  men  for  several  miles,  this  mode  of 
construction  for  military  bridges  may  sometimes  possess  great  advan 
tages.  A  very  important  application  of  this  principle  may  be  made  to 
the  construction  of  a  board  suspension  bridge  for  ordinary  military  pur 
poses.  The  board  catenaries  drawn  across  the  stream,  anchored  to  posts, 
and  floating  on  the  water,  may  be  raised,  at  intervals  of  30  or  40  feet,  by 
means  of  a  scow,  and  trestles  placed  under,  giving  as  many  points  of 
support  as  may  be  considered  necessary.  Such  a  bridge  could  be  con 
structed,  with  great  rapidity. 

No.  17.  EXPEDIENTS  FOR  CROSSING  STREAMS. — Promises  to  be  of 
very  great  value  in  military .  operations.  It  consists  of  a  frame  (see 
page  217)  covered  with  an  India-rubber  blanket,  or  with  painted  canvas, 
or  any  other  material  impervious  to  water. 

The  frames  are  made  of  round  or  split  sticks,  not  much  larger  than 
chair  sticks,  put  together  by  means  of  the  pocket  auger  represented  on 
page  191. 

To  afford  sufficient  capacity,  the  best  size  for  the  blanket  is  8  feet 
long  by  5  feet  wide.  This  will  allow  two  men  to  sit  in  each  boat,  facing 
each  other,  with  their  legs  extended.  The  frames  are  16  inches  high,  28 
inches  wide  and  64  inches  long,  outside  dimensions.  The  blanket  is 
surrounded  by  eyelets  and  tied  to  the  top  rail  of  the  frame  by  strings. 

Although  these  boats  may  be  used  singly,  for  scouting  and  for  other 
purposes,  yet  their  most  important  use  promises  to  be  in  throwing  large 


286  REMINISCENCES    OF 

bodies  of  troops  suddenly  across  a  stream,  even  in  the  face  of  an  enemy 
of  equal  strength,  and  enabling  them,  by  the  rapidity  of  the  maneuver, 
to  occupy  and  hold  their  ground  before  the  enemy  can  concentrate  to 
oppose  them.  To  accomplish  this  movement,  which  books  on  military 
science  declare  to  be  impracticable,  a  point  should  be  selected  where 
artillery  can  command  the  opposite  bank,  and  where  troops  can  be 
massed  unobserved.  When  all  is  ready,  two  regiments  of  engineer 
troops,  each  man  carrying  his  boat,  advance  rapidly  to  the  stream, 
throw  in  the  boats,  lash  them  together  in  rafts  of  25,  send  over  ropes  to 
tie  to  trees  on  both  sides,  and  in  a  few  minutes  a  ferry  is  extemporized, 
capable  with  two  ropes,  of  throwing  troops  across  at  the  rate  of  10,000 
men  per  hour;  one  of  the  ropes  being  used  for  the  loaded  rafts,  and  the 
other  to  return  the  empty  ones  (see  page  257).  Each  raft  will  carry  50 
to  65  men;  and  to  avoid  confusion  and  delay,  the  men  who  manage  the 
rafts  should  be  drilled.  Cavalry  may  be  passed  over  by  holding  the 
bridles  of  the  horses;  artillery  (see  page  265),  by  flooring  the  rafts  with 
poles.  In  No.  17  (see  page  233)  two  boats  of  smaller  dimensions  than 
those  prescribed  carry  four  men,  but  the  men  should  sit  flat  on  the  bot 
tom,  not  on  boards  across  the  top. 

No.  18.  EXPEDIENTS  FOR  CROSSING  STREAMS. — Blanket  boats  on  the 
Potomac  (see  page  241)  some  distance  from  shore.  A  pair  of  boats 
carries  four  men,  and  a  single  small  boat,  made  of  an  ordinary  blanket, 
one  man,  who  is  sitting  on  the  bottom.  Boats  of  blankets  of  the  ordinary 
size  are  too  small.  They  have  buoyancy  enough  to  carry  a  man,  but  he 
must  be  very  expert  in  the  use  of  a  canoe  or  he  will  upset. 

No.  19.  EXPEDIENTS  FOR  CROSSING  STREAMS. — Frame  of  a  blanket 
boat  (see  page  217)  of  proper  size.  The  outside  dimensions  are :  height 
16  inches,  breadth  28  inches,  length  64  inches.  The  rails  of  the  frame 
are  one  inch  and  a  half,  round  or  square ;  the  connecting  pieces  one  inch, 
round  or  square.  The  material  may  be  obtained  from  fence  rails,  poles 
or  split  timber.  It  is  not  absolutely  necessary  that  an  India-rubber 
blanket  should  be  used  for  covering  the  frames;  any  kind  of  tight  can 
vas  will  answer  as  well.  Pieces  of  sail  cloth  or  condemned  tents  may  be 
used  for  this  purpose  to  great  advantage.  A  coat  of  thick  paint  will 
render  them  impervious  to  water. 

No.  20.  EXPEDIENTS  FOR  CROSSING  STREAMS. — Pocket  auger  (see 
page  191)  used  to  construct  the  frames  of  the  blanket  boats.  It  consists 
of  a  hollow  case  about  6  inches  long,  which  contains  a  34-inch  auger  for 
boring  holes  in  the  rails,  and  in  the  end  is  a  hollow  auger  for  cutting 
round  tenons  34-inch  diameter  and  1^  inches  long.  The  auger  can  be 
carried  with  little  more  inconvenience  than  a  jack-knife. 

No.  21.  EXPEDIENTS  FOR  CROSSING  STREAMS. — A  pair  of  small  pon 
toons  (see  page  225),  designed  to  facilitate  scouting  operations.  They 
should  be  about  10  inches  diameter  and  7  or  8  feet  long.  They  can  be 
carried  by  a  strap  around  the  waist  and  concealed  by  an  overcoat.  A 
boat  can  be  made  of  these  by  running  poles  through  the  loops,  and  then 
placing  sticks  across.  They  were  originally  designed  by  General  Haupt 
for  the  use  of  surveying  parties,  but  for  scouting  expeditions  they  may 
be  of  great  value. 

No.  24.  EXPERIMENTAL  BRIDGE  TRUSSES. — Truss  for  military 
bridges  (see  pages  61,  71,  81,  91),  which  is  composed  of  boards  nailed 
and  spiked  together.  The  span  is  60  feet;  the  height  of  truss  six  feet. 
The  form  is  that  of  a  fish  or  two  arches  curved  in  opposite  directions. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  287 

The  lower  arch  is  composed  of  six  boards,  the  upper  arch  of  five.  The 
braces  are  of  two-inch  plank,  and  through  the  trusses,  vertically,  inch 
bolts  are  passed.  These  trusses  were  tested  by  forming  a  bridge  of  two 
of  them,  which  was  loaded  with  railroad  iron  until  it  broke.  The  weight 
was  applied  by  first  piling  a  number  of  bars  on  the  bridge,  then  pulling 
over  a  car  loaded  with  twenty  tons  by  means  of  a  rope,  so  as  to  avoid  risk 
to  the  men.  The  bridge  broke  (see  page  91)  with  108,000  pounds. 

This  was  a  highly  satisfactory  experiment,  and  although  the  trusses 
were  designed  simply  for  ordinary  military  bridges,  they  would  safely 
have  carried  a  locomotive.  When  they  broke,  the  weight  stood  on  the 
bridge  five  minutes  before  it  came  down.  Much  stronger  trusses  than 
those  experimented  upon,  can  be  made  by  pitching  the  surface  of  the 
boards,  bolting  them  with  half-inch  bolts  at  intervals  of  a  foot,  and 
driving  spikes  through  at  intervals  of  four  inches.  Two  such  trusses 
would  carry  a  train,  but-  three  or  four  could  be  used  if  preferred. 

Instead  of  the  two  arches  turned  in  opposite  directions,  one  of  them 
may  be  replaced  by  a  straight  chord- 
No.  27.  SECOND  EXPERIMENT  WITH  BOARD  TRUSSES. — This  truss 
was  60  feet  long,  the  clear  span  56  feet,  height  of  truss  six  feet.  The  top 
and  bottom  arches  were  each  composed  of  six  boards,  one  inch  thick  and 
twelve  inches  wide;  the  surfaces  of  the  boards  were  covered  with  pitch; 
the  boards,  as  they  were  successively  placed,  were  nailed  with  tenpenny 
nails,  four  inches  apart;  at  intervals  of  one  foot  were  placed  two  half- 
inch  bolts,  compressing  the  boards  tightly,  and  spikes,  six  inches  long, 
were  driven  through  the  boards  at  intervals  of  four  inches.  Boards  were 
also  nailed  vertically  on  the  sides. 

The  bridge  was  loaded  until  it  broke.  The  breaking  weight  was 
95  tons,  30  tons  of  which  were  on  the  car;  the  equivalent  was  about  105 
tons,  uniformly  distributed. 

When  the  truss  broke,  it  appeared  that  the  built-chord  had  acted  as 
a  solid  piece ;  there  was  no  slipping  of  the  boards  upon  each  other.  The 
fractures  of  the  six  boards,  on  each  lower  chord,  were  nearly  at  the  same 
point.  Assuming  five  of  the  boards  to  have  resisted  the  tensile  strain, 
the  breaking  strain  was  2,900  pounds  per  square  inch.  The  top  chords 
did  not  break. 

No.  36.  EXPERIMENT  WITH  BOARD  TRUSSES. — Experiments  having 
proved  that  trusses  could  be  made  of  boards  of  sufficient  strength  to 
carry  railway  trains,  it  was  concluded  to  construct  1,000  lineal  feet  of 
bridging  of  this  description  (see  page  61)  preparatory  to  the  forward 
movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

The  construction  of  these  bridges  furnished  employment  to  the 
Construction  Corps  when  they  had  no  other  work.  It  was  intended  that 
the  trusses  should  be  carried  whole  and  placed  in  position,  without  the 
use  of  false  works,  resting  the  ends  on  wooden  piers  when  the  trusses 
were  shorter  than  the  spans  which  they  replaced. 

Each  pair  of  trusses  was  to  form  a  span  of  60  feet  of  bridging. 
The  trusses  were  to  be  placed  about  10  feet  apart,  braced  by  planks,  and 
the  ties  placed  directly  on  the  top  chords,  as  shown  in  plate. 

These  trusses  were  composed  of  nine  boards  in  each  chord.  The 
surfaces  were  not  pitched.  The  half -inch  bolts  were  in  pairs  one  foot 
apart,  as  in  the  trusses  previously  constructed.  Cut  spikes,  six  inches 
long,  were  driven  from  both  sides  at  intervals  of  four  inches.  Boards 
were  also  nailed  vertically  on  the  sides  of  the  trusses  covering  the  edges 
of  the  other  boards. 


288  REMINISCENCES. 

A  pair  of  these  trusses  were  experimented  upon  and  tested  by  first 
loading  them  uniformly  with  one  ton  per  lineal  foot,  in  addition  to  the 
weight  of  the  bridge,  and  then  running  on  a  car  loaded  with  30  tons  of 
rails.  The  strain  thus  produced  was  supposed  to  be  twice  as  great  as 
that  caused  by  the  passage  of  any  ordinary  railroad  train. 

The  bridge  stood  the  test  without  any  yielding  or  slipping  of  the 
boards  in  the  middle  of  the  span.  Only  one  board  appeared  to  have 
slipped  about  the  sixteenth  part  of  an  inch,  but  even  this  was  doubtful. 

There  were  about  one  hundred  of  these  valuable  photographs 
illustrating  the  peculiar  inventions  of  General  Haupt  to  promote 
the-  operations  of  war,  but  the  remainder,  where  not  reproduced  in 
this  volume,  require  no  description. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

SUBSEQUENT  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  THE 
MILITARY  RAILROAD  CORPS. 

AFTER  the  repulse  of  General  W.  S.  Rosecrans  in.  September, 
1863,  East  Tennessee  was  considered  in  great  jeopardy,  and 
Secretary  Stanton  decided  to  send  a  portion  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  to  reinforce  the  armies  in  the  West.  An  article  in  the 
Century  of  March,  1887,  states  that  General  Halleck  considered 
the  movement  impracticable,  as  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  the 
transfer  effected  in  time.  After  much  discussion,  the  President 
was  inclined  to  side  with  General  Halleck.  Stanton  requested  an 
adjournment  until  evening,  and  in  the  meantime  sent  for  my  suc 
cessor,  Colonel  McCallum,  and  presented  the  question : 

Assuming  that  you  have  entire  control  of  rail  and  telegraph,  what 
is  the  shortest  time  in  which  you  can  transfer  the  required  number  of 
troops,  with  artillery,  ammunition  and  supplies,  to  the  objective  point  ? 

McCallum  made  his  figures  and  reported  a  date  earlier  than 
that  which  the  Secretary  considered  necessary.  At  the  adjourned 
meeting  Colonel  McCallum  was  sent  for  and  gave  his  figures,  and 
was  ordered  at  once  to  commence  the  movement,  which  was  success 
fully  accomplished,  22,000  men,  artillery,  ammunition  and  sup 
plies  being  moved  from  near  Catlett's  Station,  on  the  Orange  & 
Alexandria  Railroad,  to  a  point  1,166  miles  distant  in  eight  days. 
McCallum  was  rewarded  by  a  commission  as  Brigadier-General. 

But  it  was  in  Sherman's  great  campaign,  in  his  world- 
renowned  march  to  the  sea,  that  the  wonderful  efficiency  of  the 
Construction  Corps  was  most  strikingly  exhibited.  The  marvel 
ous  celerity  with  which  bridges  were  reconstructed  and  broken 
communications  restored  inspired  so  much  confidence  in  General 
Sherman  that  he  would  risk  advances  when  dependent  upon  ex 
tended  rail  lines  of  hundreds  of  miles  in  his  rear  for  supplies,  and 
that,  too,  when  these  lines  were  subject  to  constant  breaks  from 
guerrilla  bands  and  hostile  citizens. 

In  this  famous  march,  the  transportation  was  under  the  direc 
tion  of  W.  W.  Wright,  the  repairs  of  roads  under  Adna  Anderson, 
and  the  bridges  under  E.  C.  Smeed.  Wright,  being  much  of  his 
time  at  Headquarters  and  receiving  instructions  from  General 

289 


290  REMINISCENCES    OF 

Sherman  and  from  his  Chief  Quartermaster,  appears  to  have  been 
the  only  officer  of  the  Corps  recognized  by  General  Sherman  in  his 
Memoirs,  and  to  him  all  the  credit  has  been  given:  but  Wright 
managed  the  transportation  only;  the  reconstruction  of  the  roads 
was  in  the  hands  of  General  Anderson,  who  held  a  more  difficult 
position. 

There  could  have  been  no  transportation  without  a  continu 
ous  track,  and  there  could  have  been  no  continuous  track  without 
bridges. 

The  bridges  were  the  key  of  the  situation,  and  they  were 
under  the  charge  of  E.  C.  Smeed,  and  to  this  diffident,  unassuming 
man,  whose  name  was  not  even  mentioned,  more  than  to  any  other, 
T  give  the  credit  of  the  success  of  Sherman's  great  campaign. 

Sherman  could  not  have  moved  without  supplies ;  he  could  not 
have  had  supplies  without  the  railroads,  and  the  railroads  could 
not  have  been  used  without  the  bridges,  and  I  firmly  believe  that 
no  other  man  living  could  have  been  found  capable  of  reconstruct 
ing  the  bridges  with  equal  celerity. 

During  this  campaign  I  received  a  letter  from  Smeed  inform 
ing  me  that  he  had  built  a  bridge  across  the  Chattahoochee.  which 
contained  twice  the  amount  of  timber  of  the  Potomac  Creek  bridge, 
and  was  built  in  just  half  the  time,  or  four  and  a  half  days,  the 
timber  being  taken  from  the  stump. 

The  records  of  the  whole  world  cannot  find  the  equal  of  such 
a  performance,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  Smeed  had  a  corps 
of  men  thoroughly  organized  and  drilled,  veterans  in  military 
bridge  construction,  while  at  Potomac  Creek  I  had  details  of  com 
mon  soldiers,  changed  every  day,  unskilled,  untrained  and  many  of 
them  useless  for  any  purpose. 

I  was  very  anxious  to  get  an  account  from  Smeed  himself  of 
the  reconstruction  of  this  Chattahoochee  bridge  to  include  in  these 
Memoirs,  and  wrote  to  him  two  or  three  times  without  reply.  I 
finally  concluded  that  his  well-known  and  extreme  diffidence  ren 
dered  him  indisposed  to  place  himself  in  any  position  that  would 
render  him  conspicuous ;  but  after  his  death,  in  1892,  his  daughter, 
Mrs.  Kate  Smeed  Cress,  of  Emporia,  Kansas,  wrote  to  me  that  she 
had  found  amongst  her  father's  papers  an  unfinished  letter  ad 
dressed  to  me,  which  she  would  forward  if  desired.  Of  course  it 
was  desired,  and  the  following  is  a  copy  of  the  letter : 

OMAHA,  NEB.,  May,  1899. 

DEAR  GENERAL:  Replying  to  yours,  asking  to  be  furnished  with 
a  brief  account  of  my  operations  while  connected  with  the  Construction 
Department  of  the  Military  Railways  of  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  I  will  say: 

In  the  fall  of  1863,  while  at  Alexandria,  Virginia,  I  received  an 
order  to  report  for  duty  to  General  D.  C.  McCallum  at  Bridgeport, 


OF  THE 

UNIV 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  293 

Alabama.  I  started  the  same  day  I  got  the  order  and  went  direct  to 
Stevenson.  While  there  I  learned  by  telegraph  from  Colonel  W.  W. 
Wright  that  General  McCallum  and  himself  were  in  New  York  waiting 
for  men  to  be  recruited  for  railway  service  in  the  Southwest,  and  that 
they  would  not  come  on  South  for  some  time.  1  also  learned,  while  in 
Stevenson,  that  the  base  of  supplies  for  the  army  then  in  Chattanooga 
was  at  Bridgeport,  Alabama. 

Being  unable  to  render  any  service  where  I  was,  I  went  on  to 
Bridgeport,  the  terminus  of  the  railway.  Finding  nothing  I  could  do 
there  towards  opening  the  railway  further  South,  I  went  on  about 
twenty-five  miles  further  to  a  point  where  a  long  and  high  bridge  that 
carries  the  railway  over  a  deep,  wide  valley,  had  been  burned.  There  I 
found  a  party  of  workmen  engaged  in  rebuilding  it.  The  person  in 
charge  of  the  work  said  they  were  working  under  orders  of  Colonel 
Anderson — you,  no  doubt,  know  him;  he  was  formerly  an  engineer  on 
the  Pennsylvania  Railroad.  These  men  had  been  at  work  here  for  con 
siderable  time  and  the  construction  of  the  bridge  was  well  under  way. 
The  methods  employed  in  the  construction  were  not  the  best ;  they  were 
orthodox,  but  to  a  member  of  the  Construction  Corps  of  Virginia  they 
did  seem  a  little  old-fashioned  and  unsuited  to  the  occasion.  Steps  were 
immediately  taken  to  change  the  mode  of  operation,  and  introduce  better 
and  more  expeditious  methods  of  construction,  which,  I  think,  succeeded 
fairly  well,  as  the  bridge  was  finished  in  a  few  days  that  would  have 
taken,  under  the  old  regime,  as  many  weeks. 

On  my  return  to  camp,  I  found  General  McCallum  and  Colonel 
Wright ;  they  had  come  on  by  rail  and,  being  unable  to  cross  the  bridge, 
waited  there  for  me  to  return,  which  I  did  that  evening,  and  after  being 
assured  by  me  that  the  railway  would  be  ready  for  trains  the  next  day, 
they  concluded  to  remain  over  night  in  my  camp. 

The  next  morning  the  bridge  was  finished  and  several  trains  loaded 
with  supplies  crossed  over  it  and  ran  into  Chattanooga. 

General  McCallum  and  Colonel  Wright  rode  into  Chattanooga  on 
the  first  train,  and  that  was  the  only  part  either  of  them  took  in  opening 
up  the  railway  communications  with  Chattanooga,  although  I  have  often 
heard  each  of  them  speak  of  their  great  achievement  in  opening  up  the 
railway  to  carry  food  to  the  starving  army  in  Chattanooga. 

After  the  railway  was  opened  to  Chattanooga,  Colonel  Wright  was 
placed  in  charge  of  railway  construction  in  the  Southwest,  with  head 
quarters  in  Chattanooga. 

As  soon  as  the  railway  was  in  good  running  order  I  was  ordered 
by  Colonel  Wright  to  open  up  communications  between  Chattanooga 
and  Knoxville.  For  this  service  I  had  two  companies  of  the  Con 
struction  Corps  that  had  just  come  on  from  Virginia,  they  being  a  part 
of  the  old  force  employed  there  by  me  before  I  went  South. 

The  track  force  went  by  rail,  taking  their  tools  and  supplies  with 
them,  and  repaired  the  railway  as  they  advanced. 

The  bridgemen  took  their  tools  and  supplies  in  army  wagons,  and 
marched  about  forty  miles  to  Charleston,  the  place  where  the  bridge 
over  the  Hiwassee  River  had  been  burned.  The  bridge,  although  quite 
long  and  high,  was  finished  before  the  trackmen  arrived  there.  As  soon 
as  the  track  force  came  up  the  work  of  repairing  the  road  was  pushed  on 
as  far  as  London,  about  twenty-five  miles  from  Knoxville. 

While  at  London  I  received  an  order  to  turn  the  forces  over  to 
Colonel  E.  L.  Wentz,  and  to  report  for  duty  to  Colonel  John  Clark,  at 
Nashville,  Tennessee,  to  complete  an  unfinished  railway  between  Nash- 


294  REMINISCENCES   OF 

ville  and  Johnsonville.  When  I  arrived  on  the  work,  I  found  the  road 
in  running  order  for  about  twenty-five  miles  out  from  Nashville;  the 
remaining  forty-five  miles  that  had  been  built  to  reach  Johnsonville  was 
in  work.  The  grading  was  being  done  by  colored  troops,  the  track  and 
bridges  by  Engineer  troops — a  brigade  of  the  former  and  two  regiments 
of  the  latter  having  been  detailed  for  that  service.  The  work  was  being 
done  under  the  old  established  rules  generally  followed  in  such  cases, 
viz.,  the  earth  being  wheeled  out  of  the  cuts  to  make  the  fills.  The 
timber  for  the  bridges  were  squared  and  framed  together  according  to 
old  established  customs.  The  cross-ties  were  being  bedded  to  a  straight 
edge,  and  the  rails  were  being  laid  and  spiked  down  in  the  usual  manner. 
In  order  to  open  the  line  as  soon  as  possible,  the  track  was  laid  before 
the  grading  was  finished  and  the  cuts  taken  out  and  the  fills  brought  to 
grade  afterwards.  Our  new  methods  were  introduced  in  bridge-building 
and  track-laying,  and  by  these  means  the  road  was  opened  to  Johnson 
ville  in  about  thirty  days. 

All  these  operations  were  preliminary  to  the  Atlanta  campaign. 

When  the  Atlanta  movement  began  I  was  in  Nashville,  Tennessee, 
and  did  not  expect  to  go  with  the  Construction  Corps  on  that  campaign, 
as  another  engineer,  Colonel  Eicholtz,  had  been  selected  for  that  service. 
But  some  time  after  the  movement  south  from  Chattanooga  began,  I 
received  a  telegram  to  proceed  to  Chattanooga  and  join  the  Construc 
tion  Corps  in  the  field  as  soon  as  possible.  I  started  immediately 
on  receipt  of  the  order  and  joined  the  Corps  near  Big  Shanty,  Georgia. 
After  I  joined  the  Corps,  Colonel  Wright  and  Colonel  Eicholtz  remained 
with  it  until  the  railway  was  repaired  to  Marietta.  Soon  after  I  joined 
the  Corps  Colonel  Wright  and  Colonel  Eicholtz  returned  to  Chattanooga, 
and  I  saw  very  little  of  Colonel  Wright  and  nothing  of  Colonel  Eicholtz 
until  the  railway  was  opened  to  Atlanta.  Colonel  Wright  occasionally 
made  short  visits  to  the  front,  but  never  remained  with  us  very  long. 

Our  operations  here  in  the  Southwest  were  conducted  quite  similar 
to  the  Front  Royal  campaign  in  Virginia;  you,  of  course,  remember 
how  we  did  the  work  there.  Our  forces  here  were  better  organized  and 
equipped,  and  consequently  more  efficient  than  the  raw  details  employed 
there.  Our  tools  for  bridge-building  consisted  chiefly  of  axes,  cross 
cut  saws,  spiking  mauls,  augers,  ropes,  blocks  and  tackle,  timber-rollers, 
scaffolding  plank,  when  we  could  get  them,  and  two  good  sets  of  balance 
beams,  and  a  few  carpenters'  tools,  the  latter  seldom  used.  We  always 
carried  a  full  supply  of  wrought  bridge  spikes,  that  were  liberally  used 
in  our  temporary  works.  Eor  track  service  we  had  a  regular  set  of  track 
tools  for  laying  track,  and  in  addition  we  always  carried  hooks  for 
taking  up  track  and  bending  rails.*  You  remember  the  first  of  these 
hooks  were  made  in  Alexandria,  Virginia.  I  see  General  Howard,  in  his 
Century  article,  gives  Colonel  Poe  the  credit  for  inventing  it.  You 
know  who  invented  it. 

Our  transportation  by  rail  consisted  of  locomotives,  box  cars  for 
supplies,  flat  cars  for  materials  and  stock  cars  for  animals.  Our  land 
transportation  was  all  done  with  ox  teams,  which  were  drawn  from  the 
Commissary  and  returned  to  the  Commissary  when  we  were  out  of  beef 
and  a  new  provision  return  made  out  for  more  meat  rations.  Our  camp 
equipment  consisted  of  a  sufficient  supply  of  tents  and  the  regular  camp 
equipage  for  men.  The  men  were  organized  in  squads  of  about  twenty 


*  NOTE. — Invented  by  E.  C.  Smeed  during  Hooker's  campaign,  and  previously 
described  herein. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  295 

each,  with  a  foreman  in  charge  of  each  squad.  Each  squad  had  its  own 
cook,  camp  equipage,  tools,  etc.  The  squads  were  independent  of  each 
other;  in  other  words,  any  one  of  the  squads  could  be  detached  for 
special  duty  without  interfering  with  the  organization  of  another 
squad. 

The  successive  steps  taken  to  build  a  bridge  over  a  large  stream 
would  be  as  follows  r  A  sufficient  number  of  axmen,  teamsters  and  teams 
would  be  left  in  the  rear,  where  good  timber  for  our  purposes  was  plenty, 
to  cut  and  hew  (we  usually  flatted  the  timber  on  two  sides)  and  deliver 
on  the  cars  a  sufficient  quantity  of  timber  to  build  the  bridge.  As  fast 
as  the  timber  could  be  loaded  on  the  cars  it  would  be  forwarded  to  the 
bridge  site.  The  framers  and  raisers  would  proceed  to  the  bridge  site 
and  begin  the  work  of  clearing  away  the  rubbish,  unloading  tools,  pitch 
ing  camp,  etc.  By  the  time  this  had  been  finished  the  first  lot  of  timber 
would  have  arrived  and  been  unloaded  on  the  ground. 

As  soon  as  this  was  done  the  squads  would  be  assigned  to  their 
special  duties  and  begin  their  work  at  once.  The  raisers  would  begin 
operations  by  rigging  and  running  out  their  balance  beams  at  both  ends 
of  the  bridge.  The  framers  would  frame  and  put  a  bent  together  on  the 
ground  ready  to  be  launched  into  the  stream  or  raised  from  the  ground 
into  place,  according  to  circumstances.  By  the  time  a  bent  was  put 
together,  the  leveler  would  be  ready  to  give  the  exact  length  for  cutting 
off  the  feet  of  the  posts;  in  the  meantime,  the  raisers  would  have  their 
balance  beams  rigged  and  the  falls  lowered  ready  to  raise  the  bent  into 
position.  As  soon  as  the  bent  was  stayed,  the  balance  beams  would  be 
run  out  for  the  next  bent.  This  operation  would  be  repeated  in  this  way 
from  both  ends  of  the  bridge  until  all  the  bents  were  in  place.  While 
the  shore  bents  were  being  put  up,  another  squad  would  build  a 
temporary  ferry  for  crossing  the  stream,  which  consisted  of  a  raft 
rigged  similar  to  a  rope  ferry.  The  ferry  would  always  be  located  just 
above  the  bridge  site,  so  that  the  bents  of  the  bridge  that  came  in  the 
stream  could  be  fastened  to  the  raft  and  floated  into  position  under  the 
bridge,  ready  to  be  raised  into  place.  If  the  water  was  deep  and  the 
current  swift,  several  bars  of  railway  iron  would  be  spiked  to  the  feet 
of  the  posts  to  assist  in  sinking  them.  When  a  bridge  was  two,  three 
or  four  sections  high,  very  little  attention  was  paid  to  the  height  of  the 
first  sections,  but  the  leveler  would  take  the  elevation  of  the  top  of  the 
first  section  as  soon  as  it  was  raised  and  determine  the  exact  height  of 
all  the  upper  sections,  and  they  would  be  framed  to  the  proper  height. 
As  the  work  progressed,  another  squad  would  spike  on,  where  needed, 
additional  braces.  These  braces  were  made  of  round  poles  about  six 
inches  in  diameter,  flatted  where  they  came  in  contact  with  the  main 
timbers  and  well  spiked  to  them  as  fast  as  the  befjfcs  were  raised  and 
braced.  Another  squad  of  men  would  put  on  the  track  stringers,  which 
were  made  of  round  logs  hewn  flat  on  the  top  sides  and  where  they 
rested  on  the  bents.  The  track  stringers  were  never  spliced  nor  butted 
together  on  a  cap,  but  were  always  lapped  by  each  other;  the  bays  were 
generally  about  sixteen  feet  long.  We  used  two,  four  or  six  stringers  in 
each  bay,  depending  entirely  on  the  size  and  quality  of  the  timbers  in 
them.  The  next  and  last  operation  was  lajing  the  track.  Common  hewn 
cross-ties  were  used;  they  were  spiked  to  the  track  stringers  with  long 
bent  spikes,  and  the  rails  spiked  down  to  them  in  the  usual  way. 

Generally  the  track  was  repaired  up  to  the  bridge  site  before  the 
bridges  were  begun.  Exceptions  were  sometimes  made  where  long 
stretches  of  track  had  been  destroyed  and  where  timbers  for  rebuilding 


296  REMINISCENCES. 

a  bridge  could  be  obtained  near  at  hand.  In  such  cases  the  bridgemen 
would  build  the  bridges  in  advance  of  the  track  work.  The  bridges 
built  in  this  way  were  rough  and  strong;  they  would  sometimes  settle 
out  of  line  and  surface  under  the  weight  of  the  first  trains,  but  they 
were  easily  relieved  and  surfaced  again.  Considering  the  circum 
stances  and  materials  we  had  to  work  with,  the  bridges  were  built  in  a 
very  short  time.  As  for  an  example  of  military  bridge-building,  the 
bridge  over  the  Chattahoochee  River,  near  Atlanta,  Georgia,  although 
being  a  large  one,  about  800  feet  long  and  nearly  100  feet  high,  was 
built  in  four  and  a  half  days. 

The  water  service  required  special  attention,  and  was  done  by 
men  detailed  for  that  service. 

The  advance  engines  were  supplied  with  water  carried  from  wells, 
small  streams,  or  water  courses,  to  the  tender  in  buckets  or  camp  kettles 
by  men  formed  in  line  passing  the  buckets  from  one  to  another.  The 
water  tanks  were  built  in  advance  of  the  regular  supply  trains.  JSTo 
fixed  rules  were  followed  in  building  them;  they  generally  consisted  of 
a  tub  about  twelve  feet  in  diameter  and  eight  feet  deep,  set  upon  a 
framed  stand.  Water  would  be  supplied  to  them  from  the  nearest 
spring  or  water  course. 

The  above  is  a  general  outline  of  the  way  the  railway  building 
was  carried  on  during  the  Atlanta  campaign.  We  had  to  encounter 
many  difficulties  not  enumerated  here,  but  they  were  all  matters  of 
detail  in  railway  building  in  an  enemy's  country  that  were  met  and 
overcome. 

The  foregoing  letter  is  unsigned  and  ends  abruptly.  The  sys 
tem  of  operations  was  precisely  the  same  as  that  first  introduced  by 
me  in  the  campaign  of  the  Army  of  the  Rappahannock  under  Gen 
eral  McDowell  in  1862,  in  which  operations  E.  C.  Smeed  was  my 
most  efficient  assistant. 

The  brief  mention  of  the  Chattahoochee  bridge  is  worthy  of 
note  and  characteristic  of  the  modesty  of  the  writer.  This  bridge 
I  regard  as  the  most  extraordinary  feat  in  military  bridge  con 
struction  that  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

A  bridge  780  feet  long  and  more  than  90  feet  high,  con 
structed  in  four  and  a  half  days,  the  timber  being  cut  from  the 
stump,  is  certainly  without  parallel. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  accounts  of  building  these  bridges, 
published  during  the  war,  were  considered  fabulous  by  the  mili 
tary  engineers  of  Europe,  and  that  I  was  requested  in  1868,  by  a 
unanimous  vote  of  the  British  Association  for  the  Advancement  of 
Science  at  the  Dundee  meeting,  to  explain  how  such  structures  had 
been  erected.  The  explanation  was  followed  by  a  vote  of  thanks 
and  the  tender  of  a  banquet  by  the  Eoyal  Engineers. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 
MY  ASSOCIATES  AND  SUPERIORS. 

THESE  notes,  covering  an  important  period  of  the  war,  contain 
many  papers  which  are  not  found  in  the  records  of  the  Re 
bel]  ion;  and  statements  of  facts  known  only  to  myself,  which  throw 
strong  sidelights  upon  the  main  facts  of  history. 

I  have  purposely  omitted  the  reports  of  the  Special  Agent 
sent  to  examine  into  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  West  and 
Southwest.  They  exhibited  gross  mismanagement,  wanton  waste, 
and  wholesale  destruction  of  public  property,  and  also  contain 
statements  affecting  the  integrity  of  individuals  which  should  at 
the  time  have  been  made  the  subject  of  investigation  by  a  Con 
gressional  Committee.  These  reports  were  all  submitted  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  but  as  no  public  action  was  taken  by  him,  and 
no  investigation  made  by  Congress,  it  would  be  ungenerous,  after 
so  great  a  lapse  of  time,  to  throw  a  cloud  upon  the  reputation  of 
those  who  might  have  made  a  good  defense,  or,  at  least,  have  made 
explanations  that  would  have  removed  in  part,  at  least,  the  odium 
which  appeared  to  attach  to  them. 

My  intimate  association  with  heads  of  departments  and  with 
the  commanders  of  armies  in  the  field,  renders  it  expedient  for 
me  to  give  some  expressions  of  opinion  derived  from  personal 
contact,  and  thus  help  to  remove  some  popular  errors. 

PRESIDENT  LINCOLN. — My  first  interview  with  President 
Lincoln  was  in  1861,  before  my  connection  with  the  service. 
On  the  occasion  of  a  visit  to  Washington,  Hon.  John  Covode,  of 
Pennsylvania,  asked  me  to  go  with  him  to  see  the  President. 

Covode  was  not  a  man  who  paid  any  attention  to  the  rules 
of  etiquette.  He  took  me  to  the  White  House,  and  without  sending 
a  card,  walked  up  stairs,  then  along  the  hall  to  a  room,  opened 
the  door  without  knocking,  and  ushered  me  into  the  august  presence 
of  Abraham  Lincoln.  The  President  was  alone,  seated  in  a  chair, 
tilted  back,  with  his  heels  upon  the  sill  of  an  open  window,  clad  in 
a  linen  duster,  for  the  weather  was  warm. 

Covode  was  greeted  very  cordially,  and  then  I  was  intro 
duced  with  some  rather  extravagant  words  of  commendation,  when 
Covode  remarked:  "Mr.  President,  I  always  thought  it  strange 

297 


298  REMINISCENCES    OF 

that  the  first  time  we  met  we  seemed  to  know  each  other,  and  I 
think  I  have  discovered  the  reason.  You  are  called  'Honest  Abe' 
and  I  'Honest  John/  and  honest  men  are  so  mighty  scarce  in 
Washington  that,  of  course,  we  knew  each  other  at  sight." 

The  President  laughed,  and  then  said:  "That  reminds  me 
of  a  little  story."  It  was  about  two  little  newsboys,  and  was 
appropriate,  but  I  have  forgotten  the  point. 

I  met  the  President  occasionally  afterwards  during  my  con 
nection  with  the  service,  but  never  intruded  iipon  him  unless  I 
had  something  of  importance  to  communicate.  I  was  always 
received  with  cordiality. 

On  one  occasion  I  had  returned  from  a  visit  to  the  army 
with  Covode,  who  was  a  prominent  and  useful  member  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  He  asked  me  to  go  with 
him  to  see  the  President.  It  was  a  period  of  gloom.  We  found 
the  President  much  depressed.  Covode  reported  the  dissatis 
faction  in  the  army  and  the  criticisms  on  his  policy,  and  had 
proceeded  for  some  time,  when  the  President  suddenly  turned, 
placed  his  hand  upon  his  knee  and  said : 

"Covode,  stop !  Stop  right  there !  ISTot  another  word !  I 
am  full,  brim  full  up  to  here" — drawing  his  hand  across  his  neck. 

The  President  was  tired  of  hearing  criticisms  upon  his  policy ; 
he  knew  that  he  was  doins;  his  dutv  as  best  he  could,  and  the 

O  -     •/ 

verdict  of  posterity  has  been  entered  up  in  his  favor. 

The  President  respected  the  sanctity  of  the  Sabbath  and  dis 
approved  of  unnecessary  work  upon  that  day.  I  accompanied  him 
on  his  visit  to  McDowell  at  Falmouth,  when  the  General  told 
him  that  he  would  not  be  ready  to  start  before  Sunday  on  the 
march  to  Richmond,  but  knowing  his  objections  to  initiating 
movements  that  day,  he  would  leave  it  to  his  judgment.  The 
reply  was :  "Take  a  good  ready  and  start  Monday  morning." 

It  was  on  his  return  from  this  visit  that  he  told  members  of 
the  War  Committee  that  I  had  built  the  Potomac  Creek  bridge 
out  of  nothing  but  beanpoles  and  cornstalks. 

In  Pope's  second  battle  of  Manassas  I  have  reason  to  believe 
that  the  President  passed  many  days  without  sleep,  for  at  all 
hours  of  the  night  I  received  telegrams  from  him  asking  if  I 
had  no  further  intelligence  to  communicate. 

He  wras  sorely  tried  by  McClellan's  inactivity,  and  his  letters 
and  dispatches  were  often  pathetic :  "If  you  don't  intend  to  use 
that  army,  won't  you  lend  it  to  me  ?"  "What  has  your  cavalry 
been  doing  since  the  battle  of  Antietam  that  would  fatigue 
anything  ?" 

It  is  useless  to  indulge  in  any  eulogies  of  President  Lincoln. 
His  heart  was  tender  and  full  of  sympathy,  with  no  room  for 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  301 

enmity.  His  intellect  was  penetrating  and  intuitive,  his  judg 
ment  almost  infallible.  In  him  the  South  lost  their  best  friend, 
and  the  Nation,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Washington,  their 
greatest  President. 

SECRETARY  EDWIN  M.  STAN  TON. — I  had  some  acquaint 
ance  with  Mr.  Stanton  when  he  was  practicing  law  in 
Pittsburg,  but  was  not  intimate.  He  was  a  man  of  marked 
ability  and  of  strong  characteristics.  He  was.  I  believe,  honest, 
patriotic  and  fearless,  but  at  times  impulsive  and  headstrong. 
He  made  enemies  and  was  denounced  by  those  who  unsuccessfully 
opposed  him  or  felt  the  force  of  his  power,  as  unjust  and 
tyrannical. 

Although  T  incurred  his  displeasure  by  interesting  myself  in 
behalf  of  parties  who  had  been  charged  with  and  punished  for 
disloyalty,  when  I  believed  there  was  no  ground  for  it,  I  was 
treated  in  general  with  much  consideration  by  the  Secretary,  and 
furnished  with  a  card,  "Admit  the  bearer  at  any  hour  day  or 
night."  At  times  he  was  lavish  in  compliments;  at  other  times 
he  charged  me  with  disrespect  for  not  obeying  orders  that  I  believed 
to  be  impracticable  and  unreasonable. 

On  the  whole,  our  relations  wrere  satisfactory  until  he  was 
compelled  to  choose  between  Governor  Andrew  and  myself,  and,  of 
course,  chose  the  former. 

PETER  H.  WATSON. — Mr.  Watson  was  Assistant  Secre 
tary  of  War.  He  had  been  associated  with  Mr.  Stanton  as  a  lawyer, 
and  was  his  most  intimate  friend.  He  was  a  man  of  bright 
intellect  and  sound  sense;  discreet,  prudent  and  eminently 
practical,  and  acted  as  a  balance-wheel  in  the  Department. 

Between  Watson  and  myself  there  never  was  a  ripple  of 
antagonism.  When  I  was  recalled  to  resume  charge  of  the  rail 
roads  in  1863,  no  one  welcomed  my  return  more  cordially.  He 
gave  me  authority  to  arrest  and  imprison  parties  guilty  of  treason 
able  practices ;  placed  at  my  disposal  part  of  the  contingent  fund 
to  employ  detectives  to  ferret  out  abuses  and  frauds,  and  no  one 
regretted  my  retirement  more  sincerely. 

He  held  important  positions  after  the  war,  and  was  at  one 
time  President  of  the  Erie  Railroad. 

GENERAL  HENRY  W.  HALLECK. — In  July,  1862,  General 
Halleck  was  summoned  to  Washington  as  General  in  chief  com 
mand  of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  and  military  adviser 
of  the  President.  Previous  to  that  time  he  had  been  in  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  Missouri,  Headquarters  at  St.  Louis. 


302  REMINISCENCES   OF 

He  had  been  a  counsellor-at-law  at  San  Francisco,  author  of 
numerous  works  on  Military  Science,  an  LL.  D.,  a  man  of 
superior  attainments  and  eminently  fitted  for  the  responsible  posi 
tion  to  which  he  had  been  called.  Secretary  Stanton  had  known 
him  professionally  in  California  and  may  have  been  the  cause  of 
his  promotion. 

Before  this  time  there  had  been  no  military  head  to  the 
armies,  each  commander  acting  independent!}'  with  such  instruc 
tions  as  he  received  from  the  War  Department  or  the  President. 

My  office  was  on  G  street,  near  the  War  Department,  and 
Halleck' s  office  was  a  few  doors  east.  I  was  with  him  frequently 
and,  after  his  appointment,  consulted  him  instead  of  the  Secretary 
in  regard  to  the  operations  of  my  Department.  General  George 
W.  Cullom  was  his  Chief  of  Staff,  and  Colonel  J.  C.  Kelton  his 
Adjutant  General. 

I  formed  a  very  high  opinion  of  General  Halleck' s  sound 
judgment,  prudence  and  discretion,  and  was  encouraged  by  him  to 
express  opinions  and  make  suggestions  freely  in  all  matters  per 
taining  to  the  operations  under  my  charge. 

There  is,  and  has  been,  a  widespread  misapprehension  in 
regard  to  the  interference  of  General  Halleck  with  the  Generals  in 
command  of  armies  in  the  field,  and  he  has  been  censured  by  the 
press  for  giving  orders  which  trammelled  their  liberty  of  action, 
and  resulted  in  disaster.  This,  I  think,  is  an  error,  and  does  him 
great  injustice. 

I  have  already  narrated  the  interview  between  the  President 
and  General  Halleck  after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  when  he 
positively  refused  to  issue  orders  for  the  retirement  of  the  army 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river.  He  told  the  President  decidedly 
that  if  such  orders  were  issued,  he  must  give  them  on  his  own 
responsibility.  He  said  if  he  were  personally  present  he  might 
take  such  responsibility,  and  then  enunciated  his  position  in  these 
words — a  position  from  which  I  never  knew  him  to  depart:  "I 
hold  that  a  General  in  command  of  an  army  in  the  field  is.  or 
ought  to  be,  the  best  judge  of  the  situation.  He  should  be  allowed 
full  liberty  to  exercise  his  own  discretion  and  not  be  trammelled 
with  orders  from  those  who  are  not  in  a  situation  to  know  all  the 
conditions  which  influence  a  decision." 

In  his  dispatches  to  Hooker  he  refused  to  give  him  detailed 
instructions,  and  stated  that  it  was  proper  for  those  at  Washington 
merely  to  indicate  the  objects  to  be  accomplished ;  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  Generals  in  the  field  to  use  their  own  discretion  as  to  the 
best  means  of  accomplishing  those  objects.  The  general  directions 
were :  Do  not  manoeuvre  in  such  a  manner  as  to  leave  the  capital 
exposed ;  keep  as  near  the  enemy  as  you  can ;  use  your  cavalry 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  303 

to  obtain  information  as  to  his  position  and  movements;  if  he 
spreads  out,  strike  as  opportunity  offers :  it  is  more  important  to  de 
feat  and  destroy  the  army  of  the  enemy  than  to  take  Richmond. 

General  Halleck  has  been  severely  censured  for  the  orders 
^iven  to  Meade  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  I  am,  perhaps, 
responsible  for  these  orders  more  than  any  one  else. 

At  my  interview  with  General  Meade  on  the  next  morning 
after  Lee's  retreat,  I  felt  sure  that  if  the  rest  of  several  days  which 
he  proposed  to  take  were  really  taken,  the  enemy  would  escape, 
and  I  urged  General  Halleck  to  give  orders  to  commence  the 
pursuit  immediately  and  prevent  Lee  from  effecting  a  crossing  of 
the  Potomac  back  into  Virginia. 

When  Lee  did  escape  it  wras  natural  that  great  dissatisfaction 
should  be  felt,  and  it  was  to  have  been  expected  that  such  dissatis 
faction  should  also  be  expressed  when  the  fruits  of  the  splendid 
victory  at  Gettysburg  had  been  lost  by  inaction. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  IRVIN  McDowELL. — Of  all  the  commanders 
of  the  Armies  of  the  East  during  my  connection  with  them,  I 
considered  General  McDowell  the  most  able,  but  at  the  same  time 
the  most  unfortunate  and  the  most  unpopular. 

My  relations  with  McDowell  were  more  intimate  personally 
than  with  any  other  General  in  command.  I  was  a  member  of 
his  staff,  enjoyed  his  confidence  and  was  authorized  by  him  to 
attach  his  name  to  any  orders  I  misfht  find  it  necessary  to  issue. 
He  wished  me  to  be  with  him  as  much  as  possible,  to  make  his 
camp  my  Headquarters,  and  assured  me  that  a  camp  bed  and 
plate  were  always  at  my  service ;  but  this  could  not  be,  as  my  duties 
required  a  constant  change  of  location. 

McDowell  never  forgot  what  he  was  pleased  to  consider  my 
kindness  to  him  when  he  came  to  West  Point  as  a  new  cadet  and 
was  received  by  me  as  a  tent-mate,  assisted  and  protected  from 
hazing.  I  claim,  therefore,  that  I  should  know  McDowell  thor 
oughly,  and  whether  the  public  opinions  in  regard  to  him  were 
correct. 

He  was  a  man  of  fine  education,  with  superior  conversational 
powers,  but  a  very  strict  disciplinarian.  He  sought  to  increase  the 
mobility  of  his  army  by  cutting  off  unnecessary  transportation. 
He  had  no  use  for  regimental  bands,  and  objected  to  the  barrels 
of  lager  and  the  cases  of  wines  and  liquors  which  increased  the 
wagon  trains  and  delayed  movements. 

He  himself  used  no  stimulants,  and  could  not  regard  them  as 
a  necessity  for  others,  which  made  him  obnoxious,  especially  to 
the  German  regiments. 

16 


304  REMINISCENCES   OF 

He  regarded  newspaper  reporters  as  a  nuisance.  They 
retaliated  by  writing  him  down,  and  their  papers,  circulating 
amongst  the  camps,  manufactured  a  public  opinion  amongst  the 
rank  and  file,  much  to  the  injury  of  the  commander. 

On  one  occasion  a  band  came  to  serenade  him,  but  he  was  so 
much  occupied  in  studying  maps  and  papers  that  he  probably  did 
not  hear  them,  and  they  went  off  with  uncomplimentary  epithets. 

He  was  thoroughly  systematic,  and  when  sending  an  order 
always  sent  a  duplicate  and  required  an  indorsement,  as  evidence 
of  receipt.  This  practice  proved  of  value  before  the  Court  of 
Inquiry,  when  a  German  General,  having  repeatedly  denied  receiv 
ing  a  certain  order,  McDowell  took  a  paper  from  a  package  and 
asked  him  if  he  recognized  his  own  signature.  The  only  answer 
was,  "Well !  I  forgot  it" 

There  is  no  question  that  McDowell  felt  hampered  by  instruc 
tions  from  Washington,  and  was  not  always  permitted  to  exercise 
his  own  judgment  to  the  full ;  but  it  was  not  the  same  with  subse 
quent  commanders  to  an  equal  extent. 

After  the  unsuccessful  movement  to  Front  Royal,  against 
which  McDowell  had  so  earnestly  protested,  and  truly  predicted 
the  result,  the  public  clamor  demanded  his  removal,  which  was 
made  by  the  President  with  great  reluctance,  as  I  believe  he 
enjoyed  his  entire  confidence. 

One  of  his  staff  related  an  instance  of  his  coolness  under  fire. 
They  were  riding  along  an  open  valley,  when  a  rebel  battery  on  a 
hill  opened  fire  upon  them.  On  the  opposite  side  of  the  valley 
were  a  large  number  of  artillery  horses.  He  sent  an  officer  of  his 
staff  to  have  them  removed  to  a  place  of  safety,  seeming,  as  my 
informant  said,  more  concerned  about  the  safety  of  the  horses 
than  the  safety  of  his  staff. 

Had  Halleck  come  into  command  sooner,  or  had  McDowell 
remained  in  command  later,  I  think  favorable  results  would  have 
come  to  fruit  earlier. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  POPE. — With  General  Pope  I  was 
not  so  well  acquainted.  I  never  had  more  than  three  or  four 
personal  interviews  with  him. 

He  did  not  recognize  my  position  when  he  came  into  com 
mand,  although  McDowell  told  him  he  was  making  a  great 
mistake.  He  seemed  to  think  it  a  simple  matter  to  run  a  railroad, 
and  that  his  Quartermasters  could  manage  it.  I,  therefore, 
returned  to  Massachusetts,  but  was  soon  recalled  by  Assistant 
Secretary  Watson  with  the. information  that  there  was  not  a  wheel 
moving  on  any  of  the  roads. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  305 

In  the  interview  on  the  battlefield  of  Cedar  Mountain  he  was 
quite  courteous,  and  directed  his  Chief  of  Staff,  Colonel  Ruggles, 
to  issue  any  order  I  might  dictate.  This  was  the  first  interview; 
the  second  was  on  the  banks  of  the  Kappahannock  when,  from  the 
reports  made  in  my  presence,  I  suspected  a  flank  movement,  of 
which  Pope  thought  there  was  no  danger,  but  which  was  then 
actually  taking  place,  and  from  which  I  narrowly  escaped  capture 
at  Catlett's. 

The  next  interview  was  after  the  battle,  when  Pope  and 
McDowell  gave  me  a  full  account,  in  their  camp,  from  which  I 
formed  and  maintained  for  years  very  unfavorable  impressions  of 
the  conduct  of  Fitz  John  Porter,  which  were  not  removed  until 
Porter's  counsel,  John  C.  Bullit,  of  Philadelphia,  put  in  my 
hands  the  testimony  before  the  court.  This  modified  my  opinion 
so  far  as  this  particular  officer  is  concerned,  but  I  still  think  that 
if  there  had  been  proper  cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  under  General  McClellan,  a  complete  victory  would 
have  been  gained, 

As  to  Pope's  generalship,  I  do  not  feel  competent  to  express 
an  opinion,  but  McDowell,  on  whose  judgment  I  relied,  considered 
him  an  officer  of  more  than  ordinary  ability. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  B.  MoCi.ELLAN. — General  McClel 
lan  was  the  idol  of  the  army  and  the  favorite  of  the  public.  He 
was  the  very  antipode  of  McDowell  in  his  characteristics.  He 
possessed  personal  magnetism,  was  affable  and  courteous,  treated 
newspaper  reporters  with  the  greatest  consideration,  and  they  in 
return  wrote  him  up  as  a  hero,  as  they  falsely  wrote  down 
McDowell  as  a  brute.  The  newspapers,  much  more  than  military 
capacity  or  achievement,  made  the  public  sentiment  of  the  army 
and  of  the  people. 

I  was  not  a  participant  in  McClellan's  operations  on  the 
Peninsula,  but  I  had  much  to  do  with  him  after  his  return.  His 
first  interview  with  me,  which  continued  some  hours,  impressed  me 
with  the  idea  that  his  caution  was  excessive,  and  that  he  was  not 
a  man  to  incur  risks  or  assume  responsibilities,  which  opinion  was 
not  changed  upon  further  acquaintance.  He  did  not  seem  anxious 
to  get  his  army  into  the  fight  at  Manassas,  but  rather  to  make  the 
capital  secure  by  placing  his  men  in  the  forts  surrounding  it,  and 
telegraphed  that  he  did  not  despair  of  saving  the  capital,  when 
perhaps  no  one  else  supposed  the  capital  could  be  in  any  danger. 

He  gained  a  splendid  victory  at  Antietam,  where  good 
generalship  seems  to  have  been  exhibited,  but  he  suffered  his 
beaten  enemy  to  escape.  I  am  not  disposed,  however,  to  criticise 
this  fact  too  severely.  It  may  not  have  been  possible  to  prevent  it. 


306  REMINISCENCES   OF 

Lee  had  bridges  there,  which  he  did  not  possess  after  his  retreat 
from  Gettysburg. 

The  battle  of  Antietam  was  on  the  17th,  and  on  the  19th  Lee 
was  across.  It  would  have  required  a  knowledge  of  Lee's  intentions 
and  far  greater  celerity  of  movement  than  was  exhibited  by  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  or  any  other  of  the  Armies  of  the  East,  to 
have  prevented  this  movement.  Stonewall  Jackson  might  have 
done  it.  I  know  of  no  one  else  who  could.  Jackson  could  follow 
up  an  advantage  and  not  lose  the  fruits  of  victory  by  stopping  to 
rest.  I  may  be  in  error,  but  such  is  my  opinion. 

After  Antietam  there  was  a  long  delay  before  starting  in 
pursuit.  The  General  was  always  wanting  something,  and  when 
that  something  was  supplied  he  would  think  of  something  more, 
until  at  last  the  long-tried  patience  of  the  President  was  exhausted 
and,  in  reply  to  a  statement  that  the  horses  were  fatigued,  he 
begged  to  be  informed  what  the  horses  had  been  doing  since  the 
battle  of  Antietam  that  would  fatigue  anything. 

My  observations  of  McClellan  would  lead  me  to  characterize 
him  as  The  Unready. 

John  Covode,  a  Congressman  from  Pennsylvania,  in  his 
homely  phraseology,  used  to  say  that  "McClellan  has  been  raised  to 
so  high  a  pinnacle  that  he  is  afraid  to  move  in  any  direction  for 
fear  that  he  will  fall  and  break  his  neck." 

MAJOR-GENERAL  AMBROSE  E.  BURNSIDE. — Whatever  may 
have  been  the  failings  of  General  Burnside,  it  cannot  be  charged 
that  he  was  characterized  by  any  large  amount  of  self-conceit.  I 
accompanied  General  Halleck,  at  his  request,  on  the  occasion  of 
the  visit  to  camp  when  Burnside  was  appointed  to  succeed  McClel 
lan.  He  was  very  reluctant  to  accept  it;  declared  emphatically 
that  he  was  not  fit  for  it ;  that  there  were  many  better  men  in  the 
service,  but  that  if  the  President  and  General  Halleck  insisted 
upon  it,  he  would  do  the  best  he  could,  and  could  promise  no  more. 

Burnside  had  not  the  system  and  order  which  distinguished 
McDowell,  and  his  ideas  of  practical  operations  were  sometimes 
very  crude.  On  one  occasion  he  wanted  a  new  wharf  built  below 
Acquia  Creek,  and  asked  me  how  much  time  would  be  required. 

I  answered,  "About  three  weeks."  He  exclaimed,  "three 
weeks!  I  want  it  in  three  days.  I  will  detail  twenty  thousand 
men  for  the  service. " 

I  explained  that  more  than  a  limited  number  of  men  could  not 
work ;  they  would  only  be  in  the  way,  and  that  some  time  would  be 
required  to  collect  tools  and  material.  His  idea  seemed  to  be  that 
if  50,000  days'  work  were  required  to  complete  a  structure,  he 
could  detail  50,000  men  and  do  it  in  one  day. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  309 

Burnside  had  promised  to  give  no  orders  about  rail  trans 
portation,  except  through  me,  but  he  sometimes  forgot  and  gave 
orders  to  subordinates  which  invariably  led  to  trouble. 

His  movement  to  Fal  mouth  was  not  upon  the  lines  indicated 
by  the  President  and  General  Halleck  as  the  best,  and  was 
probably  a  mistake,  but  he  was  allowed  to  use  his  own  judgment. 

A  greater  mistake  was  made  in  his  assault  on  the  heights  at 
Fredericksburg.  which  were  too  strong  to  be  taken  in  front.  If 
there  had  been  more  prompt  movement  of  his  forces  on  the  left 
flank,  the  position  might  have  been  taken ;  but  this  is  simply  my 
opinion.  I  was  with  Burnside  during  the  battle.  This  battle 
was  the  only  event  of  importance  during  General  Burnside's 
career,  which  was  brief,  and  General  Hooker  became  his  successor. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER. — In  conferring  the  com 
mand  upon  General  Hooker,  the  President  wrote  one  of  his 
characteristic  letters,  in  which  he  told  him  that  he  had  placed  him 
in  command,  not  for  the  things  that  he  had  done,  but  in  spite  of 
them. 

I  well  remember  Hooker  when  he  came  to  West  Point  as  a 
cadet,  .1  remarkably  handsome  youth  with  a  florid  complexion, 
which  he  always  retained. 

Hooker's  accession  to  the  command  was  followed  by  a  long 
period  of  cessation  of  military  operations,  during  which  my  Corps 
was  occupied  in  the  shops  and  yards  of  Alexandria  in  preparing 
for  the  "On  to  Richmond"  movement  in  the  spring. 

My  relations  with  Hooker  were  entirely  satisfactory.  He 
never  interfered  with  transportation  movements,  and  communi 
cated  his  plans  to  me  confidentially,  so  that  I  should  be  fully 
prepared  when  a  movement  was  commenced. 

Of  the  personal  habits  of  General  Hooker  I  am  unable  to 
speak.  He  was  charged  with  fondness  for  stimulants,  but  I  never 
saw  him  when  I  thought  he  was  under  their  influence. 

When  the  movement  commenced  in  the  spring  of  1863,  a 
heavy  rainfall  embarrassed  his  movements  by  rendering  roads 
almost  impassable,  causing  delays  which  betrayed  his  movements 
to  the  enemy,  and  compelled  him  to  modify  his  original  plans. 

The  retreat  after  Chancellorsville  was  not  approved  by  some 
of  his  besfCorps  Commanders,  especially  by  Reynolds  and  Meade, 
and  was  probably  a  serious  error,  as  his  forces  at  the  time  were 
said  to  have  been  superior  to  those  of  the  enemy. 

My  report  to  General  Halleck  of  the  interview  with  General 
Hooker  at  Fairfax  had  probably  much  influence  upon  the  prompt 
itude  with  which  his  request  to  be  relieved  was  acted  upon;  but 
he  would  no  doubt  have  been  retired  if  the  request  had  not  been 
made. 


310  REMINISCENCES   OF 

MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  GORDON  MEADE. — General  Meade 
graduated  from  West  Point  in  1835,  in  the  same  class  with  myself. 
His  class  rank  was  19  in  a  class  of  fifty-six  members.  He  was  not 
distinguished  at  the  Military  Academy  by  any  prominent  charac 
teristics.,  was  dignified,  courteous  and  gentlemanly,  but  rather 
reserved  and  without  personal  magnetism.  I  was  not  particularly 
intimate  with  him  while  at  the  Academy. 

General  Meade  married  a  daughter  of  the  distinguished 
lawyer,  John  Sargent,  of  Philadelphia,  and  upon  making  a  call 
upon  him  after  his  marriage,  I  was  introduced  to  Henry  A.  Wise. 
of  Virginia,  who  had  married  another  daughter. 

After  this,  our  next  meeting  was  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

His  appointment  to  the  command  of  the  army  was  wholly 
unexpected  and,  under  the  circumstances,  a  crushing  weight  of 
responsibility  was  imposed  upon  him.  He  had  no  knowledge  of 
where  the  enemy  was,  or  where  his  own  forces  were  scattered,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a  more  embarrassing  position. 

Good  fortune  directed  my  steps  to  Harrisburg  on  the  night  of 
June  30.  After  hearing  the  reports  of  the  movement  of  the  enemy 
I  was  able  to  interpret  them  correctly,  and  advised  Meade  the  same 
night  by  telegraph  and  courier  that  Lee  was  concentrating  his 
forces  at  Gettysburg  to  fall  upon  and  crush  his  Army  Corps  in 
detail,  before  they  could  be  concentrated. 

The  battle  commenced  by  an  attack  upon  the  First  Corps. 
Its  able  commander,  John  F.  Reynolds,  was  killed  and  his  men 
were  driven  back,  fighting  through  the  town  to  the  Cemetery 
Ridge,  which  was  a  very  strong  position,  and  where  a  stand  was 
made  until  reinforcements  could  arrive  and  the  whole  army  was 
concentrated  at  that  point. 

General  Meade  arrived  on  the  second  day.  He  had  no  inten 
tion  of  fighting  a  battle  at  Gettysburg.  His  intention,  as  he  told 
me  in  the  interview  on  Sunday  after  the  battle,  was  to  fall  back 
towards  Baltimore  and  occupy  a  defensive  position  along  Pipe 
Creek,  but  circumstances  beyond  his  control  changed  his  plans. 

That  Meade  allowed  the  fruits  of  his  brilliant  victory  to  be 
lost  by  tardy  movement  is  as  undeniable  as  it  was  unfortunate. 
Lee  retreated  July  4,  and  did  not  get  across  the  Potomac  until 
July  14 — double  the  time  that  would  have  been  necessary,  under 
skillful  engineers,  to  build  bridges  and  make  his  escape. 

I  have  no  wish  to  detract  from  the  high  reputation  won  by 
General  Meade  at  Gettysburg,  but,  while  I  was  not  sure  that 
McClellan  could  have  prevented  the  escape  of  Lee  at  Antietam,  I 
was  just  as  sure  that  Meade  could  have  succeeded  after  Gettys 
burg.  I  was  well  acquainted  with  all  the  country  to  the  Potomac 
and  knew  all  the  roads  and  the  topography.  I  had  gone  to  Gettys 
burg  in  1836  to  locate  the  Gettysburg  Railroad  across  the  South 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  311 

Mountain  to  Hagerstown,  had  married  in  Gettysburg  and  lived 
there  ten  years,  part  of  the  time  as  Professor  of  Mathematics  and 
Civil  Engineering  in  Pennsylvania  College. 

The  residence  which  I  built  on  the  Seminary  Eidge  was  in 
the  battlefield,  and  one  of  Longstreet's  batteries  was  in  front  of 
this  house,  and  from  what  I  know  of  the  country  along  the 
Potomac,  it  would  be  difficult  to  convince  me  that  prompt  move 
ment  would  not  have  insured  the  capture  of  Lee's  army  and  ended 
the  war  then  and  there. 

I  had  myself,  when  locating  the  railroad,  walked  from  a 
more  distant  point  on  the  Potomac  to  Gettysburg  in  one  day,  and 
could  not  believe  that  it  was  impossible  for  troops  to  march  a 
shorter  distance  in  two  days. 

GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT. — I  never  met  General  Grant  in  the 
army  and  had  formed  an  unfavorable  opinion  of  him  as  a  man 
who  was  not  naturally  gifted,  of  not  more  than  ordinary  intelli 
gence,  taciturn  because  he  had  nothing  to  say,  and  whose  elevation 
was  due  more  to  favorable  circumstances  than  to  genius;  his 
successes  to  the  weakness  and  exhaustion  of  his  adversary  and  his 
own  unlimited  resources. 

But  T  was  mistaken.  At  the  celebration  of  the  opening  of 
the  Northern  Pacific  Railroad,  General  Grant  and  also  Generals 
Cass  and  Newton  and  Secretary  Evarts  had  been  assigned  to  the 
sections  of  the  train  under  my  special  charge,  and  to  my  private 
car.  I  was  with  him  daily  for  a  week,  during  which  time  I  had 
a  good  opportunity  of  becoming  well  acquainted  with  my  special 
guests. 

I  found  General  Grant  really  very  well  informed,  his  conver- 
^ational  powers  much  above  the  average,  his  affability  and 
condescension  to  inferiors  great,  no  affectation  or  conceit  about 
the  man,  but  perfect  simplicity  and  disregard  of  self.  At  the 
various  stations  the  assembled  crowd  cheered  for  Grant.  They 
seemed  to  care  for  no  one  else.  When  they  called  for  a  speech,  he 
said  that  speech-making  was  not  his  forte;  that  he  had  brought 
Secretary  Evarts  with  him  who  was  an  accomplished  orator,  and, 
as  he  had  communicated  his  ideas  to  him,  Secretary  Evarts' 
speeches  might  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  his  own  opinions. 

Women  crowded  around  the  platforms,  holding  up  their 
infants  to  be  kissed.  To  see  Grant  was  the  great  event  of  their 
lives,  something  to  talk  over  at  their  humble  firesides  and  transmit 
the  narrative  to  children's  children. 

General  Grant  shook  hands  with  all  who  offered,  although 
frequent  ablutions  were  rendered  necessary  as  a  consequence. 
During  the  whole  trip  he  touched  no  stimulants;  in  fact,  the 
occupants  of  my  car  formed  a  very  dry  party. 


CHAPTEE  XXIII. 

PERSONNEL  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  MILITARY 
RAILROADS. 

THE  operations  of  the  Construction  Corps  during  the  campaigns 
of  1862  and  1863,  under  my  leadership,  had  raised  it  to  a 
condition  of  marvelous  efficiency.  Colonel  D.  C.  McCallum,  who 
had  been  my  predecessor  and  who  became  my  successor,  was  a 
thorough  master  of  transportation,  when  he  could  be  relieved  from 
military  interference  and  have  a  telegraphic  line  under  his  entire 
control — conditions  that  did  not  exist  previous  to  my  charge. 

New  cadets,  or  "plebes,"  as  they  are  called  at  West  Point, 
regard  cadets  in  the  higher  classes  with  great  veneration,  and, 
after  leaving  the  Academy,  junior  graduates  retain  respect  for 
their  seniors.  This  was,  no  doubt,  of  advantage  to  me  in  assuming 
charge  of  the  Military  Railroads.  With  the  exception  of  General 
Hcintzelman,  there  was  no  Corps  or  Army  Commander  that  I  can 
recall  whose  first  commission  in  the  army  antedated  my  own. 

This  fact,  in  connection  with  the  order  making  my  authority 
supreme,  effectually  put  a  stop  to  that  scourge  of  Military  Rail 
roads,  interference  and  conflicting  orders  by  the  different  com 
manders  along  the  lines. 

McCallum  was  a  civilian,  and  civilians  were  considered  as 
entitled  to  no  respect  when  the  convenience  of  officers  was  involved. 
I  do  not,  therefore,  claim  that  the  improved  condition  of  affairs, 
after  I  took  charge,  was  due  to  superior  ability. 

D.  C.  MCCALLUM. — D.  C.  McCallum  had  been  for  many 
years  the  General  Superintendent  of  the  Erie  Railroad,  and  was 
one  of  the  most  experienced  managers  in  the  country.  He  could 
sit  in  his  ISTew  York  office  and  move  his  trains  by  telegraph  with 
the  utmost  precision,  but  the  conditions  were  widely  different  on 
the  Military  Railroads.  When  the  wires  were  not  down  they  were 
in  use  by  the  military  authorities,  who  would  not  allow  them  to 
be  interrupted. 

McCallum  was  a  splendid  office  man,  thoroughly  familiar 
with  every  detail  of  requisitions,  accounts  and  red-tape,  which  I 
|7as  not-  Moreover,  I  did  not  care  to  learn,  so  it  did  not  take 
long  to  come  to  a  perfect  understanding  and  division  of  duties 

312 


GENERAL  HERMAN  EAUPT.  313 

which  suited  us  both.  McCallum  took  the  office  and  I  took  the 
field,  and  did  not  trouble  myself  with  accounts,  except  when 
matters  of  claims  were  referred  to  me,  as  they  frequently  were  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,  for  investigation  and  report. 

WILLIAM  H.  WHITON. — William.  II.  Whiton  was  Chief 
Clerk.  He  was  a  gentleman  of  education,  intelligence,  inde 
pendent  circumstances  and  high  social  position.  He  had  married 
a  daughter  of  Mr.  Lord,  the  first  President  of  the  Erie  Rail 
road,  and  owned  a  fine  estate  on  the  Hudson  River  near  Piermont. 
His  reasons  for  accepting  the  position  of  Chief  Clerk  were 
patriotism  and  personal  friendship  for  McCallum.  He  was  a 
thorough  accountant,  and  the  right  man  in  the  right  place. 

JOHN  II.  DEVEREUX. — I  had  no  acquaintance  with  J".  H. 
L'evereux  before  I  took  charge  of  the  Military  Railroads,  and  my 
first  impressions  were  not  favorable.  He  was  a  warm  friend  of 
McCallum,  whom  I  superseded,  and  there  was  naturally  some 
dissatisfaction  in  consequence  of  this  change,  which  was  shared  by 
many  others;  but  further  acquaintance  broke  the  ice,  and  when 
we  knew  each  other  our  relations  became  fraternal.  Our  friend 
ship  continued  until  his  death. 

Devereux  was  a  man  of  superior  and  cultivated  intellect,  an 
accomplished  gentleman,  a  zealous  and  active  churchman,  a  con 
scientious  Christian,  a  master  of  all  transportation  details,  and  a 
man  of  great  powers  of  endurance.  He  could  remain  at  his  post 
for  nights  in  succession  without  sleep ;  his  discipline  was  kind  but 
inflexible,  and  his  judgment  almost  infallible. 

After  retiring  from  the  service  he  became  General  Superin 
tendent  of  the  Cleveland  &  Pittsburg  Railroad,  and  was  one  day 
surprised  by  the  visit  of  a  committee  who  tendered  him  the  Presi 
dency  of  an  important  line  of  railroad  centering  in  Cleveland, 
with  a  salary  of  $25,000  per  annum  and  a  bonus,  in  addition,  of 
$100,000.  This  position  he  accepted  and  retained  until  his  death, 
recognized  as  one  of  the  leading  railroad  men  of  the  country. 

While  connected  with  the  Military  Railroads,  he  managed  the 
transportation  on  the  roads  centering  in  Alexandria,  and  a  more 
efficient  Superintendent  could  not  have  been  found. 

As  a  churchman  he  was  usually  one  of  the  lay  delegates  in 
Episcopal  conventions  and  took  a  prominent  part  in  their 
discussions. 

ADNA  ANDERSON. — General  Anderson  was  another  individual 
with  whom  I  had  no  acquaintance  until  after  my  connection  with 
the  Military  Railroads.  He  was  quiet  and  taciturn,  and  although 


314  REMINISCENCES   OF 

I  saw  him  frequently  as  I  passed  through  the  office,  we  seldom 
spoke  to  each  other,  and  I  took  but  little  notice  of  him. 

One  day  Devereux  said  to  me :  "Do  not  be  offended  at  the 
liberty  I  propose  to  take,  but  I  have  observed  that  you  have  little 
or  nothing  to  say  to  Anderson.  You  do  not  know  him.  If  you 
would  cultivate  him.  you  would  find  him  to  be  a  very  superior 
man." 

I  did  cultivate  him  from  that  time  and  did  find  him  to  be 
very  superior.  He  was  not  only  an  able,  intelligent  and  scientific 
civil  engineer,  but  also  thoroughly  familiar  with  all  details  of 
transportation  and  accounts. 

I  gave  him  charge  of  the  Construction  Corps  as  Chief  Engi 
neer.,  and  whenever  there  wras  any  duty  to  perform  requiring 
prompt  action,  energy  and  sound  judgment,  Anderson  was  the 
man  above  all  others  that  I  called  upon  to  assume  the  charge.  He 
it  was  who  managed  the  transportation  so  successfully  over  the 
Western  Maryland  Railroad  during  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  and 
he  had  charge  of  the  Construction  Corps  during  Sherman's  cele 
brated  campaign,  although  Sherman  probably  did  not  know  him 
and  did  not  give  him  credit  for  the  results  to  which  his  own 
success  and  reputation  were  largely  due. 

After  the  war  I  saw  but  little  of  Anderson  until  1881,  when 
we  were  again  brought  into  contact  on  the  Northern  Pacific  Rail 
road.  He  was  Chief  Engineer  of  Construction,  and  I  the  General 
Manager  of  Transportation. 

WILLIAM  W  WEIGHT. — William  W.  Wright  had  been  my 
pupil  at  Gettysburg  in  mathematics  and  engineering,  and  my 
Assistant  Engineer  on  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  where  his 
intelligence,  activity  and  efficiency  gave  me  great  satisfaction. 
Knowing  him  to  be  the  man  for  the  place,  I  gave  him  charge  of 
the  transportation  on  the  Acquia  Creek  &  Fredericksburg  Rail 
road,  which  \vas  well  managed. 

He  accompanied  General  Sherman  in  his  march  to  the  sea, 
and  managed  the  transportation  on  the  whole  system  of  Military 
Railroads  used  in  that  memorable  campaign,  securing  results 
which,  considering  the  difficulties  encountered,  were  truly 
marvelous. 

General  Sherman  has  referred  to  Wright  in  his  Memoirs  in 
terms  of  the  highest  commendation,  but  T  regret  that  he  overlooked 
Anderson  and  Smeed,  without  whose  efficient  service  in  construc 
tion  no  transportation  could  have  been  effected :  but  these  gentle 
men  were  in  the  field,  and  at  a  distance,  and  did  not  come  under 
the  eye  of  the  General  in  command,  while  Wright  spent  much  of 
his  time  at  Headquarters,  and  an  opportunity  was  offered  for 
better  acquaintance. 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  317 

E.  C.  SMEED. — I  may  be  considered  extravagant  in  the  strong 
expressions  of  commendation  I  have  used  in  regard  to  members  of 
my  staff  in  the  Construction  and  Transportation  Corps  of  the 
Military  Railroads,  but  amongst  them  all  Smeed  is  the  man  whom 
I  most  delight  to  honor,  and  especially  so  as  Generals  Sherman 
and  McCallum,  while  making  favorable  mention  of  others,  have 
omitted  entirely  the  man  whom  I  consider  most  worthy  of  especial 
notice. 

Before  the  war  Smeed  held  a  subordinate  position  on  the 
Catawissa  Eailroad  in  Pennsylvania  as  a  Eoad  Supervisor,  in 
charge  of  bridges  and  trestles.  He  came  to  Virginia  in  the  employ 
of  Daniel  Stone  as  a  foreman  of  carpenters,  and  was  with  a 
number  of  others  assigned  to  me  when  I  commenced  work  on  the 
Fredericksburg  Railroad. 

He  attracted  my  attention  by  the  manner  in  which  he  handled 
his  men,  and  at  the  Potomac  Creek  bridge  I  placed  him  in  general 
charge  of  all  the  gangs.  He  was  the  best  organizer  of  work  I  ever 
saw,  possessed  unlimited  resources  in  adopting  expedients  to  secure 
rapid  progress. 

If  he  could  not  get  the  material  he  wanted,  he  would  use  what 
he  could  get.  If  trees  or  buildings  were  near,  he  would  never 
delay  work  to  wait  for  transportation.  • 

A  spirit  of  emulation  was  encouraged  in  his  gangs,  and  they 
would  rival  each  other  to  secure  the  greatest  daily  progress. 
Without  Smeed  I  never  would  have  been  able  to  build  the 
Potomac  Creek  bridge  in  the  space  of  time  which  General 
McDowell  thought  so  wonderful  a  performance. 

Smeed  was  a  man  without  education,  reserved,  diffident  and 
slow  to  make  the  acquaintance  of  strangers,  but  he  was  a  close 
student  and  in  time  became  an  expert  mathematician,  and  able  to 
make  the  most  intricate  calculations  on  the  strains  of  bridges  and 
trusses. 

Srneed's  inventive  genius  produced  the  simple,  portable  and 
efficient  apparatus  which  destroyed  track  and  twisted  rails  so  they 
could  not  be  again  used,  and  it  was  chiefly  through  Smeed's  efforts, 
working  night  and  day,  through  rain  or  sunshine,  that  the 
numerous  bridges  on  the  Northern  Central  and  Gettysburg  Rail 
roads  were  reconstructed  in  about  five  days,  and  General  Meade 
placed  in  communication  with  Washington,  both  by  rail  and  tele 
graph,  on  the  very  next  day  after  Lee's  retreat — a  result  which, 
Meade  told  me,  he  had  not  believed  possible  for  two  weeks. 

Smeed  accompanied  General  Sherman's  army  in  his  march  to 
the  sea,  and  had  charge  of  bridge  construction.  The  Trumpet  of 
Fame  has  never  published  his  exploits  of  that  period.  I  never  saw 
them  noticed  in  bulletins,  or  by  the  press,  but  his  Chattahoochee 


318  REMINISCENCES   OF 

bridge  is  the  greatest  feat  of  the  kind  that  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

Without  Smeed,  Sherman's  military  railroads  could  not  have 
been  reconstructed  with  the  celerity  with  which  the  work  was 
accomplished.  Without  the  roads,  there  could  have  been  no  trans 
portation  of  supplies;  without  supplies  the  army  could  not  have 
moved  in  the  enemy's  country  and  the  campaign  would  have  been 
a  failure.  Let  Smeed  have  the  credit  that  is  due  to  him. 

After  the  war,  by  force  of  merit,  Smeed  raised  himself  to  a 
high  position  ;  became  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Kansas  Pacific  Rail 
road,  where  Jay  Gould  discovered  his  value.  I  tried  to  get  him 
with  me  on  the  Northern  Pacific,  but  Gould  bid  $4,000  per  year 
higher  than  I  could  bid  and  I  had  to  let  him  stay. 

Such  were  the  men  who  formed  my  staff  on  the  Military  Rail 
roads,  and  to  whom  the  merit  of  results  was  largely  due.  If  I  can 
claim  credit  for  myself,  it  is  chiefly  in  discovering  their  qualifi 
cations,  and  in  placing  them  in  positions  to  render  them  available. 

There  were  others,  and  many  others,  worthy  of  mention,  but 
I  cannot  refer  to  them  individually.  There  was  G.  W.  Nagle  and 
his  three  brothers,  George  Speer  and  other  bridge  foremen,  each 
with  his  own  permanent  gang;  men  who  could  run  on  planks  on 
tops  of  high  trestles  with  the  agility  of  squirrels.  There  was 
Tinglepaugh,  who  managed  the  drove  of  oxen — ^"Ilaupt's  horned 
cavalry"  as  they  were  called — whose  services  were  invaluable. 

Many  of  the  conductors  had  been  brought  by  Thomas  A. 
Scott,  when  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  from  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad.  Some  of  them  had  been  appointed  by  me  when  I  was 
General  Superintendent  of  the  road,  and  a  more  efficient  set  of 
men  could  not  have  been  found. 

The  train  dispatchers  and  operators  were  also  entitled  to 
much  credit.  They  occupied  advanced  positions  near  the  enemy 
to  report  his  movements  and  held  positions  after  the  military  had 
retired  until  nearly  surrounded,  then  escaped  through  the  bushes. 
One  of  the  most  efficient  (McCrickett)  was  killed  by  guerrillas. 
The  engine  on  which  he  was  riding  was  switched  off  the  track  on 
a  high  embankment  by  means  of  a  telegraph  wire  attached  to  a 
rail  and  pulled  by  men  concealed  in  a  thicket.  Several  others  were 
killed  at  the  same  time. 

Engineers  and  firemen  were  so  often  fired  upon  that  it  became 
necessary  to  use  boiler  plate  cabs  for  their  protection,  but  they 
never  hesitated  to  perform  a  duty,  and  volunteers  could  always  be 
found  for  extra-hazardous  risks,  of  which  there  were  many. 

Most  of  these  men  have  gone  to  their  rest  unhonored  and 
unknown,  but  their  fidelity  and  sacrifices  entitle  them  to  as  much 
consideration  as  those,  who,  occupying  higher  positions,  were  more 


GENERAL  HERMAN  HAUPT.  319 

conspicuous  marks  for  public  favor.  There  is  one  at  least,  who 
can  appreciate  their  services  and  who  takes  pride  in  doing  justice 
to  their  memory. 

They  wrought  night  and  day  without  intermission  when  a 
necessity  for  such  service  existed ;  they  knew  just  what  to  do  and 
how  to  do  it;  they  laid  track  and  built  bridges  at  night  by  the 
light  of  lanterns,  uttering  no  complaint,  and  defying  storms  and 
dangers. 

With  the  exception  of  the  superior  officers  and  the  foremen, 
the  Construction  Corps  consisted  almost  entirely  of  so-called 
"contrabands/'  Thousands  of  these  refugees  had  nocked  into 
Washington,  and  from  them  were  selected  several  hundred  healthy, 
able-bodied  men  familiar  with  the  use  of  the  ax.  These  Africans 
worked  with  enthusiasm,  and  each  gang  with  a  laudable  emulation 
to  excel  others  in  the  progress  made  in  a  given  time. 

In  rebuilding  to  restore  communications,  permanency  was 
not  considered.  Tt  was  not  a  question  of  months,  or  of  weeks,  as 
in  erecting  permanent  structures,  but  one  of  hours. 

The  Potomac  Creek  bridge  was  reconstructed,  as  General 
McDowell  declared,  in  as  many  days  as  the  former  structure, 
which  it  replaced,  had  required  months,  and  yet  for  all  the 
purposes  of  the  campaign  it  was  just  as  useful.  The  nineteen 
bridges  destroyed  by  the  enemy  on  the  Northern  Central  Railroad 
were  rebuilt  in  a  few  days,  and  all  the  bridges  on  the  branches 
leading  to  Gettysburg  were  reconstructed  during  the  battle, 
communication  with  Washington  being  re-established  by  noon  of 
the  day  after  Lee'*s  retreat! 

While  Generals  who  fought  the  battles  have  been  eulogized 
and  costly  statues  erected  to  their  memories,  the  humble  Corps, 
through  whose  fidelity  and  efficiency  victories  were  rendered 
possible,  have  found  no  historian  to  do  them  honor. 

If  there  ever  should  be  recognition  of  their  great  services,  the 
faithful  contrabands  will  be  justly  entitled  to  their  share;  no 
other  class  of  men  would  have  exhibited  so  much  patience  and 
endurance  under  days  and  nights  of  continued  and  sleepless  labor. 


APPENDIX. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON,  July  26,  1861. 
To  the  Officers  U.S.  A.: 

Please  furnish,  upon  requisitions  from  A.  Carnejie,*  Superin 
tendent  in  charge  of  railways,  such  facilities,  rations,  etc.,  as  he  may 
desire  for  the  forces  under  his  charge. 

THOMAS  A.  SCOTT, 
General  Manager  Government  Railways  and  Telegraphs. 

AN  ACT  to  authorize  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  certain 
cases  to  take  possession  of  railroad  and  telegraph  lines,  and  for 
other  purposes. 

Be  it  enacted  ly  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  when  in  his  judgment  the  public  safety  may 
require  it,  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  to  take  possession  of  any  or 
all  the  telegraph  lines  in  the  United  States,  their  offices  and  appur 
tenances;  to  take  possession  of  any  or  all  the  railroad  lines  in  the 
United  States,  their  rolling  stock,  their  offices,  shops,  buildings,  and 
all  their  appendages  and  appurtenances;  to  prescribe  rules  and  regula 
tions  for  the  holding,  using,  and  maintaining  of  the  aforesaid  telegraph 
and  railroad  lines,  and  to  extend,  repair,  and  complete  the  same,  in 
the  manner  most  conducive  to  the  safety  and  interest  of  the  Govern 
ment;  to  place  under  military  control  all  the  officers,  agents,  and 
employes  belonging  to  the  telegraph  and  railroad  lines  thus  taken 
possession  of  by  the  President,  so  that  they  shall  be  considered  as  a 
post  road  and  a  part  of  the  military  establishment  of  the  United 
States,  subject  to  all  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Rules  and  Articles 
of  War. 

SEC.  2.  And  be  it  further  enacted,  That  any  attempt  by  any  party 
or  parties  whomsoever,  in  any  State  or  District  in  which  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  are  opposed,  or  the  execution  thereof  obstructed  by  insur 
gents  and  rebels  against  the  United  States,  too  powerful  to  be  suppressed 
by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings,  to  resist  or  interfere  with 
the  unrestrained  use  by  Government  of  the  property  described  in  the 
preceding  section,  or  any  attempt  to  injure  or  destroy  the  property 
aforesaid,  shall  be  punished  as  a  military  offense,  by  death,  or  such 
other  penalty  as  a  court  martial  may  impose. 

SEC.  3.  And  be  it  further  enacted,  That  three  commissioners  shall 
be  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  assess  and  determine  the  damages 
suffered,  or  the  compensation  to  which  any  railroad  or  telegraph 

*  Andrew  Carnegie,  the  great  ironmaster  and  philanthropist. 

320 


APPENDIX.  321 

company  may  be  entitled  by  reason  of  the  railroad  or  telegraph  line 
being  seized  and  used  under  the  authority  conferred  by  this  act,  and 
their  award  shall  be  submitted  to  Congress  for  their  action. 

SEC.  4.  And  ~be  it  further  enacted,  That  the  transportation  of 
troops,  munitions  of  war,  equipments,  military  property  and  stores, 
throughout  the  United  States,  shall  be  under  the  immediate  control 
and  supervision  of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  such  agents  as  he  may 
appoint;  and  all  rules,  regulations,  articles,  usages,  and  laws  in 
-conflict  with  this  provision  are  hereby  annulled. 

SEC.  5.  And  l>e  it  further  enacted,  That  the  compensation  of 
each  of  the  commissioners  aforesaid,  shall  be  eight  dollars  per  day 
while  in  actual  service;  and  that  the  provisions  of  this  act,  so  far  as 
it  relates  to  the  operating  and  using  said  railroads  and  telegraphs, 
shall  not  be  in  force  any  longer  than  is  necessary  for  the  suppression 
•of  this  rebellion. 

Approved  January  31,  1862. 

[EXTRACT  FROM  GENERAL  D.  C.  MCCALLUM'S  FINAL  REPORT.] 

v/ 

With  few  exceptions,  the  operations  of  the  Military  Railroads 
have  beon  conducted  under  orders  issued  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  or 
"by  army  commanders  in  the  field. 

During  February,  1862,  I  received  the  following  important  verbal 
order  from  the  Secretary  of  War:  "I  shall  expect  you  to  have  on  hand 
at  all  times  the  necessary  men  and  materials  to  enable  you  to  comply 
promptly  with  any  order  given,  nor  must  there  ~be  any  failure" 

It  was  made  the  duty  of  the  Director  and  General  Manager  to 
arrange  the  Military  Railroad  oganization  upon  a  basis  sufficiently 
comprehensive  to  permit  the  extension  of  the  system  indefinitely;  to 
perfect  the  modus  operandi  for  working  the  various  lines;  to  determine 
as  to  the  number  of  men  to  be  employed  in  the  several  departments, 
and  the  compensation  to  be  paid  therefor;  the  amount  and  kind  of 
machinery  to  be  purchased,  and  the  direction  as  to  the  distribution  of 
the  same. 

Having  had  a  somewhat  extensive  railroad  experience,  both  before 
and  since  the  Rebellion,  I  consider  this  order  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  have  been  the  very  foundation  of  success;  without  it  the  whole 
railroad  system,  which  has  proved  an  importont  element  in  con- 
•ducting  military  movements,  would  have  been  not  only  a  costly  but 
ludicrous  failure.  The  fact  should  be  understood  that  the  management 
of  railroads  is  just  as  much  a  distinct  profession  as  is  that  of  the  art 
•of  war,  and  should  be  so  regarded. 

The  difficulty  of  procuring  a  sufficient  force  of  competent  railroad 
men,  both  in  the  construction  and  transportation  departments,  was 
almost  insurmountable.  Owing  to  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  service 
and  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  railroad  system,  the  supply  of  railroad 
operatives  in  the  country  has  always  been  limited ;  many  had  entered  the 
army  in  various  positions,  thus  diminishing  the  actual  number  in  civil 
life,  while  the  stimulus  imparted  by  the  war  to  the  business  of  Northern 
railroads  had  greatly  enhanced  the  value  of  the  services  of  those  who 
remained  at  their  posts,  thus  rendering  the  home  demand  for  skillful 
labor  far  in  advance  of  the  supply.  When  the  large  number  of  men 
necessary  to  equip  these  military  lines  were  sought  for,  it  was  extremely 
difficult  to  induce  those  who  were  really  valuable  to  leave  secure  positions 
enter  upon  a  new  and  untried  field  of  action. 


322  APPENDIX. 

The  difference  between  civil  and  military  railroad  service  is 
marked  and  decided.  Not  only  were  the  men  continually  exposed  to 
great  danger  from  the  regular  forces  of  the  enemy,  guerrillas,  scouting 
parties,  etc.,  but,  owing  to  the  circumstances  under  which  military 
railroads  must  be  constructed  and  operated,  what  are  considered  the 
ordinary  risks  upon  civil  railroads  are  vastly  increased  on  military  lines. 

The  hardships,  exposure,  and  perils  to  which  trainmen  especially 
were  subjected  during  the  movements  incident  to  an  active  campaign 
were  much  greater  than  that  endured  by  any  other  class  of  civil 
employes  of  the  Government — equalled  only  by  that  of  the  soldier  while 
engaged  in  a  raid  into  the  enemy's  country.  It  was  by  no  means 
unusual  for  men  to  be  out  witli  their  trains  from  five  to  ten  days, 
without  sleep>  except  what  could  be  snatched  upon  their  engines  and 
cars  while  the  same  were  standing  to  be  loaded  or  unloaded,  with  but 
scanty  food,  or  perhaps  no  food  at  all,  for  days  together,  while  con 
tinually  occupied  in  a  manner  to  keep  every  faculty  strained  to  its 
utmost.  Many  incidents  during  the  war,  but  more  especially  during 
the  Atlanta  campaign,  exhibited  a  fortitude,  endurance,  and  self- 
devotion  on  the  part  of  these  men  not  exceeded  in  any  branch  of  the 
service.  All  were  thoroughly  imbued  with  the  fact  that  upon  the 
success  of  railroad  operations,  in  forwarding  supplies  to  the  front, 
depended,  in  great  part,  the  success  of  our  armies ;  that  although  defeat 
might  be  the  result,  even  if  supplies  were  abundantly  furnished,  it  was 
evident  there  could  be  no  advance  without;  and  I  hazard  nothing  in 
saying,  that  should  failure  have  taken  place  either  in  keeping  the  lines 
in  repair  or  in  operating  them,  General  Sherman's  campaign,  instead 
of  proving,  as  it  did,  a  great  success,  would  have  resulted  in  disaster 
and  defeat;  and  the  greater  the  army  to  supply  the  more  precarious 
its  position.  Since  the  end  of  the  rebellion  I  have  been  informed  by 
railroad  officers  who  were  in  the  service  of  the  enemy  during  the  war, 
"that  they  were  less  surprised  at  the  success  of  General  Sherman,  in  a 
military  point  of  view,  than  they  were  at  the  rapidity  with  which  rail 
road  breaks  were  repaired  and  the  regularity  with  which  trains  were 
moved  to  the  front;"  and  it  was  only  when  the  method  of  operating 
was  fully  explained  that  it  could  be  comprehended. 

The  attempt  to  furnish  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand 
(100,000)  men  and  sixty  thousand  (60,000)  animals  with  supplies  from 
a  base  three  hundred  and  sixty  (360)  miles  distant,  by  one  line  of 
single-track  railroad,  located  almost  the  entire  distance  through  the 
country  of  an  active  and  most  vindictive  enemy,  is  without  precedent 
in  the  history  of  warfare,  and  to  make  it  successful  required  an  enor 
mous  outlay  for  labor  and  a  vast  consumption  of  material,  together 
with  all  the  forethought,  energy,  patience,  and  watchfulness  of  which 
men  are  capable. 

This  line,  from  the  fact  of  its  great  length,  was  imperfectly 
guarded,  as  troops  could  not  be  spared  from  the  front  for  that  purpose. 
This  rendered  the  railroad  service  one  of  great  risk  and  hazard,  and 
at  times  it  was  only  by  the  force  of  military  authority  that  men  could 
be  held  to  service.  As  an  item  showing  the  real  danger  attending 
military  railroad  operations,  it  may  be  stated  that  during  the  last  six 
months  of  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1865,  the  wrecking  train 
picked  up  and  carried  to  Nashville  sixteen  (16)  wrecked  locomotives 
and  two  hundred  and  ninety-four  (294)  car-loads  of  car  wheels,  bridge 
iron,  etc.  These  wrecks  were  caused  by  guerrillas  and  rebel  ra.ids. 


APPENDIX.  323 

The  Chattanooga  &  Atlanta,  or  Western  &  Atlantic  Kailroad 
extends  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta,  136  miles,  with  a  branch  from 
Kingston  to  Rome  seventeen  miles  long. 

The  reconstruction  and  maintenance  of  this  line  was,  in  many 
respects,  the  most  difficult  of  any  military  railroad  operations  during 
the  war.  By  it  the  Confederate  army  under  General  Johnston  made 
its  retreat  from  Buzzard  Roost  to  Atlanta;  and  in  falling  back  from 
one  strong  position  to  another  it  did  such  damage  to  the  road  as  was 
supposed  would  delay  or  prevent  Sherman's  pursuit,  but  in  this  it  was 
unsuccessful.  However  great  the  damage  done,  it  was  so  speedily 
repaired  that  General  Sherman  soon  ceased  to  fear  any  delay  from  this 
cause,  and  made  his  advance  movements  with  perfect  confidence  that 
the  railroad  in  his  rear  would  be  "all  right." 

Being,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  entirely  ignorant  of  the 
obstacles  to  be  encountered  at  each  advance,  the  construction  force  was 
at  all  times  prepared  for  any  emergency — either  to  build  bridges  of 
formidable  dimensions,  or  lay  miles  of  track,  or,  perhaps,  push  back  to 
some  point  on  the  line  and  repair  damages  done  by  guerrillas  or  raiding 
parties.  These  attacks  on  the  line  to  the  rear  were  of  such  frequent 
occurrence,  and  often  of  so  serious  a  character,  that  to  insure  speedy 
repairs  it  became  necessary  to  station  detachments  of  the  Construction 
Corps  at  various  points  along  the  road,  and  also  to  collect  supplies  of 
construction  materials,  such  as  iron,  rails,  chairs,  spikes,  cross-ties,  and 
bridge  timber,  at  points  where  they  would  be  comparatively  safe  and 
easily  obtained  when  required.  These  precautionary  measures  proved 
to  be  of  the  utmost  importance  in  keeping  the  road  open. 

The  detachments  stationed  along  the  line  were  composed  of  bridge- 
builders  and  track-layers,  with  an  ample  supply  of  tools  for  all  kinds  of 
work.  Each  detachment  was  under  the  command  of  a  competent 
engineer  or  supervisor,  who  had  orders  to  move  in  either  direction, 
within  certain  limits,  as  soon  as  a  break  occurred,  and  make  the  neces 
sary  repairs  without  delay,  working  day  and  night  when  necessary. 
Under  this  arrangement  small  breaks  were  repaired  at  once,  at  any 
point  on  the  line,  even  when  the  telegraph  wires  were  cut  and  special 
orders  could  not  be  communicated  to  the  working  parties.  When  "big 
breaks"  occurred,  one  or  more  divisions  of  the  Construction  Corps  were 
moved  as  rapidly  as  possible  thereto,  either  from  Chattanooga  or  the 
front.  Construction  trains,  loaded  with  the  requisite  tools  and  materials, 
were  kept  ready  at  each  end  of  the  road  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice. 

Guerrillas  and  raiding  parties  were  more  or  less  successful  in 
destroying  portions  of  track  during  the  whole  time  we  held  this  line; 
but  the  crowning  effort  was  made  by  the  enemy  in  October,  1864,  when 
Hood,  getting  to  Sherman's  rear,  threw  his  whole  army  on  the  road — 
first  at  Big  Shanty,  and  afterward  north  of  Resaca — and  destroyed  in 
the  aggregate  thirty-five  and  one-half  miles  of  track  and  455  lineal  feet 
of  bridges,  killing  and  capturing  a  large  number  of  our  men. 
Fortunately,  however,  the  detachments  of  the  Construction  Corps  which 
escaped  were  so  distributed  that  even  before  Hood  had  left  the  road  two 
strong  working  parties  were  at  work,  one  on  each  end  of  the  break  at 
Big  Shanty,  and  this  gap  of  ten  miles  was  closed  and  the  force  ready 
to  move  to  the  great  break  of  twenty-five  miles  in  length  north  of 
Resaca  as  soon  as  the  enemy  had  left  it.  The  destruction  by  Hood's 
army  of  our  depots  of  supplies  compelled  us  to  cut  nearly  all  the  cross- 
ties  required  to  re-lay  this  track,  and  to  send  a  distance  for  rails. 


324  APPENDIX. 

The  cross-ties  were  cut  near  the  line  of  the  road,  and  many  of  them 
carried  by  hand  to  the  track,  as  the  teams  to  be  furnished  for  hauling 
them  did  not  get  to  the  work  until  it  was  nearly  completed.  The  rails 
used  on  the  southern  end  of  the  break  had  to  be  taken  up  and  brought 
from  the  railroads  south  of  Atlanta,  and  those  for  the  northern  end  were 
mostly  brought  from  Nashville,  nearly  two  hundred  miles  distant. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  disadvantages  under  which  the  labor  was 
performed,  this  twenty-five  miles  of  track  was  laid  and  the  trains  were 
running  over  it  in  seven  and  a  half  days  from  the  time  the  work  was 
commenced. 

The  economy  so  commendable  and  essential  upon  civil  railroads 
was  compelled  to  give  way  to  the  lavish  expenditure  of  war;  and  the 
question  to  be  answered  was  not,  "How  much  will  it  cost?"  but  rather, 
"Can  it  be  done  at  any  cost?" 

The  greatest  number  of  men  employed  at  the  same  date  during 
the  war  was : 

In  Virginia 4.542 

In  North  Carolina 3,387 

In  military  division  of  the  Mississippi 17,035 

Total  number  of  men 24,964 

The  total  number  of  miles  operated. 

In  Virginia 611 

In  North  Carolina 293 

In  military  division  of  the  Mississippi 1,201 

Total    2,105 

The  number  of  engines. 

In  Virginia 72 

In  North  Carolina 38 

In  military  division  of  the  Mississippi 260 

In  Georgia   14 

Provided  but  not  used 35 


Total    419 

The  number  of  cars. 

In  Virginia 1,733 

In  North  Carolina 422 

In  military  division  of  the  Mississippi 3,383 

In  Georgia   * 213 

Provided  but  not  used . .  579 


Total    6,330 

Lineal  feet  of  bridges  built  or  rebuilt. 

In  Virginia 34,931 

In  North  Carolina 3,263 

In  Missouri 1,680 

In  military  division  of  the  Mississippi 97,544 

Total  number  of  feet 137,418 

Or  twenty-six  miles  and  one  hundred  and  thirty-eight  feet. 

The  length  of  trade  laid  or  relaid. 

Miles.  Feet. 

In  Virginia 177  2,961 

In  North  Carolina 30  4,632 

In  mil'tary  division  of  the  Mississippi 433  2,323 

Total    641  4,636 


APPENDIX.  325 

The  following  statement  exhibits  the  amount  expended  during  the 
war  in  constructing  and  operating  the  United  States  Military  Railroads, 
said  sum  having  been  furnished  from  the  appropriation  made  for  the 
expenditures  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department: 

Virginia. 

For  labor $5,227,145  24 

For  materials   4,920,317  27 

$10,147,462  51 

North  Carolina. 

For  labor 1,086,224  60 

For  materials   1,510,435  45 

2,596,660  05 

Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 

For  labor 16,792,193  05 

For  materials   1 2,870,588  06 

-     29,662,78111 

Department  of  the  Gulf. 
For  materials 55,238  88 


Total    .................................................      42,462,142  55 

Property  sold  under  Executive  Order  of  August  8,  1865     7,428,204  96 
Property  sold  for  cash  ..............  ..............      3,466,739  33 

Receipts  from  passengers  and  freight  ...............      1,525,493  04 

Receipts  from  hire  of  rolling  stock  .................         103,528  50 

Property  on  hand   (estimated)  .....................         100,000  00 


Net  expenditures   .......................................   $29,838,176  72 

It  was  impossible  for  this  Department  to  keep  an  accurate  account 
of  the  persons  and  material  transported,  as  whole  corps  and  even  armies, 
with  all  their  artillery  and  equipments,  were  moved  upon  verbal  orders 
from  commanders  sometimes  hundreds  of  miles,  and  frequently  in  face 
of  the  enemy.  As  an  illustration,  one  of  the  largest  movements  of  this 
character  was  that  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps  in  1865,  from  Carter's 
Station,  in  East  Tennessee,  to  Nashville,  three  hundred  and  seventy- 
three  (373)  miles,  and  which  employed  one  thousand  four  hundred  and 
ninety-eight  (1,498)  cars. 

In  conclusion  permit  me  to  say  that  the  Government  was  peculiarly 
fortunate  in  securing  the  services  of  civilian  officers  of  great  nerve, 
honesty,  and  capability,  to  whom  the  whole  country  owes  a  debt  of 
gratitude. 

Among  them  I  take  the  liberty  of  naming,  as  principal  assistants  : 
A.  Anderson,  Chief  Superintendent  and  Engineer;  Colonel  W.  W. 
Wright,  Chief  Engineer  in  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
and  Chief  Engineer  and  General  Superintendent  in  the  Department  of 
North  Carolina;  J.  J.  Moore,  General  Superintendent  and  Chief  Engi 
neer  of  Kailroads  in  Virginia;  E  .  L.  Wentz,  General  Superintendent 
and  Chief  Engineer  of  Eailroads  in  Virginia,  and  afterward  for  a  time 
General  Superintendent  of  Railroads  in  the  Division  of  the  Mississippi  ; 
W.  J.  Stevens,  General  Superintendent  of  United  States  Military  Rail 
roads,  Division  of  the  Mississippi;  L.  H.  Eicholtz,  Acting  Chief 
Engineer,  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  during  the  absence  of 
Colonel  W.  W.  Wright  in  North  Carolina;  A.  F.  Goodhue,  Engineer 
and  Superintendent  Military  Railroads,  West  Tennessee  and  Arkansas. 
Also  the  following  commissioned  officers  :  Brevet  Brigadier-  General  H* 


326  APPENDIX. 

L.  Robinson,  Acting  Quartermaster,  Washington,  D.  C. ;    Brevet  Major 

F.  J.  Crilly,  Acting  Quartermaster,  Nashville,  Tennessee;  and  Captain 

G.  S.  Roper,  Commissary  of  Subsistence,  Nashville,  Tennessee. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

D.  C.  McCALLUM, 
Brevet  Brigadier-General,  Director  and  General  Manager 

Military  Railroads  United  States. 
Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton, 

Secretary  of  War. 


INDEX. 


Anderson,  A.  A.,  185,  213,  216,  236, 

240,  244,  247,  253,  275,  277,  289, 

290,  293,  313,  314,  325. 
Andrew,  Gov.  J.  A.,  xxiii,  xxiv,  xxv, 

xxvi,  xxviii,  xxix,  xxxii,  xxxiii,  43, 

261. 

Appleton  &  Co.,  D.,  xvi. 
Arthur,  Pres.  C.  A.,  224. 
Augur,  Gen.,  63. 

Banks,  Gen.  N.  P.,  xxiii, xxxiii,  50, 76, 
118,  120,  125,  126,  155. 

Barksdale,  Gen.,  223. 

Barnard,  Gen.,  108. 

Barstow,  Capt.  S.,  46,  269. 

Beckwith,  E.  G.,  75. 

Belger,  Q.  M.,  139,  165. 

Benson,  B.  D.,  xxxv. 

Bickford,  104. 

Biddle,  Col.,  47. 

Bird,  Frank,  xxxiii. 

Bollman  truss,  xiv. 

Boyle,  104. 

Boutwell,  Geo.  S.,  xxiv. 

Breck,  S.,  55. 

Brown,  Maj.,  47. 

Bullitt,  J.  C.,  xxvi. 

Bull  Run  (Second  Battle  of)  xxx,  69, 
(bridge)  84,  86,  89,  90,  91,  101, 
(Two  Perilous  Days  at)  116. 

Burnside,  Gen.  A.  E.,  147,  150,  158, 
160,  166,  168,  169,  170,  176,  177, 
178,  179,  180,  183,  184,  185,  187, 
194,  196,  207,  271,  272,  306,  309. 

Butterfield,  Gen.,  194. 

Cameron,  Mr.,  219. 

Cameron,  Simon,  246. 

Carnegie,  Andrew,  320. 

Carroll,  120. 

Cass,  Gen.,  311. 

Campbell,  H.  R,,  xiv. 

Cedar  Mountain,  108. 

Chandler,  Col.,  106. 

Chapin,  C.  W.,  xxi,  xxxiii. 

Chase,  S.  P.,  46. 

Choate.J.  H.,  xxvi. 

Churchill,  123. 

Clark,  John,  279. 

Clarke,  Col.  J.  C.,  120,  156,  293. 

Cleary,  Col.,  115. 


Close,  Col.,  110. 

Clough,  Gen.  J.  B.,  107, 110, 124,  128, 

130,  137,  216,  276. 
Colburn,  Col.  A.  V.,  129,  133,  150, 

153. 

Conrad,  Capt.,  47. 
Conway,  104. 
Couch,  Gen.,  118,  119,  123,  124, 125, 

219,  231,  232,  237,  239,  246. 
County  Commissioners,  Baltimore, 

xxxvi. 
Covodejohn,  43,  55, 177,   264,297, 

306. 
Cox,  Gen.,  74,  79,  84,  86,  93,  96,  98, 

99,  103,  107,  135. 
Cress,  Mrs.  K.  S.,  290. 
Crilly,  Maj.  F.J.,326. 
Cullum,  Gen.  G.  W.,  159,  206,  302. 
Curtin,  Gov.  A.,  137,  211,  235. 

Derbyshire,  A.  J.,  xxii. 

Devereux,  J.H.,56,57,  59,  77,  78,  80, 

83,  84,  86,  95,  104,  105,  109,  110, 

116,  128,  130,  134,  150,  185,  240, 

248,  277,  313,  314. 
Dickson,  S.,  xxvi. 
Du  Barry,  J.N.,  213,  216,  219,  220, 

236,  244. . 

Eads,  J.  B.,  xxxix. 
Early,  Gen.  J.  A.,  213,  214. 
Eicholtz,  Col.  L.  H.,  294,  325. 
Ellet,  Chas.,  xxxii. 
Evarts,  W.  M.,  311. 
Ewell,  Gen.,  115,  213. 

Feaster,  Capt.,  47. 
Ferguson,  93. 
Field,  Cyrus  W.,  xxv. 
Field,  J.  E.,  xxv,  43. 
Field,  S.  T-,  xxv. 
Fifield,  Maj.,  110. 
Fink,  Albert,  xviii,  xxxiv. 
Fink  truss,  xiv. 
Flagg,  120. 
Flower,  F.  A.,  xl. 
Forbes,  F.  H.,  189,  277. 
Ford,  Lieut.,  46. 
Foster,  W.  B.,  xvi. 
Franklin  Institute,  xxxix. 


327 


328 


INDEX. 


Franklin,  Gen.  W.  B.,  74,  107,  110, 

135. 

Fremont,  Gen.  J.  C.,  50. 
French,  Gen.,  232. 
Fry,  Capt.,  221. 
Fulton,  W.  R.,  47. 


Garrett,  J.  W.,  117,  138,  139. 

Geary,  Gen.,  51. 

General  Orders,  (No.  17)  55,  (No.  7) 

67,  (No.  23)  70,  (No.  182)  150,  (No. 
78)  257. 

Gibbon,  Gen.  John,  195. 

Gillespie,  Prof.,  xvi. 

Glascut,  58. 

Gold-spike,  Yillard,  xxxvii. 

Gooch,  D.  W.,  xxvi. 

Goodhue,  A.  F.,  325. 

Gould,  Jay,  318. 

GOY.  Robinson,  xxi. 

Graham,  120. 

Grant,  Gen.  U.  S.,  311. 

Gregg,  Gen.,  148,  247,  251. 

Halleck,  Gen.  H.  W.,  xxxii,  70,74,76, 
77,  78,  79,  80,  83,  87,  88,  89,  90, 
93,  94,  95,  96,  97,  98,  99,  100,  103, 
106,  107,  108,  114,  115,  120,  123, 
124,  125,  126,  127,  128,  136,  139, 
144,  146,  147,  153,  158,  159,  160, 
165, 173,  177,  178,  180,  185,  190, 
204,  205,  206,  207,  208,  212,  214, 
215,221,  224,  227,  228,  230,231, 
232,  235,  237,  238,  240,  243,  246, 
255,  256,  257,  263,  277,  278,  279, 
289,  301,  302,  303,  304,  306,  309. 

Haller,  Col.  G.  O.,  120,  127,  128,129, 
130  133 

Hancock,  Gen.  W.  S.,  94,  95,  99,  105, 
107. 

Hardie,  J.  A.,  260,  261,  262. 

Hardie's  pneumatic  motors,  xxxvi. 

Harker,  Lieut.,  46. 

Harley,  H.,  xxxiv,  xxxv. 

Harter,  Lieut.,  47. 

Harris,  D.,  xxxiii. 

Haupt  &  Co.,  H.,  xxvii,  xxxiii. 

Haupt,  Jacob,  xiii. 

Haupt,  Mrs.  H.,  xxviii. 

Haupt,  Prof.  L.  M.,  xiv. 

Haupt,  Herman,  xiii,  xiv,  xv,xvi,xvii, 
xviii,  xix,  xx,  xxi,  xxii,  xxiii,  xxiv, 
XXY,  xxvi,  (Brig.-Gen.)  xxvii,  xxviii, 
xxix,  xxx, xxxii,  xxxiii,  xxxvi,  xxxvii, 
xl,43,44,  45.  47,  50,  53,  54,  55,  56, 
57,  58,  60,  61,  62,  63,  64,  65,  66, 

68,  69,  70,  71,  72,  73,  74,  75,  76, 
77,  78,  81,  82,  83,  84,  85,  87,  88, 
89,  90,  92,  95,  96,  97,  98,  99,  100, 
101,  102,  103,  104,  105,  106,  107, 


108,  109,  110,  113,  114,  115,  117 
118,  119,  120,  123,  124,  125,  126, 
127,  128,  129,  130,  133,  134,  135, 

136,  137,  138,  143,  144,  145,  146 

147,  150,  153,  154,  155,  156,  159 
160,  163,  164,  165,  166,  167,  168 
169,  173,  176,  178,  179,  185,  189, 
190,  194,  203,  212,  213,  214,  215, 
216,  219,  220,  221,  222,  224  227 
232,  235,  237,  238,  239,  240,  243, 
244,  246,  248,  252,  254,  256  257 
260,  261,  263,  280,  288,  318. 

Heintzelrnan,  74,  78,  79,  80,  85,  93 

137,  138,  154,  252,  312. 
Henry.  Capt.,  47. 

Hill,  Gen.  A.  P.,  115,  213,  221,  231. 

Hoar,  E.  R.,  xxvi. 

Holly,  Birdsall,  xxxviii. 

Holly  Mfg.  Co.,  xxxviii. 

Hood,  Gen.,  323. 

Hook,  W.,  124,  128. 

Hooker,  Gen.  J.,  74,  85,  87,  88,  89, 
90,93,109,113,115,  119,  184,  185, 
187,  188,  193,  194,  195,  204,  205, 
206,  207,  208,  211,  231,  272,  302, 
309. 

Howard,  Gen.  O.  O.,  244,  294. 

Hoyt,  A.  W.,  46. 

Hudson,  S.,  104. 

Humphreys,  A.  A.,  246,  254. 

Hunt,  Gen.,  231. 

Ingalls,  Gen.  R.,  xxxii,  116,  144,  145, 

148,  153,  156,  170,  178,  213,  214, 
215,  216,  239,  240,  244,  245,  246, 
248,  252,  260,  271. 

Irish,  J.  D.,  57,  58,  76,  86,  102,  126. 
Irwin,  Capt.  R.  B.,  138. 

Jackson,  Gen.  "Stonewall,"  xxix,  50, 

55,  74,  110,  115,  120,  230,  306. 
Jackson,  Pres.  Andrew,  xiii. 
Johnson,  R.  L,  115. 
Johnston,  Gen.  J.  E.,  323. 

Kearney,  Gen.  P.,  74,  76,  77,  78,  84, 

85,  87,  88,  89,  113,  237. 
Kelton,  Col.  J.  C.,  160,  302. 
Keller,  Ann  Cecelia,  xiv. 
Keller,  Rev.  Benj.,  xiv. 
Kenly,  Gen.,  140. 
Kennedy,  Lieut.,  47. 
Keyes,  Gen.  E.  D.,  77,  93. 
King,  Gen.  R.,  247,  251. 

Letters  from  * 
Anderson,  Gen.  A.,  247. 
Banks,  Gen.  N.  P.,  120. 
Burnside,  Gen.  A.  E.,  159. 


*  Nearly  all  letters  in  war  time  are  sent  by  telegraph. 


INDEX. 


329 


Letters  from 

Clough,  Gen.J.  B.,  216. 

Colburn,  Col.  A.  V.,  129,  150  153. 

Devereux,  J.  H.,  57,  77,  150,  247, 
248,  252. 

Halleck,  Gen.  H.  W.,  77,  79,  87,  88, 
93,  94,  103,  107,  153,  206,  237, 
240,  243. 

Haller,  Col.  G.  O.,  127. 

Hancock,  Gen.  W.  S.,  95. 

Hardie,  Gen.J.  A.,  261. 

Haupt,  H.,  44,  48,  53,  54,  59,  66, 
76,  77,  78,  79,  80,  84,  85,  86,  87, 
88,  89,  90,  93,  94,  95,  99,  100, 
103,104,  105,  107,  108,  109,110, 
114,115,  117,  118,  119,  120,123, 
124,125,  126,  127,  128,  129,130, 
133,134,  136,  138,  144,  147,150, 
155,156,  158,  163,  164,  166,167, 
168,169, 170,  176,  178,  179,185, 
212,214,  215,  219,  220,  221,227, 
235,238,  239,  240,  243,  244,247, 
251,  262. 

Hooker,  Gen.J.,  204,  206,  207. 

Hudson,  S.,  104. 

Humphreys,  A.  A.,  246,  254. 

Ingalls,  Gen.  R.,  153,  239. 

Irish,  J.  D.,  86,  126. 

Irwin,  Capt.  R.  B.,  138. 

King,  Gen.  R.,  247,  251. 

Lincoln,  Pres.,  100,  104,  108,  114, 
118,119,  124,  184,  204,  205,206, 
232,  246,  247. 

Marcy,  Gen.  R.  B.,  114,  126. 

McCallum,  Gen.  D.  C.,  117,  127, 
216. 

McCrickett,  86,  95,  104,  105,  128, 
130,  134. 

McClellan,Gen.G.B.,  103,  107,109, 
110,119,  120,  123,  129,  146,147. 

McKener,  Col.  C.,  137. 

Meade,Gen.  Geo.  G.,  235,  238,  246. 

Miegs,  Gen.  M.  C.,  216,  243. 

Moore,  J.  J.,  107,  123,  154. 

Painter,  U.  H.,  220. 

Pope,  Gen.,  75,  77,  79,  85,  86,  87, 
88. 

Ruggles,  Gen.  G.  D.,  78,  86. 

Sawtelle,  C.  G.,  246. 

Scott,  Col.  T.  A.,  232,  239. 

Smeed,  E.  C.,  290. 

Stager,  Gen.  A.,  120. 

Stanton,E.M.,44,53,  55,  145,  163, 
220,  264. 

Strein,  C.  M.,  110. 

Sturgis,  Gen.  S.,  87. 

Townsend,  Gen.  E.  D.,  163. 

Watson,  P.  H.,  53,  84,  85,  86,  88, 
90,  114,  127,  128. 

Williams,  Gen.  S.,  123,  124. 


Letters  to 

Anderson,  Gen.  A.,  240,  244. 
Burnside,  Gen.  A.  E.,  158,  166,  168, 

169,  170,  178. 
Cameron,  Simon,  246. 
Clough,  Gen.,  130. 
Colburn,  Col.  A.  V.,  129,  133. 
Devereux,  J.  H.,  77,  78,  86,  95,  104, 

105,  110,  128,  130,  134,  240. 
Du  Barry,  J.  N.,  244. 
Gregg,  Gen.,  247. 
Halleck,  Gen.  H.  W.,  76,  77,  79,  88, 

89,94,95,  99,  100,  103,  104,  107, 

108,109,115,  123,  124,  125,  126, 

128.136.144,  212,  214,  220,  221, 
227,  232,  235,  238,  246. 

Haller,  Col.  G.  O.,  120,  129. 

Haupt,  H.,  44,  53,  54,  57,  76,  77, 
78,  79,  84,  85,  86,  87,  88,  90,  93, 
94,  99,  100,  103,  104,  107,  108, 
109,114,117,  118,  119,  120,  123, 
124,126,127,  128,  129,  130,  137, 

138.139.145,  146,  147,  150,  153, 
154,159,163,  215,  216,  219,  220, 
232,239,243,  246,  247, 248, 251, 
252,  254,  261,  264,  290. 

Heintzelman,  Gen.,  154. 

Hooker,  Gen.J.,  184,  204,205,206. 

Ingalls,  Gen.  R.,214,  239,  240,  244, 

248,  252. 

Kearney,  Gen.  P.,  89. 
King,  Gen.  R.,  251. 
Lincoln,  Pres.,  100,  107,  108,  110, 

115,118,119,  124,  126,  157,  204, 

206. 

Marcy,  Gen.  R.  B.,  126. 
McCrickett,  78,  84,  85,  86,  90,  105, 

120,  124,  130,  133,  134. 
McCallum,  D.  C.,  77,  95,  127,  144, 

216,  244,  252. 
McDowell,  Gen.,  48,  53. 
McClellan,  Gen.  G.  B.,    103,   104, 

107,108,110,  114,  120,  125,  126, 

129,  130,  133,  146. 
Meade,Gen.  Geo.  G.,  237,  240,  243. 
Meigs,  Gen.  M.  C.,   153,  215,  238, 

239,  240,  243. 
Moore,  J.J.,  104,  109. 
Morrell,  D.J.,  243. 
Pope,  Gen.,  76,  78,  79,  80,  85,  88, 

89,  90,  93. 

Rucker,  Gen.  D.  H.,  220. 
Ruggles,  Gen.,  76,  78. 
Smeed,  E.  C.,  244. 
Stager,  Gen.  A.,  104,  120. 
Stanton,  Sec.  Edwin  M.,  44,  49,  54, 

59,  66,  163,  164,  166,  238,  262. 
Strein,  C.  M.,  106,  113. 
Sturgis,  Gen.,  87. 
Thomson,  Col.  A.,  219. 
Tyler,  Gen.,  126,  130. 


330 


INDEX. 


Letters  to 

Watson,  P.  H.,  53,  76,  80,  84,  85, 
88,  89,  90,  117,  118,  124,  127, 
155,  156. 

Wendell,  Col.,  153. 
Williams,  Gen.  S.,  133. 
Wright,  W.  W.,  138,  167,  176,  179, 
219. 

Lampman,  Lieut.,  47. 

Latrobe,  B.  H.,  xiv. 

Lee,  Gen.  R.  E.,  xxxi,  xxxii,  75,  109, 
115,  134,  137,  145,  147,  157,  204, 
205,  208,  211,  212,  213,  221,  223, 
224,  227,  228,  229,  230,  231,  232, 
238,  243,  244,  246,  247,  251,  276, 
303,  310,  319. 

Lee,  Gen.  W.  R.,  xxviii. 

Lincoln,  Pres.,  xxxi,  xxxii,  49,  50,  63, 
75,  87,  96,  97,  100,  104,  107,  108, 
110,  114,  115,  118,  119,  124,  126, 
127,  135,  145,  160,  174,  177,  184, 
194,  195,  204,  205,  206,  207,  224, 
227,  228,  232,  237,  243,  246,  247, 
253,  264,  289,  297,  298,  306,  309. 

Lincoln,  Robt.  T.,  224. 

Lombaert,  H.  J.  xix. 

Longmaid,  S.,  47. 

Longstreet,  Gen.,  115,  212,  213,  221, 
223,  231,  311. 

Lord,  Mr.,  313. 

Lowe,  194. 

Lowell,  Col.,  247. 

McCallum,  Gen.  D.  C.,  44,  54,  58,  77' 
95,  127,  144,  167,  185,  216,  244' 
252,  264,  277,  289,  290,  293,  312, 
313,326. 

McClellan,  Gen.  George  B.,  43,  75, 
87,  97,  98,  99,  103,  104,  105,  106, 
107,  108,  109,  110,  113,  114,  119, 
120,  123,  124,  125,  126,  129,  130, 

133,  134,  136,  137,  138,  140,  144, 
145,146,147,  148,  (relieved)   150, 
153,  154, 155,  156,  157,  158,  180, 
185,  298,  305,  306,  310. 

McDowell,  Gen.  Irvin,  43,  44,  45,  46, 
47,48,49,50,53,  54,  55,  56,  60,  61, 
63,  68,  69,  70,  74,  115,  119,  155, 
156,  174,  185,  228,  264,  269,  271, 
296,  298,  303,  304,  305,  306,  317, 
319. 

McKean,  J.  A.,  xxix. 

McKelvey,  D.,  xxxv. 

McKener,  Col.  C.,  137. 

McCrickett,  84,  85,  86,  90,  95,  98, 
104,  105,  120,  124,  128,  130,  133, 

134,  318. 

McPherson,  E.,  137. 
Marcy,  Gen.  R.  B.,  114,  126. 
Markham,  E.  M.,  113. 

Meade,  Gen.  Geo.  G.,  xiii,  xxxi,  xxxii, 
207,  208,  211,  212,  214,  215,  221, 


223,  224,  227,  228,  229,  231,  232 

235,  236,  337,  238,  239,  240,  243, 

246,  247,  248,  252,  253,  254,  260, 

276,303,  309,  310,  317. 
Meig's  elevated  r.  r.,  xxxviii. 
Meigs,  Gen.  M.  C.,  138,153,160,165, 

169,  180,  189,  215,  216,  238,  239 

240,  243,  245. 
Merrick,  S.  V.,  xvi. 
Merrill,  A.  B.,  xxii. 
Miller,  E.,  xvi. 
Moore,  J.  J.,  104,  105,  106,  107,  109, 

123,  154,  155,  325. 
Moorhead,  Gen.  J.  K.,  46. 
Alorrell,  D.  J.,  240,  243. 
Morris,  Gen.  T.  A.,  xiii. 
Moseby,  Gen.,  148,  251. 


Nagle,  G.  W.,  138,  237,  276,  318. 

Napoleon,  47,  148,  230. 

Nevin,  G.  W.,  244. 

Nevins,  I.  B.,  47. 

Newton,  Gen.,  311. 

Notice  (by  H.  Haupt),  95,  105. 

Ord,  Gen.  E.  O.  C.,  58. 

Order  (by  E.  M.  Stanton),  45,  70, 

159. 
Orders,  General,  (No.  17)  55,    (No  7) 

66,  (No.  23)  70,  (No.  182)  150. 

Painter,  U.  H.,  220. 

Park,  Gen.  J.  G.,  176. 

Passes,  136,  140. 

Patrick,  Gen.  M.  R.,  49,  223. 

Paxton,  Rev.  W.,  174. 

Pennypacker,  Lieut.,  47. 

Pierce,  Col.,  86. 

Pleasanton,  Gen.  A.,  223,  232. 

Plunt,  Capt.,  153. 

Poe,  Gen.,  O.  M.,  199,  294. 

Pond,  Lieut.,  46. 

Pope,  Gen.  John,  xxix,  50,  63,  69, 
70,  73,  74,  75,  76,  77,  78,  79,  80, 
83,  86,  87,  88,  89,  90,  93,  95,  97, 
98, 99, 103, 109, 113, 114,  115,  117, 
118,  119,  120,  129,  134,  135,  139, 
147,  168,  185,  247,  269,  270,  271, 
298,  304,  305. 

Porter,  Gen.  F.J.,  74,  305. 

Potts,  J.  D.,  138,  140. 

Ramsay,  Lieut.,  47. 

Reed,  Rev.  A.,  174. 

Report  of  Gen.  Halleck,  207. 

Report  of  Gen.  H.  Haupt,  45,   139, 

149,  197,  235,  255,  268. 
Report  of  Gen.  McCallum,  321. 
Report  of  Gen.  Pope,  74. 
Reynolds,  Gen.  J.  F.,  74, 137, 309, 310. 


INDEX. 


331 


Richardson,  Gen.,  117. 

Roberts,  B.  S.f  73. 

Robinson  Gen.  H.  L.,  78,  85,  326. 

Robinson,  Gov.,  xxvii. 

Rogers,  Lieut.  E.  M.,  47. 

Roper,  Capt.  G.  S.,  326. 

Rosecrans,  Gen.  W.  S.,  289. 

Rucker,  Gen.  D.  H.,  220. 

Ruggles,  Gen.  G.  D.,  70,  76,  78,   86, 

305. 
Russell,  Capt.  A.J.,  256. 

Sargent  John,  310. 

Sawtelle,  C.  G.,  246. 

Saxton,  Lieut.,  47. 

Scammon,  Col.,  96,  98,  99,  106,  107, 

108,  110. 
Schenck,  Gen.  R.  C.,  212,  213,  214, 

215,  235. 
Scott,  T.  A.,  xx,  211,  212,  213,  231, 

232,  235,  239,  240,  243,  276,  318, 

320. 

Scott,  J.,  124. 
Secretary  of  War,  xxxviii,  45,  53,  54, 

59,  66,  69,  116,  117,  127,  135,  136, 

145,  154,  160,  163,  174,  188,  189, 

190,  193,  208,  215,  227,  235,  238, 

260,  261,  263,  268,  277,  297,  321. 
Sedgwick,  Gen.,  194,  207. 
Seward,  W.  H.,  46. 
Shannon,  Car»t.,  47. 
Sheridan,  Gen.  P.,  199. 
Sherman,  Gen.  W.  T.,  290,  314,  317, 

318,322,323. 
Shields,  Gen.  J.,  49. 
Shoemaker,  S.  M.,  215,  237. 
vSickles,  Gen.  D.   E.,   115,   153,   221, 

236,  276. 
Sigel,  Gen.    P.,   109,  113,   115,    119, 

146. 

Slocum,  Gen.,  94,  95. 
Smeed,  E.   C.,    47,    176,    186,    187, 

193,  199,  237,  244,  271,  276,  289, 

290,294,296,317,318. 
Smith,  Gen.  W.  P.,  94,  95,   99,   106, 

115,  239,  246. 
Smith,  W.  P.,'139,  144. 
Spear,  G.  P.,  47,  318. 
Special  Order,  159,  208. 
Stager,  Gen.  A.,  58,  98,  104,  120. 
Stanton,  Sec.  E.  M.,  xxviii,xxix,xxxi, 

xxxii,  xxxiii,  43,  53,  55,  59,  66,  70, 

87,90,135,145,157,159,  163,  164. 

165,  166,  189,  207,  216,  220,  237, 

238,  262,  264,  267,  268,  289,  301, 

326. 

Stephenson,  Robt.,  xvi. 
Steriger,  J.  B.,  xiii. 
Stevens,  Gen.  74. 


Stevens,  W.  J.,  325. 

Stone,  D.,  45,  46,  53,  54,57,269,317. 

Stoneman,  Gen.,  207. 

Strein,  C.  M.,  106,  113. 

Stuart,  Gen.  J.  E.  B.,  73,  115,   190, 

212. 
Sturgis,  Gen.  S.,  74,  76,  79,  80,  83, 

86,  87,  88,  89,  90,  94,  95,  99,  135, 
Summer,  Gen.,  168. 

Taylor,  Gen.,  96,  98,  103,  104,  105, 

270. 

Taylor,  Mr.,  xxix. 
Thomas,  Chas  ,  238. 
Thomas,  Lieut.,  47. 
Thomson,  Col.  A.,  219. 
Thomson,    John    Edgar,    xvi,     xvii, 

xxxiv. 

Townsend,  Gen.  E.  D.,  163. 
Tyler,  Col.,  103,  104,  120,  126,  130. 

Upperdale,  Lieut.,  47. 

Vanbon, 146. 

Villard  gold-spike,  xxxvii. 

Wadsworth,  Gen.  J.  S.,  68,  127,  156. 

War,  Sec.  of,  xxxviii,  43,  45,  53.  59, 
66,69,116,117,127,135,  136,  145, 
154,  160,  163,  174,  188,  189,  190, 
193,  208,  215,  227,  235,  238,  260, 
261,  263,  268,  277,  297,  321. 

Warren,  Engineer,  253. 

Waterhouse,  120. 

Watson,  P.  H.,  53,  54,  69,  76,  79,  80, 
83,  85,  86,  87,  89,  90,  113,  116, 
117,  118,  125,  127,  128,  155,  156, 
165,  264,301. 

Wellington,  A.  M.,  xviii. 

Wells,  Col  ,  78. 

Wendell,  Col.,  153. 

Wentz,  E.  L.,  277,  293,  325. 

White,  Col.,  99. 

Whiton,  W.  H.,  144,  313. 

Whit  well.  Engineer,  xxiii. 

Wiggins,  199. 

Willard,  J.  C.,  46. 

Williams,  Gen.  S  ,  123,  124,  133,  260. 

Wilson,  Capt.  E.  C.,  138. 

Wise,  H.  A.,  310. 

Wood,  Gen.,  139. 

Wood,  M.  P.,  124. 

Wool,  Gen.  J.  E.,  140. 

Wright,  J.  A.,  137. 

Wright,  W.  W.,  47,  138,  160,  165, 
167,  176,  179,  185,  193,  195,  219, 
244,  271,  277,  289,  293,  294,  314, 
325. 


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